fication to the causes, and occasions, leaving all these qualifications, like the case itself, in the discretion of the State governments. It must be a clear case, it is said, a deliberate case; a palpable case; a dangerous case. But then the State is still left at liberty to decide for herself, what is clear, what is deliberate, what is palpathets avail any thing? Sir, the human mind is so constituted, that the merits of both sides of a controversy appear very clear, and very palpable, to those who respectively espouse them; and both sides usually grow clearer as the controversy advances. South Carolina sees unconstitutionality in the tariff; she sees oppression, there, also; and she sees danger. Pennsylvania, with a vision Lt less sharp, looks at the same tariff, and sees no such thing in it-she sees it all constitutional, all useful, all safe. The faith of South Carolina is strengthened by opposition, and she now not only sees, but resolves that the tariff is palpably unconstitutional, oppressive and dangerous: but Pennsylvania, not to be behind her neighbors, and equally willing to strengthen her own faith by a confident as

of the embargo act, was none other than that | great man, of whom the gentleman has made honorable mention, Samuel Dexter. He was then, sir, in the fulness of his knowledge, and the maturity of his strength. He had retired from long and distinguished public service here, to the renewed pursuit of professional duties; carrying with him all that enlargement and ex-ble, what is dangerous. Do adjectives and epipansion, all the new strength and force, which an acquaintance with the more general subjects discussed in the national councils, is capable of adding to professional attainment, in a mind of true greatness and comprehension. He was a lawyer, and he was also a statesman. He had studied the constitution, when he filled public station, that he might defend it; he had examined its principles that he might maintain them. More than all men, or at least as much as any man, he was attached to the general government and to the union of the States. His feelings and opinions all ran in that direction. A question of constitutional law, too, was of all subjects, that one which was best suited to his talents and learning. Aloof from technicality, and unfettered by artificial rule, such a question gave opportunity for that deep and clear analy-severation, resolves, also, and gives to every sis, that mighty grasp of principle, which so much distinguished his higher efforts. His very statement was argument; his inference seemed demonstration. The earnestness of his own conviction, wrought conviction in others. One was convinced, and believed, and assented, because it was gratifying, delightful, to think and feel, and believe, in unison with an intellect of such evident superiority.

Mr. Dexter, sir, such as I have described him, argued the New England cause. He put into his effort his whole heart, as well as all the powers of his understanding; for he had avowed, in the most public manner, his entire concurrence with his neighbors, on the point in dispute. He argued the cause, it was lost, and New England submitted. The established tribunals pronounced the law constitutional, and New England acquiesced. Now, sir, is not this the exact opposite of the doctrine of the gentleman from South Carolina? According to him, instead of referring to the judicial tribunals, we should have broken up the embargo by laws of our own; we should have repealed it, "quoad" New England; for we had a strong, palpable, and oppressive case. Sir, we believed the embargo unconstitutional; but still that was matter of opinion, and who was to decide it? We thought it a clear case; but, nevertheless, we did not take the law into our own hands, because we did not wish to bring about a revolution, nor to break up the Union: for I maintain, that, between submission to the decision of the constituted tribunals, and revolution, or disunion, there is no middle ground-there is no ambiguous condition, half allegiance, and half rebellion. And, sir, how futile, how very futile it is, to admit the right of State interference, and then attempt to save it from the character of unlawful resistance, by adding terms of quali

warm affirmative of South Carolina, a plain, downright, Pennsylvania negative. South Carolina, to show the strength and unity of her opinion, brings her assembly to a unanimity, within seven voices; Pennsylvania, not to be outdone in this respect more than others, reduces her dissentient fraction to a single vote. Now, sir, again, I ask the gentleman what is to be done? Are these States both right? Is he bound to consider them both right? If not, which is in the wrong? or rather, which has the best right to decide? And if he, and if I are not to know what the constitution means, and what it is, till those two State legislatures, and the twenty-two others, shall agree in its construction, what have we sworn to, when we have sworn to maintain it? I was forcibly struck, sir, with one reflection, as the gentleman went on in his speech. He quoted Mr. Madison's resolutions, to prove that a State may interfere, in a case of deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of a power not granted. The honorable member supposes the tariff law to be such an exercise of power; and that, consequently, a case has arisen in which the State may, if it see fit, interfere by its own law. Now it so happens, nevertheless, that Mr. Madison deems this same tariff law quite constitutional. Instead of a clear and palpable violation, it is, in his judgment, no violation at all. So that, while they use his authority for a hypothetical case, they reject it in the very case before them. All this, sir, shows the inherent--futility--I had almost used a stronger word-of conceding this power of interference to the States, and then attempting to secure it from abuse by imposing qualifications, of which the States themselves are to judge. One of two things is true; either the laws of the Union are beyond the discretion and beyond the control of the States; or else we

have no constitution of general government, and are thrust back again to the days of the confederacy.

do they find the power to interfere with the laws of the Union? Sir, the opinion which the honorable gentleman maintains is a notion, founded in a total misapprehension, in my judgment, of the origin of this government, and of the foundation on which it stands. I hold it to be a popular government, erected by the people; those who administer it, responsible to the people; and itself capable of being amended and modified, just as the people may choose it should be. It is as popular, just as truly emanating from the people, as the State governments. It is created for one purpose; the State governments for another. It has its own powers; they have theirs. There is no more authority with them to arrest the operation of a law of Congress, than with Congress to arrest the operation of their laws. We are here to administer a constitution emanating immediately from the people, and trusted by them to our administration. It is not the creature of the State governments. It is of no moment to the argument, that certain acts of the State legislatures are necessary to fill our seats in this body. That is not one of their original State powers, a part of the sovereignty of the State.

