duced by a forgetfulness, of those passages which represent Christ as giving his life for the sheep, as loving the church and giving himself for it. And, resting upon too narrow a basis, they do not meet and explain all the facts of the case. A special purpose must draw after it, and does so of necessity, a special act; in other words, the accomplishment of the purpose. Election secures and requires calling, not the general call of the gospel merely, but especial calling, effectual calling, as it is usually denominated, or God's council might fail, and he might not do all his pleasure. General Divine influence, if it be proper to call it such, will not account for the actual salvation of the elect.

Thirdly. This view of the influence of the Holy Spirit virtually ascribes the praise of man's salvation to himself. After having stated that Divine influence is exclusively moral in its nature; that, in employing it, God is not a "respecter of persons," (i.e., is putting it forth upon all men, at least to whom the gospel comes,) they add, “It is manifest, from all that has been said, that it is entirely in consequence of the Holy Spirit's influences that any sinners do believe it." Few things, I apprehend, can be less manifest than this, unless they restrict the Holy Spirit's influence to that which secured a faithful record of the great propitiation. If this, i.e., inspiration, may be properly included under the phrase Divine influence, perhaps it may be said, that the faith and entire salvation of a sinner is the result of the Holy Spirit's influences; for," how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard?" &c. But, then, this is not the general sense attached to the phrase; nor, indeed, is it the correct

tion, is an unusual use, if not an abuse, of terms.

And if all other Divine influence of which they speak, be moral influence, i.e., the tendency of the gospel to enlighten and to sanctify, then this tendency being, of course, a fixed, not a variable quantity and power, the question arises, "How comes it to operate so differently-working faith in some and not in others?" Their views of universal atonement have misled them here. As the atonement is universal, so are the Spirit's influences; and the latter they seem to think must be universal, or God would be a 66 respecter of persons." They forget that though God, in his rectoral character and relation, cannot be such, yet that, as a sovereign, he not only may be, but absolutely is, such; or how can innumerable facts in providence, as well as in grace, be explained? The Pelagianism of Bishop Tomline teaches that God must do, or that he would be a respecter of persons," as much for the salvation of one person as of another.

Now, if no special influence of the Spirit be exerted to bring an individual to the knowledge and faith of the gospel, this may be true; or, at least, the assertion may be a greater approximation to the truth. But, if a special influence be exerted, then God does more for the salvation of one than of another, i.e., in the sense of bestowing a higher measure of good (not attracted by any thing in the recipient) upon one than another. God, in this sense, in his character of sovereign benefactor, is a "respecter of persons ;" and if there be no special operation of the Spirit of God in conversion; in other words, for the meaning is the same, if the Holy Spirit's influences are moral, and exclusively so in their character, the faith of the man who receives the gospel must be ascribed to himself, or to accident. It is, as Sandeman represents it, an "empirical discovery, like that of the polarity of the needle, or the virtue of the Jesuit's bark."

Having urged these objections against

their views of Divine influence, I would now offer a few remarks upon the assertions contained in "the Statement," that "God equally desires the salvation of all men," and that, in the case of every man, he uses all the influence that his circumstances will admit of to bring him to believe. The first assertion is, that God equally desires the salvation of all men. It may be well to inquire into the meaning of the expression. A difficulty is apt to strike the mind of most persons when they hear it for the first time. "If God desire the salvation of all men, especially if he equally desire it, how comes it to pass that all men are not saved?" To understand this we must recollect that the salvation of any man is the result of a Divine act or influence upon his mind, that special influence of the Holy Spirit, of which we have been speaking; and, further, that action, in the case of God as well as in that of man, is the result not of desire, but of purpose, will, or determination. A judge may desire to pardon a criminal, for the sake of his family, &c.; but until the desire creates a purpose to pardon, which it may or may not do, it is inoperative; no pardon flows from it. If there were a purpose, on the part of God, to save all men, all men would be saved; for, "His purpose must stand, and he will do all his pleasure;" but desire may be fruitless, inactive in the case of God as well as in the case of man. It may be inquired, however, "Will not the desire, in the case of God, invariably produce purpose?" With man, indeed, it may not, and does not, because man is ignorant and weak; but God is wise and powerful. I answer, that in some cases it does; but that, in others, it does not. When the thing desired cannot be secured without the putting forth of power or influence by God, it may not, on various accounts, appear desirable to him to put forth that influence, and then the desire does not grow into a purpose. Still, it may be further said, "But will not the perceived inexpedience of putting forth

such influence extinguish or rather prevent any desire of the thing?" I see no reason why it should do this, in the case of God, more than in the case of man. In the latter case, we know it does not. The perceived inexpedience of extending pardon to a criminal may prevent the desire of a judge to do it from growing into a determination, but it does not extinguish it. It cannot but appear to the judge a desirable thing, for the sake of the family, that the man should be pardoned; but it does not appear to him desirable to pronounce the sen tence of pardon.

