"We have established, in the first part of this work the duty of religious profession; now every duty implies a right, and every right calls for guarantees.

"Every duty implies a right; there is no right more sacred than that of the fulfilment of duty; in this world it is the only absolute right; for right is based upon primitive necessity; duty constitutes our first necessity; or, to speak more strictly, our only necessity.

"The candid profession of religious convictions is then our right, because it is our duty. This right seeks for guarantees in the bosom of society, in which its exercise is required; but where shall these securities be found?

"We hasten to reply: its true guarantee is within itself; the best security of right is the consciousness of right; and this consciousness is exactly proportioned to that of duty. With a conscience alive to its own state, and to this principle, this right will be always strong; without such conscience, the strongest external guarantees will be weak and powerless."

Our author thus marches onward, with the dignity of a Christian philosopher, to his conclusion, that as it is the right, because it is the duty, of every individual to profess his religious belief, so it must be "an obligation corresponding to the right of the individual, that we demand from society to recognize and to respect, in all its institutions, the right of the free manifestation of religious convictions." Right," observes Mr. V., "cannot be opposed to right, duty to duty, necessity to necessity; and if it be the duty of the individual to profess his faith, it must be the duty of society to respect that profession. The one truth implies the other." To take any other ground would be "to maintain, that society and the individual were not conceived by the same mind, nor with the same design; that society and the individual are two distinct creations, totally destitute of mutual relations, whom a ridiculous chance has forced to dwell together; and that God, not being the author of one of the two, must of necessity be the author of neither, since his wisdom would certainly have suited society to the individual, and the individual to society; but such a thought would be impious."

In this masterly manner does Mr. V. lay down his theory of religious liberty, and then develops it with surpassing beauty and force.

"The state," says he, has only promoted her own peace, when, without regarding the principles which gave them birth, she has dealt her blows against anti-social actions, or when she has severely punished crime erecting itself into doctrine; but when, making inroads into the mysterious domain, the inviolable sanctuary of person

ality; when invading the spiritual domicile of the individual, authority has arrogated to itself the right of forbidding to conscience the manifestation of that system of faith which it has adopted, with reference to the invisible, the infinite, and the immortal; then, wounded to the life, human liberty has roused itself. Feeling at the very heart the point of the sword, reduced to the alternative of abjuration or of contest, convinced that it is called upon, either to devote itself to the struggle, or to extinguish itself by silence, it has raised its voice against oppression, it has stood up in all its dignity, and by this single act, whatever may have been its effects upon human authority, by this single act, it has vanquished. The conflict was no less than to be, or not to be;'-thus to have understood the question, thus to have disposed of it, was nothing short of conquest.'

Our author goes on to show, "that persecution on the part of the state, while it has stifled conviction in weak consciences, has only given a new impulse to stronger minds; and thus even persecution itself, by an overruling Providence, has been the soil in which the plant of liberty has been reared to its most luxurious height." "Oppressed convictions have drawn their oppressors into inextricable embarrassments; moderate men have become ardent, the mildest have been exasperated; religious dissensions have given rise to political dissensions; the state has become convulsed; Cadmus has sown the teeth of the dragon in the vast field of the future. Experience, above all, has spoken so long, so loudly, so uniformly, that it bas compelled attention; it has brought all minds to the laborious investigation of the disputed right; for, in all cases, it is by the violation of a right, that right is made apparent; we are scarcely aware of the rights of conscience, until facts abundantly demonstrate the dangers of disallowing them. The right is not less the right for having been so discovered; and having attained the sum mit of the social edifice, it can, if it so please, cast down with a disdainful foot the scalingladder of experience, by means of which it has gained admittance to that citadel which ought to have thrown open to it the folding. gates of honour."

But many will readily concede the point, that creeds are not to be persecuted by the state, who yet maintain that it is the province of the state to protect them. "Perhaps," observes Mr. V., "it will be expected, that, having protested against persecution, we shall accept of protection with avidity. Yes, it is most true, that we desire that the profession of religious convictions should be protected, but protected as the common right of all, and consequently without distinction of creeds.

