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“ The next step in tracing the pro. course to the north once more, to meet gress of Lord Wellington led to a them. Then followed the siege of period full of glory and renown-the Burgos ; and so far from considering battle of Salamanca. But from what as a disappointment the failure of Lord circumstances did that battle arise? Wellington in his attempt to reduce Did it arise out of his efficiency, or out that fortress, madness alone could have of his necessity? It arose from the supposed that a fortress of such a demagnificence, the splendour, the great- scription should be reduced by a few ness of his talents. He struck the guns. Lord Wellington's means were enemy with his spear the moment he confessedly inadequate to the object, saw an opening. But was the unex. according to all the established rules pected coincidence, out of which such of war. great events arose, a solid ground to “ Again, when it was understood, build a system of policy upon ? Lord 80 far back as the month of June last, Wellington's talents, indeed, were a that Lord Wellington was advancing firm and secure rock, on which any into Spain, could ministers fail to dishopes, anyexpectations, however great, cover, that France, being engaged however exalted, might be founded ; a war with Russia, must necessarily þut it ill became statesmen to calculate detach a great part of her force to that upon chances and occasions presenting quarter of Europe ; and that now was themselves for success in operations, the moment, not only in reference to upon the prosperous issue of which so that event, but also to the temper of much depended. Did the ministers the Spanish nation, to send out suffimean to say, that their system was cient reinforcements to enable his lord. raised solely upon the matchless abili. ship to proceed upon a large and effecties of their general, and upon

tive scale of operations ? Without such rors of the enemy? Did they mean to reinforcements, it was manifestly imaffirm, that all their plans amounted prudent to advance into Spain. But only to this? The battle of Salaman- how was Lord Wellington reinforced? ca was certainly productive of great On the 21st of October he thought it events; the evacuation of the south of necessary to retire from Burgos ; on Spain; the raising of the siege of Ca. the 25th he saw the French army, and diz, and the occupation of Madrid by we knew from his dispatches it was our troops. But did it secure these greatly.superior to his own force, espeadvantages? Were they permanent ? cially in cavalry, an arm so important Was Lord Wellington able to pursue to military operations in that country. Marmont? No. He was not able to On the 25th of October, therefore, do that, which so obviously he ought that army which Lord Wellington had to have done, because Joseph's army, conquered on the plains of Salamanca, reinforced by the corps from Suchet, -that army which he had driven bewas hanging on his fiank, and after: fore him on that memorable day, with wards on his rear. It was necessary a grandeur of military achievement to disperse that army. He did so, which the language of history or poand entered Madrid. Could he then etry could never equal, and which march southward to pursue the career ranked him among

the most renowned of his conquests ? No. He found that generals of this or any other age,the corps which he had so lately de. that army had received strong and effifeated, the army over which he had so cient reinforcements since the battle of recently triumphed, was strong again, Salamanca, and was now enabled to and he was compelled to direct his turn upon its pursuers. Where were

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Lord Wellington's reinforcements du- June, but was so small that it could ring the same period ? Scattered every effect nothing. Suchet, meanwhile, where: some in port at home, some wrote to Joseph, that he could not on the ocean, and some landed at too proceed with his whole corps, but that great a distance to be of any use. he sent him a reinforcement ; which

Fifteen hundred men reached him on reinforcement, it afterwards appeared, - the 24th, four days after he had begun had the effect of defeating every great

his retreat. Where were the others ? object of the campaign. Suchet had One regiment advanced as far as Bene. nothing to apprehend from the Sicilian vento, and was forced to retreat again expedition, in the force to which, at to the frontiers. Two regiments were that period, it amounted. Some time landed at Corunna, and were re-em- afterwards, however,-about the end barked for Lisbon, where they might of July-arrived the remainder. They probably arrive in time to reach Lord appeared on the coast of Catalonia, Wellington at the commencement of and all they accomplished was to exthe next campaign.

