darkness, and solitude of a prison, while profligate tyrants have been at liberty to corrupt, or to enslave men, and to set at open defiance the justice of heaven? Or, to use the words of the poet :

"Why unassuming worth in secret lived,

And died neglected: why the good man's share
In life was gall and bitterness of soul:
Why the lone widow, and her orphans pin'd
In starving solitude; while luxury,

In palaces, lay straining her low thought,

To form unreal wants; why heaven-born truth,
And moderation fair, wore the red marks
Of superstition's scourge: why licens'd pain,
That cruel spoiler, that embosom'd foe,
Imbittered all our bliss."-Thomson.

When any person shall give a satisfactory answer to all these inquiries, he may, with less impropriety, demand the reason why communications of celestial grace are not made to all in the same measure?

It is by no means to be imagined, that in distributing variously the blessings either of providence or grace, the Almighty acts arbitrarily, or with caprice. As has been heretofore remarked, when it is said that God is a sovereign,—that he does all things according to the counsel of his own will,—and that he has mercy on whom he will have mercy, we are not to imagine, that he acts merely because he has the power of acting, or that his choice is not regulated by perfect wisdom. No being in the universe is more invariably confined, so to speak, by the rules of fitness and propriety. Herein consists the perfection and dignity of his character. By the sovereignty of God is meant nothing more, than that his reasons for acting are concealed from human observation. Reasons always exist in the divine mind, why the gifts of providence and grace are bestowed with greater liberality on one, than on another. Perhaps some of these reasons are made known to the spirits of just men made perfect. Perhaps the subject is still further understood by the angels :

and as the capacities of both are enlarged, and as they advance in their acquaintance with the great plan of divine government, the number and cogency of apparent reasons will perpetually in

crease.

2. It may be natural to inquire, whether God gives to some small portions of divine influence, with design, that they should not repent. To this inquiry an affirmative answer could not, I think, with safety be rendered. I know of no reason to doubt, that the repentance and conversion of the non-elect under those circumstances, in which they are placed, would be agreeable to the mind of God: nor do I perceive, on any other supposition, how those numerous declarations of Scripture, which express the divine reluctance to abandon and punish sinners, can be reconciled with perfect integrity: Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die, saith the Lord? Turn ye, turn ye, for why will ye die, O house of Israel. As I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth. At a time when the crimes of Israel were such as to require severe chastisements, the language of God was full of benignity and forbearance. How shall I give thee up, Ephraim? How shall I deliver thee, Israel? How shall I make thee as Admah? How shall I set thee as Zeboim? My heart is turned within me. My repentings are kindled together? Christ asserts, that he would often have gathered the inhabitants of Jerusalem; but they would not: and exclaims: O that thou hadst known, at least in this thy day, the things of thy peace: but now they are hid from thine eyes. Now, all this is perfectly intelligible, if the repentance of these persons, under existing circumstances, would have been agreeable to the mind of God. On this supposition, there is unquestionable sincerity in the declarations cited.

It is not pretended, however, that all difficulties are yet removed. It has been asserted, you say, that there are persons to whom God never determined to give those advantages and influences of grace, which would in fact issue in their reformation. If this be true, the Jews, to whom the preceding quotations re

fer, were doubtless of that number. Now, if God never determined to give them such divine influence, and place them in such circumstances, as would in fact produce reformation, how can it be said, that such an event would have been agreeable to the divine will?

I answer, that whatever may be the consequence of the first position, its truth will not be denied by any one, who considers for a moment, the absurdity, which such denial embraces. Would you assert; or would any person in the free use of his rational powers assert, that God did give to the inhabitants of Jerusalem such powerful influences of his Spirit, or placed them in such circumstances, as actually produced a change of character, and saved them from ruin? And if he did not this, it will hardly be said that he ever determined to do it.

