measure, Buonaparte could never have put his decrees in execution, if we had not assisted him by stopping our own goods while finding their way to the continental markets. Commerce was much more necessary to us than to France; and therefore it was folly in us to act upon these orders, which only secured the attainment of the objects of France.

Lord Grenville said, if a neutral power granted certain advantages to the enemy, then we had an undoubted right to insist on being admitted to the same advantages; or, if a neutral power acquiesced from weakness, in the demands of the enemy, all that we could in justice require, was, that in consequence of this demand, the enemy should not be placed in a better situation in regard to her than we were. But we had no right, because the enemy violated the rights of one neutral, to violate the rights of all neutrals; for if this principle were once admitted, it would lead to an tension of hostilities over the whole civilized world. The foundation of the orders in council was stated in the preamble to be, that neutral states had not obtained the revocation of the French decree; a circumstance which he considered as of no importance whatever; for if it was not executed, it was the same thing as if it had never been published. It could not be asserted that America had acquiesced in this decree. Having then mentioned several facts in proof of this, he said, that if any thing, after all the circumstances which he had enumerated, was necessary to evince the determination of America not to submit to an invasion of her rights on the part of

France, the embargo lately laid ora her shipping, not after receiving the British orders in council, but after the receipt of advices from France, would be amply sufficient for that purpose. The old argumeuts which were used in favour of the dispensing power of raising ship money, &c. were, like the present measure, justified on the plea of necessity. He had always thought, however, that our ancestors had set these questions, and all of a similar nature, to rest, at the time of the revolution. Lord G. contended, that in many in, stances the orders were unintelligible. He would undertake to prove, that in four clauses of the same paragraph, they contained four direct contradictions. Lord G. proceeded to shew the extreme impolicy of the orders. They tended to effect a fundamental change in the whole commercial relations of the country, both with belligerent and commercial powers. They tended to subject this country to a loss in the same proportion that they distressed the enemy. This principle of forcing trade into our markets, would have disgraced the darkest ages of monopoly. The orders were calculated to defeat their own object. No ship would submit to the ignominy of touching and paying tribute at a British port, merely for the purpose of exposing itself to capture and confiscation by the French.

Lord Auckland was replied to, and the orders in council defended, by the earl of Bathurst. The order of the 7th of January, 1807, he observed, did distinctly assert the right of his majesty to adopt farther measures of retaliation, if France ·-did not, in the mean time, recede from the violent pretensions on

which the decree of the 21st November 1806, was founded. France had not receded; but on the contrary, the head of the French government had ordered a more rigorous execution of the decree; and, therefore, the British order of November 11, 1807, and the subsequent orders, became necessary. It was found expedient to regulate that trade, which could not be prohibited. With this view the orders in council were issued; which were, in fact, a compromise between belligerent rights and commercial interests. In making the enemy, however, feel his own acts of violence, every possible attention had been paid to the commercial interests of the country. Lord Auckland had expressed his wonder, that neutrals were allowed to trade with the enemy's colonies, whereas an opposite policy would have tended to relieve our own West India planters and merchants, from that pressure which affected them, in consequence of the superabundance of the produce beyond the demand.

was found that the surplus produce of our own colonies, beyond our own consumption, was not above a third of what was wanted for the supply of the continent, it was thought expedient to admit of the trade with the enemy's colonies: with the intention, however, that the produce of such colonies should, in the circuitous trade through this country, be subjected to a duty, sufficiently high, to prevent its having advantages over our own colonial produce; and also for embarrassing the commerce of the enemy.

The legality and justice of the orders in council, was also maintained by the lord chancellor and lord Hawkesbury. From the preamble to the French decree of November 21, the chancellor contended, that Buonaparte must have meant not only to exclude British produce and manufactures from his ports, but also to prevent all trade whatever in British commodities. Whoever traded with Great Britain, was to be considered as an enemy to France: which was a flagrant violation of the rights of neutrals and the law of nations.

To this remark, lord Bathurst replied, that this, in fact; was intended as a boor to the Americans, and inust be to them of great value; because, when intelligence arrived in America, of the intention of the French government rigorously to execute the decree, and the embargo was in consequence resorted to, the general impression there was, that we would resort to measures of retaliation, which would amount to a prohibition of their trade with those colonies. It was intended, that all American domestic produce should be allowed to pass through this country with out the payment of any duty, ex-in his opinion, tantamount to a de cept the article of cotton. As it claration of war against America. VOL. L. [G]*

Lord Hawkesbury predicted, from the orders of council, a great many commercial advantages. With regard to the point of legality, he insisted chiefly on the old argumentum ad hominem taken from the order of council, Jan. 7.

The earl of Lauderdale wished the orders to be considered, not on their comparative, hut their own positive merits. He believed that they had been infinitely mischiev ous. They injured neutrals much more than the enemy; and were,

Lord.

Lord viscount Sidmouth was desirous, that the orders might be referred to a committee, that he might have an opportunity of fully investigating this important subject; on which he had not yet been able to form a decided opinion.

The house then divided. For lord Auckland's motion 48-Against it 106.

On the same day, in the house of commons, Mr. Ponsonby, who had moved for some papers relative to America, but which were not yet ready to be laid before the house, said, that he hoped the chancellor of the exchequer would agree to postpone the second read ing of the bill, relative to the orders of council, for three or four days, as the subject was not only momentous but intricate.

The chancellor of the exchequer could not see the necessity of the papers cailed for.

After some little debate on this point, Mr. Whitbread moved, "That the second reading of the said bill be now read, for the purpose of being discharged."

After some observations on both sides, the house divided. For dis charging the order 81-Against it 113. But it was finally agreed, that the second reading of the bill should be postponed till Thursday the 18th, upon a mutual understanding, that there should be no delay required beyond that day: when, accordingly, the order of the day was moved for the second reading of the orders of council bill..

The motion was opposed by Mr. Eden, the earl Temple, Mr. Hibbert, Mr. William Smith, and lord H. Petty; and supported by the advocate general, (sir John Nichols) Mr. Rose, and lord Castlereagh.

In the preceding discussions on the orders in council, in both houses, the debate was confined almost solely to the justice, or legality of the measure. The ques tion of policy seemed to have been industriously avoided; or when brought forward, it was touched on but slightly. In the debate of this night, and in subsequent debates, the question of policy was fully as much discussed as that of legality.

Lord Temple observed, that there was now only one neutral, by whose means our commerce might be carried on, and why did we assist the views of Buonaparte, by closing up this outlet? By these orders we were distressing our own colonies, by bringing so much produce into competition with theirs, as far as exportation to foreign markets was concerned. We were preventing the Americans from carrying off the surplus of our Indian commodities, and by stopping up their channels of trade, rendered them less able to purchase our own manufactures.

Mr. Hibbert denied, that in these orders there was any particular view to the interests of the West India trade. The great quantity of goods which would be brought here for exportation would interfere, whatever the duty might be, with the exportation of our own commodities.

Mr. William Smith, having observed, that it was not expected to be able to compel Buonaparte to rescind his decree, and that all that could be done, was, to press so heavily on the people, as to force them to smuggle; said, that the question came to this: whether we should run the risk of provoking the hostility of America, or continuing her

embargo,

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