cite the Catalonians to a demonstra“ Such was the state of the war in tion of attachment to the British and the peninsula,—such the manner in Spanish cause, which led, in the result, which it had been conducted,—and it to dreadful executions among them. might be asked, whether, if the same The result had left also, on the minds exertions had been made by the mini- of the Catalonians, sentiments of suspisters of this country as were made by cion, alienation, and hatred, which it the enemy, Lord Wellington might would be difficult to eradicate. It was not have been able to prosecute to thought advisable that this expedition their full extent his operations against should operate either at Barcelona or Burgos ?-Now for the Sicilian expe- Tarragona, or at some intermediate dition, as it had been denominated. point; but at last it arrived where no The plan of that expedition had been human being could have anticipated its concerted with Lord Wellington when presence, and then became utterly exhe was before Badajoz. In conse. tinct as to any efficient purpose in the quence of the improved fortune of our prosecution of the war. No adequate affairs in Italy, it was thought that a apology could be offered for this fatal part of our force might be spared from indecision : at one time it was thought that quarter to cooperate with our this place would be the best at which armies in Spain ; and, if it had arrived to disembark; and then another was at the proper season on the south-east suggested, till at last the very worst coast of that country, at the period place of all was adopted. If it was the when Lord Wellington fully expected greatest trial of a powerful mind to it, Suchet would have been utterly un- decide among great difficulties, it was able to detach a corps to reinforce the test of a weak mind to be placed Joseph's army: Joseph, indeed, must between two advantages, and not know have hastened to assist Suchet. Such which to choose. The singular feaa timely arrival would have been of ture of the present case, however, was, real service ; but, like all the other that both the advantages were lost, parts of the system, it was imperfect and only this disadvantage gained, exactly at that moment when it was that a warlike province of Spain had most required to be perfect ; some. been alienated from the Spanish cause thing was done, but not all; and what the indecision of the allies. And was done was therefore of no use. The what had been the result of all those first division arrived in the course of proceedings ? It had been said in the speech from the throne, indeed, that just and proper ; but if they were ade the result was nothing more than the quate to extensive operations, then the concentration of the French armies, as second plan was obviously the fittest if Lord Wellington's retreat had been to be adopted.

to be adopted. But the plan which merely a military maneuvre ; after all mankind must reprobate, was that which followed the monstrous propo of employing our resources, so as to sition, that such events were favour expose the sinews of our strength to 2 able to the interests and resources of hourly danger ; bearing hard upon our the Spanish nation. Some explana- finances, yet accomplishing no great tion should be yiven of that assertion; object. Such a plan as this every one for it was most injuriou» both to this must concur in condemning. It was conrtry and to Spain Had the south essentially hostile to the principles of of Spain been delivered ? Did the mi economy; it was expence without ad. nister mean to say, that, in point of vantage; and yet that was the system fact, the south of Spain was not now which had been pursued during the under the dominion of France ? late campaign A vast expence of

“ln moving from Burgos, Lord blood and treasure had been lavished, Wellington found himself pursued by and our resources enfeebled, without a force much superior to that under accomplishing

any one definite or prehis command ; and such being the end cise object. When France was mediof the campaign, what real progress tating fresh wars in the north of Eu. had been made towards the great ob- rope, and when we saw Russia pre. ject of the contest ?-With regard to pared to resist her ambitious designs the object of the war in Spain, three to the last extremity, what more vischemes had been successively devised; gorous or effectual assistance could we two were merely talked of, and the have given to Russia, than by prosethird was practised. The first was cuting the war in Spain? The best founded on an idea that it would be succour we could give to that coun. imprudent to embark as a principal in try, the most essential aid we could the contest, unless some other power, bestow, was by carrying on the war by its co-operation, prevented the force in the peninsula upon a broad and ex. of France from being concentrated to. tensive scale of operations ; but it was wards that one point-the subjugation not so carried on, and our present sysof Spain. From such a scheme of po. tem, therefore, might almost be thought licy this inference was deducible, that a defection from the cause of Russia. our resources were considered by those The events of the last campaign had who maintained the opinion to be in. indeed been beneficial to Spain ; but sufficient to carry on the war as prin. those benefits were imperfectly secu. cipals upon an adequate scale, and that red, and could not be expected to be we must therefore wait a more favour. permanent " able opportunity. The second plan The speakers on the side of opposi. proceeded on the principle that it would tion then passed to the affairs of the be prudent and highly expedient to north, and alluded to the hopes held make exertions upon a large scale, ade out of a diversion from Sweden in fa. quate to the destruction of the French vour of the operations of Russia. No. power in Spain. Both these plans thing could be more erroneous in poli. were different in their principle, and cy, they maintained, than the line of yet each was consistent upon its own conduct pursued with regard to Sweden. principle. If our resources were really “Amore extraordinary act of diplomainadequate, then the first plan was very cy had never occurred than the treaty

