Mulda, to the southward of Dessau. His vanguard occupied Cothen, between the Mulda and the Saale, and Bernbourg, which is situated on the last-mentioned river. The armies of the north of Germany, and of Silesia, amounting together to 180,000 men, made a combined movement on the 5th towards Leipzig.-Schwartzenburgh, with the main body of the Bohemian army, was at Chemnitz on the 8th,Generals Kleist and Wittgenstein were near Altenberg.-At Lutzen, the Bo hemian army communicated with the advance of the other combined armies under Count Woronzoff; so that a line was formed, in Buonaparte's rear, from Aileben to Altenberg, Chemnitz, and the Bohemian frontier.-Ne. ver, perhaps, had a grander movement been accomplished. The allies had now effected their great object of placing themselves in the rear of the enemy; and it is impossible not to admire the skill, boldness, and activity displayed upon this occasion.

An event now occurred of the most embarrassing nature to the French. Bavaria had long been the ally of France, but whether attached by fear or favour, it had been difficult to determine. Buonaparte had certainly been liberal to her; he had aggrandized her at the expence of Austria; he evidently wished to raise up this state as a barrier to protect the French territory.-There were many circumstances, however, which might prevent Bavaria from being deeply affected by these benefits. She had been treated as a vassal, she had been obliged to unite her troops to the French armies, and to send them to the extremities of Europe, to shed their blood in wars in which she could take no interest. The tenure by which crowns at the disposal of Buonaparte were held, could not inspire Bavaria with much confidence. When his own brothers, whom he had raised to thrones, were,

in a moment of caprice, at once precipitated from them, the destinies of others connected with him by no natural ties, could not be considered as very secure. Such sentiments on the part of the Bavarian monarch, were more than seconded by the people, who shared the flame of patriotism by which every German breast was filled. In the army this feeling was very ardent; and remonstrances from that quarter are said to have had consider. able influence in producing the determination of the cabinet A superior Austrian corps, under Prince Reuss, had already entered the Bavarian territory; and the French army assembled on the Maine, and from which Buonaparte had promised assistance to Bavaria, had in the exigency o nie affairs been directed to repair to the Elbe. The king therefore suddenly determined to dissolve all the ties which united him to France, and to afford to the cause of the allies his full and cordial co-operation. A treaty of alliance and concert between Austria and Bavaria was accordingly signed by Prince Reuss and General Wrede, on the 8th of October. Wrede, with 35 000 Bavarian troops, and 25,000 Austrians, which were placed under his command, immediately co-operated with the combined armies.

In this most critical state of affairs, Buonaparte had but one part to act. He had no choice but to quit Dresden without delay, as he could no longer indulge any reasonable hope of maintaining it; and, with the utmost expedition, to concentrate his whole forces upon Leipzig, and the line of the Saale. He might thus have inpeded the movements of the two great portions of the allied army, and might have been enabled to maintain himself for some time in his new position. A succession of similar movements might indeed have manoeuvered him out of Germany. For the present, however,

he remained unbroken, and might have · established himself on the line of the Maine, a most advantageous position, which defended France by threatening the flank of any enemy who might enter it, and, at the same time, afford ed an opening into the very heart of Germany. But his mind was not yet brought down to the level of his fortune; he refused to bend beneath the fate which pressed on him, and persisted to act upon principles suited to other times and other circumstances than those to which he was now reduced. He was thus led to prefer a bolder plan, which the allies had left open for him. He resolved to cross the Elbe; to extend himself along the opposite bank from Dresden to Mag deburg, and thence to push detached corps into the heart of Prussia, and even upon Berlin; but this course was imprudent and chimerical Inferior in the field, and with the entire population hostile, he had no chance of obtaining a footing in the Prussian territory; while, by suffering the allied armies to operate in his rear, he laid the sure foundation of disaster, if not of total destruction.

This plan, however, being resolved upon, no immediate obstacle opposed its execution. On the 7th of October, Buonaparte set out from Dresden, preceded by the greater part of his army, which directed its march, not upon Leipzig or the line of retreat, but upon Wittenburg, and the bridges by which the Swedish and Prussian armies had crossed. There was nothing to make head against him: The bridges were taken or destroyed; the blockade of Wittenberg was raised; General Tauentzein, with his small army of 10,000 men, was driven back precipitately upon Berlin, and the utmost alarm seized that capital.

The Crown Prince and Blucher, upon learning this new direction of

the French army, although they could not anticipate from it any unfavour able issue to the contest, felt the necessity of making a corresponding change in their own arrangements. They determined to follow close in the rear of Buonaparte, and to be ready to act against him wherever he might be found. With this view they repassed the Saale and the Elster, and were preparing to gain the other side of the Elbe, when they learned that a complete change was observable in the movements of the enemy. The divisions which had passed the Elbe and threatened Berlin had been recalled, and all the different corps were moving apparently in the direction of Leipzig. Buonaparte, in fact, was now hastening, with all his forces, to that field of action where the fate of Europe was so soon to be decided.

