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cessity not only fails you, but the reasons you | is engaged at the distance of several hundred render are converted against you.

But the Spaniards will excite the Indians. Do not the papers before us prove that the Indians were peaceable, undisturbing, undisturbed, until you invaded Florida? Put an end to your invasion, and you put an end to Indian excitement. Indians on their own soil defend themselves, and this you call crime; they re- | taliate as far as they can your wrong, and this you call abomination. But the Spanish seduce the negroes. Is the fact verified? How can they have communication with the negroes of Georgia? And if they had, did they ever do so until you invaded their territory-until you had promised fifty acres of land to every Spaniard who would betray his country, and violate his allegiance? It stands an undisputed fact, that Matthews, the agent of this government, did this. Mr. Foster expressly charges it on Mr. Monroe, and he does not deny the fact. He admits it. I appeal to the correspondence of November, 1811. In the whole progress of this business you make your previous wrong an apology for subsequent wrong. All the evils that have happened, all that you apprehend, are the necessary and natural consequences of your previous acts:

"I do the wrong, and first begin the brawl; The secret mischiefs that I set abroach, I lay unto the grievous charge of others." But so far from its being a sound position, that military necessity irresistibly compels you to this measure, I venture to assert that, in a merely military point of view, you cannot do any thing so erroneous, probably so fatal as the occupation of East Florida.

If you mean to press this undertaking with zeal, and with that ardor and promptitude that can alone give you a chance of success, the whole force of the southern country ought in May next to be driving at this object. Will you not then invite an invasion by Great Britain at the very spot, at the very time she desires? This enterprise will at any rate suggest to her the design, because it affords the opportunity-the enviable opportunity, of causing a diversion from your Canada project, and dispensing at the same time the most effectual relief to their allies. I ask, whether this project, drawing as it necessarily must the whole of the southern defensive force from the points of defence, does not insure an invasion from your present enemy, and at the very point, where, from peculiar circumstances, you are most vulnerable?

Gentlemen seem to hug themselves in the notion that Charleston is secure, as though that were the only point to be preserved; but examine the maps of that country, recollect the military and naval operations of colonial times, and inquire into the practicability of an English fleet entering the harbor of Port Royal, and effecting at that point the invasion of the Southern States. Your whole effective force

miles in foreign conquest. Would you not soon be compelled to raise your siege of the capital of Florida, and, hurrying home to relieve a deserted and unprotected country, pursued by the emancipated and enraged troops of St. Augustine, harassed night and day by parties of Seminoles and Creeks, arrive, if you arrive at all, faint and exhausted, to encounter a new and formidable enemy. Proceed with this fatal enterprise, and deplorable indeed will be the fate of our Southern brethren.

It is made matter of serious accusation against the Spaniards, that in defence of their own homes, they intend to employ black troops. I do not know what right we have to dictate to them on this important point of complexion. We provoke to combat. We are assailants, and for plunder, and yet undertake to prescribe to our devoted victim the mode of his defence. Black troops were employed by Spain in 1739, at the same place and for the same purpose they are now employed. England has thousands and tens of thousands of black and colored troops in her pay, as I am afraid we shall to our cost discover.

We employed black troops in the war of our Revolution. The State of Rhode Island raised a black regiment. But though we have neither the power nor the right to prohibit the employment of such troops by our enemy, I admit, as has been suggested, that the consequences may be tremendous. That unhappy species of population, which prevails in our southern country, aroused to reflection by the sight of black soldiers, and black officers, may suspect themselves to be fellow-men, and fondly dream they likewise could be soldiers and officers. The bloody tragedy of St. Domingo, may be acted over again, in this devoted country. If your enemy has half the malignity of motive, or atrocity of design, which, for the purpose of goading a reluctant people to drag on an unprofitable and unnecessary war, you daily impute to him, he will aid the in this nefarious business.

