nual action of body and mind, not only mended, but by degrees eftablished his health. All the refources of his fertile genius were explored, and all the meafures which the enterprizing fpirit of the Prince of Brunswick, and his other commanders could fuggeft, were adopted, in order to force or furprize the enemy into an action; or at leaft to compel them to fuch a change of pofition, as might afford an opportunity, for enlarging the theatre, and changing the nature of the war.

Some strange indetermination, feemed, upon the whole, to operate on the fide of the Court of Vienna. Or at least feveral diftinct parts of her language and conduct feemed to have been cast

in very different moulds. In her general language, we have already feen that he was high, haughty,, decifive, and apparently but little difpofed to afford much fatisfaction to her opponents. In feveral parts of her conduct she manifefted the fame fpirit, with the appearance of a fixed, and by no means unwilling determination of proceeding to the utmost extremities, fooner than abate any one point of pretenfions; the extent of which the referved for her own future fpecification, as circumftances and events might direct their limits. Yet,

when affairs came to fuch a crifis, that war feemed inevitable, fhe conftantly shewed a difpofition to avoid, or at least to defer, that final refort, and unexpectedly propofed to negociate. In that itate again, the appeared fo cold, fo referved, fo ambiguous, and her propofitions, if they might be called fuch, were couched in fuch doubtful and general terms, that

it could be scarcely believed any thing direct or ferious could be intended by them. These contradictions feemed to indicate great divifions in the cabinet of that Court; which probably varied her conduct, as each party happened to prevail or lofe ground. It is faid, that the Empress Queen was as ftrongly averfe to the war, as the Emperor was difpofed to it.

The King of Pruffia had been no longer in Bohemia, than was neceffary for completing the preparations for immediate action, when propofals (faid to be directly from the Emperor) were made, for the appointment of Minifters to open another negociation to accommodate matters. The King agreed to the proposals fo far as related to the appointment of Ministers, and the holding of conferences, but rejected the overtures that were made for a ceffation of arms, and did not permit this negociation, (which was as fruitlefs as the former) at all to influence his conduct, or to retard his operations.

The undecifiveness of the campaign, had, as is natural in fuch a ftate, occafioned a prodigious defertion on both fides. It was however greater on that of the King; it being a disadvantage to which the Pruffia armies are particularly liable, from their being principally recruited with foreigners, who cannot be expected to bear that attachment to any fervice, which native troops bear to their country. Tradesmen and manufacturers, who are very numerous in that fervice, are alfo much more difpofed to defertion, than the plain laborious countrymen who compofe the Auftrian armies. The Auftrian Gazettes however, though

their own defertion far exceeded any thing that could be expected upon the principle we have laid down, magnified that of the Pruffians in terms of fuch extravagance, and killed fuch multitudes of their men, in paltry rencounters of no name, that had any credit been given to them, it would have brought no fmall degree of inputation upon their own commanders, and of difgrace upon their troops, to have fuffered their country to be infulted and ravaged by fuch a handful of men, as the remainder muft neceffarily have

been.

Indeed the campaign was fo barren of events, that it became neceffary to catch at every fmall matter, which could help to fill up the attention, or to gratify the curiofity of the public. For it may be obferved in the most defpotic governments, that however the people are trampled upon and defpifed in the feafons of peace, and of felicity to their rulers, yet the ferious and doubtful appeals to the word, always reftore them to fome part of their natural confequence, and caufe a particular degree of attention, however fhort its duration, to be paid to their opinions and likings. Thus, both parties magnified every fmail action into importance; and the taking a few carts from a convoy, or the rout of a fubaltern's command of Huffars or Croats, were dwelt upon as matters of triumph. Such circumftances are, however, fortunate to brave men destitute of intereft, who may then push themselves into notice and preferment by thofe fpirited actions, which would have been overlooked and loft in the general

glare of great deeds and of victory.