The reason assigned by Buonaparte himself for so sudden a change of plan, was the intelligence just received, that Bavaria had not only dissolved the alliance which had so long united her to France, but had concluded with the allies a treaty of co operation, and that her armies were about to act in conjunction with those of Austria. Such events might no doubt have afforded a sufficient reason for this change of movement, had other reasons been wanting; yet very slight reflection might have sufficed to convince him of the absurd nature of the plan upon which he had been acting. This instance of vacillation in his councils, however, was the source of irrepa rable injury to his affairs. By not marching at once to Leipzig and the Saale, he suffered the allied armies to conduct their operations unmolested in his rear; and he was afterwards driven to retrace his steps when it was too late to reap the benefits which might have been derived from more vigorous and seasonable measures.

When Buonaparte arrived at Leip

zig, the place was still in the possession of his troops; but hostile armies were on every side, within view of its walls. The united armies of the Crown Prince and of Blucher extended on the north from the Mulda to the Saale; the army of Silesia communicated along the Saale with the grand army, which extended on the south from that river to the Mulda. The two armies touched each other only at this extremity; they were thus in some degree separa. ted at other points; but their opposite lines were so near that they could communicate by signals, and hear the sound of each other's cannon. They thus obviated, in a great measure, the danger of separation; and the French gained little or no benefit by their interposition: They were obliged to divide their force to make head against the northern army on the one side, and the grand army on the other; and as they were pressed into so narrow a space, those bold and sweeping manoeuvres which they were accustomed to prac tise with so much success were altogether precluded.

The 16th of October, the day immediately following the arrival of Buonaparte, was fixed upon by Prince Schwartzenberg for a general attack on all the French positions around Leipzig. On the north, the French line extended from that city through Delitch and Bitterfeld to the Mulda. The army of the Crown Prince formed the left of the opposite line, reaching from Wetten to Zarlug. But as General Blucher was on the right, and had his head-quarters pushed to Gross Kirgal, he was nearest Leipzig; and it was therefore determined that on his side the grand effort should be made.Having made his dispositions, the Prussian general accordingly attacked, in the morning, three French corps commanded by Marshal Ney. The enemy made a desperate resistance; seve

ral of the villages in dispute were five or six times taken and retaken; but at length the French were driven from all their positions, and forced to retire behind the Partha, which immediately covered Leipzig. The French lost in this battle forty pieces of cannon, and 12,000 prisoners; General Blucher's loss was estimated at 6 or 7000 killed and wounded.

On the same day, a simultaneous attack was made on the other side by the grand Bohemian army in the neighbourhood of Wachar and Liebert Walkowitz. The Russians be gan by storming two fortified positions which covered the front of the enemy's centre. Buonaparte, however, collected the whole mass of his cavalry, which, commanded by Murat, succeeded in breaking the centre of the allies. The moment was critical; total defeat might have been the conse quence; but six regiments of Austrian cuirassiers advanced, gallantly withstood the efforts of the enemy, and succeeded in checking his progress. The French gained some ground; but, upon the whole, this desperate and sanguinary action made no material change in the relative position and strength of the two armies.

On the 17th, the allies made a pause, with the view of bringing up their reinforcements. General Benningsen had, on the advance of Prince Schwartzenberg, been left to observe Dresden with a large army; but when Buonaparte quitted that capital, and left it defended by St Cyr alone, with a gar rison of 16,000 men, so great a force was no longer necessary for the pur poses of observation, and active ope rations against Dresden could be delayed with perfect safety till the great battle was decided. Benningsen was therefore directed to leave merely a detachment before Dresden, and with his whole remaining force to push for

ward as expeditiously as possible to join the grand army.

It is difficult to account for the inactivity in which Buonaparte remained during this important day. Aware, as he must have been, of the advantages which the allies were deriving from the delay, a wise policy surely dictated that he should either have attacked them before their reinforcements could arrive, or that he should have seized the opportunity of effecting his retreat with less molestation. It was inconsistent with his usual system thus to linger, and allow the allies to choose their own time for attack-Some minor changes, however, were made in the dispositions of the French army; it was drawn closer round Leipzig. On the north it was withdrawn behind the river Partha, which afforded an advantageous defensive line; on the south, it retired from Liebert Walkowitz, and Wachar, where the battle of the 16th had been fought, into the interior line of Conneivitz, Prolisthey da, and Steteritz. The French succeeded also on this day in making an opening through the allied line along the Saale, in the direction of Weissenfels. Thus they at once secured to themselves a retreat, and cut off the communication, unless by signals, between the allied armies.