We will now endeavor to show that his not resorting to greater efforts, than were employed for reforming the Jews, was perfectly consistent with divine admonitions, and with an inclination that they should repent. A parent, let it be supposed, gives to his son those advantanges, which if rightly improved, would secure to him a competent knowledge of the arts and sciences. He at the same time being perfectly acquainted with the disposition of the latter, knows, that unless these advantages are doubled, or altogether changed in kind, the effect will not be produced, the desired acquisition will not be made. Now there may be a thousand reasons, to prevent him from increasing the number of these advantages, or altering their kind. Perhaps this could not be done consistently with justice to his other children. Still it would be perfectly agreeable to his wishes that the son to whom we refer, should be skilled in the arts and sciences. Nor would any one call in question, that such was the father's desire, although for good reasons he did not see fit to afford those greater advantages, without which he foresaw, that the end would not be obtained.

Here you will see the necessity of recurring to a distinction, made in the last lecture, between what a person might do, and what he actually will do. The son, mentioned in our sup

position, is placed in such situation, as to render attainable the contemplated degree of information; but through a wrong temper, he will not in fact make the acquirement, unless the facility of doing it is greatly increased. In the same manner, nothing prevents the non-elect from repentance and salvation, but perverseness of temper ;-disaffection to the character of God. Why then should it be doubted, that their conversion would be agreeable to his will, because he affords not those more powerful communications, without which he foresees, they will remain irreligious?

There is one point, in which it may be supposed, that the cases are so dissimilar, as to render inconclusive all reasoning from the one to the other. The earthly parent is limited in his power. All means are not at his command. To increase the scientific advantages of his son, might, as has been suggested, be injurious to his other children. But the power of God is unlimited and therefore, you suppose, he can be under no restraint.

It is true, that the power of God is the greatest that can be conceived. In regard to him, nothing is physically impossible, but what implies a contradiction; and nothing is morally impossible, but what is inconsistent with his wisdom and goodness. It is not derogatory to the power of God, to assert, that he cannot render the same beings at the same time both happy and miserable; or that he cannot create beings in the same sense both rational and irrational. And it is so far from being injurious to his character, to assert, that he can do nothing opposite to wisdom or benevolence, that on this account alone his character demands supreme reverence and affection.

So very small a portion of God's great scheme of government is subject to human investigation, and so little is known of the dependence, which one part has on another, that in relation to a thousand measures, we cannot pronounce with the least certainty, whether they would, or would not be consistent with divine wisdom, or with that vast, universal, and complicated scheme, which God is carrying into effect. For the same VOL. II.

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reason we cannot be certain, that to impart greater light or more powerful divine influences, than are imparted to each individual, would not be inconsistent with that system of proceeding, which God has adopted for the promotion of general order and happiness. In this way may divine power be circumscribed; i. e. it may be limited by physical impossibilities, or by that wisdom and goodness, which are essential to the divine char

acter.

If there be any obscurity in this reasoning, it will probably be lessened by recurring to particular facts. What is the cause, why Deity does not reduce that enormous quantity of pain, which is endured by mortals? As the sufferings of men cannot in themselves considered, be agreeable to a benevolent being, is it not certain, that God would diminish or remove those sufferings, were there not, all things considered, good reasons for their continuance? These reasons then are the limitations of divine power?-they are a kind of restriction, from which even the Almighty is not exempt.

To put a case still more to the point, Why does not God, whose nature is infinitely pure, and to whom nothing is so hateful as moral evil, prevent all the crimes which are committed among men? This will not be attributed to the want of physical power, of wisdom, or of goodness. There must, therefore, be some reason in the view of God, why an effectual effort is not made for the suppression or extermination of vice. No one can doubt, that those reasons, which Deity esteems weighty, are such in reality. Here again we see what may be considered as limits of the divine power: and hence it appears, that the supposition, which has been made relative to an earthly parent, was not inadequate to the purpose for which it was introduced; seeing, that there may be restrictions in either case.

Further, when any person will assign reasons, why the sufferings and the vices of men are not diminished or prevented, it will be no difficult matter to show, why those more powerful communications of grace are not imparted, without which, it is distinctly foreseen, that the impenitent will not be renewed.