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mined. If some of these suits be carried to | other courts, will it be wrong? They will still have business enough. Then there is no danger that particular subjects, small in proportion, being taken out of the jurisdiction of the State judiciaries, will render them useless and of no effect. Does the gentleman think that the State courts will have no cognizance of cases not mentioned here? Are there any words in this constitution which exclude the courts of the States from those cases which they now possess? Does the gentleman imagine this to be the case? Will any gentleman believe it? Are not controversies respecting lands, claimed under the grants of different States, the only controversies between citizens of the same State, which the federal judiciary can take cognizance of? The case is so clear, that to prove it would be an useless waste of time. The State courts will not lose the jurisdiction of the causes they now decide. They have a concurrence of jurisdiction with the federal courts in those cases in which the latter have cognizance.

How disgraceful is it that the State courts cannot be trusted, says the honorable gentleman. What is the language of the constitution? Does it take away their jurisdiction? Is it not necessary that the federal courts should have cognizance of cases arising under the constitution and the laws of the United States? What is the service or purpose of a judiciary, but to execute the laws in a peaceable, orderly manner, without shedding blood, or creating a contest, or availing yourselves of force? If this be the case, where can its jurisdiction be more necessary than here?

cases. The contrary is well known to you, Mr. Chairman, to be the case in this commonwealth. With respect to mills, roads, and other cases, appeals lie from the inferior to the superior court, as to fact, as well as law. Is it clear that there can be no case in common law, in which an appeal as to fact might be proper and necessary? Can you not conceive a case where it would be productive of advantages to the people at large, to submit to that tribunal the final determination, involving facts as well as law? Suppose it should be deemed for the convenience of the citizens, that those things which concerned foreign ministers, should be tried in the inferior courts: if justice should be done, the decision would satisfy all. But if an appeal in matters of fact could not be carried to the superior court, then it would result, that such cases could not be tried before the inferior courts, for fear of injurious and partial decisions.

But, sir, where is the necessity of discriminating between the three cases of chancery, admiralty, and common law? Why not leave it to Congress? Will it enlarge their powers? Is it necessary for them wantonly to infringe your rights? Have you any thing to apprehend, when they can, in no case, abuse their power without rendering themselves hateful to the people at large? When this is the case, something may be left to the legislature, freely chosen by ourselves, from among ourselves, who are to share the burdens imposed upon the community, and who can be changed at our pleasure. Where power may be trusted, and there is no motive to abuse it, it seems to me to be as well to leave it undetermined, as to fix it in the constitution.

To what quarter will you look for protection from an infringement on the constitution, if you will not give the power to the judiciary? With respect to disputes between a State and There is no other body that can afford such a the citizens of another State, its jurisdiction has protection. But the honorable member objects been decried with unusual vehemence. I hope to it, because, says he, the officers of the gov- no gentleman will think that a State will be ernment will be screened from merited punish- called at the bar of the federal court. Is there ment by the federal judiciary. The federal no such case at present? Are there not many sheriff, says he, will go into a poor man's house cases in which the legislature of Virginia is a and beat him, or abuse his family, and the fed-party, and yet the State is not sued? It is not eral court will protect him. Does any gentle- rational to suppose, that the sovereign power man believe this? Is it necessary that the shall be dragged before a court. The intent is, officers will commit a trespass on the property to enable States to recover claims of individuals or persons of those with whom they are to residing in other States. I contend this contransact business? Will such great insults on struction is warranted by the words. But, say the people of this country be allowable? Were they, there will be partiality in it, if a State a law made to authorize them, it would be void. cannot be defendant-if an individual cannot The injured man would trust to a tribunal in proceed to obtain judgment against a State, his neighborhood. To such a tribunal he would though he may be sued by a State. It is necesapply for redress, and get it. There is no rea- sary to be so, and cannot be avoided. I see a son to fear that he would not meet that justice difficulty in making State defendant, which there, which his country will be ever willing does not prevent its being plaintiff. If this be to maintain. But on appeal, says the honorable only what cannot be avoided, why object to the gentleman, what chance is there to obtain jus-system on that account? If an individual has tice? This is founded on an idea, that they will not be impartial. There is no clause in the constitution, which bars the individual member injured, from applying to the State courts to give him redress. He says, that there is no instance of appeals as to fact in common law VOL. II.-2

a just claim against any particular State, is it to be presumed, that on application to its legislature, he will not obtain satisfaction? But how could a State recover any claim from a citizen of another State, without the establishment of these tribunals.

justice. But the court of chancery grants relief. Would it not be so in the federal court? Would not depositions be taken to prove the payments, and if proved, would not the decision of the court be accordingly?