"We are not desirous that any particular creed should be protected, nor in general, believers, to the exclusion of unbelievers. We deprecate protection, for the same reason that we deprecate persecution. For the right of protection necessarily involves the right of persecution. Endeavours are made to limit this right; to prevent its exercise beyond the point where protection terminates; it may be forbidden to advance further, but the limit is arbitrary, and it is impossible to conceive in sound logic, that the state can be denied the right of persecution, after having been allowed that of protection."

The following questions are discussed by the author, with extraordinary force and brilliancy of argument:-1. Does the state, by taking part in religious questions, affect to possess a religion? 2. Is it true that the individual would no longer possess a religion, if he should acknowledge the right and power of the state to possess one? 3. Can the state, as a state, possess a religion? Upon the second of these questions, we have the following memorable observations:-"If the state possess religion, she must also have a conscience; if she have a conscience, how should the conscience of the individual maintain its ground against that of the state? Conscience is supreme in the man, how should it not be supreme in the state? With his conscience alone, a man may maintain his ground against the state; but what head could a man make against a state possessing a national conscience! It is impossible to oppose sovereignty to sove. reignty, omnipotence to omnipotence; impossible to suppose that all individual conscience will amalgamate to produce a state conscience. What a mystery, or rather what an absurdity would not this supply? No, if the state have a conscience, it is on the condition that the individual should have none; and, inasmuch as conscience is the seat of religion, if the state be religious, the individual is not so."*** Again: "The state is either a being or a fact; there is no medium; and it must be granted, that if the state be a being, the man is not one; if the state be a man, the man is a man no longer; he is but the shadow of one. They must remain distinct; the one necessarily becomes all that the other is not; the one ceases to be all that the other becomes. If the state be a being, it is every thing; if it be not every thing, it is only a fact; and the man remains complete in the man; there is no alternative.

"For observe, that in making the state a being, you do not simply make it an individual, with respect to whom the individual, properly so called, is on an equality, and against whom he can maintain his individual

rights. Were this the case, the system would be as fruitless in its results as it is illfounded in principle. In matters of religion one individual is equal to another, neither more nor less. Thus the state would be equal to each one of its members, and, to carry out the consequence, the state would have its, and the individual his: what could be more absurd? No, if the state be a man, it is the only man; if the state possess a conscience, there is no other conscience; if the state have its religion, there is no other religion. Again we say, there is no alternative."

Such is the logic of this book; and we can assure our readers that its piety is equally remarkable. It is a work of great principles, but it is no less a work of deep feeling. Christianity is displayed, in every page, in its own native simplicity and matchless grandeur. It is shown to be impossible to link it to the state, or the state to it, without impairing its heavenly character. The supposed benefits of state connexion are all shown to be nugatory in point of argument, and in point of fact; while the appeal throughout is made directly to the conscience, enlightened by the beams of heavenly truth, and sanctified by the Spirit of Christ. We cannot but wish that such a work may become part of the household literature of Great Britain.

ANGLO-CATHOLICISM NOT APOSTOLICAL: being an Inquiry into the Scriptural Authority of the Leading Doctrines advocated in the "Tracts of the Times," and other Publications of the Anglo-Catholic School. By WILLIAM LINDSAY ALEXANDER, M.A. 8vo. pp. 462.

A. and C. Black, Edinburgh; and Longman and Co., London.

(Continued from p. 393.)

IN the conclusion of cur last notice of this masterly treatise, we showed that the author had overturned the reasoning of the traditionists, in so far as it depended on the assumption that there existed in the Apostolic churches any authoritative doctrinal symbol, by which they expounded the writings of inspired men. That no such symbol existed is manifest from the facts, that converts were received into the church upon the briefest and most informal profession of faith in Jesus as the Saviour of the world, -that no authentic fragment of such symbol has come down to posterity, and that none of the early Fathers so much as allude to it, but appeal directly to Scripture, as all rightminded Christians do in the present age. The very fact, that several of the Fathers

drew up creeds, or digests of what they considered to be the substance of the Christian doctrine, sufficiently proves that there was no authoritative symbol in the apostolic church. Had such a symbol been known to exist, the act of drawing up such creeds would have been an intolerable presumption, if not a daring blasphemy.