Let me here say, sir, that if the gentleman's doctrine had been received and acted upon in New England, in the times of the embargo and non-intercourse, we should probably not now have been here. The government would very likely have gone to pieces, and crumbled into dust. No stronger case can ever arise than existed under those laws; no States can ever entertain a clearer conviction than the New England States then entertained; and if they had been under the influence of that heresy of opinion, as I must call it, which the honorable member espouses, this Union would, in all probability, have been scattered to the four winds. I ask the gentleman, therefore, to apply his principles to that case; I ask him to come forth and declare, whether, in his opinion, the New England States would have been justified in interfering to break up the embargo system under the conscientious opinions which they held upon it? Had they a right to annul that law? Does he admit, or deny? If that which is thought palpably unconstitutional in South Carolina justifies that State in arrest- | It is a duty which the people, by the constituing the progress of the law, tell me, whether that which was thought palpably unconstitutional also in Massachusetts, would have justified her in doing the same thing? Sir, I deny the whole doctrine. It has not a foot of ground in the constitution to stand on. No public man of reputation ever advanced it in Massachusetts, in the warmest times, or could maintain himself upon it there at any time.

tion itself, have imposed on the State legislatures; and which they might have left to be performed elsewhere, if they had seen fit. So they have left the choice of President with electors; but all this does not affect the proposition, that this whole government, President, Senate, and House of Representatives, is a popular government. It leaves it still all its popular character. The governor of a State I wish now, sir, to make a remark upon the (in some of the States) is chosen, not directly Virginia resolutions of 1798. I cannot under- by the people, but by those who are chosen by take to say how these resolutions were under- the people, for the purpose of performing, stood by those who passed them. Their lan- among other duties, that of electing a governor. guage is not a little indefinite. In the case of Is the government of the State, on that account, the exercise by Congress, of a dangerous power, not a popular government? This government, not granted to them, the resolutions assert the sir, is the independent offspring of the popular right, on the part of the State, to interfere, and will. It is not the creature of State legislaarrest the progress of the evil. This is suscep- tures; nay, more, if the whole truth must be tible of more than one interpretation. It may told, the people brought it into existence, estabmean no more than that the States may inter-lished it, and have hitherto supported it, for fere by complaint and remonstance, or by proposing to the people an alteration of the Federal Constitution. This would all be quite unobjectionable; or, it may be, that no more is meant than to assert the general right of revolution, as against all governments, in cases of intolerable oppression. This no one doubts; and this, in my opinion, is all that he who framed the resolutions could have meant by it: for I shall not readily believe, that he was ever of opinion that a State, under the constitution, and in conformity with it, could, upon the ground of her own opinion of its unconstitutionality, however clear and palpable she might think the case, annul a law of Congress, so far as it should operate on herself, by her own legislative power.

I must now beg to ask, sir, whence is this supposed right of the States derived?-where

the very purpose, amongst others, of imposing certain salutary restraints on State sovereignties. The States cannot now make war; they cannot contract alliances; they cannot make, each for itself, separate regulations of commerce; they cannot lay imposts; they cannot coin money. If this constitution, sir, be the creature of State legislatures, it must be admitted that it has obtained a strange control over the volitions of its creators.

The people, then, sir, erected this government. They gave it a constitution, and in that constitution they have enumerated the powers which they bestow on it. They have made it a limited government. They have defined its authority. They have restrained it to the exercise of such powers as are granted; and all others, they declare, are reserved to the States, or the people. But, sir, they have not stopped

members? Would any thing, with such a principle in it, or rather with such a destitution of all principle, be fit to be called a government? No, sir. It should not be denominated a constitution. It should be called, rather, a collection of topics, for everlasting controversy; heads of debate for a disputatious people. It would not be a government. It would not be adequate to any practical good, nor fit for any country to live under. To avoid all possibility of being misunderstood, allow me to repeat again, in the fullest manner, that I claim no powers for the government by forced or unfair construction. I admit that it is a government of strictly limited powers; of enumerated, specified, and particularized powers; and that whatsoever is not granted, is withheld. But notwithstanding all this, and however the grant of powers may be expressed, its limit and extent may yet, in some cases, admit of doubt; and the general government would be good for nothing, it would be incapable of long existing, if some mode had not been provided, in which those doubts, as they should arise, might be peaceably, but authoritatively, solved.

