equally divided between those living in tenements, and those living in lodgings in disused residence houses. Besides the headquarters and men's residence (20 Union Park) there is the women's residence, a 'Union' for civic and recreational uses, a registry house for approved lodgings, a nurses' house,—an offshoot from the women's residence, and a house of childhood. There are also several out-of-town houses known as vacation centres. One of the most interesting and useful of these last is the caddies' home at Bretton Woods, a resort much desired and striven for as a reward for good 'citizenship' by the boys of the neighborhood, from whom the 'gangs' would otherwise be recruited.

The general management of the settlement is in the hands of a council of twenty-four elected by an association of some three hundred members. The finances of the settlement are on a democratic basis. The settlement is not underwritten by any wealthy patron, but is supported by annual subscriptions from members of the Association and from others interested in the work. The value of the unencumbered real estate is about $100,000, and the amount of the present endowment fund is $30,000. The annual cost of the settlement is about $20,000. I doubt if an example can be found, outside the range of the social settlements, of results of like character and magnitude attained with so great economy of material resources, because of such lavish and generous expenditure of personal service. This preponderance of personal service and sacrifice must always exist as vital to all settlement work; but in view of the results achieved, the question is pertinent whether the time has not now come for society at large to coöperate more freely through wise and adequate endowments insuring permanency of results.

The specific object of the settlement when first applied to social conditions in this country was, as we have seen, to arrest the process of segregation which was going on in all our larger cities. I think that we should now speak of this same object in much larger terms. When we now refer to the vast work of assimilating our foreign peoples we speak of their Americanization. We have not as yet, however, come to understand that any serious attempt to carry out this purpose must involve in a very real sense the re-Americanization of the native stock. Nowhere is this necessity more apparent than in the older communities like New England. The man of Puritan traditions and training has before him a much greater duty than that of tolerance or even of hospitality -the duty of understanding through study, sympathy, and coöperation the alien peoples with whom his lot is now cast. What can better serve to remind him of this urgent and impartial duty than the presence in the city of Boston, the great immigrant city of New England, of the organized groups of highly trained and sympathetic men and women committed to the task of unifying our diverse and discordant social elements, in the interest alike of native and of alien, but above all in the interest of the Republic? Evidently the emphasis will fall upon this unifying work differently in different parts of the country, but it must mean everywhere both the Americanization and the reAmericanization of our whole people, if we are to learn to think of the Nation according to its constituent elements and in terms at all commensurate with its manifest future. In the searching trial through which we are now passing, I believe it will be found that after the public school the social settlement has been the most direct and effective agency at work for the coherence and the integrity of the Nation.

I AM asked to give an opinion from a British point of view of the proposals of the League to Enforce Peace. Liberal compliance with this request would be rather difficult, for I fail to see why there is, or should be, any specially British point of view on a question of universal international justice. Neither can it be said that there exists in fact any decided national view; we have not so far had any thorough discussion. My impression is that competent opinion here is not at present so near a general consent as it appears to be in America. Be that as it may, my individual opinion is so much in accordance with that of the League that I have really no criticism of substance to offer, and can only make some observations on the proposals by way of illustration and supplement. Again, I do not know what risk there may be in America of such misunderstandings as have exercised one or two able publicists here, and therefore must crave excuse if any cautionary explanation here set down is superfluous for most readers of the Atlantic Monthly. I will follow the proposals of the League in the order in which they are laid down.

First: All justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

The reference to the limitations of treaties apparently means that signatory powers would remain free to act

in particular cases, as between themselves, on any special arbitration treaties to which they were already parties, such as the treaty of 1914 between Great Britain and the United States. Disposal of any question under such a treaty would in effect be a species of settlement out of court, and rather to be encouraged. The constitution of the tribunal is wisely not specified in detail. Until the plan is seriously taken up by the authority of a quorum of governments, in such number and value as will suffice to make it workable, it is useless to spend time in weighing out the imaginary mint and anise and cummin. One of the things to be considered will be whether, and to what extent, the machinery already established on a merely voluntary basis at The Hague can be made use of. It would be wholly premature to express an opinion on this.

