at the first rush. The French, who seem to have expected this, endeavoured to render the further advance of the assailants impracticable, and to concentrate such a fire on the spot as to make it impossible to remain exposed to it, while the confined space of the summit of the breach prevented the assailants from using any cover against its effects.

The events of this day are highly honourable and encouraging to the British soldier, as they prove that when his labour aids his courage by carrying the approaches completely to the wall, and when the assault of the breach is duly supported by a close fire from the trenches, his success is ensured. The advantages must then be all on his side; and how shall a few worn-out and dispirited men, exposed to a murderous fire every time they attempt to stand up, resist the attack of enemies elated with success, and requiring only one effort more to crown their labours. The old and tried maxim on this subject cannot, however, be too much attended to,-" at a siege never to attempt any thing by force which can be obtained by labour and art." The regular mode of gaining a breach is so certain, so simple, and so bloodless, that it is much to be preferred to any other, and forms so advantageous a contrast to the open assaults in Spain, unaided by fire from the trenches, that there are few who will not regret the inability of the British army to have adopted it on all occasions.

Soult made another unsuccessful effort about this time. A force, chiefly Spanish, was drawn up along the left bank of the Bidassoa, in a position which covered all the approaches to St Sebastian. As the enemy occupied the height which overhangs the op. posite banks, and which he had fortified with cannon, he could command at any point the passage of the river.

VOL. VI. PART I.

On the morning of the 31st, the very day of the storming of St Sebastian, he crossed in great force, and attack. ed the Spanish troops posted on the hills at a little distance. The attack was repulsed at once in the most gallant manner, and repeated attempts had uniformly the same result. In the afternoon, having still the command of the river, the French passed over an additional body of troops, which, joined to the former, made a new and desperate attack on the Spanish positions. They were instantly driven back in the same prompt and gallant manner as formerly; and the enemy, losing all hope, entirely withdrew his troops. Lord Wellington, who had not hitherto pla ced full confidence in the Spanish armies, posted a British division on each of their flanks; but their own valour was equal to the occasion, and no aid was necessary. This day, in short, may be considered as finally retrieving the tarnished reputation of the Spanish arms.

When the French made this attempt to penetrate by the high road to St Sebastian, they about the same time crossed the Bidassoa higher up, with a view of gaining the place by a circuitous route through Oyazzun. They attacked a Portuguese brigade, which was stationed at that place, and which, though reinforced, was unable to maintain the position, but fell back upon another, which equally covered St Sebastian. The enemy finding all his attempts fruitless, withdrew behind the Bidassoa. The immediate fall of the fortress rendered it unnecessary to make any further efforts.

Some discussions of an unpleasant nature took place about this time between Lord Wellington and the Spanish government. His lordship had advanced into Spain in the confidence and with the understanding, that the army of that country should be placed

N

under the command of officers, on whose co-operation he could rely. He had particularly stipulated, that the chief command of the provinces through which he was to pass, and of the armies levied from them, should be entrusted to Castanos, an officer, not perhaps of very shining abilities, but of great worth, integrity, and candour. The dignity of his character, and his conciliatory manners, rendered him an admirable instrument for conciliating the British and Spaniards. It was in this capacity Lord Wellington wished to employ him. While the Gallician army was ably led by General Giron, Castanos went through the provinces, maintaining or der, and forwarding supplies. An ad ministration unfriendly to him having come into power, took advantage of his military inactivity to remove him from the command which he held; while other changes were made, contra ry, as Lord Wellington conceived, to the engagement originally entered into with him, and without his advice or concurrence. Such conduct to such a man, and a man to whom Spain was so deeply indebted, can admit of no justification. Lord Wellington, in a letter to the Spanish minister of war, remarked, that the local situation of the 4th army prevented its being formed into a corps, at the head of which the captain general could be placed, with any regard to propriety, considering the dignity of his office,-that on this account, and at his (Lord Wellington's) request, General Castanos placed his head-quarters with his lordship's and those of the Portuguese army, that General Castanos, besides commanding the 4th army, was captain-general of Estremadura, Castile, and Gallicia; and that among the duties of that high office was that of establishing the Spanish authorities in the different districts and cities

which the enemy was evacuating, a duty which Castanos could not have discharged had he been literally at the head of the 4th army,-that it was himself and not General Castanos, who suggested the propriety of his excellency being employed in this manner,— that the conduct of the Spanish government in this respect was a direct breach of the contract which had in

duced him to take the command of the Spanish armies,-that, however great his desire might be to serve the Spanish nation, he could not submit to such injurious treatment, and that the contract must be fulfilled, if it was desired that he should retain the command.His lordship also complained of the removal of General Giron without any reason assigned. But although Lord Wellington in the first instance addressed this letter to the regency, he had the magnanimity not to suffer his private wrongs to interfere with his exertions for the public cause, and continued to conquer for the nation which thus injured him.

