A REVIEW OF A

PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY

INTO THE

ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS

OF THE

1

SUBLIME AND BEAUTIFUL.

HE Title of this Book very naturally excites

T Curiofity, as the Subject is in general pleafing

to all Readers, who have any Pretenfions to Tafte. But in treating abstract Ideas, there is often great Danger that the Author will bewilder himfelf in a Maze of chimerical Notions; and this the more especially if he attempts to fet himself up for a Syftemmaker. Something like this, we are apprehenfive, has happened to the Author of the Performance now before us; who has however the Merit of having been very curious in his Research, and appears to have employed much clofe and deep Thinking about the Subject of his Investigation. But the Love of Novelty feems to have been a very leading Principle in his Mind, throughout his whole Compofition; and we fear that in endeavouring to advance, what was never faid before him, he will find it his Lot to have faid what will not be adopted after him,

We

do

do not think this Gentleman faw his Way very clearly through the Question: and we are of Opinion that he has been very ingenious to err, inftead of affording us any new Lights, whereby we might find out the Sources of the Sublime and Beautiful. A Review of his Book, we think, will fet this Matter in a clear Light.

But

In order to come at the Botton of Things, he fets out with explaining the first Principles of the human Mind he obferves that Curiofity is one of our earlieft Paffions: he then endeavours to prove that Pain and Pleasure are not connected, and that the Removal of Pain is not a pofitive Pleasure, but for Diftinction's Sake, he chufes to call it Delight. If a Man,' fays he, in a State of Tranquility fhould fuddenly hear a Concert of Mufic, he then enjoys Pleasure without previous Pain; and on the other Hand, if a Man in the fame State of Tranquility should receive a Blow, here is Pain without the Removal of Pleasure.' furely the Removal of a Tooth-ach, is Pleasure to all Intents and Purpofes; it induces a Train of pleasing Ideas in the Mind, fuch as Satisfactionwith our prefent State, &c. and Pleasure is equally pófitive whether it begins in the Mind, or is conveyed thither by agreeable bodily Senfation. In like manner the Removal of Pleasure is pofitive Pain, as the Abfence of a fine Woman to whom we are attached, &c. The Truth is, Pain and Pleasure may fubfift independently, and alfo reciprocally induce each other. Our Author allows, that the Lofs of Pleasure occafions three different Senfations, viz. Indifference, Difappointment, or Grief: but furely Disappointment and Grief are pofitive Pains. But,' fays he, Grief can be no Pain, because we fee that many Perfons are found indulging it.' They are fo! but it should be remembered that Grief is a mixed Paffion, confifting of Sorrow for our Lofs and Fondness for the Object : now our Fondness for the Object makes our Imagina

tion

tion dwell on the Idea, though we feel very painful Senfations at the fame Time. Animum picturâ pafcit inani. Our Author proceeds to divide our Paffions into Two general Claffes, viz. Self-prefervation, and Society; the Selfish and the Social Paffions would have been a better Distinction, because Selfish includes all the Ideas of Self-prefervation, and all our other Gratifications. The Paffions which concern Self-prefervation he rightly obferves turn mostly on Pain and Danger; and thefe he adds, very justly, are the most powerful in our Nature. He then endea vours to graft the Sublime on our Paffions of Self. prefervation. Whatever is fitted,' fays he, to excite Ideas of Pain and Danger, or operates in a Manner analogous to Terror, is a Source of the Sublime; that is, excites the strongest Emotion which the Mind is capable of feeling.' But furely this is falfe Philofophy: the Brodequin of Ravilliac, and the iron Bed of Damien are capable of exciting alarm ing Ideas of Terror, but cannot be faid to hold any thing of the Sublime. Befides, why are our other Paffions to be excluded? cannot the Sublime confift with Ambition? it is perhaps in confequence of this very Paffion, grafted in us for the wifeft Purposes by the Author of our Exiftence, that we are capable of feeling the Sublime in the Degree we do; of delighting in every thing that is magnificent, of preferring the Sun to a Farthing Candle, that by proceeding from greater to still greater, we might at last fix our Imagination on Him who is the Supreme of all. And this perhaps is the true Source of the Sublime, which is always greatly heightened when any of our Paffions are strongly agitated, fuch as Terror, Grief, Rage, Indignation, Admiration, Love, &c. By the strongest of thefe the Sublime will be enforced, but it will confift with any of them. As for inftance, when Virgil lays of Jupiter,

Annuit

Annuit et totum nutu tremefecit Olympum ;

Here we have a Sublime Image encreafed by our Terror, when we think of his fhaking the Poles with a nod. And on the other Hand, when the fame Poet defcribes the fame Perfonage,

Vultu quo cælum tempeftatefque ferenat ;

With that Countenance with which he looks Storms and Tempefts into a Calm, we still have a Sublime Idea of the Power which thus commands all Nature, and we feel it with Love and Admiration.

T

Our Author proceeds to the focial Paffions, which he claffes into Two Sorts, Firft, the Society of the Sexes; and next, the more general Society which we hold with Mankind and the whole Universe. With regard to the First he observes, that Beauty is the Object of it; and he endeavours to refute Mr. Addifon's opinion, that Animals have a fense of Beauty to confine them to their own Species: but as he only fuppofes a Law of another kind, we think Mr. Addifon's may stand till he will be pleased to fubftitute a better. He agrees that Beasts have no Perception of Beauty because they do not pick and choose: but furely it is probable that they may have an immediate Perception of fomething beautiful in their own Species, without waiting to compare it with others, and felect for themselves. This would be to enjoy the Advantages of deliberate Reasoning and Reflection; Qualities of which they do not appear to be poffeffed.

Our Author himself affigns a Reason why the Brute Creation need not chufe for themselves. But Man, who is a Creature adapted to a greater Variety and Intricacy of Relation, connects with the general Paffion the Idea of fome focial Qualities, which direct and heighten the Appetite which he has in common with all other Animals: and as he is not de

figned

figned like them to live at large, it is fit that he should have fomething to create a Preference, and fix his Choice; and this in general should be fome fenfible Quality; as no other can fo quickly, so powerfully, or fo furely produce its Effect.'

From hence it appears why a Beaft in the Field, according to Mr. Addifon's ingenious Notion, may have a Senfe of Beauty in its own Species, without waiting to determine its Choice by Comparison.

In contradiction to his former Affertions, he says, that Solitude is as great a pofitive Pain as can be conceived and yet the Pain of Solitude, is a Privation of Pleasure, and is merely a Difappointment, and a Grieving for the Lofs of Company. In talking of the Social Paffions, he fays, I am convinced we have a Degree of Delight, and that no small one, in the real Misfortunes and Pains of others; for let the Affection be what it will in Appearance, if it does not make us fhun fuch Objects, if on the contrary it induces us to approach them, if it makes us dwell upon them, in this Cafe I conceive we must have a Delight or Pleasure of fome Spieces or other in contemplating Objects of this kind.' But this is certainly very false Reasoning: we have no Delight in the real Misfortunes of others; and if we go near them, it is because our Fondness attaches us to them, and we cannot keep away, even though the Sight is painful. This he has afterwards obferved himself, when he fays, Pity is a Paffion accompained with Pleasure, because it arises from Love and Affection.' He therefore should have faid, we have a Pleasure in feeling and compaflionating the Misfortunes of others. With regard to the Pleasure resulting from Tragedy, he afcribes it to Imitation, and then retracts it again when he says, we shall be mistaken if we imagine our Pleasure arifes from its being no Reality: the nearer it approaches to Reality, the more perfect its Power,' This is certainly true, but it is because