The King at length finding that all his efforts on the fide of Koning gratz and Jaromitz, whether to provoke the enemy to an engagement, or to compel them to a change of pofition, proved equally ineffectual, made, towards the middle of Auguft, a grand movement to his right, leaving General Wunfch, with a ftrong command, to keep the communication open, and to guard the important post of Nachod. Several motives concurred to this meafure. It was hoped that by advancing towards the head of the Elbe, he might turn the enemy's left, and compel him to take new ground and pofitions. The King thereby approached nearer to Nimes, and it was to be expected that fo effectual a communication might have been opened with Prince Henry's army, as would afford an opportunity for a fudden junction, if any great profpect of advantage fhould render that measure advisable. It was taking new ground with respect to provifions and forage, which was a matter of no fmall confideration with an army, when the old was already eaten to the utmost degree of barenefs. It is befides, not impoffible, that as the army was to pafs the defiles of Kovalkowitz, and other grounds equally dangerous, which a leffer General would not have ventured in the face of a vigilant and equal enemy, the King on the contrary, confiding in his own ability to remedy thofe difadvantages which he well forefaw, held them out as lures, to tempt the Auftrian Generals to an attack. At any rate, if none of the pro

pofed

pofed effects were produced, any change of ground and fituation, was better fuited to the King's temper and character, than that tire fome famenefs which he had fo long endured.

If any fnare was intended, the enemy was too wary to be entrapped in it. The king paffed all the defiles without obAug. 14th. ftruction, and keeping to the northward, encamped at Burkerfdorf, between Trautenau and Arnau, his right inclining to the former, and his left to the latter of thefe places. The hereditary Prince of Brunswick advanced with a feparate corps on the front of the left to Langenau, from whence he extended his pofts towards Hohen Elbe. It is impoffible, without a knowledge of the country which can only be obtain ed by fecing it, or an exact delineation of the various pofts and pofitions of the Auftrian army, which has not yet in any degree been communicated, to account for feveral of the movements which took place at this time, and for a month after, on the King's fide. The Prince of Brunfwick's advance to Langenau, probably looked towards a defign of attacking General Dalton, who lay with a ftrong force at Arnau; or perhaps it was hoped that his feparation from the main army, might have enticed that General to an attack upon him. Neither of thefe events, however took place.

The King advanced afterwards to Wiltfchitz, Hermanfeifen and Lauterwaffer, and the hereditary Prince pushed on to the high grounds of the Schwartzeberg, almoft at the north-eaft extremity of Bohemia; Trautenau, Branau,

and all the country on the right, as far as Silefia, being abandoned by the Auftrians, who kept their pofts on the left, up towards the fource of the Elbe in great force. All the movements that were made, whether in advancing or retiring in this rough and impracticable country, through wild forests, mountains, and the moft miferable roads, would have been exceedingly dangerous under lefs able commanders, and in cafe of misfortune, would have drawn the heaviest cenfure from the military world, on thofe who had involved an army in fuch ftraits. It is not even impoffible, that both fides built too much upon the King's name, the fuperiority of his troops, and the excellency of his officers.

Nothing can more clearly fhew the full and certain confidence which the Auftrians repofed in the fecurity afforded by their inacceffible fituations, than, that the Emperor, with fo mighty an hoftile force full in his view; with an enemy fo quick in difcerning, and fo prompt in feizing, all appearances, and every opportunity of advantage, with the utmoft vigilance watching his motions, and all his fagacity and penetration in conftant exercife, to obviate the ftrength of his pofitions, to profit by any error in their arrangement, or by the fmalleft inattention to the mutual connection and dependence of fo many detached parts; fhould, notwithstanding thefe circumftances, venture to quit an army expofed to fuch a fituation, and as if no enemy had been near, pay a vifit of fome days to that under the command of Marshal Laudohn. It will scarcely increase our furprize to know, that upon

his return he detached feveral regiments to reinforce that army.

In the mean time, both armies grew very fickly, the heavy and Gontinued rains incident to the feafon in that mountainous country, engendering fevers, fluxes, and other putrid diforders in great abundance. It will be easily fuppofed that the ftrangers were the greater fufferers in this general calamity. The rains alfo, rendered the roads in the vallies fo deep, and the hills fo flippery, that, if all other obstacles had been removed, to attack, or be attacked, became for feveral days equally impracti

cable.

In these circumstances, the King being fully convinced, that nothing could provoke or induce the enemy to venture an open engagement, finding that all other means had proved equally ineffectual, and that they were fo covered with woods, hills, defiles and entrenchments, that an attempt to force them, whatever the fuccefs, muft be attended with the certain lofs of the best and braveft of his troops; with great juftice thought it advifable to preferve fo fine an army for more eligible service. And as the Winter was now faft approaching, whilft the fickness of the troops, and the impracticability of the roads was daily increafing, he at length determined to evacuate Bohemia. Sept. 8th.