The tribunal itself is to be charged with the duty of determining whether any question submitted to it is 'justiciable' as leading to issues capable of definite judicial determination; or 'non-justiciable' as depending on moral or political considerations which cannot be reduced to a definite issue. In the latter case, the matter would, I presume, be passed on to the Board of Conciliation to be next mentioned. This would be simpler than instituting some kind of special examining committee or tribunal des conflits, and I see no reason why it should be less efficient.

Nothing is said about enforcing the awards of the tribunal when made; and it does not appear that any such

provision is necessary. There have, in fact, been very few cases of refusal to execute an international award on a question submitted to arbitration by agreement of the parties. It must not be supposed, however, that the League would be wholly indifferent to the subsequent conduct of the litigants. A successful litigant state should not be left under the unrestrained temptation to execute the award for itself by military force if the defeated party fails to comply with it for a time which appears unreasonable. It seems that taking the law into one's own hand without the authority of the League, even after an award, would be in spirit, if not in the absolute letter, such an act of hostility as is provided against in the third article, and that the proper course in case of excessive delay would be to appeal to the League - in an executive, not a judicial capacity - for license to take the necessary steps. I cannot help thinking that the first case of this kind which arose would probably lead to the League being invested with direct executive power, tempered perhaps by the requirement of using, in this class of emergencies, economic pressure before military action. But it is possible that the need might never arise. In cases of extraordinary difficulty there might be a provision for rehearing by a specially reinforced tribunal. Any regular appellate procedure, however, seems neither practicable nor desirable.

The suggestion of President Lowell of Harvard, that the court should have power to issue decrees in the nature of interlocutory injunctions, pending the hearing and decision of a cause, is eminently reasonable and proper.

The judicial proceedings of the tribunal would presumably be public, except for some very special reason. Not that such reasons appear likely to occur, but it would be unwise not to leave room for the possibility.

Some people here have gratuitously assumed that the League would undertake to guarantee the territorial status quo of its members, and have thereupon raised an alarm of a revived Holy Alliance for the oppression of national movements and subjection of minor states. There is no foundation whatever for this. Neither boundaries, nor forms of government, nor domestic regulation of provincial autonomy, the condition of protected or personally united states, and the like, would be guaranteed against anything but the forcible interference of an external power which refused to submit the matters in difference to conciliation or arbitration. It is true that the formation of a stable and effective league presupposes the establishment of a more stable and rational system of political boundaries, and a much better approximation to the general satisfaction of national desires and sympathies than had been attained in 1914. But reconstruction of that kind has to be undertaken in any case as part of the settlement after the war, and the prospect of a standing League of Peace would in my judgment make it easier, if anything. As for the smaller states, which are now powerless in isolation, they would have everything to gain by acquiring a defined position and an assured voice in closer contact with the greater powers and with one another.

The second article runs: All other questions arising between the signatories and not settled by negotiation shall be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration and recommendation.

Such a body would have to be called 'conseil' in French, but I should prefer 'board' as the English equivalent; this, however, is a very small verbal detail. The Board would not, I presume, be bound strictly to follow judicial forms, but would adopt such procedure as it

thought best fitted for the nature of the case. Professional advocates, for example, might sometimes be dispensed with. The recommendations of the Board would have only a persuasive force, but its real power would be that of gaining time for reflection, and its greatest triumph would be to guide the parties to a settlement which they should believe to be of their own finding. It ought, I think, to be in the Board's discretion whether its proceedings should be public, and whether anything should be published beyond the result. In discussions of this kind, which are a mixture of moral or political argument and of negotiation, the less temptation either side has to play to its own gallery the better.

Internal difficulties of a constitutional or political kind would not be within the jurisdiction of the Board. Such, for instance, are the questions that have arisen with regard to the union of the Empire of Russia with the Grand Duchy of Finland. The Board, however, might well be empowered to deal with such disputes if authorized representatives of the interests concerned agreed to refer them for mediation. Contentions of this kind are apt to excite sympathies and agitations beyond their own borders, and have often afforded a reason or pretext for warlike interference on the part of other states. It seems, therefore, quite within the spirit of the League to do what it can in the way of opening a door to voluntary conciliation, the rather that the greatest danger to the stability and permanence of the League itself may be thought to lie in this direction.

