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for preventing it had been submitted to the judgment of those whose duty it was to enquire into the subject. As to the most convenient weight of guns, there were very different opinions among the officers of the navy. Some officers extolled heavy metal very much, while nine out of ten of the commanders would rather go to sea without guns of that kind.-Upon the whole it was contended that the motion was altogether unnecessary." The motion was accordingly negatived.

On opening the American congress, Mr Madison, as usual, presented a very elaborate philippic against this country, which contained among others the following passage: "The British cabinet must be sensible, that with respect to the important question of impressment, on which the war so essentially turns, a search for, or seizure of, British persons or property, on board neutral vessels on the high seas, is not a belligerent right, derived from the law of nations; and it is obvious, that no visit, or search, or use of force for any purpose, on board the vessel of an independent power on the high seas, can in war or peace be sanctioned by the laws or authority of another power."

Thus Buonaparte and Mr Madison professed the same principles, and pursued the same object. Both would have deprived Great Britain of the right of search, by establishing the principle, that free bottoms should make free goods-the maxim extend.

ing to the persons as well as to the property on board. But a nation engaged in hostilities with another nation has a right to the support of all her subjects, and to take them whereever she can find them. The declaration of opposite principles, by the American government, precluded of course all hopes of an amicable arrangement.

Yet, although such was the spirit displayed by the general government of the United States, a considerable proportion of the people continued hostile to the war. Their burdens were increasing-their disasters had been severe-the advantages gained by their arms comparatively unimportant; and Mr Madison's partizans had some difficulty in managing them. To animate their zeal various devices were resorted to: Among others the appointment of a committee of congress to report in formal array the alleged outrages committed by this country. Even this expedient, however, failed of effect: And the Americans at last applied to the Emperor of Russia to interfere as a mediator betwixt them and Great Britain. But the British government had wisely determined never to submit to the judg ment of any neutral power the important questions in dispute with America; and the mediation of the Russian emperor was accordingly declined. An offer was at the same time made to enter into direct negociation with America, which, however, led to no immediate result; and the unhappy contest was still protracted.

CHAP. VII.

Affairs of India.-General View of the Reasons for restricting the Monopoly enjoyed by the East India Company-Sketch of the Limitations under which the Charter was renewed by Parliament.

THE first thing which must strike every one who reflects on the merits of our Indian policy, is the mysterious style in which most persons are accustomed to speak upon the subject, as if, when examining any question relating to India, there existed a necessity for laying aside all the received principles of commercial and political science, and for abandoning even the most familiar maxims of com mon sense and sound reasoning. The affairs of India, we are told by those who profess to be particularly conversant in them, are quite different from the affairs of all other countries, and must be regulated by a separate and distinct set of maxims. There is something, it is pretended, in the climate of Asia-in the physical constitution of the eastern nations, as well as in their laws, manners, and religion, which must for ever baffle those European politicians who may presume to interfere in the legislation of the Asiatics. So successful indeed have the politicians who are supposed to have a peculiar and official knowledge of India affairs, been in imposing this singular delusion on the public, that

even the statesmen, to whom we are accustomed on all other subjects to listen with respect, are heard with distrust, when they come to deliver their sentiments on the complicated and mysterious subject of Indian policy.

Yet it were absurd to doubt that in Asia as well as in Europe, that is the best system of government which most effectually promotes the great ends of liberty and protection to its subjects, at the least possible expense of their lives and fortunes; and that the best plan of commercial intercourse for India, as well as for England, which ensures the perfect freedom of individual industry, while it offers the most splendid rewards to the successful exertion of individual talent, and the most promising hopes to the fortunate issue of individual enterprise and speculation. It is impossible to believe, that there is any thing either in the climate of Asia, or in the condition of its inhabitants, which should prescribe a system of government for them materially different in its principles from those which are recognized in Europe; or that an upright and vigorous administration of justice, a

powerful establishment for defence, a system of prudent economy on the part of the administration, and a free and unrestrained intercourse of trade, should be of equivocal or dangerous influence in India.