The King accordingly, having previously fent off his heavy artillery, fell back from the high grounds of the Lauterwaffer, where he had been for fome time encamped, and retired to his old camp at Wiltfchitz. Nothing was ever conducted with greater ability than this retreat, VOL. XXI.

which was made in the face of the enemy, by roads little lefs than impaffable, through an impractible country, and the most dangerous defiles. The Auftrians by no means neglected the opportunity. Their light troops made feveral attacks with great vigour upon the different lines of arch in the most difficult grounds, and made bold pushes to feize a confiderable part of the artillery which remained with the army, and which feemed to be fo inextricably involved in the mud and floughs of the hollow ways, that they already deemed them a certain prize. All the movements were, however, made with fuch judgment, and the different columns fo effectually fupported and covered each other, that they were every where repulfed without obtaining the fmalleft advantage, or taking a fingle piece of cannon; the lofs of men was pretty equal on both fides. This retreat, in fuch a country, and in the face of fo powerful and numerous an enemy, was faid to be immediately directed in all its parts by the King, who gave written directions for every movement; fome of which are faid to have been fo bold, and the fuccefs fo evidently depending upon the clock-like operation and coincidence of the whole, that his oldeft Generals were startled at the defign. In a word, it is represented as a mafterpiece in its kind.

The King continued near a week at Wiltfchitz. Towards the middle of the month, the army moved to Alt- Sept. 14th.

stadt, near Trautenau; and in fome days after to Schatzlar, near the frontiers of Silefia, and on the high road to Landshut, where it [C]

conti

October, when it finally evacuated Bohemia. The ground was little lefs difficult in the two former of these movements, than in the march to Wiltfchitz, and the Auftrians, under General Wurmfer, being now much more powerful, the attacks were more frequent and violent; which, however, produced no other effect than a greater lofs of men on both fides, no advantage of any value being gained by either. It is given as an inftance of the advantage, and a proof of the excellency of difcipline, that a Pruffian regiment, having in one of thefe engagements been fo clofely preffed on all fides, as to be under a neceffity of throwing itfelf into what is called a hollow or fquare battalion, upon repelling the enemy, and in all the heat of a brisk engagement, it inftantly recovered its former order of march, with the fame ease and regularity, that it could have paraded from the ground of exercise on a field day.

During the greater part of these tranfactions, Prince Henry continued at Nimes; his army occupying the pots we have already ftated, and enjoying the moft profound tranquillity; being likewife free from thofe incommodities which had diftreffed the King's forces, in a miferable country, rendered ftill more wretched by the badness of the weather. When it became at length apparent, that the caution and fituation of the enemy muft unavoidably fruftrate all the views of the campaign; that the taking up of Winter quarters in Bohemia, was from the fame caufes rendered utterly impracticable; and that the approaching feafon

that country without lofs, every day more difficult; the Prince made feveral motions preparatory to that event, but immediately tending to divert the attention of the enemy from his real defign, and with a hope of leading him to fome change of pofition, which might either on his own fide, or on that of the King's, afford an opportunity for opening a more favourable feene of action.

The Prince accordingly quitting Nimes, Sept. 10th. and turning to the right, advanced towards the Elbe by the way of Neufchlofs, Pleifwedel, and Aufche, and paffing that river at Leutmeritz, encamped not far from thence at Tfchifchkowitz, on the great road to Prague. At the fame time, a part of the left wing, under the Prince of Bernberg, fell back towards the upper Lufatia, until it had occupied the strong grounds on the fide of Gabel and Zittau. This movement on the fide of the Prince, obliged Marshal Laudohn to quit the Ifer, and paffing the Elbe and the Muldau, to encamp at Martinowes, near Budin, to prevent his advancing towards Prague. After a number of fkirmishes had taken place, and that the armies had for fome days kept thefe pofitions; the Prince quitted his camp at Tfchifchkowitz, and returning without lofs to the confines of Saxony, had entirely evacuated Bohemia by the end of the month.

Nor was the war on the fide of the Auftrian Silefia productive of any action of confequence; for the Pruflian Generals being much fuperior in force to the Marquis de Botta, he was not able to under

take