He objects, in the next place, to its jurisdiction in controversies between a State and a foreign state. Suppose, says he, in such a suit, a foreign state is cast, will she be bound by the decision? If a foreign state brought a suit against the commonwealth of Virginia, would she not be barred from the claim if the federal judiciary thought it unjust? The previous consent of the parties is necessary; and, as a federal judiciary will decide, each party will acquiesce. It will be the means of preventing disputes with foreign nations. On an attentive consideration of these courts, I trust every part will appear satisfactory to the committee.

The honorable member objects to suits being instituted in the federal courts by the citizens of one State against the citizens of another State. Were I to contend, that this was necessary in all cases, and that the government without it would be defective, I should not use my own judgment. But are not the objections to it carried too far? Though it may not in general, be absolutely necessary, a case may happen, as has been observed, in which a citizen of one State ought to be able to recur to this tribunal, to recover a claim from the citizen of another State. What is the evil which this can produce? Will he get more than justice there? The independence of the judges forbids it. What has he to get? Justice. Shall we object to this, because the citizen of another State can obtain justice without applying to our State courts? It may be necessary with respect to the laws and regulations of commerce, which Congress may make. It may be necessary in cases of debt, and some other controversies. In claims for land it is not necessary, but it is not dangerous. In the court of which State will it be instituted said the honorable gentleman. It will be instituted in the court of the State where the defendant resides, where the law can come at him, and nowhere else. By the laws of which State will it be determined-said he. By the laws of the State where the contract was made. According to those laws, and those only, can it be decided. Is this a novelty? No, it is a principle in the jurisprudence of this commonwealth. If a man contracted a debt in the East Indies, and it was sued for here, the decision must be consonant to the laws of that country. Suppose a contract made in Maryland, where the annual interest is at six per centum, and a suit instituted for it in Virginia, what interest would be given now, without any federal aid? The interest of Maryland, most certainly, and if the contract had been made in Virginia, and suit brought in Maryland, the interest of Virginia must be given without doubt. It is now to be governed by the laws of that State where the contract was made. The laws which governed the contract at its formation, govern it in its decision. Te preserve the peace of the Union only, its jurisdiction in this case ought to be recurred to. Let us consider, that when citizens of one State carry on trade in another State, much must be due to the one from the other, as the case between North Carolina and Virginia. Would not the refusal of justice to our citizens, from the courts of North Carolina, produce disputes between the States? Would the federal judiciary swerve from their duty, in order to give partial and unjust decisions?

The exclusion of trial by jury in this case, he urged, would prostrate our rights. Does the word court only mean the judges? Does not the determination of a jury, necessarily lead to the judgment of the court? Is there any thing here which gives the judges exclusive jurisdiction of matters of fact? What is the object of a jury trial? To inform the court of the facts. When a court has cognizance of facts, does it not follow, that they can make inquiry by a jury? It is impossible to be otherwise. I hope that in this country, where impartiality is so much admired, the laws will direct facts to be ascertained by a jury. But, says the honorable gentleman, the juries in the ten miles square will be mere tools of parties, with which he would not trust his person or property, which, he says, he would rather leave to the court. Because the government may have a district ten miles square, will no man stay there but the tools and officers of the government? Will nobody else be found there? Is it so in any other part of the world, where a government has legislative power? Are there none but officers and tools of the government of Virginia in Richmond? Will there not be independent merchants, and respectable gentlemen of fortune, within the ten miles square? Will there not be worthy farmers and mechanics? Will not a good jury be found there as well as any where else? Will the officers of the government become improper to be on a jury? What is it to the government, whether this man or that man succeeds? It is all one thing. Does the constitution say, that juries shall consist of officers, or that the supreme court shall be held in the ten miles square? It was acknowledged by the honorable member, that it was secure in England. What makes it secure there? Is it their constitution? What part of The objection respecting the assignment of their constitution is there, that the parliament a bond to a citizen of another State, has been cannot change? As the preservation of this fully answered. But suppose it were to be right is in the hands of parliament, and it has tried as he says, what would be given more ever been held sacred by them, will the govthan was actually due in the case he men-ernment of America be less honest than that tioned? It is possible, in our courts as they of Great Britain? Here a restriction is to be now stand, to obtain a judgment for more than found. The jury is not to be brought out of