Every thing now indicated the intention of the British commander to cross the Pyrenees, and to carry the war into the heart of France; this measure was delayed only until his rear should have been secured by the fall of Pampluna. In the meantime it appeared expedient to Lord Wellington to cross the Bidassoa, and drive the enemy from the posts which he was fortifying behind that river.

The left of the allied army crossed the river on the 7th October, in front of Andaye, and near to Montagne Verte. The British and Portuguese troops took seven pieces of cannon on this part of the line, and the Spanish troops, who crossed the fords above the bridge, one piece. At the same time Major-General Baron Alten attacked the light division at the Puerta De Fera, and Don P. Giron attacked the

enemy's entrenchments on the mountain of La Riuna. These troops carried every thing before them until they arrived at the foot of the rock, which proved inaccessible. On the morning of the 8th, the attack was renewed on the right of the enemy's position by the same troops, and the point was instantly carried in the most gallant manner. The enemy then withdrew from all parts of his position.-The object was now accomplished; France was entered; and that country, which, for twenty years, had never been trodden by hostile foot, now saw a mighty in. vading army established within its frontier.

A new epoch in the war was now celebrated, a victory had been gained by a British general and army within the French territories. How many reflections crowded at once upon the mind! About ten years before, Great Britain was arming her whole popula tion to resist a French invasion, and now her troops had invaded France. In 1803, no man doubted that a descent on the British shores would be attempted; and the legislature was exclusively occupied in devising the means of repelling it. In 1813, almost the first proceeding of the legislature when it met, was to vote thanks to the brave troops who had defeated the enemy upon his own territories, and established a British army on the fields of France. In 1803, Buonaparte had constructed an immense fleet of boats within 25 miles of the British coast; the means of invasion, the troops to be employed in it, were visible daily from our own shores. In 1813, when the naval force of France was destroyed, her fleets rotting in her ports, her colonies gone, her trade ruined, her projects baffled, her armies beaten in every encounter when her troops had been driven out of Portugal, driven out of Spain, this same England, once destined for

destruction, was raised to the highest pitch of glory! In 1803, the Parisians were amused with the exhibition of some old tapestry, representing the successes by which William I. obtained the government of Eng. land; and the casual finding of this relic was hailed as the omen and forerunner of other atchievements on the same ground. In 1813, the Parisians were studying the operations of these very British upon their own plains of Gascony; while, instead of the French flag waving victorious upon the banks of the Thames, the British standard was advancing in triumph to the borders of the Garonne.-Base must have been the mind which did not exult over such a scene of glory!-No thirst of conquest had directed the career of England-no desire of enlarging her territories led her on to battle;-but the ambition of doing good-the desire to rescue a nation from its oppressors, had nerved her arm. For this holy object, and in this sacred cause, she fought and conquered Spain and Portugal were saved-and France, the invader and oppressor, was herself defeated and invaded.

On the 31st of October, Pampluna surrendered after a blockade of four months. The garrison became prisoners of war, and all the artillery and stores were given up.-Nothing therefore now detained Lord Wellington from pushing his victorious career into France; and the enemy, who had so lately aimed at the entire subjugation of the peninsula, sought only to defend the approaches of his own territories. He formed two successive lines of defence; the one along the river Nivelle, the other immediately in front of Bayonne. These lines, ever since the battle of Vittoria, he had been diligently employed in fortifying, and until he was driven from them, the British could not advance into the in

terior of the kingdom. The better to provide for defence, a decree had been recently issued, by which a new levy of 30,000 conscripts was to be drawn from the provinces immediately bordering on the Pyrenees; and the reinforcements derived from this source were already assembling.

Lord Wellington's advance was delayed for a few days by the heavy rains and the bad state of the roads; but on the 10th of November, the whole army was brought forward, and was enabled to commence its attack upon the French entrenched position along the Nivelle. The right of this position was on the Spanish side of the river, in front of St Jean de Luz, while the centre and left extended along the opposite bank, and occupied the villages and mountains situated in this vicinity. The right had been fortified so strongly that an attack in front was judged impracticable; but it could be turned, if the centre were forced to give way. Against the centre therefore the main attack was directed. It was conducted by three British and one Spanish division; and, after a desperate resistance, the enemy were driven from all the strong and fortified positions which they occupied on the left of their centre. The heights on the Nivelle being thus carried, and the enemy's centre driven back, Lord Wellington immediately directed troops to advance upon the rear of their right; but before this movement could be completed night intervened. The enemy took advantage of the darkness to quit their fine positions and retire upon Bedart, leaving the whole ground which they had occupied in possession of the allied army. As the affairs of this day consisted wholly in the storming of entrenched positions, and lasted from day-light till dark, the loss was necessarily considerable. It consisted of 2500 British and Portuguese killed

and wounded, besides Spaniards, of whose loss no regular account has been given.