The same remarks are true, as it appears to me, in the case of God. How can it be doubted that to the God of love the salvation of all men must be an object of desire? It may not, however, be his purpose or determination to save all men, or rather to exert that influence which might secure the salvation of all, and the consequence is that, as the salvation of any man results from God's purpose to bestow converting and confirming grace, all men will not be saved.

Some writers would explain the matter differently. They would say that God, as the Supreme Ruler, desires the salvation of all men, but not as a sove reign benefactor, or why are not all men saved? The preceding statements appear to me to afford a better solution of the facts of the case. I have no hesitation in saying, with "the Statement," that God desires the salvation of all men. Whether their mode of explaining the assertion accords with mine, I know not.

"The Statement" goes on to affirm that, "in the case of every man, God uses all the influence that his circumstances will admit of to bring him to believe." The argument is that, were he not to do this, "he would not be infinitely benevolent." I confess this bald and bold assertion, in reference to what God can and cannot do, grates harshly upon my ears. It evinces, I cannot but think, somewhat less than the caution of the admirable" Butler."

However, we must deal with it in the best way we can. Now, I request the reader to mark the phraseology. The writers have not ventured to say that God uses all the influence he could use, to bring every man to believe, though their argument requires them to say this. Their assertion is, that God uses all the influence that the circumstances of every man will admit of; while they admit, what is no doubt implied in this phraseology, that circumstances permit much more to be done for one man than another. Now, if the argument, borrowed from God's benevolence, be valid to prove that he must do all to bring a man to believe, that can be done in the circumstances in which he is placed, I ask if it does not prove that he must place him in the circumstances in which the most

can be done for him? Why should

infinite benevolence constrain to the one and not to the other? In regard to the assertion itself, I ask, "Is it true, in any sense?" God must be viewed in the double relation of moral Governor and sovereign Benefactor. Now, is it the case that, as a moral Governor, God does for every man all that in the circumstances he could do? I am not denying this; but I ask, whether there be not something of rashness in the assertion that superior means of knowledge and conviction could not have been granted to any one, that more awakening providences might not have been permitted to befall him? If it be alleged that then his circumstances would have been different, while they merely say that God does all for him that is possible in his circumstances, I answer that the assertion, thus explained and limited, amounts only to this, that God does for him just what he does.

And, if the assertion be rash in its reference to God as moral Governor, what shall we say of it in reference to him as a sovereign Benefactor? They admit that faith is the gift of God. Now, God has not given faith to all men. The question, then, is, "Could

he not have done it?" Suppose I should grant that the depravity of some minds is so great that all the resources of moral government will fail to subdue it, I might ask, "Could not special grace, the omnipotent agency of the Spirit of God, subdue it?" They will scarcely venture to reply in the negative. Either, then, they must deny that any such agency is ever put forth, or that it could be put forth in cases in which men remain unbelievers. They will say, perhaps, that for reasons not revealed to us God did not see it to be expedient to put it forth, and, therefore, could not do it, being unable to do any thing which is not the wisest and the best. Now I admit that, in all cases where God desires the salvation of sinners, (as the words have been explained,) and brings all those means and influences of his moral government, which are adapted to produce faith, to bear upon them, but does not put forth special converting grace, I admit that, in all such cases, he refrains from doing this because it appears to Him most expedient on the whole thus to refrain. But, whether he shall refrain or not is evidently to him a question of expe diency, not of possibility, or power. The inability to do more than he does to secure faith, which these writers ascribe to God, is not literal but figurative or moral inability. It is the very kind of inability which a wise and good man feels, to do what he does not deem best upon the whole, and which even the writers of " the Statement" would not allow to be inability at all.

Some American writers of the new school, whose opinions are not always distinguished by perfect wisdom, write much in the same manner respecting the fall. God, they say, or are understood to have said, permitted the fall of man, just because he had not sufficient power to prevent it. I might dwell upon the absurdity involved in the language, for it is somewhat like saying of the lamb, that it permits the tiger to devour it. But I would direct attention to the

needless rashness of the assertion.* What are the facts of the case? Man fell. God did not in point of fact uphold him. Was it because he could not uphold, i.e., had not literally power to uphold him? I cannot see otherwise than that it would be very unwise and rash to assert that. It is surely sufficient to say that for infinitely wise reasons, which are not fully revealed, partly, perhaps, because they might be beyond our comprehension; it appeared best to the perfect wisdom of God not to put forth the power which might have held him up. If any one should say that, on this account, he could not have done it, the assertion, as it appears to me, would either involve a denial of God's omnipotence, or land us in a mere logomachy.

