Denmark against this country? Where were her armies? In Holstein. Where was her fleet? Lying in ordinary. Her armies, so far from being in hostile movement against us, were, to the number of 20,000 men, encamped in Holstein, guarding against the hostile movements of the French. Had they been in Zealand, we might not so easily have been able to congratulate ourselves on the victory we obtained. Her navy, so far from meditating hostilities against us, was surprized, the greater part of it in a state of complete disrepair. It was said that the French would have seized on Holstein, and from thence might have easily passed over into Zealand. This, his lordship understood, was by no means so easy as was imagined; such a frost seldom occurred as to afford a comfortable passage from the one place to the other; and even when it did so happen the people of Zealand might break the ice nearest to their own side. And, supposing that the French might thus have got possession of the Danish navy, what use could they have made of it? What had we to dread from the addition of sixteen sail of the line, of such ships as those of Denmark? Even before the battle of Trafalgar we could have had nothing to dread from such an accession of strength to our enemy, far less now. We were told that hostile dispositions, on the part of the northern powers, had begun to shew themselves ever since the peace of Tilsit. Why then had we allowed a Russian fleet since that time to pass through the Mediterranean, and three sail of the line belonging to Russia to go unmolested, at the very same time the Danish fleet was seized on? Would it not have been more magnanimous to have attacked the powerful than the weak? It was known that the minds of the inhabitants of Petersburgh were favourable to this country. Our fleet, by presenting itself at a proper time before that capital, might have gained possession of it, and thus Sweden would have been saved; and Denmark, who was as much our friend as Russia was our ally, would have been spared. This mode of warfare his lordship objected to, particularly as tending to overturn the law of nations. It would have been more becoming in Great Britain to oppose our honour and good faith to our enemy's mode of warfare. The earl of Aberdeen defended the expedition to Copenhagen. Of the law of nations, self-protection was a principle. Much had been said of the extraordinary and unprecedented nature of this expedition; but there was a precedent for it in the conduct of the late administration towards Turkey. And he did not conceive it to be more probable, that the Turkish fleet should sail into the English channel than the Danish. Lord Grenville said, that from the commencement of the war in 1793, down to the termination of the illustrious administration of the illustrious Mr. Pitt, in no speech from the throne, at the commencement of a session, were parliament called upon to pledge themselves in support of measures without evidence before them of their necessity, propriety, or utility. In no case were they called upon to approve of measures before the papers relating to them were produced, whereon a judgment might be formed according to the evidence of the case; yet, in the present instance, [B 3] ministers ministers departing from so salutary a rule, not only called upon parliament to approve of measures which nothing but absolute necessity could justify, and respecting the necessity of which not a tittle of evidence had been produced, but had even called upon them to applaud other measures now, respecting which papers were to be produced hereafter. There was on the continent of Europe a great reliance on the integrity and justice of the British parliament; and it looked with anxiety for the decision of this council on the motives and policy of the expedition to Copenhagen. This had already made an impression throughout the continent unfavourable to this country. How much greater would that impression be, if parliament should give its decision approving of that expedition? And still more, if it should do so, without any evidence or information on the subject. Ministers had asserted, that there were secret articles in the treaty of Tilsit affecting the interests of this country, and the French government asserted there were none. Here then was a challenge; and it was incumbent on ministers to prove that there were such articles, but this they had not attempted to do; and in the speech from the throne had given up the assertion they bad formerly made, of the existence of those secret articles, in his majesty's declaration respecting Russia. That circumstances might, exist which would imperatively justify such an expedition as that to Copenhagen, was admitted by the most approved writers on the law of nations. The same writers, how ever, stated the dreadful consequences that would result from the application of such a doctrine, unless the imperative circumstances were clearly proved and accurately defined. The danger ought to be clearly established, and the inability of the neutral state to defend itself. With respect to the Danish fleet, which it had been said was in a state of preparation, was it not natural when all the powers around her were at war, that she should be in a state of preparation? But if he had not been grossly misinformed, so far from this being the case, the greater part of the Danish ships were laid up in ordinary. It was contended, that because French troops occupied Holstein, Zealand must fall of course, but this was not at all proved; on the contrary, there were between Holstein and Zealand two passages of the sea; the one six, and the other sixteen miles wide, which a French army must cross to invade Zealand, and where they might be met with effect by British or Danish ships. It might as well be said, that England must be conquered by the French because they occupy the continent of France, there being only a channel twenty-one miles broad between Calais and Dover, as that Zealand must fall if Holstein were occupied by French troops. It had been argued by the noble lord who spoke last, that the expedition to Copenhagen had a precedent in that to Constantinople. Supposing the expedition to Constantinople to have been an instance of bad faith, how is that to justify another instance of bad faith? The fact however was, that the expedition to Turkey was chiefly in conformity with the treaty with Russia, and that its object was not to seize the Turkish fleet, but but to enforce the execution of trea- than those which would tend to the ties. With regard to the two propositions maintained by ministers, first, that we should not enter into a negociation unless the basis thereof should be previously stated; and, secondly, that we should not avail ourselves of the mediation of any power not perfectly impartial, or suspected of partiality to the enemy, Lord G. could not conceive any thing more preposterous. The second proposition was peculiarly untenable, because we do not accept a mediator as an umpire, but merely as a medium of facilitating our communication with the enemy. If the mediator be partial to the enemy, what injury can result to us? We are not bound by his sentiments, and we may avail ourselves of his interposition, by rejecting which we may provoke him to declare