the State. There is no such restriction in that | fied in law and fact? The honorable gentlegovernment; for the laws of parliament de- man says, that no law of Congress can make cide every thing respecting it. Yet gentlemen any exception to the federal, appellate jurisdictell us, that there is safety there, and nothing tion of fact as well as law. He has frequently here but danger. It seems to me, that the laws spoken of technical terms, and the meaning of of the United States will generally secure trials them. What is the meaning of the term exby a jury of the vicinage, or in such manner as ception? Does it not mean an alternation and will be most safe and convenient for the people. diminution? Congress is empowered to make But it seems that the right of challenging exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction, as to the jurors is not secured in this constitution. law and fact, of the supreme court. These exIs this done by our own constitution, or by any ceptions certainly go as far as the legislature provision of the English government? Is it may think proper, for the interest and liberty done by their magna charta, or bill of rights? of the people. Who can understand this word, This privilege is founded on their laws. If so, exception, to extend to one case as well as the why should it be objected to the American con- other? I am persuaded, that a reconsiderastitution, that it is not inserted in it? If we tion of this case will convince the gentleman, are secure in Virginia, without mentioning it that he was mistaken. This may go to the cure in our constitution, why should not this security of the mischief apprehended. Gentlemen must be found in the federal court? be satisfied, that this power will not be so much abused as they have said.

The honorable member says, that he derives no consolation from the wisdom and integrity of the legislature, because we call them to rectify defects which it is our duty to remove. We ought well to weigh the good and evil before we determine. We ought to be well convinced that the evil will be really produced before we decide against it. If we be convinced that the good greatly preponderates, though there may be small defects in it, shall we give up that which is really good, when we can remove the little mischief it may contain, in the plain, easy method pointed out in the system itself?

The honorable gentleman said much about the quit rents in the Northern Neck. I will refer it to the honorable gentleman himself. Has he not acknowledged that there was no complete title? Was he not satisfied, that the right of the legal representatives of the proprietor did not exist at the time he mentioned? If so, it cannot exist now. I will leave it to those gentlemen who come from that quarter. I trust they will not be intimidated on this account, in voting on this question. A law passed in 1782, which secures this. He says that many poor men may be harassed and injured by the representatives of Lord Fairfax. If he has no right, this cannot be done. If he has this right, and comes to Virginia, what laws will his claims be determined by? By those of this State. By what tribunals will they be determined? By our State courts. Would not the poor man, who was oppressed by an unjust prosecution, be abundantly protected and satisfied by the temper of his neighbors, and would he not find ample justice? What reason has the honorable member to apprehend partiality or injustice? He supposes that if the judges be judges of both the federal and State courts, they will incline in favor of one government. If such contests should arise, who could more He states a case, that a man may be carried properly decide them, than those who are to from a federal to an anti-federal corner, and swear to do justice? If we can expect a fair vice versa where men are ready to destroy him. decision any where, may we not expect justice Is this probable? Is it presumable that they to be done by the judges of both the federal will make a law to punish men who are of difand State governments? But, says the hon-ferent opinions in politics from themselves? Is orable member, laws may be executed tyrannically. Where is the independency of your judges? If a law be exercised tyrannically in Virginia, to what can you trust? To your judiciary. What security have you for justice? Their independence. Will it not be so in the federal court?

Gentlemen ask what is meant by law cases, and if they be not distinct from facts. Is there no law arising on cases in equity and admiralty? Look at the acts of assembly; have you not many cases, where law and fact are blended? Does not the jurisdiction in point of law as well as fact, find itself completely satis

I was astonished when I heard the honorable gentleman say, that he wished the trial by jury to be struck out entirely. Is there no justice to be expected by a jury of our fellow-citizens? Will any man prefer to be tried by a court, when the jury is to be of his countrymen, and probably of his vicinage? We have reason to believe the regulations with respect to juries will be such as shall be satisfactory. Because it does not contain all, does it contain nothing? But I conceive that this committee will see there is safety in the case, and that there is no mischief to be apprehended.

it presumable, that they will do it in one single case, unless it be such a case as must satisfy the people at large? The good opinion of the people at large must be consulted by their representatives; otherwise mischiefs would be produced, which would shake the government to its foundation. As it is late, I shall not mention all the gentleman's argument; but some parts of it are so glaring, that I cannot pass them over in silence. He says that the establishment of these tribunals, and more particularly in their jurisdiction of controversies bebetween citizens of these States and foreign citizens snd subjects, is like a retrospective law.

