Collective Choice and Social Welfare
Elsevier, 2014/07/24 - 236 ページ
This book is concerned with the study of collective preference, in particular with the relationship between the objectives of social action and the preferences and aspirations of society's members.
Professor Sen's approach is based on the assumption that the problem of collective choice cannot be satisfactorily discussed within the confines of economics. While collective choice forms a crucial aspect of economics, the subject pertains also to political science, the theory of the state, and to the theory of decision procedures. The author has therefore used material from these disciplines, plus philosophical aspects from ethics and the theory of justice.
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Chapter 7 AGGREGATION QUASIORDERINGS1
Chapter 8 CARDINALITY WITH OR WITHOUT COMPARABILITY
Chapter 8 BARGAINS AND SOCIAL WELFAREFUNCTIONALS
Chapter 9 EQUITY AND JUSTICE
Chapter 9 IMPERSONALITY AND COLLECTIVE QUASIORDERINGS
Chapter 10 MAJORITY CHOICE AND RELATED SYSTEMS
Chapter 10 RESTRICTED PREFERENCES AND RATIONAL CHOICE
Chapter 11 THEORY AND PRACTICE
aggregation alternatives appealing approach Arrow assume assumption axiom called cardinal Chapter choice function collective choice collective choice rule comparability complete concerned condition Consider corresponding course criterion decision defined DEFINITION depend discussed economics element ethical example existence fact factual Further given Hence holds implies important impossibility independence indifferent individual orderings individual preferences individual welfare interesting interpersonal involved irrelevant justice least Lemma logically majority matter maximal measures merely method necessary noted ordering pair Pareto Pareto principle partial particular person positive possible preference relation principle probability problem proof quasi-ordering question relation relevant require respectively restriction result satisfy seems sense set of individual similar social choice social preference society specified strict sufficient Theorem tion transitivity triple units utility value judgments violates voting weak welfare welfare function yield