But, strange to say, though the Puseyites cannot produce a single fragment of the symbol they contend for, they exert an amazing industry in endeavouring to dig up from the mine of antiquity something that shall be regarded as equivalent to the lost symbol. This, in the absence of any thing but post-apostolic documents, is really very quixotic. Mr. Alexander treats this fraud of the Anglo-catholics as it deserves; and shows, "that what Mr. Keeble calls the very precious and sacred fragments of the unwritten teaching of the first age of the church," has no substantial claim to be so regarded. Mr. Alexander frankly admits all the obligations which are due to the Fathers, and records them with becoming manliness and candour; but, having done so, he then tests the degree of deference which is due

to

them; and shows, convincingly, that while their combined testimony is to be received as to matters of fact, such, for instance, as the canon of Scripture, their opinions upon the contents of the books of Scripture themselves is of no more value than those of any other class of men; and subject, in some cases, to more than ordinary deduction by reason of that early tendency to superstition which many of them evinced. The fallacy of the Tractarians' deference to the Fathers, as authorities in religion, or, at least, as authoritative interpreters of Scripture, lies here, that they do not properly

66

distinguish between the evidence proper to an historical fact, and the evidence proper to a doctrine or opinion. We can never prove an historical fact by mere reasoning; and as little can we prove a doctrine by mere testimony. Let this distinction, then, be made, and all the apparent force of this much vaunted argument melts away. The authorship of the New Testament is an historical fact, which, like all such facts, is to be proved by testimony: the proper meaning of any part of the New Testament is a matter of opinion, which is to be made out by reasoning. Now, who does not see that one may, with the most perfect consistency, receive implicitly the concurrent testimony of the early church to the fact, and yet refuse it to the opinion? In the one case the evidence adduced is proper and competent; in the other it is not. The apostolic authorship of the New Testament was a matter of public notoriety in the days of the early church, and all that we receive from its

members is the attestation of this fact. If to this they add the deliverance of their opinion as to the meaning of the New Testament, that is a thing which we may take or reject as we please, for we have the New Testament before our eyes, and can judge in that matter for ourselves."

But, in point of fact, this appeal to tra dition for the explanation of Scripture, is a thing of comparatively recent date. The Fathers, so called, scarcely ever resort to it. In perusing their "writings," observes Mr. Alexander, "nothing seems more obvious, than that their authors found just the same sort of difficulties in Scripture which we find now, and sought their removal by the same processes which are familiar to us." In proof of this, our author appeals to very decisive quotations from Irenæus, Origen, Chrysostom, and Athanasius, showing that they employ a language about the difficulties of Scripture completely at variance with the recognized existence of any known authori tative standard of traditional interpretation, and, in point of fact, sending every indivi dual Christian directly to the Bible for the solution of his religious difficulties.

Mr. Alexander admits, indeed, that the Fathers do speak in reverential terms of apostolic tradition; but then he contends most conclusively, that the tradition they speak of is a very different thing from that contended for by the Tractarians,-that, in some instances, by tradition, they mean the apostolic writings, as did Paul, 2 Thess. ii. 15; and in others, any doctrine commonly regarded in the church as sanctioned by Scripture, without thereby intending to con. vey any idea of its having been handed down orally from the Apostles. And, moreover, if some of the Fathers do use a language too much corresponding with that of the Tractarians, Mr. Alexander shows that the Fathers generally do not do so, and, therefore, maintains that their theory of Catholicity must be resigned, if they plead for a view of tradi tion which some of the most eminent of the Fathers repudiate. In defence of this view, Mr. Alexander appeals, with success, to Polycarp (Ep. ad Philippenses, § iii.); Irenæus, (adv. Hær. iii. 1); Origen, (Præf. in opus de principiis, § 2); and Cyprian, (Ep. 74, ad Pompeium, pp. 223, 228), in confutation of the statement, that if some of the Fathers did speak of oral tradition as if it possessed authority, others of them made their appeal to the Scriptures simply. "Here, then," observes Mr. Alexander, "is a dilemma, out of which I see not how the advocates of that doctrine (the doctrine of tradition) can escape. Either they must give up Vincent's test of true doctrine, or they must give up the truth of their own doctrine concerning tradition. In either

case they give up their entire system; for, in the former, they leave themselves without any test of truth distinct from Scripture; in the latter, they relinquish the guide by whose aid alone they tell us Scripture can be understood." p. 108.