Refrain, then, from this measure, which has such a host of evils in its train. If I were a citizen of South Carolina or Georgia, I should doubly deplore and deprecate this attack on St. Augustine. I would down on my knees, to entreat the government to forbear. I should protest against this withdrawing all the efficient force of the country, to a distant and dangerous point, for the purpose of a wicked war of offence, when all that force will be wanted for defence and protection at home, and to repel the invasion which this measure will inevitably suggest and superinduce. I do address this consideration, most sincerely and solemnly, to the honorable gentlemen from those States. that while you are pursuing foreign conquest, your own homes are not devastated. Take care, that while your war eagle is soaring a sublime and romantic flight, and "beating widely on the wing for prey," her own eyry be not plundered, and she compelled to turn her course homeward; "her pinions guided by her young

Take care,

ones' cries." Will you, for the chance of conquering East Florida-of annexing the Island of Amelia to your territory-of satisfying the cupidity of land-speculators, or even of gratifying a mistaken sense of interest in a respectable State, encounter the terrible contingencies, the almost certain horrors of negro insurrection, of Indian hostility, of midnight conflagration, of widespread ruin and indiscriminate massacre?

Sir, it appears to me, that the prominent argument, that is urged for the adoption of this measure, viz., the war with England, is the strongest argument against it. What is the great object of your policy, your solitary hope of success, in your war against England? It is avowed to be, the conquest of Canada. How is this to be effected? by frittering your force into various divisions; an army of the south, an army of the north, and an army of the west? No, sir, if like our ally France, we are impelled by this lust of conquest, and aspire to like success, we must adopt her mode of ensuring it. Select one great point for attainment, and keeping that steadily in view, press upon it with all the energy of your means. Why scatter your forces, in numerous, frivolous, and unavailing plans? Why not make one grand, undivided effort, and conquer Canada? Why divert into such various channels that force, which ought to be accumulated and contracted into one irresistible torrent?

By pursuing both, we shall be disappointed in both objects. Your war with Spain will ruin your war with England. Your war with England will ruin your war with Spain. Is it true that a war with England and at the same time with Spain, has always been intended? Last year the propositions to seize East Florida, and to conquer Canada, were associated. The inducements then held out were an enlargement and arrondissement of territory at the two extremities—a fair division of the spoil. We consent that you may conquer Canada; permit us to conquer Florida. The declaration that Canada should be conquered and retained was the exacted pledge of the northern men who voted for the war. You have got their votes. You have not, you cannot redeem your pledge. How is it that the proposition for seizing Florida is revived and so strenuously enforced, and so little is said, or done, or wished as to the conquest and incorporation of Canada? Where is the promised benefit to the North?

But, sir, it seems a point of honor demands that we should continue our efforts to reduce the fortress of St. Augustine, because the Spaniards refuse an amnesty to those worthy individuals who were willing to betray their country into our hands. Not only our sympathies are addressed, and even our deliberate approbation challenged for traitors and conspirators, dignified with the name of patriots, but we are invoked for their sakes solely, to plunge into a new war. And to this we are invoked in the hallowed name of the national faith. It is almost degradation to be obliged to examine such

an allegation. Have we not denied the acts of Matthews-refused to ratify them? I will not say, that by this the government did not violate its faith with Matthews-so far as it relates to this, instead of imputing exclusive blame to this unfortunate, and, as I understand, confessedly meritorious officer, I cannot but believe that he thought he acted with perfect good faith to the government; strictly in virtue of his private, if not public instructions-and that he counted not only on the support but the applause of government. Cruelly disappointed in the result, he conceived that he had just cause of complaint

