like of another, leads to see danger only on one side, and serves to veil* the arts of influence on the other. Real patriots, who resist the intrigues of the favorite, become suspected and odious. Its tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people to betray their interests.

The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations, ought to be to have as little political connection with them as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with circumspection, indeed, but with perfect good faith; here† let it stop.

Europe has a set of primary interests, which have none or a very remote relation to us. Hence she must be involved in frequent contests, the causes of which will be essentially foreign to us. Hence, therefore, it must necessarily be unwise on our part to implicate ourselves by an artificial connection in the ordinary vicissitudes of European politics-in the combination and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

Our detached and distant situation invites us to a different course, and enables us to pursue it. If we remain a united people, under an efficient government, the period is not distant when we may defy material injury from external annoyance-when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we shall at any time resolve to observe, to be violated with caution -when it will be the interest of belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, to be very careful how either forced us to throw our weight into the opposite scale -when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall dictate.

Why should we forego the advantages of so felicitous a situation? Why quit our own ground to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with any part of Europe, should we entangle our prosperity and peace in the nets of European ambition, rivalship, interest or caprice?

Permanent alliance, intimate connection with any part of the foreign world, is to be avoided; so far, I mean, as we are now at

* and second.

† but there.

liberty to do it; for let me never be understood as patronizing infidelity to pre-existing engagements. These must be observed in their true and genuine sense.* *

Harmony, liberal intercourse, and commerce with all nations, are recommended by justice, humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal hand, neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences-consulting the natural course of things-diffusing and diversifying by gentle means the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing-establishing with powers so disposedt temporary rules of intercourse, the best that present circumstances and mutual opinion of interest will permit, but temporary; and liable to be abandoned or varied, as time, experience, and future circumstances may dictaterememberings that it is folly in one nation to expect disinterested favor in another-that to accept is to part with a portion of its independence, and that it may find itself in the condition of having given equivalents for nominal favors, and of being reproached with ingratitude in the bargain. There can be no greater error in national policy than to desire, expect, or calculate upon real favors. 'Tis an illusion that experience must cure, that a just pride ought to discard.

In offering to you, my countrymen, these counsels of an old and affectionate friend-counsels suggested by laborious reflec tion, and matured by a various experience, I dare not hope that they will make the strong and lasting impressions I wish— that they will control the current of the passions or prevent our nation from running the course which has hitherto marked the destiny of all nations.

But if they may even produce partial benefit, some occasional

* But 'tis not necessary, nor will it be prudent, to extend them. 'Tis our true policy, as a general principle, to avoid permanent or close alliances. Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments in a respectably defensive position, we may safely trust to occasional alliances for extraordinary emergencies.

† In order to give to trade a stable course, to define the rights of our merchants, and enable the government to support them.

and conventional.

always.

any thing under that character.

I may flatter myself.

good... that they sometimes recur to moderate the violence of party spirit-to warn against the evils of foreign intrigue-to guard against the impositions of pretended patriotism—the having offered them, must always afford me a precious consolation.

How far in the execution of my present office I have been guided by the principles which have been recommended,* the public records and the external evidences of my conduct must witness. My conscience assures me that I have at least believed myself to be guided by them.

In reference to the present war of Europe, my proclamation. of the 22d of April, 1793, is the key to my plan, sanctioned by your approving voice, and that of your Representatives in Congress--the spirit of that measure has continually governed meuninfluenced and unawed by the attempts of any of the warring powers, their agents, or partisans, to deter or divert from it.

After deliberate consideration, and the best lights I could obtain (and from men who did not agree in their views of the origin, progress, and nature of that war) I was satisfied that our country, under all the circumstances of the case, had a right and was bound in propriety and interest to take a neutral position. And having taken it, I determined as† should depend on me to maintain it steadily and firmly.‡

Though in reviewing the incidents of my administration, I am unconscious of intentional error-I am yet too sensible of my own deficiencies, not to think it possibles that I have committed many errors-I deprecate the evils to which they may tendand fervently implore the Almighty to avert or mitigate them. I shall carry with me, nevertheless, the hope that my motives. will continue to be viewed by my country with indulgence, and that after forty-five years of my life, devoted with an upright zeal to the public service, the faults of inadequate abilities will be consigned to oblivion, as myself must soon be, to the mansions of rest.

* "inculcated" for "recommended."

† as far as.

Here a large space is found in the draft evidently left for the insertion of other matter.

"probable" for "possible."

Neither ambition nor interest has been the impelling cause of my actions. I never designedly misused any power confided to me. The fortune with which I came into office, is not bettered otherwise than by that improvement in the value of property which the natural progress and peculiar prosperity of our country have produced. I retire with a pure heart, with undefiled hands, and with ardent vows for the happiness of a country, the native soil of myself and progenitors for four generations.

FRANCE.

1796.

There are circumstances which render it too probable, that a very delicate state of things is approaching between the United States and France. When threatened with foreign danger, from whatever quarter, it is highly necessary that we should be united at home; and considering our partiality hitherto for France, it is necessary towards this union, that we should understand what has really been the conduct of that country towards us. It is time for plain truths, which can only be unacceptable to the hirelings or dupes of that nation.

France, in our revolution war, took part with us. At first she afforded us secret and rather scanty succors, which wore more the complexion of a disposition to nourish a temporary disturbance in the dominions of a rival power, than of an intention to second a revolution.

The capture of Burgoyne and his army decided the till then hesitating councils of France, produced the acknowledgment of our independence, and treaties of commerce and defensive alli

* without cause for a blush.

† with no alien sentiment to the ardor of those vows for the happiness of his country, which is so natural to a citizen who sees in it.

ance. These again produced the war which ensued between France and Great Britain.

The co-operation and succor of France after this period was efficient and liberal. They were extremely useful to our cause, and no doubt contributed materially to its success.

1

The primary motives of France for the assistance she gave us, was obviously to enfeeble a hated and powerful rival, by breaking in pieces the British empire. A secondary motive was to extend her relations of commerce in the new world, and to acquire additional security for her possessions there, by forming a connection with this country when detached from Great Britain. To ascribe to her any other motives-to suppose that she was actuated by friendship towards us, or by a regard for our particular advantage, is to be ignorant of the springs of action which invariably regulate the cabinets of princes. He must be a fool, who can be credulous enough to believe, that a despotic court aided a popular revolution, from regard to liberty or friendship to the principles of such a revolution. In forming the conditions upon which France lent her aid, she was too politic to attempt to take any unworthy advantage of our situation. But they are much mistaken who imagine that she did not take care to make a good bargain for herself. Without granting to us any material privilege in any of her external possessions, she secured in perpetuity a right to participate in our trade, on the foot of the most favored nation. But what is far more important, she, in return for the guarantee of our sovereignty and independence, obtained our guarantee of her West India possessions in every future defensive war. This may appear at first sight a mutual and equal advantage, but in its permanent operation it is not so. The guarantee of our sovereignty and independence, which is never likely to be again drawn into question, must hereafter be essentially nominal; while our guarantee of the West India possessions must grow into a solid advantage, increasing in importance as we advance in strength-and exposing us often to the chances of being engaged in wars, in which we may have no direct interest. However this guarantee may be regarded as nominal on our part, in this very early stage of our national