which ministers had concluded with grand and much-talked

of expedition. the Swedish government. It was a What sort of explanation ministers had treaty which promised every advan- it in their power to give upon this tage to Sweden, without guaranteeing subject, it was difficult to conjecture ; any to England. It was, in fact, a but it appeared most extraordinary, treaty in which, as it had been once that after the meeting and discussion whimsically observed upon a similar just mentioned, ministers should not contract, the reciprocity was all on one have been enabled to judge of the real side ; for we had engaged to afford disposition of the Crown Prince of Sweden all the assistance in our power, Sweden, or that they should not have in her operations against the enemy, taken measures to ascertain whether or for her own protection, while no- any change had taken place in that thing appeared likely to be done for disposition before the dispatch of the us, or for our allies, on her part. An transports. With respect to Russia, expedition was indeed projected, and while all must concur in the panegyric expected to sail from Sweden, to co- pronounced upon the magnanimity disoperate with Russia ; but that object played by that power, it might be was soon abandoned ; no expedition asked, what assistance had our mini. ever did sail ; and in consequence of sters afforded to encourage the display, that abandonment, General Victor, or to aid the operation, of that magwho, with his force, waited in Swedish nanimity? This it was difficult to conPomerania to meet the apprehended ceive, except sending the Russians diversion, was enabled to withdraw, about 50,0001, together with Lords and his division actually formed a part Cathcart and Walpole, were to be of the army with which Buonaparte viewed in this light. made his way to Moscow. Such were · The war in the north of Europe the important effects of the inactivity was the child of that great effort in of Sweden; and for that inactivity, so the peninsula, which had enabled Euinjurious to the objects of the war, it rope to reflect on its condition, and was for ministers, in their diplomatic roused it to struggle for emancipation. management with Sweden, to account. There can be but one feeling-that of This account, indeed, they were bound, unbounded admiration at the great for their own justification, to produce. efforts which Russia had made. NoAt a meeting which had taken place at ble indeed has been the struggle, and Abo, about the end of July, between glorious beyond anticipation the rethe Emperor Alexander, Lord Cath. sults in that quarter ; there, even there, cart, and the Crown Prince of Sweden, where the tyrant anticipated an easy it was understood to have been arran- victory, and concluded, from former ged that the expedition already alluded experience, that one decisive battle to should be dispatched from Sweden; would be the precursor of an abject and so cordially, it seemed, did mini- peace,—there, where, thinking that he sters enter into the project ; so power. knew his man, and that he should fully did they determine to forward its have only one man to cope with and progress, with the view of impeding to cajole, he found, what he had for. the French army, that transports for gotten to take into his estimate, a the conveyance of the Swedish expe. nation; where, imagining that, having dition were ordered to sail from Sheer- issued a bulletin and taken a fort, his ness on the 19th September, and Buo- work was done, he unexpectedly found szaparte entered Moscow on the 14th a countless population thronging to of the same month! So fared this the standard of their sovereign, pre.

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pared for exertions and for sacrifices proposed to regenerate, not merely such as the world has seldom, if ever, because it may be apprehended that witnessed before ; and opposing, not he might not realize those promises, merely with the arms of a disciplined but simply because he is a foreigner soldiery, not merely with the physical and an invader. If this were to be the mass of impenetrable multitudes, but sole result of what had taken place in with famine and with fire, with the the north, it would be an invaluable voluntary destruction of their own re- addition to, or rather it would be a sources, and with the conflagration of timely and salutary revival of, those their own houses, the progress of his ancient maxims of national independdesolating ambition. No man can con- ence, which the convulsions of the template the recent occurrences in the modern world have almost buried in north of Europe without feeling ex- oblivion. But is this all ? Can any ultation in his bosom. The invader man who looks at the present condi. of Russia flattered himself that a na- tion of Buonaparte, with what ability tion, to which he affixed the appella- soever he may have rescued himself tion of barbarous, and which he pic. from former difficulties, so chastise his tured to himself as in a condition of feelings as not to entertain a sanguine degrading and disheartening servitude, hope of events most decidedly favour. conld entertain no generous and patri. able to the general cause of Europe ?" Oric sentiment. He had yet to learn,

With reference to the war with that there is a principle of instinctive America, it was generally agreed that patriotism, which prevails even over a more iniquitous attack never was the vice of positive institutions ; he made upon the peace of any nation than had to learn, that in spite of the doc- that made by the American governtrines, and, it may be added, of too ment upon this country, nor could any many of the events of the last twenty cause be figured of which the justice years, it is not an universal truth, that

was more apparent, than that which before the people of any country de. this country had to oppose to America. termine to resist an invader, they cold. But the passage in the speech from ly speculate on all the possible im- the throne, which sanctioned the opi. provements to be made by regenera- nion that ministers still hoped for paci. ting laws in the actual condition of fication with America, in consequence their society, that they refuse to draw of something done previously to the a sword in defence of their altars or declaration of war, created much surtheir fire-sides, until they have weigh- prise. Nothing, it was said, appeared ed well the question, whether they be more preposterous than the hope that worth defending, and entered at full 'the repeal of the orders in council leisure and with all imaginable research would serve to pacify America ; for into a comparative anatomy of various these orders were never, in fact, the political constitutions. The invader point at issue. The dispute with Ameof Russia has found that the natural rica did not turn upon the orders in feelings of man, the sacred attachment council, but referred to higher ques. to home, the ties of custom, of family, tions, to topics deeply affecting our of kindred, are enough to arouse re- great maritime rights,—to points, insistance to a foreign invader, come deed, of such importance, that the though he may with splendid promises British government could not accede of freedom and improvement; that be to the pretensions of America without may be resisted, and gallantly and ef. throwing into her hands the trident of fectually resisted, by those whom he the main. It would not avait mini.

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