Is there no difference between a tribunal which shall give justice and effect to an existing right, and creating a right that did not exist before? The debt or claim is created by the individual; he has bound himself to comply with it; does the creation of a new court amount to a retrospective law?

The honorable gentleman says, that unjust claims will be made, and the defendant had better pay them than go to the supreme court. Can you suppose such a disposition in one of your citizens, as that to oppress another man, he will incur great expenses? What will he gain by an unjust demand? Does a claim establish a right? He must bring his witnesses to prove his claim. If he does not bring his witnesses, the expenses must fall upon him. Will he go on a calculation that the defendant will not defend it, or cannot produce a witness? Will he incur a great deal of expense, from a dependence on such a chance? Those who know human nature, black as it is, must know that mankind are too well attached to their interest to run such a risk. I conceive that this power is absolutely necessary, and not dangerous; that should it be attended by little inconveniences, they will be altered, and that they can have no interest in not altering them. Is

We are satisfied with the provision made in this country on the subject of trial by jury. Does our constitution direct trials to be by jury? It is required in our bill of rights, which is not a part of the constitution. Does any security arise from hence? Have you a jury when a judgment is obtained on a replevin bond, or by default? Have you a jury when a motion is made for the commonwealth against an individual; or when a motion is made by one joint obligor against another, to recover sums paid as security? Our courts decide in all these cases, without the intervention of a jury; yet they are all civil cases. The bill of rights is merely recommendatory. Were it other-there any real danger? When I compare it to wise, the consequence would be, that many laws which are found convenient, would be unconstitutional. What does the government before you say? Does it exclude the legislature from giving a trial by jury in civil cases? If it does not forbid its exclusion, it is on the same footing on which your State government stands now. The legislature of Virginia does not give a trial by jury where it is not necessary. But gives it wherever it is thought expedient. The federal legislature will do so too, as it is formed on the same principles.

the exercise of the same power in the govern-
ment of Virginia, I am persuaded there is not.
The federal government has no other motive,
and has every reason of doing right, which the
members of our State legislature have. Will a
man on the Eastern Shore, be sent to be tried
in Kentucky; or a man from Kentucky be
brought to the Eastern Shore to have his trial?
A government by doing this would destroy it-
self. I am convinced, the trial by jury will be
regulated in the manner most advantageous to
the community.

SPEECH IN ROBBINS' CASE.

This speech in the case of Thomas Nash alias | and what was still more valuable, the very able Jonathan Robbins, who was surrendered to the British Government for trial for a supposed murder, committed by him on board of a British man-of-war, was delivered by Mr. Marshall in the House of Representatives, on the fourth of March, 1800: *

Believing, as I do, most seriously, that in a Government constituted like that of the United States, much of the public happiness depends, not only on its being rightly administered, but on the measures of administration being rightly understood: on rescuing public opinion from those numerous prejudices with which so many causes might combine to surround it, I have been highly gratified with the very eloquent,

* Certain resolutions were brought forward in the House of Representatives, censuring the President of the United States for the surrender of Robbins, in terms of decided disapprobation, as unconstitutional and improper.-See Bee's Reports and Wharton's State Trials.

and very correct argument which has been de-
Bayard, against the resolutions now under con-
livered by the gentleman from Delaware, Mr.
sideration. I had not expected that the effect
of this argument would have been universal;
but I had cherished the hope, and in this I
have not been disappointed, that it would be
very extensive. I do not flatter myself with
being able to shed much new light on the sub-
ject; but, as the argument in opposition to the
resolutions has been assailed, with considerable
ability, by gentlemen of great talents, I trust
the House will not think the time misapplied,
which will be devoted to the re-establishment
of the principles contained in that argument,
and to the refutation of those advanced in op-
position to it. In endeavoring to do this, I
shall notice the observations in support of the
resolutions, not in the precise order in which
they are made; but as they apply to the differ-
ent points, I deem it necessary to maintain, in
order to demonstrate, that the conduct of the
Executive of the United States cannot justly be

}

charged with the errors imputed to it by the resolutions.