The enemy now retired into his last line of defence, which was formed by the entrenched camp in front of Bayonne. The left occupied the peninsula formed by the confluence of the Adour and the Nive, whence it communicated with the army of Catalonia; the right and centre extended from the left bank of the Nive to the Adour below Bayonne; and the front was here defended by an impassable morass. Lord Wellington, on surveying a position thus defended by nature and art, judged it impregnable against any di rect attack. A movement to the right to threaten the rear of the enemy, and his communication with France, seemed to afford the only chance of success. Operations were again delayed by the condition of the roads; but on the 8th of December, Generals Hill and Beresford were, in conformity with Lord Wellington's plans, directed to cross the Nive with two divisions.

The only serious operation on the 9th was the passage of the Nive at Cambo and Usturitz by Sir Rowland Hill and Sir Henry Clinton, who obliged the enemy to retire from the right bank of the river towards Bay

onne.

While this operation was proceeding, another division of the army attacked and carried the village of Ville Franche and the heights in the vicinity. Meanwhile Sir John Hope, with the left division, after driving in the out-posts at Biaritz and Anglet, and reconnoitring the right of the enemy's entrenched position, retired in the evening to the ground he had occupied before the reconnoisance.-The effect of the first day's operations was to clear the right bank of the Nive.

The operations of the 10th com. menced with a movement by the right of the allied army, under Sir Rowland

fill, who, moving his right from the Vive, placed it on the Adour, his left aning at Villa Franche on the Nive. -He thus kept up the communiation with the centre under Marshal leresford, which was removed from the ight to the left of the Nive, to be eady to sustain the left wing under iir John Hope, upon which the enemy editated his main attack. A brirade of dragoons, and Murillo's Spaish division, meanwhile observed and ecupied the force under General Pais, which had moved from St Jean Pied de Port towards St Palais, to be a readiness to support the operations f the enemy on the Adour.

Soult was aware, that unless some igorous measures were taken to arest this movement, his position must con become untenable. Not only nust he lose his communication with France, but the navigation of the Alour, by which his supplies were transnitted, must fall into the hands of he British. He determined instantly pon the most vigorous operations.

is project was to attack with his whole force that part of the allied rmy which had not passed the Nive, and thus induce the British general 0 recall his advanced divisions.

Soult issued from his entrenched amp with all his force, except that which was opposed to Sir Rowland Hill, and made a desperate attack upon Sir John Hope's and General Alton's divisions at Biaretz and Arcanque. His great object, as already mentioned, was to compel the British to abandon a position which gave them the command of the sea-coast, and of the road from St Jean de Luz-an attempt, which, if successful, might have rendered it necessary for them, not only to quit the banks of the Nive, but also to repass the Nivelle, and fall back to the Bidassoa. Soult, however, failed completely in this attempt. The termination of the action was

marked by the defection of the Dutch and German regiments of Nassau and Frankfort, which came over to the allies.

The 11th was marked by no operations of much importance. The enemy's grand army remained in front of the British left, and made some attacks in the afternoon upon Sir John Hope's posts, but was repulsed with loss. The right and centre of the allies were not attacked.On the 12th, the enemy again attempted to drive the British right from its positions, and the conflict lasted from the morning till the afternoon; but being again repulsed, he retired within his entrenched camp, and abandoned all thoughts of making any impression in this quarter.

On the 13th, Soult resolved to make an entire change in his operations. Having shewn so much pertinacity in his attacks against the British left; having, by so many efforts, produced, as he thought, a firm perSuasion in the mind of Lord Wellington, that his whole attention would still be directed to this quarter, he determined to move his whole force suddenly through Bayonne, and fall upon the British right, under Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill. This determination does credit to the skill of Soult; but he found in this instance, as he always did before, that he had to contend with a general who anticipates every movement of his antagonists, dives into all their plans, and provides for every emergency. Lord Wellington expected this attack, and reinforced Sir Rowland Hill. But it appears that even if his lordship had not entertained this expectation, Soult would have failed in his attempt; for Sir Rowland Hill's troops alone defeated the enemy with immense loss. Thus beaten at all points, the French retired upon their entrenchments.

Such was the issue of these con