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one therefore was an enemy to France. To feed that national enmity the war had been begun and carried on. For the purpose of crushing the Emperor of France, the most powerful combinations had been entered into. They had all failed. In the wars which he had waged, no one would say he was always wrong. Treaties which he had entered into were broken by the contracting parties. And how were they broken? By the machinations of persons who were paid, fed, and protected by this country. If we would persist in this course, we put ourselves in a condition out of which it was not easy to be extricated. Buonaparte knew that his destruction was our sole object-an object upon the accomplishment of which we seemed to place our hopes of national safety; and of course he would seek the destruction of this country in return. There had been some mention about the evacuation of Prussia. Prussia was a conquered country, and why was it so?-because of the last war into which it madly rushed. The causes of that war were well known. In the negociations for peace on a former occasion, it was urged by us, that the restitution of Hanover was essential to the dignity of the British Crown. Buonaparte consented to restore it, and in order to do so required of Prussia to give it back to France. Prussia refused, and commenced a war which terminated in her irretrievable ruin. Now, had Buonaparte offered to restore Hanover, on the late communication with this Government, he should certainly have thought that offer an insidious one, because it was a thing so highly insisted on formerly, and so flattering to the Crown of this country; and, he would say, that in the present state of Europe, the restoration of Hanover to England would be a most unfortunate event. Taking another view of the negociation, he would be glad to ask the Ministers how it happened, when they returned such a direct negative to all negociation-(No, no, from the Ministerial benches)-that they were so unprepared for the war in the North? Lord Cathcart is now about to set out as Ambassador to the Court of Russia; but, not being quite so sanguine as some gentlemen, he (Mr. Whitbread) should not be surprised if Buonaparte arrived at Petersburgh before his lordship. And what was to be gained by the contest? The ports of the Baltic would be opened to us, and so far some benefit would be derived to our manufactures and commerce. But what prospect was there of a favourable issue? What prospect was there of such a termination of

such an honourable peace, as would compensate for the money to be drained from the pockets of the people of this country to support our ally? Let us look to the situation we were in with regard to America: what, too, was our situation with regard to that country at the moment when the negociation was broken off? We bad not then revoked those measures which were hurrying us to our destruction; and we were boldly maintaining that America could not, that in fact she dared not, make war with us. Now, however, we had fatally found that she could, and that she had proclaimed war against us; and by the latest advices from that country, there was every reason to believe that the executive had added its sanction to the decision of the two Houses of Legislature. He sincerely hoped, however, that an actual rupture between the two countries would be avoided by the notification of the repeal of the Orders in Council. Some persons affected to think lightly of a war with America, but he thought otherwise; he thought it would be infinitely worse for this country than for America. He would call upon our Financiers, to know how they would support such a war? He would call upon them to say what would be the effect produced on the finances, by the sudden check of our manufactures and commerce? He I would ask also, what was to be done with the Vote of Credit lately submitted to the House? Was Russia to be subsidised, or Sweden ?-or was both? Into what a scene were we plunging! A new coalition about to be formed against France, and yet, at this particular time, we could not condescend to enter upon negociation!--not condescend to say upon what terms we should choose to negociate. We had suffered our only chance (a northern war) to escape, and now we were taking a course that could only end in disappointment. He hoped he had now convinced his right honourable friend, that he did not wish any thing derogatory to the character of the British nation, and that he had advanced nothing so absurd and contradictory as that which he had undertaken to answer, without his having said it. The motion was one he cordially approved of; it was one he should himself have made, had it not been made by his right honourable friend. He had no doubt he should be misapprehended as usual; he was prepared for such unpopularity; but he should have the satisfaction of knowing that he had done his duty. VOL. III.-18.12.

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Lord Castlereagh began by observing, that it certainly was not his intention to oppose the motion, and that the speech of the right honourable gentleman who made it, was one that had considerably narrowed the discussion as far as related to himself. At the same time, some things which had fallen from the honourable Member who spoke last, called for a reply; and he would put it to the House whether it was not a violation of all sound reasoning, to consider the answer returned to the French Government as a direct negative upon all negociation. He would say, that any other answer would have been a dereliction of duty. He was far from contending for the principle of interminable war, nor would he justify the proceedings of Government upon any such principle; but at the same time he thought they would study the lesson of the last twenty years to very little advantage, if they adopted the feelings of the honourable gentleman, who, so far from having any jealousy towards the French Government, not only thought the present moment the most proper for negociation, but also contended that every overture from France, during the last and present war, had been made with sincerity and good faith—(hear, hear!) He did not think any other man in the empire would affirm that proposition; and if the honourable Member did really think so, he would say, that his mind must be practically disordered upon that particular topic-(hear, hear!) He (Lord Castlereagh) thought there was something in the time of making the overture that seemed suspicious; for it had always been the policy of the French Ruler to make propositions for peace to this country when he was about to place himself at the head of his armies for purposes of the most extensive conquest. The right honourable gentleman who made the motion had justly observed, that those propositions were seldom sincere, but that they were to be con sidered as one of the instruments in the shape of negociation to be turned against the enemy he was going to crush. The honourable Member had suggested the species of answer that ought to have been returned: but what was the answer that was returned? It merely required to know the meaning of the proposition; and that request was accompanied with the most distinct assurance, that the basis proposed with regard to the Spanish dynasty was such as could be received by this country with due regard to its honour. We were perfectly ready to enter into explanations upon all the other topics, as preliminary steps towards pacification, anxious