Mr. Alexander's next section relates to the "Right of private judgment in interpreting Scripture," " and contains a most satisfactory and ingenious demolition both of the Romanist and Tractarian theories on this subject. "Hitherto," says he, "I have been occupied in endeavouring to expose the unsoundness of those positions which the advocates of tradition assume in defence of their views. I turn, now, to the still more important task of offering some remarks in support of the antagonist doctrine, that it is the duty and privilege of all who have the Bible in their hands to study it for themselves, to gather from its statements the truths it contains, according to the best of their own judgments,-and, by the conclusions at which they thus arrive, to regulate their religious opinions, feelings, and conduct."

Here our author shows himself to be thoroughly master of his subject. We recommend the careful perusal of this chapter to our younger brethren in the ministry, as it condenses within the narrow space of twenty-seven pages, a complete discussion of the whole question. Most just are Mr. A.'s concluding remarks.

"It will be found, I believe, almost invariably the case, wherever men are persuaded to regard the Bible as a book which they can understand only through the teaching of the church, that they yield far more deference to the formulas in which that teaching is embodied, than to the inspired word itself. This only is what might have been expected, for the natural tendency of such a conviction is to lower the Bible in the estimation of those by whom it is entertained, whilst it unduly elevates in their view the human composition to which they are, in the first instance at least, indebted for their religious views.

"The Bible claims to be not only a full, but a perfect revelation of God's will to

man.

We

This claim the advocate of creeds, as the authoritative interpreters of Scripture, professes to admit; but what he admits in words, he denies in effect. For, what do we mean when we say that Scripture is perfect as a revelation of God's will to man? mean, surely, that all truth necessary for our salvation is therein made known to us in the manner best adapted to be apprehended by us. But if this be the meaning of the assertion, is it less than a contradiction in terms to maintain that the truth thus perfectly made known to us cannot be known

by us without the aid of the church's authoritative teaching? It is impossible for the mind to receive both these propositions. If

No

an astronomer were to tell us that the atmosphere is a perfect medium for the transmission of the sun's rays to our organs o vision, and at the same time to assure us that to this perfect medium must be added another of stained glass before we could procure the light, we should conclude at once, either that he was labouring under some strange hallucination, or that he was attempting to amuse himself at our expense. thing can prevent the mind from concluding that there can be no perfect medium of illumination to which something needs to be added, before it can illuminate; and as little can that be a perfect vehicle of truth which teaches nothing except to those who have already learned its lessons from another source. It is thus that the Scripture is depreciated in the estimation of men by this doctrine of the need of an authoritative interpreter to unfold its meaning. It is thus that men are brought imperceptibly, but surely, to think far less of the divinely constructed medium of illumination, than of the fragment of coloured glass, without which they have been taught to believe that that illumination could not have reached them." pp. 128, 129.

(To be concluded in our next.)

PIETY the best PATRIOTISM. A Sermon, occasioned by the decease of the late THOMAS WILSON, ESQ., Treasurer of Highbury College, preached at Craven Chapel, on Sunday, June 25, 1843. By the Rev. J. LEIFCHILD, D.D. 8vo, p. 48.

Jackson and Walford.

Such men as Thomas Wilson are raised up by God for special purposes of mercy to mankind; and are to be viewed as the instruments of a wise and merciful Providence. They could never have been what they were, but for favouring circumstances, and the action of events which it was impossible for them to create. Mr. Wilson was a member of a distinguished family, and the son of parents eminent for their personal devotedness to God, and their high standing in the Christian church. By the death of his honoured father, he was placed at once, as Treasurer of Hoxton College, in a position of commanding influence. The period, too, at which he entered upon public life was peculiarly favourable to the development of his talent for usefulness. The electric shock of methodism was vibrating through the whole of the British churches; and he himself had felt its vivifying touch under the

The DEPARTURE of the RIGHTEOUS : blessed to themselves, portentous to their survivors. A Sermon, preached in the parish church of Cheltenham, on Sunday morning, July 23, 1843. By the Rev. FRANCIS CLOSE, A. M., Incumbent. Together with a brief OBITUARY of the late Rev. H. BLUNT, A. M., Rector of Streatham, Surrey. 8vo, pp. 32.

