intercourse, and withhold all encouragement, from the persons so employed. The natives should be made to under stand that the missionaries act entirely from the impulse of their own minds.

Not that there is reason to despair of seeing the light of Christianity diffused through the Eastern world; it would seem, on the contrary, that the same Power which at first planted our holy religion, has made visible and ample provision for its general diffusion, at perhaps no very distant period. This provision consists in the decisive superiority in arts and knowledge to which European or Christian nations have attained, and in the intimate communication which the instrumentality of these arts has enabled European nations to form with the most distant parts of the globe. America belongs entirely to Europe; every port of Asia is crowded with her vessels, and even the wilds of Africa are beginning to feel her influence, Her knowledge cannot fail in time to become universal; for there are natural desires in the human mind which it tends to gratify. In imbibing the science and philosophy of Europe, more barbarous nations will insensibly imbibe her religion also; and an ac

quaintance with her literature and history will enable them to appreciate on what that religion rests. Here then is opened a vast field for the philan thropic exertions of those who have at heart the higher interests of their species. If the funds which are lavished in useless missions were employed in forming establishments for instruction, the most beneficial and lasting effects might be produced. The Indians would receive with pleasure and gratitude the fruits-of such institutions, even from hands which they might judge unhallowed. The manner in which so grand an object is to be accomplished must of course be determined by a view of the actual circumstances of India. European teachers could not be supplied in any proportion to the number required; but there might be formed, at convenient stations throughout British India, se minaries for the instruction of native teachers, who might afterwards diffuse among their countrymen the know. ledge which they had acquired.— Much good may be done by the wise liberality of government; nothing but mischief can be expected from the zeal of fanatics.

THE obstinate and strenuous resistance first offered in the peninsula to the ambition of France, has given to the events which occurred in this part of the world, an interest beyond even that excited by the great efforts of other nations to support their independence. An eager curiosity has been employed to discover the causes of that heroic spirit which burst forth in a country where its existence was little suspected. Why did Spain, after its government had been dissolved, and its army annihilated, refuse that obedience to the conqueror so long yielded by the states of Germany? Why, in spite of all their outrages and triumphs, were the French unable to subdue the spirit of the Spanish na tion, although they had ensured the temporary subjection of the most considerable states of the continent? The Spanish authorities were indeed without those powers of combination by which the invaders of their country might at once have been overwhelmed; yet neither flattery nor menace, neither suffering nor reward, could degrade the rude peasant of Spain to submission, or make him for a moment forget the wrongs, or betray the independence, of his country. Whence this virtue which triumphed over every temptation-this patriotic

courage which encountered every dan ger? Whence that noble spirit which declared eternal resistance to the invader-baffled his plans, and rendered vain his calculations-prevented him from consolidating his power, and profiting by his conquests and, finally, opened a way for the torrent, by which, in the course of this memorable year, the hordes of the invader were swept from this fine country?

The causes which produced results to the ambition of France, while contending amid the mountains of Spain, so different from those which had at tended its efforts in Germany and other countries, are imperfectly but judiciously assigned by one of the invaders, who was himself the victim of Spanish patriotism. "We were called," says M. de Rocca, a French officer of hussars, " from the sandy plains of the north of Germany, where we had to do with people, subject, for the most part, to governments whose forms were entirely military. The different sovereigns who made up the parts of the Germanic body had, for more than a century, turned all their views towards perfecting those military institutions which might secure their authority, and serve their personal ambition; but in accustoming their subjects to a minutely punctual obedience, they

had weakened the national character, the only invincible bulwark which nations can oppose to foreign invaders. "When a province of Germany was conquered by the French, and could no longer receive the orders of its sovereign, the inferior classes, unaccustomed to the exercise of their own free will, dared not to act without the commands of their governments or of their liege lords: These governments became, by the very act of conquest, subordinate to the conquerors; and the liege lords, long accustomed to witness the hourly vexation which the people experienced from the soldiery, resigned themselves the more easily to the evils which war brings in her train.

"The clergy in Prussia had but little ascendency over the people; the Reformation has destroyed among the protestants that power which the priests preserve, even in our days, in some catholic countries, and especially in Spain. The men of letters, who might have influenced public opinion, and made their wisdom subservient to the cause of their country, were but rarely called to take an active part in public affairs. Literary reputation was the only end of their ambition, and they rarely addicted themselves to occupations or studies applicable to existing circumstances. The real power of several states in Germany rested on their military systems, and their political existence could not but depend entirely on the strength or weakness of their governments.

"In the plains of Germany, the localcircumstances of the country did not permit the people to escape so easily from the yoke of their conquerors as in some other countries of a different nature. Small bodies of troops kept a great extent of conquered country in awe, and assured the French armies of subsistence. The citizens could have found no secure retreats if they had tried partial revolts against the invaders; besides, the Germans, accus

tomed to a quiet and regular life, are only roused to make a desperate effort by the complete breaking up of all their former habits.

"The French had nothing to fear from the inhabitants of the countries conquered by their arms, and the war of Germany had been carried on solely by armies of regulars, between whom their exists rather rivalry than hatred. The success of a campaign depended on the aggregate of the military operations, on the activity and perseve rance of the commanders, and their skill in discovering and preventing the plans of each other, and in bringing with skill and celerity great masses down on the points of attack. these little partial actions were avoid. ed, which, in war, only increase the miseries of individuals, without contributing to any important advantage; and the talents of the generals were never baffled by the exertions of individuals, or by the spontaneous movements of the people.

All

"In Germany the French had only to subdue governments and armies; in the Spanish peninsula, the government and the army were already annihilated. Buonaparte had invaded Portugal and Spain, put to flight, or reduced to captivity, the sovereigns of those two countries, and dispersed their military forces. The French were not called to fight against troops of the line, but against a people insulated from all other continental nations, by their manners, their prejudices, and even the nature of their country. The Spaniards were to oppose to them a resistance so much the more obstinate, as they believed it to be the object of the French government to make the peninsula a secondary state, irrevocably subject to the dominion of France.