he considered himself the victim of a temporising, vacillating, insidious policy-and I ask the honorable gentleman from Georgia, did not Matthews die with such sentiments trembling to the very last on his lips? The averment of his own honor and innocence of the tergiversation and pusillanimity of his employers. Was he not hurrying on to Washington, literally for his vindication; when, fortunately for those he had it in his power to expose, death arrested his course? But, sir, what is the ground of the government? They distinctly assert that Matthews has transcended his powers; that he has acted without the scope of his authority. He cannot, say the government, produce our letter of permission to sanction what he has done. Then, clearly, the consequence is, our faith was not compromitted, for our name and authority were not legally or fairly used. Our sympathies cannot justly be awakened for those conspirators. We are not interested in this amnesty. Let the Spanish Government deal with these men, as we should have done with Arnold, had he fallen into our power. Let them meet the punishment of traitors; or let them, rousing themselves to a new, and by us unprompted effort, deserve to be successful. Let them take the chance of being rebels or patriots; of swallowing the hemlock, or being crowned with myrtle.

That indeed is a suspicious patriotism, which bargains beforehand for foreign aid: that is hardly a valorous patriotism, that submits nothing to hazard-that conditions for amnesty before guilt, and secures the spoil, without fighting the battle. I will not say I have no sympathy for these people. I would save them if I could; but I will not, on their account, endanger my country's peace or fame. But another claim upon our honor is, our troops were attacked at Moosa-Moosa, where is it? within two miles of the fortress of St. Augustine. And if you had the camp of an enemy at Georgetown, threatening the capitol, the existence of your government-a foreign force, combined with domestic traitors, to overwhelm you, to throw you neck and heels into the Potomac, as one of your choice spirits once proposed-would you not attack? This is, of all others, the most miserable subterfuge. Good God! where are we? In what age do we live? In what country, when it is made a crime to extirpate the invaders of our native soil? In what age,

in what country, when it is made a virtue for a nation, itself at war for neutral rights, to invade an unoffending, helpless, friendly, neutral country?

the treason, and restored that city to its freedom and independence. In what age did this happen? In comparatively a benighted period, the thirteenth century. Will you, Americansyou who have styled yourselves the most enlightened people, of a most enlightened age, be put to shame, by such an event happening, in such an era-in such a country?

But it is asked, Is not this measure defensible on the ground of precedents, and the practices of nations? O yes, undoubtedly. For this, as for every other enormity, you can find an example, but not a justification. I am apprehen- But still, you have a thousand instances to sive, sir, that in pursuing this unprofitable re-encourage you. You have not the merit of ference to precedents and authorities, less skilful novelty in your wickedness. Deeds as reprethan the learned gentlemen who have preceded hensible, as nefarious as yours, and on the same me, I cannot avoid giving to my remarks an airgrounds and pretences, crowd and deform the of pedantry. I call this an unprofitable, and page of history. The annals of despotism help perhaps deceptive pursuit; because a recent ex- you out. Louis the XIVth was in the heart of perience shows, how pervertible are the clearest the Netherlands, before it was known he had a texts of the soundest authors. For when I dis- pretence to any part of those rich provinces, covered the honorable chairman making quota- under a pretended right of his wife. Frederick tions from Vattel, in support of the present of Prussia, in 1741, gave the intimation of his proposition, which authorizes us to take posses- claim against Silesia, at the head of 60,000 men. sion of that, to which we have no right, I could | Shall I mention the two divisions of Poland, not help recollecting, that attending as a spec- the recent instances of French usurpation in tator in your gallery, during the debate on Mr. Holland, in Switzerland, in Portugal, in Italy, Ross's resolution, I heard the same honorable and Spain? No; these instances are too idengentleman adduce passages from the same au- tical for illustration. It is unnecessary to exthor, to prove that we ought not to take, what hibit those instances, of which your proceedof perfect right did belong to us. ings are but polygraphic copies. I will hasten to the great precedent, which has been alluded to on both sides, as affording pertinent matter for illustration; the seizure of the Danish fleet.