My first proposition is, that the case of Thomas Nash, as stated to the President, is completely within the 27th article of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, entered into between the United States of America and Great Britain.*

He read the Article, and then observed:

The casus fœderis of this article occurs, when a person, having committed murder or forgery within the jurisdiction of one of the contracting parties, and having sought an asylum in the country of the other, is charged with the crime, and his delivery demanded, on such proof of his guilt as, according to the laws of the place where he shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the

offence had there been committed.

The case stated is, that Thomas Nash, having committed a murder on board of a British

frigate, navigating the high seas under a commission from His Britannic Majesty, had sought an asylum within the United States, and on this case his delivery was demanded by the minister of the King of Great Britain.

It is manifest that the case stated, if support ed by proof, is within the letter of the article, provided a murder committed in a British frigate, on the high seas, be committed within the jurisdiction of that nation.

That such a murder is within their jurisdiction, has been fully shown by the gentleman from Delaware. The principle is, that the jurisdiction of a nation extends to the whole of its territory, and to its own citizens in every part of the world. The laws of a nation are rightfully obligatory on its own citizens in every situation, where those laws are really extended to them. This principle is founded on the nature of civil union. It is supported every where by public opinion, and is recognized by writers on the law of nations. Rutherforth, in his second volume, p. 180, says: "The jurisdiction which a civil society has over the persons of its members, affects them immediately, whether they are within its ter

ritories or not."

* The twenty-seventh article of the treaty between the United States and Great Britain, runs thus:

"ART. 27. It is further agreed that His Majesty and the United States, on mutual requisitions, by them respectively or by their respective ministers or officers authorized to

make the same, will deliver up to justice all persons, who

being charged with murder or forgery, committed within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an asylum within any

of the countries of the other: provided that this shall only

be done on such evidence of criminality, as according to the

laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commit

ment for trial, if the offence had there been committed. The expense of such apprehension and delivery shall be borne and defrayed by those who make the requisition and receive the fugitive."

This general principle is especially true, and is particularly recognized, with respect to the fleets of a nation on the high seas. To punish offences committed in its fleet, is the practice of every nation in the universe; and consequently the opinion of the world is, that a fleet at sea is within the jurisdiction of the nation to which it belongs. Rutherforth, volume 2, p. 491, says, there can be no doubt about the jurisdiction of a nation over the persons which compose its fleets, when they are out at sea, tioned in any particular part of it. whether they are sailing upon it or are sta

latin, though he has not directly controverted The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Galthis doctrine, has sought to weaken it by observing, that the jurisdiction of a nation at sea could not be complete even in its own vessels; and in support of this position, he urged the admitted practice of submitting to search for within the territory of a neutral power. The contraband-a practice not tolerated on land, rule is as stated; but is founded on a principle which does not affect the jurisdiction of a nation over its citizens or subjects in its ships. The principle is, that in the sea, itself, no nation has any jurisdiction. All may equally exof a belligerent power to prevent aid being ercise their rights, and consequently the right given to his enemy, is not restrained by any superior right of a neutral in the place. But if this argument possessed any force, it would not apply to national ships of war, since the usage of nations does not permit them to be

searched.

and the opinions of writers on the law of naAccording to the practice of the world, then, tions, the murder committed on board of a British frigate navigating the high seas, was a murder committed within the jurisdiction of the British nation.

the letter of the article, it has been contended Although such a murder is plainly within not to be within its just construction; because at sea all nations have a common jurisdiction, and the article correctly construed, will not embrace a case of concurrent jurisdiction.

It is deemed unnecessary to controvert this construction, because the proposition, that the United States had no jurisdiction over the murder committed by Thomas Nash, is believed to be completely demonstrable.

It is not true that all nations have jurisdiction over all offences committed at sea. On the contrary, no nation has any jurisdiction at sea, but over its own citizens or vessels, or offences against itself. This principle is laid down in Rutherford, volume 2, p. 488, 491.

solemn occasion, avowed the same principle. The American government has, on a very The first minister of the French Republic asserted and exercised powers of so extraordinary a nature, as unavoidably to produce a controversy with the United States. The situation in which the government then found itself, was such as necessarily to occasion a very seri

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