And thus, in the case under dispute, it is sufficient to say that God does for every man to whom the gospel comes (for we may confine our statements now at least to them) all that he is bound to do to secure his salvation. I should not have much objection to add, in reference to some cases at least, all that he can do as a moral governor, for it is here only that his power is limited. He bestows upon every man sufficient means of salvation,—unfolds the gospel objectively in all its simplicity, truth, and glory before him,-urges him, by promises and threatenings of infinite good and evil, to repent,

* Vide on this subject, an incomparable pamphlet by Dr. Woods, sen., of Andover, entitled, "Letters to the Rev. Nathaniel W. Taylor, D.D."

and believe, and be saved! What could he have done more, as moral Governor, for his vineyard, that he has not done? But visit him with those special sovereign influences of the Holy Spirit which secure a right understanding and belief of the gospel, God has not done; and, therefore, the writers who have drawn up "the Statement" must either deny, with the Pelagians, all special influences of the Spirit; i.e., deny the doctrine of effectual calling, leading as it will do, to the surrender of the doctrine of election, of which they now avow their belief, or modify the statement that God does all he can do to secure the salvation of all men.

I perceive, I have omitted to state, in the body of the letter, what must ever be remembered, that the work of the Spirit, in bringing men to the knowledge and faith of the gospel, is extraneous from, and additional to, God's moral government. That moral government, and even the form of moral government established by the gospel, would have been perfect without it. Divine influence was not needed to lay a ground of accountability for men, -for that ground exists in the faculties of men, together with the clearness and evidence with which the gospel is presented to their view. It was intended to prevent the failure of the special purposes of the atonement-to render a sufficient atonement, an efficient

one.

THE AUTHOR OF "STRICTURES UPON DR. MARSHALL ON THE ATONEMENT."

gress, and dishonoured God. To those into whose hands this paper may fall, I would seriously address, and those especially who are looking forward with joyous hearts to a life of happiness,

and who are anticipating for themselves many seasons of youthful delights, let me speak unto you as from one who desires that you may take warning from the word of God, and who would invite you to pursue the way which will lead you seriously to consider the step which you are going to take, ere you have decided whether it be scriptural

or not.

The formation of matrimonial alliances between the people of God and the unregenerate world, the word of God is against such a union, so unholy and so productive of such evil as this. Not a precept authorizes it, not a precedent encourages it, not a promise sanctions it, not a blessing hallows it! Yea, so far from authorizing, God expressly forbids it. 2 Cor. xiv. to the end," Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers, for what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness?" How strong the command, how conclusive the argument, and how persuasive and touching the appeal! Could it be more so? The command is,-that a believer be not yoked with an unbeliever. The argument is, he is a temple of God. The appeal is, God will be a father to such, and they shall be his children, who walk obediently to this command. There are many solemn considerations which seem to urge this step upon the believer.

A child of God is not his own. He belongs not to himself. "Ye are not your own." His soul and body are redeemed by the precious blood of Christ, and therefore he is Christ's. He must not, he cannot dispose of himself. He belongs to the Lord, and has no authority to give away, either soul or body. O that this solemn fact could be written upon every believer's heart, "Ye are not your own; ye are bought with a price, therefore glorify God in your soul and in your body which are his." May the eternal Spirit engrave it deeply and indelibly there but more than this, if this were not enough to urge the command upon a believer. His body is the temple of

the living God! How solemn and weighty is this consideration! and shall he take the temple of God, and unite it with one who is a stranger to his grace, to his love, to his Son ? Yea, whose mind is at enmity against God, and whose heart beats not one throb of love to Jesus? God forbid ! "Know

ye not," says Paul, "that the friendship of the world is enmity with God?" Then for a believer to form with an unbeliever an alliance so close and lasting as this, involving interests so important and so precious, is to enter into a league with the enemies of God. It is to covenant, and that for life, with the despisers of the Lord Jesus!

It is no extenuation of this breach of God's command, that the Lord has frequently, in the exercise of his sovereign grace, made the believing party instrumental of conversion to the unbelieving party. He can and often does, bring good out of evil, order out of confusion, "making the wrath of man to praise him," and overruling events that were designed to thwart his purposes, the very means of promoting them. But, this is no encouragement to sin, and when sin is committed, this is but poor consolation. And, to enter into a compact of the nature we are deprecating, with a conscience quieted and soothed with the reflection, that "the wife save the husband, or the husband save the wife," is presumption of the highest kind, a presumption which God may punish with a disappointment as bitter as it is overwhelming. Let no dear child of God be allured into an alliance so unholy, by a consideration so specious as this. Many have fallen into the snare, and have covered themselves with shame and confusion.

To the believer himself, forming an alliance so contrary to the express injunction of God's word, the evils arising from it are many and grievous. To say nothing of the want of what must ever be considered essential to the mutual happiness of the union, oneness of mind, harmony of sentiment, congruity of spirit-there are lacking the higher elements of happiness-the mutual faith