It is scarcely necessary, therefore, to mention, that, notwithstanding the clamour which has been raised by the zeal of an interested faction, the whole question as to our Indian policy must be brought to issue on the hypothesis, that such a book as the Wealth of Nations really contains principles which do not altogether lose their force when applied to the affairs of india. In spite of all sophistry and declamation the leading doctrines of moral and political science possess a significance and application wherever men are found, an application, whose limits are confined only by those of human society. In conformity with the most obvious principles, it must be pronounced a preposterous thing, that an association of merchants should be vested with the sovereignty of an empire far more populous and extensive than that of which they themselves form but a small and comparatively insignificant portion. The causes, in a great measure accidental, of this singular phenomenon in politics, to which neither ancient nor modern times can afford any thing like a parallel, are well known as matter of history. But whatever these causes may have been, it deserves always to be remembered, that the East India Company, which has no higher rank than what belongs to the greatest mercantile society in the world, is in the actual possession of one of the largest and most fertile empires, and recently claimed the full and unqualified monopoly of a trade, which, estimating its value by the fertility of the soil, and the number of the people to whom it extends, ought to leave the trade of all other countries far behind it in extent and importance.

It must be superfluous to urge against such an arrangement the ordinary topics of censure-to declaim on the utter unfitness of such a society at once to play the parts of sovereign and merchant-or to dwell at length on the striking impropriety of bending under the yoke of such masters, a territory of almost boundless extent and fertility.-It must be equally superfluous to mention that the government of the Company, like that established in all the other oriental states, is a pure despotism; and that under such a government there exists no security for the happiness of the governed, except in the wisdom and benevolence of the administration.— It must be unnecessary also to state, that the interest in the welfare of India, which may be expected from the proprietors and directors of the Company, is really the most feeble and unsteady that can possibly be imagined; and that of course every thing might be expected from their administration, rather than a regard to the comfort and happiness of their subjects. From the very nature of the association, the interest of individual proprietors must be feeble and transient, because their great object in connecting themselves with the society at all, is to secure a certain share of influence and patronage; the exercise of which, to the fullest extent, is not by any means compatible with a disinterested regard to the prosperity of the governed. It seems quite natural to expect from such a government nothing but avarice, rapacity, and oppression towards its subjects. But all this is very apparent, and has already been frequently pressed on the consideration of the legislature and of the country.

But if the natural, and apparently incurable, defects of the Company's administration of the government of a great empire be thus apparent, the ob

jections which, at first view, present themselves to the commercial monopoly, by which the political rights of the company were at one time fortified, seem to be infinitely more formidable. There is no feature, perhaps, of the policy of an enlightened age, which is more strikingly incompatible with the fair enjoyment of individual rights, or the rapid progress of general prosperity, than this system of monopolies, and none, certainly, whose absolute in congruity with the notions of an advanced period is more palpable. What can be more unjust than the selection of a few favoured individuals, for the exclusive enjoyment of all the commercial benefits to be derived from an intercourse with distant nations, while the rest of their fellow-citizens, whose pretensions are in every respect as favourable, remain the idle and discontented spectators of the advantages secured to their more fortunate rivals? It is essential to the prosperity of commerce, that it should be free and unconstrained; that the adventurer should be left to the exercise of a discretion the most unerring, because supported by the steadiest and most powerful motives, and that he should receive from government the most ample protection for his rights, in order that he may be enabled to proceed without timidity or hesitation. But can any invasion of his rights be more gross or insulting than that which is accomplished in the shape of a monopoly, excluding him from a participation in the profits of a lucrative trade, which opens the most promising field for his skill and enter prise? Every grant of monopoly is a gift out of the great commercial patrimony of the state; and while it is the duty of a wise government, like a kind and affectionate parent, to consult the welfare of all its subjects, it is no wonder that much murmuring and discon tent should be excited by a capricious preference in the distribution of the

common inheritance. This ungene partiality, and unfair abridgmen natural right, are implied, howeve every establishment of commercial nopoly, and afford, independently other considerations, a strong ind ment to the immediate discontinu of such of them as still triumph the good sense and liberality of present age.