The allies, however, having brought up all their reinforcements, determined on the following day to execute their designs, and to bring the fate of Europe to this final crisis. The great battle which followed was not distinguished by any bold manœuvres, or striking vicissitudes. The efforts of the allied armies were chiefly confined to storming, by prodigious efforts, the French positions. On the north, the leading attack was made by the Crown Prince, who was now much farther ad

vanced than he had been on the 16th. Being at the head of the Partha river, by which the passage is least

difficult, he was in the most advantageous position for approaching Leipzig. Blucher, therefore, to enable him to act with greater effect, reinforced him with 30,000 men from his own army. The passage was effected almost without resistance, and 3000 prisoners were taken at Taucha. The enemy fell back towards Leipzig, covering his retreat by the villages of Sonnerfelt, Parmsdorf, and Schonfelott. From these, however, he was finally driven. The success at this point was greatly promoted by an unexpected event; a large body of Westphalian and Saxon troops, the latter bringing with them twenty-two pieces of artillery, came over from the opposite army; for although their sovereign still fought on the side of France, they considered the allied cause as theirs. They accepted at once the invitation of the Crown Prince, who offered to head them as they turned their guns against the enemy. A delay in the arrival of the Swedish cannon rendered this unexpected supply of the highest importance.

On the side of the grand Bohemian army, although the enemy had directed to that point his chief efforts of resistance, the success was still more decisive. The allied corps, pressing in from all quarters, carried every thing before them. Towards evening, they formed a junction with the army of the north; and the united forces of all the powers were established beneath the walls of Leipzig.

Buonaparte felt at length, and too late, that no means remained to him of further resistance. A great part of his army had perished in the preceding battles; and the preponderance of his enemies, already considerable, had been largely augmented. Of those who remained in his ranks, a great proportion were secretly hostile to him, and were the more formidable that they had not yet openly declared themselves. All

his outposts and fortified lines were gone; and no prospect now remained for him, since the victorious armies were prepared to storm his last retreat. He no longer hesitated, therefore, to retire by the only way which still remained open, and the evening had scarcely closed when the whole French army began to defile by the road leading to Weissenfels. The passage, narTowed as it was at present, was attended with extreme difficulty. Five or six rivers, running parallel, and near to each other, and requiring bridges over each, formed a long and narrow defile, through which an encumbered army could march only slowly and with difficulty. Day broke, and a part of the troops were still in Leipzig. Buonaparte ordered the magistrates of Leipzig to send a deputation, request ing that hostilities might be suspended, for the purpose of arranging a capitulation. The object of this demand was evident; he wished to retreat unmolested, and to extricate his army from their present embarrassments. It was accordingly determined that such a respite should not be granted. The Emperor Alexander received the messenger in person; and, in presence of the army, announced to him this resolution. The allied forces were then led on to the attack; after a short resistance the city was carried; and about eleven o'clock of the forenoon, the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, and the Crown Prince of Sweden, arriving from different quarters, met in the great square of Leipzig, amid the acclamations of the army and of the people. Buonaparte had quitted the city about two hours before, leaving a large party of his army. To them the disaster was greatly increased, when the confederate forces, on entering the city, were joined by all the remaining Saxon and other German troops. The French, now at tacked and fired upon from all quar

ters, no longer knew whither to turn; the narrow bridge was soon choaked by crowds of fugitives trampling upon each other. The passage was stopped; prisoners were taken by thousands; and of the few who endeavoured to save themselves by swimming, the greater part perished in the waters. The whole rear-guard of the French army, including some of its most distinguished commanders, fell into the hands of the confederates. Among the prisoners were Regnier, Brune, Vallery, Bertrand, and Lauriston. Macdonald with difficulty gained, by swimming, the opposite bank; but Prince Poniatowsky, endeavour. ing to do the same, sunk, and was drowned. The wounded, to the number of 30,000, were all taken; and the King of Saxony, with his whole court, ranked among the prisoners. It was now too late for this monarch to obtain any merit by joining the cause of the allies; and, as against his orders the whole of his troops had already ranged themselves under their standard, he was no longer capable of rendering them any service. It was judged proper to inflict some chastisement for that injury which, on a former occasion, the common cause had sustained from him, and he was sent, under a guard, to the castle of Eysebnach.

Some striking passages are to be found in the account of these great ope. rations given by the Crown Prince. "As the enemy was obliged," says Bernadottè, "to make his retreat by the defiles of Pleisse, the baggage, cannon, and troops, pressed pell-mell through the narrow passes which remained open to them, and which were soon choaked up by this general disorder. None thought but of making his own escape. The advanced guards of the army of Silesia and of Benningsen entered, almost at the same time, through the other gates of the city.

"The results of the battle of Leip