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prospect, that the limits of this dominion might be contracted, they were determined to do their utmost, to prepare for the assertion of their independence. They proceeded, in the whole affair, upon the conviction, that their efforts, so soon as they should declare themselves, would be aided by the British government.

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Holland remained in a state of tranquillity during the spring and summer of the year 1813; and the French government seems to have been deceived by this appearance. Troops were from all quarters marched off to join the army with which Buonaparte was about to attack the Russian and Prussian forces; and no serious apprehensions were entertained respecting the conduct of the people of Holland until after the battle of Leipzig. The French do not appear to have foreseen the possibility of a serious insurrection, drained as the country was of native troops, of arms, of ammunition, and overawed by numerous fortresses.

In the mouth of April, indeed, some partial disturbances ensued, in consequence of the enrolment of the national guards, a measure which was peculiarly obnoxious to the lower classes of the people. The mob accordingly, without any previous concert with the confederates, rose upon their oppressors at Alphen, the Hague, Rotterdam, Oud-Beyerland, and Zandam,destroyed the parish registers necessary for the enrolment,-took the town of Leyden, and hoisted there the Orange flag amid incessant cries of "Orange Boven !" The confederates endeavoured in vain to calm the populace, who, at the Hague, and other towns, fought desperately with the French military force in the streets; but as they wanted fire-arms, and were without a leader, this revolt was soon suppressed, though not without the loss of several lives on both sides.

From this period to the month of October following, Holland remained tranquil. When intelligence of the battle of Leipzig, however, and of its result, began to transpire, the confederates at the Hague judged that the time was now come to secure the services of a respectable band of men; and in order to effect this object, without committing the safety of the whole to the discretion of a numerous body, the following plan was adopted :Each of the confederates selected from among his friends four individuals, who, without any mutual concert or knowledge of each other, engaged to be ready whenever called upon by the selector, and implicitly to obey his command. The persons whose co-operation was thus secured, were then directed to make sure of four others,— each of whom, in like manner, was to engage to be ready at a moment's warning, with whatever arms he could procure. None of these persons was made acquainted with the plot, except as to its final object; nor informed of any name except that of his immediate selector. To avoid detection, nothing was committed to paper, no written engagement was entered into; but the individuals thus chosen received verbal instruction, in case of any tumults, to repair immediately to the spot, mingle with the crowd, and there await the orders of their chief. Thus the confederates formed a band of nearly 400 respectable adherents, selected chiefly from among the burghers of the town. This class possessed in a high degree the confidence of the people at large, and was well disposed to the cause of the Prince of Orange. If, however, contrary to all probability, any of the persons so chosen had been induced, either by corruption or intimidation, to reveal to the French police his knowledge of the plot, he could have betrayed only one name upwards in the scale, namely, that of his

ediate selector, whose individual the advance of the allies could no longer be concealed. Meanwhile, all the natives of France employed in the civil service, who could find any pretext for their departure, quitted the country with their families, and endeavoured to sell or carry off their property. This circumstance added to the increasing and ill-dissembled terror of those who were obliged to remain, and the exaggerated reports which were every day circulated of the disasters of the French army, excited a great fermentation among the populace.

ty thus depended upon his pruce in the choice of his instruments. lesides this band, Count Styrum ceeded in securing the services of nck, an inhabitant of Schævenin, a village on the coast, about a from the Hague. This person jessed great influence among the rs and fishermen in the neighbour. d; and engaged to furnish, on the test notice, fifty men, who should licitly obey the orders of the conrates. No measures were taken * none were necessary) to influence people; it was perfectly clear that rgood-will and co-operation might lepended upon, the moment leaders e presented to them in whom they ld confide; so that this enterprize free from the dilemma which atis most conspiracies, and has been ruin of so many,-viz. the necessity gaining over the multitude, and the culty of accomplishing this with risking a premature discovery of plot.

Count Styrum, whose zeal, courage, activity were remarkable, was ensted with the military details, which sisted in preparing such arms and munition as could be collected witht exciting suspicion, and obtaining thentic accounts of the state of the ench military force, and of the dissitions of foreigners in the service of ance. He succeeded in gaining over e whole of the Dutch national guard, insisting of 300 men; whose comander, Colonel Tulling, warmly emaced the cause of the Prince of range, and yet conducted himself ith so much circumspection as to ttain to the last the confidence of the refect.

So many drafts of French troops ad been made by this time from Hol. and, that the whole military force in the country did not exceed 10,000 men. The extraordinary successes and

VOL. VI. PART I.