Hatchard and Son.

The worthy author of this excellent sermon was an intimate friend of Mr. Blunt for the space of thirty-four years. He was his schoolfellow and college-companion, and maintained a cordial intercourse with him to the period of his death. How well he understood his mental and moral character is obvious from the whole train of his remarks. His estimate of his departed friend is very high, but not more high than the sober reality of truth will fully justify.

The following extract presents a pleasing and just view of Mr. Blunt as a preacher. It refers to the period when he became rector of Upper Chelsea.

ministry of George Whitefield. He was born also to fortune, and entered on the higher walks of mercantile life under every conceivable advantage. We do not mention these circumstances to diminish aught from the well-earned reputation of the late Treasurer of Highbury College; but simply for the purpose of magnifying the providence and grace of God, to which the deceased would have been the first to acknowledge his debt of everlasting obligation. True it is, that circumstances might equally have favoured the deceased, without his availing himself of them. He might have rejected the piety of his parents; he might have employed his family influence for purposes of personal aggrandizement; he might have treated as enthusiastic the revival of religion which took place in his day; he might have hoarded his wealth, or spent it upon worldly show and pomp. Happily, his mind received an early bias on the side of truth; he learnt, while young, to identify his happiness with the advancement of the cause of Christ; he cultivated the simplest tastes ; cared little for the opinions of the world, and the show of life; the result was, that, with an ample fortune, he was enabled to effect great things for the interests of religion. Few men have done more good in their lifetime than Thomas Wilson. Our theological seminaries owe him a lasting debt of gratitude. The zeal with which he urged forward the interests of Highbury College, gave an impulse to all kindred institutions. He knew, moreover, the vast importance of multiplying, in large populations, the number of our Christian sanctuaries; and set an example, in this respect, worthy of the imitation of other wealthy laymen. After all, the reason why we are so much struck with the results of Mr. Wilson's persevering efforts is, that such efforts are so rare. He did no more, perhaps, than a man of his influence and fortune ought to do. But thousands live comparatively to themselves. May the example of the deceased lead many to imitate him!

Mr. Leifchild, in his funeral discourse, has shown how much he esteemed the character of Mr. Wilson, and how justly he estimated his virtues. From long and intimate acquaintance, he was well qualified to present a correct portrait of him to the public. The sermon will be edifying to the churches in general, and more particularly to the personal friends of the deceased. It is a glowing tribute to departed worth. We hope in our next number to furnish a memoir of Mr. Wilson.

"As curate of Chelsea, his indefatigable zeal, his attractive manners, his persuasive simple eloquence, and his scriptural fidelity soon attracted the attention not only of his parishioners but of many others and at length, in the year 1830, greatly to the satisfaction of a numerous and attached people, he was presented to the new Church of the Holy Trinity, Upper Chelsea. There his character, his principles, and his peculiar talents fully displayed themselves-for five years he pursued a course of unrivalled usefulness; drawing around him the most influential congregation in London or its neighbourhood. Nobles, peers, commoners, tradesmen, and the poor alike hung upon his fascinating discourses. And what was their peculiar charm? His manner was calm and sedate-his voice was feeble, yet wherever it reached it rivetted attentionthere were no high flights of eloquence, no rhetorical flourishes, no meretricious embellishments-certainly no puerilities nor conceits-he never stooped to such means to produce a momentary effect. The charm of his preaching was its simple truth-its evangelical fidelity-he preached the truth in love-he was affectionate, earnest, persuasive-his style was chaste, I might almost say elegant and he had a singular power of adapting the word of God to the peculiar habits, feelings, and circumstances of his auditors. Abstract truth by the touch of his pen became a living and practical principle-comprehensible, and individual so that each man felt himself addressed." We earnestly recommend the perusal of Mr. Close's discourse to our

numerous

readers. It is a faithful sample of pastoral