"With regard to knowledge and the progress of social habits, Spain was at least a century behind the other nations of the continent. The distant

dalmost insular situation of the untry, and the severity of its relious institutions, had prevented the paniards from taking part in the distes and controversies which had atated and enlightened Europe during e sixteenth century. They scarcely ought, even in the eighteenth, of the ilosophical spirit which had been e of the causes of the revolution in

rance.

"Although the Spaniards were exemely indolent, and there were found their administration, that disorder ad corruption which are the inevitale consequences of a long despotism, heir national character had not been allied. Their government, arbitrary s it was, bore no resemblance to the bsolute military power existing in Germany, where the constant submision of all to the orders of one, continually pressed down the springs of individual character. Ferdinand the Catholic, Charles V. and Philip II. had, it is true, usurped almost all the privileges of the grandees and of the Cortes, and they had annihilated Spaaish liberty; but the weakness of government, under their successors, had always left to the people, notwithstanding the despotism of the sovereign, a practical freedom, which was often carried even to insubordination. "In the annals of the German states, no names had hitherto been heard, but those of the sovereign and his armies. But since Ferdinand the Catholic had united the different kingdoms of Spain, scarcely a single reign had passed in which the people had not given sensible proofs of their existence and power by imposing conditions on their masters, or by expelling the ministers or favourites. When the inhabitants of Madrid revolted, and demanded from Charles III. the dismissal of his minister Squilaci, the king himself was obliged to appear, in order to compound with

the people, and to employ the intervention of a monk, bearing a crucifix in his hand. The court, which had fled to Aranjuez, attempted afterwards to send the Walloon guards against Madrid: the people killed several, and the cry was, "If the Walloons enter, the Bourbons shall not reign." The Walloons did not enter,-Squilaci was dismissed, and order was restored.At Berlin and throughout Prussia again, the inhabitants respected the soldiers of their king, as the soldiers themselves respected their military commanders; at Madrid, the sentinels placed on guard, to attend to the execution of the orders of their sovereign, yielded the precedence to the meanest burgess.

"The revenues of the Spanish crown were very scanty, and consequently could maintain but a very limited number of troops. The regiments of the line, with the exception of some privileged corps, were incomplete, ill paid, and ill disciplined. The priests were the only powerful executive militia whom the kings of Spain could command; it was by the exhortations of the ministers from their altars, and the presentation of pontifical ornaments and relics, that they repressed and dissipated popular tumults.

"The Spanish priests hated the French from patriotism and from interest; for they well knew that the intention was to abolish their privileges, and to deprive them of their riches and temporal power. Their opinion swayed that of the greater part of the nation. Every Spaniard regarded the public cause as his own private quarrel, and the French had, in short, almost as many individual enemies to fight as the Spanish peninsula contained inhabitants.

"The high and barren mountains which surround and intersect Spain, were peopled by warlike tribes, always armed, for the purpose of smug gling, and accustomed to baffle the

regular troops of their own country, which were frequently sent in pursuit of them. The untamed character of the inhabitants of the peninsula-the mildness of the climate, which admits of living in the open air almost all the year; the inaccessible retreats of the inland mountains; the sea, which washes such extensive shores; all the great circumstances arising from the national character, the climate, and local situation, could not fail of securing for the Spaniards numberless facilities for escaping from the oppression of their conquerors, and for multiplying their own forces, whether by transporting them rapidly to those points on which the French were weak, or in securing their escape from pursuit."

These observations may account in some measure for the unexpected difficulties which the French encountered in their attempt to subdue the peninsula. But even French vanity will find it difficult to ascribe to such circumstances the overwhelming disasters which, in the course of the year 1813, drove their conquered armies from this fine country. The splendid and decisive triumphs of this year belong to England alone; and a rapid sketch of the circumstances which enabled her thus to put forth her energies, will be no unsuitable preface to the acCount of this memorable campaign.

The important changes which had taken place in the affairs of Europe, since the beginning of the last year, prescribed an alteration in the politics of this country towards Spain, and rendered it an imperious duty on the ministers to make the most signal effort for the liberation of the peninsula. Many statesmen of great eminence thought that there were grounds for such a change of policy even during the last campaign. We shall briefly recapitulate the circumstances which this opinion was founded.

on

So early as April 1811, it was

known in this country, at least to government, that Russia was laying the foundation of that great effort which she afterwards made for secu ring her independence. It was known also to be her object to establish such a system of resistance, as that, if the French should persevere in their plans of conquest and aggression, they might not only be expelled from Russia, but followed by her victorious legions into other countries. As the known cha. racter of the French government pro mised an obstinate perseverance in its aggressive policy, so there was every reason to look for the most important consequences from the new system adopted by Russia. It was the duty therefore of the British ministers to prepare for the crisis which was approaching; and as the efforts of Rus sia terminated not only in the expulsion of the French from her own territories, but in the revival of the inde. pendence of Prussia, while an oppor tunity was at the same time afforded to Austria to assert her rank among the nations of the continent, the moment seemed the most favourable which had ever occurred for the liberation of Europe. The successes of the last campaign in the peninsula besides were such as to encourage the most sanguine hopes in future; and even the circumstances in the situation of the French which had so greatly contributed to these successes were still farther calculated to excite expectation.

While the efforts of the British in the peninsula had been thus vigorous and successful, an unaccountable failure in the means of the French had become apparent. The French government in Spain, under Joseph Buonaparte, was remarkable for imbecility, and the efforts of the army were of course without unity either of council or action. The central government under the intrusive king seemed