Affairs were in this state, when, on the 13th of November, towards evening, the turf-carriers, (who are at the Hague a formidable body,) governed by chiefs of their own election, assembled in considerable numbers at the town-house, and, together with the populace, demanded, in a very tumultuous manner, that M. Slicher, who had formerly been burgomaster, should resume his functions. This gentleman deserved and possessed the confidence of the people, and though not one of the confederates, was a faithful adherent of the Prince of Orange. Count Styrum and M. Repelaer immediately repaired to the spot; and, as they thought that the favourable moment was not arrived, and that a premature explosion would ruin the cause, they easily succeeded in dispersing the mob by means of their adherents, who, according to their general instructions, had mixed with the crowd upon the first appearance of a tumult. A few moments after this the prefect arrived, accompanied by a military force, and was surprised to find no vestige of a disturbance.-The dispersion of this mob was the first essay which the confederates made of their power, and the success surpassed their expectations.

The French authorities, perceiving the danger of their situation, made an attempt to disunite the confederates and the Orange party, by employing

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them under government. But this artifice did not succeed, although the consequence of the attempt was, that the views of the Dutch leaders were discovered to the prefect.

The middle and lower orders were, throughout the whole of Holland, impatient to throw off the yoke of France, and to declare for the Prince of Orange. Those who had much to lose, though equally well disposed, were more circumspect; and this was particularly the case at Amsterdam. The powerful and wealthy inhabitants of that city dreaded the result of a popular commotion; the excesses which had been committed there in the revolution of 1787, when the populace of each party pillaged in different quarters of the town, were still fresh in their memory, and they expected at all events very soon to be delivered from the French, by the advance of the allies.

The populace, however, were anxious at once to declare their sentiments; and the national guards, a body of 1500 men, were ready to co-operate in any measures which might tend to free them from the government of Buonaparte. This corps, which was commanded by Colonel Van Brienen, had been previously gained over by one of its officers, Captain Falck, who was in communication with the confederates at the Hague, and was the chief instigator of the events which ensued. The principal obstacles opposed to him were the French government and the Dutch corporation; the members of the latter, though generally well disposed, were restrained by the fear of letting the people loose, and overawed by the vicinity of an army under General Molitor, at Utrecht. In these circumstances, Captain Falck conceived that the only way of accomplishing his object was to intimidate the French authorities, and induce them to abandon their posts through

fear of popular vengeance; and, at the same time, to persuade the corporation to accede to the wishes of the people, and form a provisional government, in order to avoid the excesses of popular violence. When this step was once taken, he judged that it would be no difficult matter to bring about a declaration in favour of the Prince of Orange, It was necessary, however, for the accomplishment of his plan, to excite the people to some overt act of opposition to the French. This was no difficult task. Accordingly, on the 15th of November, the populace being already in a state of great fermentation, a mob was collected, which immediately pro. ceeded to burn the wooden huts in which the douaniers, or excisemen, levied the duties; and to pillage the house of a receiver of the customs, who refused to take down the French arms. This tumult, which had the appearance of being purely accidental, succeeded in both its primary objects; it terrified the French authorities, who, on the next day, quitted the town; and the corporation having applied to the national guard to disperse the mob, this body, on being assured that a provisional government would next day be formed, proceeded to quell the tu mult. This commotion must be con sidered as the signal of the revolution; and to the populace of Amsterdam, exclusively, belongs the honour of ha ving been the first to raise in Holland the standard of revolt against the government of Buonaparte. No princi pals, however, had hitherto committed themselves; on the contrary, the na tional guard had quelled the tumult, which was still of a nature to be con sidered and represented only as an ac cidental popular commotion.

Next day a proclamation was issued, in which twenty-four persons were called upon by name, to assume the administration of affairs; the French authorities having thought proper to

quit the city. The confederates at the Hague received, on the evening of the 16th, intelligence of the insurrection at Amsterdam, and of the occurrences which had followed. These circumstances persuaded them that the moment was at length arrived to put their design into execution. It was considered, that if the events which had taken place in the capital were allowed to pass by without any corresponding demonstrations in the other parts of the country, the most lamentable results might ensue for that city, and for the cause. In addition to this it was urged, that a general insurrection in Holland would, no doubt, accelerate the advance of the allies, who would lose no time in profiting by so favourable an occurrence; and that at all events the Dutch might be confident of receiving as promptly as possible, whatever assistance England could afford. These considerations prevailed; and accordingly Count Styrum was, by the confederates, immediately appointed governor of the Hague in the name of the Prince of Orange.