The earliest precedent on record was the one so pleasantly, not irrelevantly, alluded to by the honorable gentleman from Vermont, who is without question, of any one among us, the best read in the most ancient and authentic of all histories, the Holy Bible. Who, at any rate, does the most frequently and the most aptly quote the scriptures that were written for our instruction. He referred to the leading case of Ahab and Naboth. Sir, I will not dwell upon it long enough to inquire who is the Jezebel that has inspired our councils. I will not ask in the language of Mr. Barlow, whether this is not the mode devised, "the least onerous to the French treasury" to do us a nominal favor, and a real injury. But I believe and I hope-I say I hope, while it is lawful to say so, that the answer of the insulted and oppressed Spaniards will be that of Naboth to Ahab, "The Lord forbid me that I should give the inheritance of my fathers unto thee."

I have a right to refer to it triumphantly, as an "argumentum ad hominem." All the disinterested part of mankind condemned this measure. In this country, all parties, federal and republican, assailed it. Let me prove a measure to be within the scope of the policy of that-let me prove a conformity, or even a strong analogy of conduct, and the proof concludes; the argument is victorious, against any individual or party in this country, the author of such a measure-more especially against those who were instinctively offended with Copenhagen Jackson-more especially against the present administration-the asserters of neutral rights-the asserters of exclusive territorial rights, even in cases of doubtful or common jurisdiction. So sensible was the honorable gentleman from Tennessee, on my right, of But do gentlemen prefer classical to biblical this, that in the early stages of this discussion, authority; the example of a republic, or rather he directed his most vigorous efforts to dislodge an aristocracy to a theocracy? Lacedemon af- this train of ideas from the mind of the Senate. fords it. The fortress of Cadmea was won by The gentleman showed his usual correctness a Lacedemonian general, by the same means of and acuteness, in discovering the stress of the treasonable correspondence, which our general argument, and selecting the turning point. But has used. The Ephori condemned their general what was his mode of refutation? How did as we have done, but retained their conquest. he attempt to efface the impression that was Do you want an instance from history to con- instantly made on our minds, when the simidemn you, to make you blush for your conduct? larity of our conduct to that of the English, in Take it from Florence-a real republic. With seizing the Danish fleet, was referred to by the a territory so small as to render the desire of honorable gentleman from Vermont? Why, its extension natural and pardonable, such was forsooth, by joining in the denunciation against the magnanimity of its republican character, its that measure-by magnifying its injustice-by inviolable adherence to principle, and its abhor- exaggerating, if possible, its enormity-by darkrence of the "selfish object of territorial aggran-ening its atrocity. Sir, this may be allowable dizement," that when the city of Arezzo was in rhetoric, but it is at best but an able evasion betrayed into its hands, it disdained to profit by of the very point, which a not over strict logic

I implore you, sir, that we still adhere to this

would say he was bound to meet. The gentle- binding the whole world under one politic and man expressed his surprise that any American moral dominion." could charge his country with an intention to perform an act so nefarious as that of the sei-system-that wise and philanthropic system, zure of the Danish fleet by the English. Sir, I am not obliged to contend, though with the utmost fairness and propriety I might, that our contemplated act transcends that in enormity, in its outrage on the law of nations, in its prostration of the principles of right and justice.

that is founded on justice, that favors the innocent, that protects the weak, that suspects and opposes the strong and the unprincipled; that disdains conspiracy in usurpation and fellowship in guilt, though the spoil of defenceless and afflicted neighbors be the bribe, and the splendid One point of difference we surely cannot for- example of exalted potentates, the justification. get, viz., that the Danish fleet was first demand- By abandoning this system, what has Europe ed, and demanded from those who had a right to become? A scene of ruins. And still, amid cede it. In this case you have made no demand, these very ruins, we meet at every turn, the and even if you had, it is of those who have no flames of war bursting out anew into wider right to convey. The mere local authorities of conflagration. Let us adhere to the ancient Florida have no right to dismember the Span-system of the law of nations. Let us snatch ish empire. Another point of difference is, that this sacred palladium from its burning temple, the French were at hand. They occupied a and re-consecrate it in this our new and virtupart of Denmark, the Duchy of Holstein. Their ous empire. ulterior success, which was not only probable, but inevitable, would have given them possession of the Danish fleet. In addition to this, the English ministry urged, (with what propriety of course I cannot tell,) the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, in justification of this

measure.