as the British Government was for the general peace of Europe. We simply asked, do you mean the dynasty of Spain, as acknowledged by the Spanish nation, and as centered in the person of Ferdinand VII. or do you mean the dynasty attempted to be established in the person of King Joseph? Such was the nature of the reply, and what other reply, consistently with the dignity and good faith of the British Government, could be returned? If the proposition was meant not to gain time, but to try the honour of the British nation, he would say that it was most insulting. The Government of Russia, continued the noble lord, was, he had no doubt, inclined to peace; and although the honourable gentleman (Mr. Whitbread) had assumed that the war was occasioned by the demand, on the part of Russia, that France should evacuate the Prussian territory, the real cause of the war undoubtedly was the numerous violations, on the part of France, of the Treaty of Tilsit, and the conviction, on the part of Russia, that it was the intention of France to heap every possible indignity on her, and to add encroachment on encroachment, and that as war at some time or other would be absolutely inevitable, it was better to fight them at the present time than after they should be less able. The honourable gentleman seemed to possess that confidence in the possibility of a peace at present, which had never once quitted him. In his opinion, nothing had a greater tendency to unhinge the country, and to paralyse its efforts, than all unwise attempts at peace at a period when no rational hope can be entertained of the realization of such an event. When the British Government, however, was asked the question, he trusted the answer was such as shewed no aversion or unwillingness, on the part of that Government, to enter upon discussions relative to peace. No person could possibly view that answer in the light of an insult; there was not one expression in it calculated to discourage the Emperor of France from entering frankly on the discussion, if he wished it. But when he shewed that he was not even prepared to disavow that part of his proposal relative to the appointment of Joseph Buonaparte to the Throne of Spain, they were entitled to conclude that he considered this a sine qua non in any discussion. The matter was not left open to discussion; no person would pretend that it was. Now the honourable gentleman himself had said that he would not recommend peace with France on such a sine qua non; and he contended, therefore, with

perfect fairness, that he was entitled to the support of that honourable gentleman that night on the libel of policy adopted by the British Government (Hear, hear!) The honourable gentleman bad said, if the French were to withdraw their army from the Peninsula, Joseph would no longer be King; but did it never occur to that gentleman that Buonaparte might not withdraw his forces from the Peninsual? they never in fact could withdraw their armies from that quarter. By the line of conduct recommended by the honourable gentleman, we should have paralysed all the exertions of our army, and lost all the advantages which they had gained for us; it would be attended, in short, by every possible disadvantage, and no one advantage. The efforts of Russia, at that critical moment, would have been paralysed. It would have been easy for any one of his Counsellors, if so disposed, then to hold this language to the Emperor of Russia-See, now Great Britain has with drawn from the conquest, there is no alternative. You must now crouch to Buonaparte-you must get the best terms with the great Emperor that you possibly can. He would not enter upon the conduct of this country in former negociations; but he was convinced that a more disastrous proposition could not be imagined than any attempt towards negociating at present; and he was also persuaded, that the country from one end to the other was persuaded that peace could not be obtained on terms which it was impossi ble for the country to accept, and that the only effect which any discussion upon the subject could at present have, would be to paralyse its exertions. He certainly did not mean to say that the present Ministry were resolved to wage an interminable war with the Emperor of the French; but he thought they ought not to possess the confidence of the country if they did not, from a consideration of the nature and organization of his power, and the councils on which he acted, consider every overture which he might think proper to make to this country, with the utmost distrust. The noble lord concluded with stating, that he had no objec tion to the production' of the papers moved for.

The Hon. C. Hutchinson said, that he could not but look on the Ministry as in the highest degree culpable, if they were to shew any thing but regret at having in any manner contributed to the present war between Russia and France, or if they had not done every thing in their power to pre vent it. Such, however, did he believe to be the infatua

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