An instrument was also drawn up, summoning a meeting of the ancient regents, that is to say, of those persons who had been members of the states of Holland in the years 1794 and

1795;

and this meeting was appoint ed to take place the next day. A proclamation was also issued by the new governor in the name of the Prince of Orange, announcing the happy change. This proclamation was received by the people with every possible demonstration of joy; an Orange flag was hoisted on the tower of the Hague, and colours were hung out, as signs of rejoicing, from almost every window in the

town.

At the moment when the confederates declared themselves so nobly, and proclaimed the Prince of Orange with so much solemnity, their whole force consisted of 8 or 900 men badly arm

ed. The country having been for three years and a half annexed to France, had been plundered of all its resources. The necessities, as well as the policy, of the French government had entirely drained it of arms, ammunition, military stores, accoutrements, artillery, and horses. The confederates had no funds but their private fortunes. It was for some time impracticable to continue the levy of the existing taxes, as the persons employed in the collec tion of them had absconded, and had destroyed, or taken away, all the papers, registers, and necessary documents; and the balances of public money which remained in hand had been all carried off on the first alarm. The prince, in whose name the confederates had taken up arms, had been 19 years in a state of exile; and it was not known whether he was in England or in Germany.

It was in such circumstances, and with such means, that half a dozen private gentlemen, aided by an unarmed populace, declared war against Buonaparte, whose troops were at this moment in possession of all the fortresses and strong places in the country, and had not even evacuated the open towns. No tumult had hitherto occurred at Rotterdam ;--Amsterdam had refused to declare itself for the Prince of Orange. General Molitor had an army of 4000 regular troops at Utrecht, only twelve leagues from the Hague, and there was a French garri

son at Gorcum. The confederates, indeed, confidently depended upon assistance, both from the British government and from the combined armies ; but the force of the allies in Holland consisted only of a few cossacks, and the easterly winds which prevailed would probably delay the arrival of troops from England.

It was ascertained about the same time, beyond all doubt, that General Bulow had instructions not to pass the

Yssel, and that it did not form part of the military plans of the allies to advance into Holland beyond the line of that river. This communication was extremely discouraging; the sword was, however, drawn, and it was impossible to recede.

The assembly of the ancient regents, which had been convoked by the proclamation of the confederates, took place at the house of M. Van Hogendorp. The persons, who had been members of the provisional states, in the years 1794, and 1795, were considered as those who could with most propriety take upon themselves the government of the country till the arrival of the Prince of Orange; but when called upon at this meeting, to form themselves into a provisional council, they all declined having any share in the administration of affairs. They objected to the confederates, that they were acting without any authority from the Prince of Orange, of whose place of residence even they were ignorant; that they were surrounded on all sides by French troops, who still retained possession of every fortress in the country; and that the French, though they had, in a mo ment of sudden panic, been expelled from a few open towns, would not fail, when they discovered the weakness of the confederates, to return with reinforcements from Utrecht and Gorcum, and complete the ruin of the country. To this the confederates replied, that although they had no specific instructions on the present occasion, they had previously received assurances from the Prince of Orange, of his cordial cooperation in any measure that might tend to throw off the yoke of France, and restore him to his country; that messengers had been already dispatched to apprize him of the events which had taken place; that with regard to the means which were at their disposal, they were not so contemptible as had

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been represented; for although not sufficient to effect a revolution, unaided by other powers, yet with courage and prudence they might serve to keep out the French until the arrival of troops from England; that if their ancestors had wasted that time which they employed in action, in nice calculations of the probabilities of success,if they had been appalled by the disproportion of force between them and their oppressors, their descendants would have remained the victims of the Inquisition, and Holland would never have existed as a free country; that experience and history prove, that when the will of the people is firmly expressed, it must be ultimately triumphant; that the French had been taught by their reverses to appreciate the truth of this remark, and were disposed to dread the results of an unani. mous insurrection of a nation headed by firm and resolute chiefs; that the character of the Dutch is neither fickle nor inconstant; and that it would be no novel event in their history to find the natives of Holland risking their lives and fortunes on the most fearful odds, in defence of their liberty and national independence; that the vengeance of their oppressors was already excited to the utmost, and could only be averted by the boldest efforts; and finally, that as to the ruin of their country, they had been taught by 19 years of tyranny and oppression, that the only certain ruin for Holland was submission to the yoke of France.

These representations were received with general, and probably sincere assurances, of good-will to the cause ; but the regents concluded the conference by distinctly declaring, that as the confederates had embarked in this enterprize without their knowledge or advice, they must carry it through without any assistance from them as a body; although, as individuals, they would each perform every duty of a

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