against us. Such precisely had been the case with respect to Russia. As to the first proposition there were not in the whole history of this, or any other civilized country, any precedents to be found for sustaining it. With respect to that topic of the speech which related to Portugal, the simple questions were, what we had lost, and what we had gained by the emigration to Portugal? We had lost, as a publication of the enemy had lately stated, two of the most important ports for us on the whole coast of the continent of Europe, Lisbon and Oporto. And, with regard to the transmarine possessions of Portugal, he asked what we had obtained, more than what we possessed before, by the presence of the Prince of Brazil in that settlement? How would the Brazils be made more productive for this country, by any other means consummate ruin of our own colonies? In so far as the emigration in question manifested any friendship for us, or as it presented a contrast to the conduct of other princes, it certainly formed a grateful subject for the contemplation of mankind, and of congratulation to that house. But as to the commercial or political advantages to be derived from it to this country, he could not consent to delude his countrymen by holding out such ideas. In reviewing the dreadful catalogue of evils which surrounded or menaced this country, he believed that the greatest additional calamity for us, and the greatest advantage for France that could be well imagined, would be a war with America. Such, indeed, was the language of ministers themselves. And yet what had been their conduct? Why, at the very time it was most material to avoid such a war, they absolutely altered the law of the land to promote it. Ministers stated, and in that Lord G. agreed with them, that no difficulty or danger could befal the country equal to that of acquiescing in the surrender of our maritime rights. If America put forth such a claim, then a call upon parliament and the country to resist it would be unanimously answered in the affirmative. But Anierica had not asserted any such claim. The speech, Lord G. observed, studiously separated the two questions involved in our controversy with America, namely, that of the Chesapeak, and that relating to our orders of council. But those questions would not be separated in America, nor yet in discussion here. In examining the orders of council, they were to be considered in three [B4] point points of view; first, as affecting our abandon, we would sink into shame Lord Grenville concluded a long speech, of which we have only given briefly the substance, as all the topics he handled afterwards became subjects of separate discussion, with an earnest representation of the importance and necessity of an inquiry into the state of Ireland, with a view to the adoption of measures calculated to conciliate the popula Lord Hawkesbury having observed, that ministers could not be expected to point out the precise quarter and channel from which they had re.ceived their information respecting the arrangements at Tilset, said, that even if ministers entertained any doubt of their information respecting what passed at Tilsit, it must long since have vanished. The information received through the channel alluded to was corroborated by a variety of other channels wholly unconnected with each other. It was corroborated by the, testimony of the government of Portugal, to whom it was proposed to make common cause with the continent against England, and to unite their fleet with that of Spain, of France, and of Denmark, to enable the confederacy to make a general attack on these islands. It was corroborated by the testimony of different persons in Ireland, where all the designs and projects of the enemy were most speedily known, and where it was promised, that the combined facets of Spain, Portugal, and Denmark, should make a descent on both Ireland and Britain, but the principal one on Ireland. A wish had been expressed that we had proceeded to Cronstadt, and seized the Russian fleet, leaving the Danish fleet of sixteen sail of the line behind us!! Besides, the Russian fleet was not so ready for sea, nor so well calculated in any respect as the Danish fleet to carry the designs of the enemy into execution. Further, there were many circumstances in the treaty of Tilsit which indisposed the people of Russia against that treaty; and even at the time the seizure of the Danish fleet was known at Petersburgh, the emperor Alexander seemed more inclined than before to renew his relations with this country. As to all that was urged against the orders in council, and against the treatment of America, while a negociation with America was on foot, it was doubtless better to abstain from a discussion that would tend only farther to inflame the minds of the two countries. He lamented the uncalled-for mention of the state of , Ireland. The concessions alluded to by the noble baron could not now be thought of. Indeed, even if these concessions were made, still more would be called for, and there would be no end of such demands. The earl of Lauderdale replied to lord Hawkesbury, and strongly urged the constitutional necessity of a bill of indemnity for the orders of council. Lord Mulgrave admitted, that neither at the time of rejecting the Russian mediation, nor at this moment, had government any copy of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. They were in possession of secret projects, but could only as sert, not adduce proof of their nature. The duke of Norfolk's motion, to omit the fourth paragraph in the proposed address to the throne, respecting the seizure of the Danish fleet; and another amendment by lord Grenville, declaratory of the opinion of the house, that it would neither be respectful to his majesty, nor becoming the dignity of the house, to give an opinion as to the propriety of rejecting the Russian mediation till the papers relative to that question were before the house, were both negatived without a division. The address was then agreed to, and ordered to be presented.-Against the decision of the house respecting the seizure of the Danish fleets, protests, with reasons of dissent, were entered by the duke of Clarence, lord Rawdon, the earl of Lauderdale, the earl Grey, lord Vassal Holland, the duke of Norfolk, the viscount Sidmouth, and lord Erskine. On the same day, Jan. 21, in the house of commons, as soon as the speech from the throne was read from the chair, Lord Hamilton rose, and in a maiden speech moved the address. After a review of the extraordinary state of Europe, the difficulties and dangers that environed our country, and the success and the glory with which it had made head against all these; he said, that in the regret which his majesty had expressed at being compelled to adopt hostile measures against Denmark, the house would undoubtedly join; but it would be a regret unmixed with reproach: for, after the treaty of Tilsit, and the subsequent conduct of Russia and Denmark, it was impossible that any man could doubt of a combination of powers having been formed against us. Too long had the common enemy of Europe been permitted to proceed in his career of violence to neutral powers for the aggrandizement of his own. That the expedition to Copenhagen was |