But after all, it was an indefensible act, deserving all the epithets of reprobation which the honorable gentleman has bestowed upon it. It was as fatal in its effects, as censurable in its principle. It gave the hearts of the Danish nation to France, it made an ally of the continental system; it startled Sweden, it irritated Russia, it turned the tide of public opinion against ministers in England, it alarmed and alienated America; and for all this, Britain gained sixteen hulks, some tons of hemp, and naval stores-and the distrust of the world.

I perceive, sir, that time will not permit me to examine this question, in the various other relations which have suggested themselves to my mind. I have so strong an opinion that this, as a military enterprise, will, having regard to our present and probable means, after all, prove abortive and unfortunate, that I had almost felt myself emboldened to submit my reasons for that opinion. St. Augustine, without a naval superiority, cannot be subdued; let General Pinckney, brave and intelligent as I know him to be, do his best. My reasons would be drawn from a detailed consideration of General Oglethorpe's operations, in 1739. I have consulted various accounts of that siege. I have a plan of his attack, taken by an engineer employed in the service, now before me. Oglethorpe's best chance of success depended on his naval superiority. But he was defeated. Can Of all the ill-consequences resulting to Great we then hope for success, when the sea is open Britain from this act, the most deeply fatal to to Spanish and British squadrons; and when, her was the opinion, justly entertained in Eng- so far as relates to our naval preparations, we land and in America, the only remaining coun- have committed the same mistake here as in tries where public opinion retains through the our Canadian campaign-a mistake, or rather press and the freedom of institutions, any opera-negligence, that has been the principal, if not tion; that she, who pretended to execrate the outrages of Bonaparte, who professed a reverence for the law of nations, and declared herself the advocate of the principles of justice, virtue and religion, should, overcome by the lure of gain, or intimidated by an unreal necessity, have fallen from her high pretensions, have forfeited her moral character, have stained her hitherto comparatively spotless reputation. In miserable contradiction to herself, she overthrew, at one blow, that system of universal public law, whose maxims and precedents have been long acknowledged-and by no nation more than herself-to be of the same force and obligation, as the municipal constitutions of particular States: "A system," as it is observed by Lord Erskine, in his celebrated protest upon this subject, "which has gradually ripened with the advancement of learning and the extension of commerce, and which ought to be held sacred and inviolable by all governments, as

the sole cause of our repeated disasters? But this subject, in all its military bearings, has been, and can be so much better illustrated by the honorable gentleman from Maryland, that I forbear to enlarge upon it. I leave also to that gentleman and others, the important topic of the disastrous consequences of this measure, to the miserable remains of our foreign commerce. The conjectures and predictions that Spain will not, because she cannot, from the depression of her fortunes, the inadequacy of her means, and the imbecility of her national character, resent this lawless aggression, I believe rather illustrative of the meanness of our motives, than of the true nature of her disposition and resources. The merchants, those who have the best means of knowing, distinctly understand that your hostile occupation of East Florida will be the signal of the immediate confiscation of American property. In relation to the interests of my own State, the consequences of this measure

an undue partiality for France. I am not taking upon myself to say that this would be a fair deduction; but the adoption of this measure would give an apparent sanction to this accusation, which we ought to avoid when we can so easily avoid it, not only without detriment, but with safety and advantage. Let us not only be chaste but unsuspected. What will be the inevitable consequence of a war with Spain? a non-intercourse with the Peninsula. The great object of France will be effected. This in addition to our concurrence in the continental system, and our war with England, is all that the ruler of France in the insolence of his power, the extravagance of his desires, the arrogance of his contempt, or the deadliness of his hatred, sanguine, haughty, insatiable, exorbitant, and inexorable as he is, ever demanded from us, and more than he could ever expect to obtain even from our trembling acquiescence.

