Collective Choice and Social WelfareElsevier, 2014/07/24 - 236 ページ This book is concerned with the study of collective preference, in particular with the relationship between the objectives of social action and the preferences and aspirations of society's members. Professor Sen's approach is based on the assumption that the problem of collective choice cannot be satisfactorily discussed within the confines of economics. While collective choice forms a crucial aspect of economics, the subject pertains also to political science, the theory of the state, and to the theory of decision procedures. The author has therefore used material from these disciplines, plus philosophical aspects from ethics and the theory of justice. |
目次
| 1 | |
| 7 | |
Chapter 2 UNANIMITY | 21 |
Chapter 2 COLLECTIVE CHOICE RULES ANDPARETO COMPARISONS | 28 |
Chapter 3 COLLECTIVE RATIONALITY | 33 |
Chapter 3 SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS | 41 |
Chapter 4 CHOICE VERSUS ORDERINGS | 47 |
Chapter 4 SOCIAL DECISION FUNCTIONS | 52 |
Chapter 7 AGGREGATION QUASIORDERINGS1 | 105 |
Chapter 8 CARDINALITY WITH OR WITHOUT COMPARABILITY | 118 |
Chapter 8 BARGAINS AND SOCIAL WELFAREFUNCTIONALS | 126 |
Chapter 9 EQUITY AND JUSTICE | 131 |
Chapter 9 IMPERSONALITY AND COLLECTIVE QUASIORDERINGS | 152 |
Chapter 10 MAJORITY CHOICE AND RELATED SYSTEMS | 161 |
Chapter 10 RESTRICTED PREFERENCES AND RATIONAL CHOICE | 173 |
Chapter 11 THEORY AND PRACTICE | 187 |
Chapter 5 VALUES AND CHOICE | 56 |
Chapter 5 ANONYMITY NEUTRALITY AND RESPONSIVENESS | 71 |
Chapter 6 CONFLICTS AND DILEMMAS | 78 |
Chapter 6 THE LIBERAL PARADOX | 87 |
Chapter 7 INTERPERSONAL AGGREGATION AND COMPARABILITY | 89 |
BIBLIOGRAPHY | 201 |
| 221 | |
| 223 | |
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多く使われている語句
acyclicity Arrow assumption axiom binary relation cardinal cardinal utility Chapter choice function choice set collective choice rule complete Consider defined DEFINITION ethical given grading principle Harsanyi Hence holds implies independence of irrelevant indifferent individual orderings individual preferences individual welfare interpersonal comparability irrelevant alternatives justice least Lemma linear transformation majority decision majority rule maximal maximal element maximin method of majority n-tuple N₁ N₂ nonbasic noncomparability nonnegative responsiveness noted number of individuals ordered pair P₁ P₁y pair of alternatives Pareto criterion Pareto principle Pareto-extension rule Pareto-optimal partial comparability person Possibility Theorem problem proof property ẞ quasi-transitivity R₁ Rawls reflexive relevant require satisfying conditions set of individual social choice social ordering social preference relation social welfare function society strict strict partial ordering subrelation subset Suppes Theorem 6*1 tion transitivity triple unrestricted domain value judgments violates voting welfare economics