drawn of the danger of Attornies General getting men into corners to pick out their story, and then turn it against them, what could be more fanciful? Who could believe the possibility of the thing? On which of the Law Officers who had filled that station since the evil of Ex-officio Informations was supposed to have grown up, could the imputation of such conduct have been fastened? Would any man say, on Lords Thurlow, or Alvanley, or Loughborough, or the noble lord on the woolsack? The idea was of course utterly unfounded, and the noble lord could not be serious in the supposition. He should now come from the ornamental parts with which the noble lord had enlivened this subject, to the Bill in question. In the first instance, what was the House to do with the third clause of the first Bill? He did not hesitate to assert, that it went to render a great part of the efficiency of the Attorney-General a jest. Did the noble lord know that the method of proceeding against all delinquents in the colonies was by information? And if so, what was to be done with a clause appointing the process to take place within three months from the offence? Why did he know that offences might be committed abroad, not for months, but years, before they could be brought to justice? Did the noble lord hear of the case of Mr. Valentine Jones, who, in the very beginning of his employment abroad, had contrived to cheat Government of 150,000l. and was now, after his imprisonment, under a civil process for refunding 100,000. more. Did he hear of the case of Hunt, who had fled from justice, and did he still talk of three months? This was its effect in colonial and revenue matters: but in others nearer home, in libels for instance, while the effect of the libel was working in the popular mind, while the public were still inflamed, how were the ends of justice to be answered, by bringing the libeller before them in the moment of that heat and inflammation ? No: to do justice, time must be suffered to intervene the general mind must be suffered to cool; and it was by its returning wisdom that the merits of the case were to be decided. He must, from every view of the subject, wonder at the Bill. He begged to be understood not as at all wishing to say any thing offensive to the noble mover, for whose sagacity and research he had great respect. He desired to be understood as perfectly sincere in this, and he congratulated that noble lord and the House on the conduct which had been pursued in the discussion

of the measure before them. He meant no allusion to any difference of conduct before, but took this opportunity of observing, how much temperance of debate added to, at least, the conveniency of the discussion. But no other consideration ought to prevent his saying, that the Bill was decidedly unfit to be entertained by the House. It was of so slight and frivolous a nature, that he should not move its being read this day three months, but its immediate rejection. The imputations upon great Law Officers ought not to be carelessly encouraged. He, in his experience, had not seen one who was not strictly honourable, and utterly above the practices with which the spirit of these motions charged them in general. If there should ever be one base enough to degrade himself, and prostitute his situation to unworthy purposes, let him suffer like any other man-in the name of God, let the land of justice fall heavy upon him; and I, said Lord Ellenborough, I will be the man, under the verdict of a jury, to inflict that justice. 1 now move you that those Bills be rejected.

Lord Erskine agreed with his noble and learned friend in the way in which he had laid down the law upon the present question, but sitting in that House as a Peer of Parliament, as a lawyer, and as a free subject of the realm, he must contend for it, that neither in the letter nor in the spirit of the law or the constitution, was there to be found any thing that, for a moment, justified the principle that had been implied, of putting the office of Attorney-General on a footing with that of a Grand Jury-Hear, hear!) The Constitution never meant to put them on a footing, because the liberty of the subject has not in them the same se curity-(hear, hear!) The one comprehended in it the great principle of trial by his Peers, the other was the servant of the Crown, and removable at the pleasure of the Crown. The comparison was therefore against the latter(hear, hear!) The Judges not in general acting on the powers given by the 26th of the King, was on the part of the Judges, no doubt, the exercise of a most laudable discretion; but then did it follow that such discretion should be left to all Judges? Their not acting, implied that they thought they had been entrusted with more power by that Act than ought to have been devolved upon them. But there was one point peculiarly called for their lordships' mature consideration-it was the difference between libels and breaches of the peace. In all cases of breaches of the