will be indeed deplorable. The little remnant | you please,) that our councils are influenced by of trade we have left is that to the Havana, which will be inevitably cut off. And it is a singular fact, well known to my honorable colleague, that real property, plantations of a very considerable value, in the Island of Caba, belong to native citizens of the State of Rhode Island. They are owned principally by the fast friends of the present administration, by gentlemen who have already loaned to the government more than some whole patriotic States, and whose private armed ships have captured from the enemy more than half a million sterling. These, to be sure, are not considerations of great moment. Since gentlemen choose to sacrifice their friends, it is officious in me to interfere, perhaps; but they are my constituents, and I deem it my duty to suggest their danger and their interests. But there are resulting from this measure, political consequences connected with your foreign relations, with your present war with England-with the present peculiar circumstances of the world, which are worthy of the gravest consideration. Do you wish to make the present contest with England popular beyond any instance in their history-to unite against you the undivided opinions--the enthusiastic feelings the animated efforts of the English people-to make this a war indefinite in continuance, vindictive in its mode of operation, and victorious to England in the end? Do you mean to render suspected, and of course unavailing, all your pacificatory propositions? Then do this dastardly act against a helpless people wage your war with Spain. If ever there was a subject which united the opinions of the British nation, it was the late Spanish revolution. If there ever was an object in which the hopes, interests, and efforts of the English nation concentred, it is Spanish emancipation. This act of yours will entirely alienate from us our friends in the British Parliament. We shall be so notoriously in the wrong, that no one in that assembly will dare defend us. But a few months ago, we could refer to the I have directed my attention solely to East majority that effected the repeal of the Orders Florida. The other member of the question in in Council, as equally the advocates of their regard to the Mobile is easily disposed of. If own best national interests, and of our most im- the territory be ours under the treaties and portant national rights. We unwisely continue laws of the United States, there is no need of our war with England after the acquisition of this law to authorize the President to take posthe great avowed object of that war. The peo-session-he ought to do it by the obligation of ple of England now understand that we fight on the single ground of maritime rights. And they are taught to believe that this cruel contest is intended, not so much for our own protection, as for their destruction. On this ground of maritime rights are placed the pride, the hopes, the fears of this sometimes misgoverned, but always magnanimous nation.

Add then a Spanish war to your English war, and you will not have a friend left in England. Do gentlemen affect to deem this of no consequence? Then they have forgotten history, or read it but to little advantage. Sir, this Spanish war will corroborate into certainty the suspicion, (the unjust, the unworthy suspicion if

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It will seem to England that this coincidence in conduct must arise from coincidence in views. She would deem us a party in the great design of her vindictive foe, and our impolitic and unfortunate war would be by her associated in principle and duration with that war, which she now wages for her own security, and the liberation of mankind. Sir, I must conclude. The subject is not exhausted, but I am. I will not attempt to recapitulate, or arrange in a more correct and compact form, the desultory remarks I have thrown out. But I must demand it of every individual member of the Senate, again and again to ask himself what right have we to the territory of East Florida? Is it any other than the right created by desire-the right suggested by ambition-the right of taking advantage of the troubles of our neighbors, of plundering weakness, of imposing on misfortune, of oppressing the oppressed? What right would Spain have to occupy St. Mary's or Cumberland Island? the same we have to occupy Augustine and Amelia.

general duty he wants no particular law to enable him to assert the claims of the United States. He must take care that the laws and treaties are executed. He encounters no hazardous responsibility; he is empowered so to do, not by a constructive, but by a plain, direct, and absolute authority.

Sir, let us presume for a moment that we shall be completely successful as to the attainment of these countries; that they cost us no money, no blood, no actual privation, no present suffering. Will not this policy of indefinitely increasing our territory be productive of the most baneful future consequences? Is it not accelerating that fatal event which the genuine friends of freedom

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