collector that he must collect no more duties under any of the tariff laws. This, he will be somewhat puzzled to say, by the way, with a grave countenance, considering what hand South Carolina, herself, had in that of 1816. But, sir, the collector would, probably, not desist at his bidding. He would show him the law of Congress, the treasury instruction, and his own oath of office. He would say, he should perform his duty, come what might. Here would ensue a pause: for they say that a certain stillness precedes the tempest. The trumpeter would hold his breath awhile, and before all this military array should fall on the custom-house, collector, clerks, and all, it is very probable some of those composing it, would request of their gallant commander-in-chief, to be informed a little upon the point of law; for they have, doubtless, a just respect for his opinions as a lawyer, as well as for his bravery as a soldier. They know he has read Blackstone and the constitution, as well as Turrene and Vauban. They would ask him, therefore, something con cerning their rights in this matter. They would inquire, whether it was not somewhat dangerAnd now, Mr. President, let me run the hon- ous to resist a law of the United States. What orable gentleman's doctrine a little into its would be the nature of their offence, they would practical application. Let us look at his proba- wish to learn, if they, by military force and ble "modus operandi." If a thing can be done, array, resisted the execution in Carolina of a an ingenious man can tell how it is to be done. law of the United States, and it should turn out, Now, I wish to be informed, how this State after all, that the law was constitutional? He interference is to be put in practice without would answer, of course, treason. No lawyer violence, bloodshed, and rebellion. We will could give any other answer. John Fries, he take the existing case of the tariff law. South would tell them, had learned that some years Carolina is said to have made up her opinion ago. How, then, they would ask, do you proupon it. If we do not repeal it, (as we probably pose to defend us? We are not afraid of bullets, shall not,) she will then apply to the case the but treason has a way of taking people off, that remedy of her doctrine. She will, we must we do not much relish. How do you propose to suppose, pass a law of her legislature, declaring defend us? "Look at my floating banner," he the several acts of Congress, usually called would reply; "see there the nullifying law!" the tariff laws, null and void, so far as they Is it your opinion, gallant commander, they respect South Carolina, or the citizens thereof. would then say, that if we should be indicted So far, all is a paper transaction, and easy for treason, that same floating banner of yours enough. But the collector at Charleston is col- would make a good plea in bar? "South lecting the duties imposed by these tariff laws Carolina is a sovereign State," he would reply. -he therefore must be stopped. The collector That is true-but would the judge admit our will seize the goods if the tariff duties are not plea? "These tariff laws," he would repeat, paid. The State authorities will undertake their are unconstitutional, palpably, deliberately, rescue; the marshal, with his posse, will come dangerously." That all may be so; but if the to the collector's aid, and here the contest be-tribunal should not happen to be of that opinion, gins. The militia of the State will be called out to sustain the nullifying act. They will march, sir, under a very gallant leader, for believe the honorable member himself commands the militia of that part of the State. He will raise the nullifying act on his standard, and spread it out as his banner! It will have a preamble, bearing, That the tariff laws are palpaple, deliberate, and dangerous violations of the constitution! He will proceed, with this banner flying, to the custom-house in Charleston:

"All the while, Sonorous metal, blowing martial sounds."

shall we swing for it? We are ready to die for our country, but it is rather an awkward busiIness, this dying without touching the ground! After all, that is a sort of hemp tax, worse than any part of the tariff.

Mr. President, the honorable gentleman would be in a dilemma, like that of another great general. He would have a knot before him which he could not untie. He must cut it with his sword. He must say to his followers, defend yourselves with your bayonets; and this is war-civil war.

Direct collision, therefore, between force and force, is the unavoidable result of that remedy for the revision of unconstitutional laws which the Arrived at the custom-house, he will tell the gentleman contends for. It must happen in the

very first case to which it is applied. Is not trusted their safety, in regard to the general this the plain result? To resist, by force, the constitution, to these hands. They have reexecution of a law, generally, is treason. Can quired other security, and taken other bonds. the courts of the United States take notice of They have chosen to trust themselves, first, to the indulgence of a State to commit treason? the plain words of the instrument, and to such The common saying, that a State cannot com- construction as the government itself, in doubtmit treason herself, is nothing to the purpose. ful cases, should put on its own powers, under Can she authorize others to do it? If John their oaths of office, and subject to their reFries had produced an act of Pennsylvania, an- sponsibility to them: just as the people of a nulling the law of Congress, would it have State trust their own State governments with a helped his case? Talk about it as we will, similar power. Secondly, they have reposed these doctrines go the length of revolution. their trust in the efficacy of frequent elections, They are incompatible with any peaceable ad- and in their own power to remove their own ministration of the government. They lead servants and agents, whenever they see cause. directly to disunion and civil commotion; and, Thirdly, they have reposed trust in the judicial therefore, it is, that at their commencement, power, which, in order that it might be trustwhen they are first found to be maintained by re-worthy, they have made as respectable, as disspectable men, and in a tangible form, I enter my public protest against them all.