peace there was a mere matter of fact to be decided upon, but in cases of alledged libel, how much matter was there that involved a various complication of conflicting con siderations, which might, and have, in sundry instances, produced doubts and differences in the breast of the soundest law authorities?—(hear, hear !) Why then, in cases of information Ex-officio, should the Judges have a power in such cases to hold to bail, where the strong probability was in favour of the presumption of the law of the land, that held all parties innocent down to the period of their conviction? He, however, should require of his noble friend (Lord Holland) to make one or two exceptions to this gene ral rule, good as the general rule itself undoubtedly was: and he believed that it was the intention of his noble friend to make an exception to this rule in cases where the parties accused excited any strong grounds of suspicion of their intention to abscond from the process. To argue from the living characters of those who had filled the office of Attor ney-General, against the abuse of the authority of that officer, was, in his opinion, not very fair reasoning to advance before men acting in a legislative capacity-( Hear, hear!) When the powers of the Coroner were limited by the 4th and 5th of William and Mary, was it then attempted to be argued that the excellent and unexceptionable character of the Coroner of that day ought to have had any weight in continuing an excessive power in the hands of that officer? certainly not. They legislate for posterity, with provident reference to all possible contingencies-and therefore, with all his well-founded and habitual reverence for the sanctity of those who bad, during his time, presided in the courts of law-with all his personal respect and esteem for those of them now living-with all his reverence for the memory of such as were now dead-still he would say as a Peer of Parliament, as a British subject, never make a Judge arbitrary--for the sake of justice itself do not! for they might rely upon it, that where a Judge might do what he pleased, public suspicion would not be slow in sapping that confidence in the sanctity of the judicial character which gave such force and efficacy to the operation of the laws themselves-Hear, hear!) As to the great age of informations Ex-officio, he did not deny it, but if time was to have been made, in all cases of projected improvement, a preliminary and insuperable obstacle, what, he would ask, what would have been the constitution of England at this

day?~(Hear!) Another great objection to the power of 65$ the Attorney-General, exerted in this way, was the vexations harrassing that might be occasioned to the accused in case äny Attorney-General thought proper to defer from time to time bringing him to trial; and as the law now stood, this was quite at the discretion of the Attorney-General. This was a power he did not wish to see lodged in the hands of one man, be that man who he may, his best and dearest friend, or the best friend to the liberties of his country. The present Bill would obviate this and other objections, and it should therefore have his support.

Earl Stanhope did not desire to unmask the learned lord, but to unmask his principles. The first part of the Bill was, that after a certain day no Ex officio Information should be filed unless within a period to be limited. If he thought he misrepresented the learned lord, he would kneel to apologise; but had he not said against that, that a defendant might, through the delays, corrupt the sources of justice? Would they permit one in so high a situation thus to attack the institution of trial by jury? It was a great merit of that institution, that neither grand nor petty jury are in existence at the time of committing an offence, or even at the commencement of prosecution. As to dropping proceedings if not begun in a certain time, the learned lord said, that it might be necessary to wait for a period of sounder and cooler judgment; from which, he (Earl Stanhope) could only learn that the Attorney-General might suspend his terrors over men's heads as long as he pleased, and visit them at the most convenient season, or not at all. The learned lord bad spoken very disrespectfully of Blackstone, but if he (Earl Stanhope) had done so, had said Blackstone wrote ignorantly, he knew how the learned lord would have trimined him for it. Blackstone, it was said, was not very wise or learned when he began to write, but became wiser when a Judge. The learned lord might have been so too when first a Judge, and perhaps, by and bye, become wiser still. The learned lord rested very stoutly on old Acts of Parliament, some of which were in fact expired. There was an Act about spreading false news, to which he had alluded. The Act of William and Mary provided, that any body convicted of publishing slander or false news, concerning the King or Queen, should suffer pillory in a market-place, and have his ears cut off, or pay a large fine; if he repeated his offence, to lose his right hand, and eventually his goods and

chattels. There was an expired Act of Elizabeth, which punished any body for exchanging a horse with a Scotchman, or in such a way as that the horse was likely to be taken to Scotland. He, for his part, liked the Scotch lads now very well; he did not know what he should have done in those days.

The Duke of Montrose objected to the sort of speeches with which the noble lord sometimes favoured the House, and should, though reluctantly, if they were continued, be obliged to resort to the standing order for clearing the House of all strangers.

The Lord Chancellor was about to put the question, when

Lord Holland rose to reply. The noble and learned lord (Ellenborough) had represented him as saying, that the mode by information was less legitimate than that by presentment. He believed the learned lord had confounded the terms legal and legitimate. He had never denied the antiquity of the present mode. However convenient informations had been found, yet had they been always considered as less preferable than the other mode; not by such as himself, but even by my Lord Hale, in his Pleas of the Crown; a Judge whom, he supposed, the learned lord would not call ignorant. Lord Hale said, that in all criminal cases, the safest way, and most agreeable to Magna Charta, and the Statutes of the Henries and Edwards, was to proceed by the presentment of twelve sworn men. It was not illegal to act by information; but why not proceed by the safe, legal, well-known mode, on which the country justly prided itself? He had thought it was completely ruled, that no man should be held to bail, on the principles of Lord Camden, except for a breach of peace. A libel was not a breach of peace, and could only be held as having a tendency to a breach of peace. The learned lord had better take the case of these seven Bishops to his aid, though perhaps he did not much wish to shelter himself under that authority. Chief Justice Parker did cut the Gordian knot, and did hold to bail for libel; but this had not, he believed, been considered as decisive authority in courts of law.

The House then divided on Lord Ellenborough's Amend