These general arguments ap with a force which was irresistibl the monopoly of the East India C pany, as it existed before the ren of the charter in the present year. the directors, who could not enco er, endeavoured to elude their forc maintaining, that the trade to Br India would, from circumstances w they were not very careful to exp admit of no extension from the uti freedom of private enterprise; that competition of private advent would, in India, enhance so much price of every article, that the Cor ny would be unable to buy, and in rope reduce the price so much the Company would be ruined by ing; and that there was somethin the constitution of the Hindoos w would prevent them from raising supply, so as to meet an increased mand for their commodities. S were the strange arguments by w the cause of the Company was ported.

Even if it could be proved that nopolies tend to promote industry opulence, and give a better direc to capital than it would take with the aid of law, one might still! some scruples as to the equity of principle, which, for the sake of advantages, would authorize so trary a restraint on the common ri of society. But it can be establis that the inexpediency of such a sy is not more manifest than its injus

It has been often proved, that at not supported by the profits whic

this calculated to yield, but remaining dependent for its continuance on extraordinary immunities and privileges, secured at the expence of those who do not participate in its gains, is necessarily a losing trade to the public, what ever may be its result to the individuals by whom it is conducted. No man will persist in devoting a portion of his funds to an employment which does not yield him an ordinary return, with out assistance from other sources, or the sacrifice of other advantages; and it may be assumed, that the same max. ims which an individual will find prudent in the management of his private affairs, will not prove of doubtful ap plication when applied to the wealth of nations. The trade, therefore, which requires a monopoly for its support, is in itself a losing trade, and should never receive the countenance of the legislature, unless it be found subservient to higher interests, which could not in any other shape be so effectually consulted.

Where a monopoly of colonial trade, such as that of the East India Comis established, it is quite obvious that one of two consequences must follow, either the monopolists will be fully qualified to conduct the whole trade in the very best manner, or they will not be able to do this, and could not stand the competition of the private merchant. If the first hypothesis be admitted, then the grant of exclusive privileges is a very unnecessary measure, since the grantees are, in truth, the very persons into whose hands the whole trade would inevitably fall in the natural course of things; and the monopoly can serve no other purpose than to excite murmurs among those who may be apt to entertain the erroneous notion, that they themselves could successfully compete with the monopolists, were all restraints with drawn. But this hypothesis is never admissible in any case of monopoly;

for it is so obviously beyond the power of human foresight and wisdom to establish prospective regulations for the complicated affairs of a great and increasing branch of trade, that the exact adaptation of the means to the end will never be credited by any man of common understanding. There re mains, therefore, but one alternative, that the monopolists are really unfit for the beneficial discharge of the trust reposed in them-that they are without the vigilance, capital, and talents, which are required to the best management of their concerns; or, in other words, that the affairs of their trade are necessarily and inevitably conducted by them to the great loss and inconvenience of the public.

Nor is it a matter of any difficulty to point out the precise way in which the loss is sustained by the country, which is unhappily led to sanction so preposterous an arrangement. The industry of the parent state can be promoted only by a demand for its manufac tures; and this demand can be increased in no other way but by competi tion among the buyers. The same ob vious maxims of political science apply also to the case of the colony, whose progressive improvement in industry and opulence forms the only lawful object of the policy of the parent state. But when you grant a monopoly you destroy this competition; you make the monopolists the only buyers both at home and abroad; you make them also the only sellers; in short, you destroy, in so far as it is possible for a narrow and misguided policy to do so, all the great springs on which the pros perity of nations must for ever depend.

Every man buys as cheap and sells as dear as possible; but the monopolist alone is enabled to do this with effect. There exists no competition to restrain the unbounded avarice of his nature; and in the free indulgence of the most selfish of passions, he is en

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