tigations; and the unbounded liberty of the press conveys an account of the measure itself, with all the reasonings for and against it, long before it can be carried into a law, to every corner of the nation. In general, the people coincide with their representatives, and wait the issue in silence. But on any attempt to innovate on the constitution from any quarter, they make themselves heard with irresistible authority; and sometimes, as in the case alluded to, they declare almost unanimously against their own delegates. Hence, through the light of letters and the liberty of the press, public opinion has risen to the rank of a fourth estate in our constitution; in times of quiet and order, silent and still, but in the collisions of the different branches of our government, deciding as an umpire with unbounded authority. With public opinion loudly supporting him, Mr. Pitt came into office in the face of the Commons; and though for a while the opposition obstructed the measures of government, yet in the end he prevailed. Had our liberties depended on the Commons, in this instance, they would have been lost for ever. The Commons themselves had conspired to seize the richest branch of the executive authority, by which they would have rendered themselves equally independent of the King and people.

Thus the balance established among the different branches of our legislature renders each jealous of the other, and each ready to appeal to the people; and the national sentiment, easily and speedily collected through the medium of the press, effectually weighs down the scale into which it falls. The balance thus happily established renders it safe for the people to delegate great powers to each branch of the legislature, which altogether form a government of great solidity and force. The seven years' duration of a House of Commons gives a stability to that House, that enables it to counteract the prerogatives of the crown; while, on the other hand, the strength of the crown renders it safe for the people to give such a permanence to the Com

mons.

A strong government, like a strong man, is magnanimous in its conduct; while that which is weak, like a weak individual, is jealous and irritable. Hence personal liberty is not only secured in a strong government from the tyranny of the worthless and profligate, but it is likewise far more free from the interference of the government itself. Where the fabric of government is firm and solid, the governors can wink at many excesses, conscious that when they do interfere, there is no resistance can avail against the law.

This is a principal source of the unbounded freedom which Englishmen enjoy. The extreme license of the press, the excesses of public meetings, the bold and daring opposition to men in power, both by individuals and public bodies, and all those other ebullitions of freedom which astonish foreign nations, are inseparably dependent on the firm texture of our government, and particularly on the strength and vigour of the executive power. Government may be compared to a net, and men to a number of wild beasts enclosed in it. If the keeper knows that the net is strong, he is not afraid of injury from any accidental commotion among the beasts, except where their violence is extraordinary. If, on the contrary, he is conscious that the net is weak, he is compelled to interfere on every symptom of disturbance, lest it should increase to a degree of violence, that might break his net to pieces, and let all the beasts loose. The strength of the magistrate's power in this country is in reality dependent, in a great measure, on the standing army. On that he knows he may place certain reliance against the violence of democracy in the last resort, and with this confidence he is slow to employ a military force, and generally succeeds in quieting the disturbance by gentle methods. Thus it is, that the very engine of

despotic power contributes, under the authority of the magistrate, to the support of liberty and of law.

If I may be allowed to give an opinion, the great defect of all the American governments, both federal and particular, is, that their texture is too flimsy. One would imagine that during their connection with England, the people had found some very serious evils resulting from choosing their representatives for seven years. This is certainly the only rational ground for changing the term of delegation to one year. Yet I never heard of a single inconvenience from the former term of delegation, either in the delegates not speaking the sense of their constituents, in their attempting to fortify themselves in power, or in suffering themselves to be corrupted by foreign gold. The change, I presume, was grounded on mere theory and speculation; and, in my judgment, it will be attended with bad consequences. A house of delegates is a house of debates, of consultation, and of deliberation. Every one ought to be open to conviction, and should form an honest judgment on the best information that has been offered; and this judgment should be founded on what he conceives to be the interest of the community at large. But if the individual constituents of each member

have a right to instruct him how he is to act, and exercise this right, the delegates are only the medium through which the electors convey their opinions; and for any thing that I see, these opinions might as well be conveyed by the post. Frequent elections, however, encourage this notion among the electors. They also render the delegates too dependent in other respects on the electors. If they are not instructed how to vote, they will in general, however, know which side of the question is most popular, and the fear of losing their election will lead them to consider rather what is popular than what is right. Hence the decisions of your house of delegates will partake too much of the spirit of those who delegate; and as those who delegate are in America chiefly composed of the lowest classes of society, or, in other words, are the mob, their spirit will always be rash and changeable, and generally base and selfish. There is, on the other hand, a possibility of rendering the delegates too little dependent on their constituents, but this is scarcely to be feared in the thirteen states, for reasons that it would be easy to point out. If the delegates are too dependent on the mob, the senate and the executive are too dependent on them. The principle of establishing a balance is totally lost sight of in your constitution-people. From such a