In any case where all the efforts of the Board were unavailing, the parties would be remitted to the old condition of independent powers having an irreconcilable difference. The League, The League, however, would have acquired full information and would be in the most

favorable position for preventing any further spread of war should hostilities ensue, and for making a fresh offer of mediation should any good opportunity present itself. At worst, we should have the extinct 'Concert of Europe' revived in a much improved form.

The third article is the executive one: The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war or commits acts of hostility against another of the signatories, before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.

The drafting, like that of President Monroe's celebrated message, is rather cramped, and shows the marks of not being the work of one hand; but the meaning is clear. A practical question arises at once, which appears to me of capital importance. How is the process of joint application of economic or military forces to be worked?

Suppose there are ten signatory powers. B has a boundary claim against A, and they have been in negotiation for some time (a fact of which the League is not bound to take notice). During this time B has been making secret preparations for seizing the coveted territory, which may include an especially desirable sea-port in a commanding strategic position, or the like. B turns upon A with a trumped-up charge of willful bad faith, picks a sudden quarrel thereupon, and invades the territory in dispute. A is not strong enough to resist alone. What are the other eight signatory states to do? If they all have to hold a conference before any of them move, В may seize the coveted positions and occupy them firmly, or even proceed to encroach on A's undisputed possession, while the joint action is being elaborated. In an extreme case, A may be in danger of a hostile occupation hardly distinguishable from conquest. Again, whose business shall it

be to take the first steps? and will emergency justify the nearest or strongest signatory power in taking action without waiting to confer? Here are grave and perilous occasions for delay, confusion, and discord. Yet again, B, if a willful wrongdoer, will probably be ready with some tale that A began hostilities; and who is to decide whether the plea of self-defense is genuine or not? Without some kind of pre-appointed emergency power which need not await a conference, it seems that there would still be an opening-less tempting than if there were not any League of Peace, but still, with luck and cunning, practicable — for a bold and unscrupulous aggressor.

The result, I submit, is that if a league to enforce peace is to be in a position to exercise timely and effective force at need and to nip offenses in the bud, it must have a standing and thoroughly organized executive authority.

The constitution of such an authority might conceivably be devised in various forms, and one must resist the temptation to speculate too much on details. Two things appear, however, to be essential: a representative, but not too numerous, body, to decide when an emergency calling for joint action has arisen, and whether that action shall be limited in the first instance to economic pressure, or prompt military measures are required; and, for the latter case, a military command ready to give effect to the decision, and authorized, without waiting for further approval, to employ the common power to the best advantage. In other words, there should be a common general staff in readiness to take charge of the necessary operations by land or by water, on the requisition of the Executive Council. Otherwise, even on the assumption that the governments concerned are perfectly unanimous, much

precious time would be wasted, and this would be just the weak point of concerted action on which an aggressor would count. On the other hand, the manifest risks of aggression will be more deterrent in proportion as the means of crushing any such attempts are better prepared in advance; and in the same proportion it will be less likely that the League will be called upon to resort to actual use of the strong hand.

In any case, there will have to be a standing council of the League for preparation and supervision of the business contemplated by the fourth article. An executive committee might either be formed out of this or constituted as an independent body. Two members from every state, one of them being a member of its government, would give a number large enough to be representative, not too large for swift and effectual decision, and in touch at all times with their respective constituents.

An actual meeting of the Executive Council should not be necessary for a decision. On a manifest emergency the chairman should be empowered to collect votes by telegraph.

The formation of an expert general staff, the technical definition of its functions, and the assignment of the quotas for which it shall be entitled to call upon the constituent states, will be matter for nice and careful adjustment. Obviously there are plenty of difficulties in this operation; but it seems no less obvious that they are of the kind which can be overcome if there is a general will to overcome them; and if there is not such a general will there cannot be any league at all.

It will be said that the establishment of a common authority with discretion. to declare a state of urgency and take the appropriate action involves a serious delegation of sovereign power. This is very true. There is only one material