1880] GHAZNI AND KELAT-I-GHILZAI 351 we passed Ahmedkhel, where Sir Donald Stewart won his victory; the name had been changed by the Natives to 'the Resting-place of Martyrs,' and the numerous freshlycovered-in graves testified to the ghazis' heavy losses. The remains of the few British soldiers, who had been buried where they had fallen, had been desecrated, and the bones were exposed to view and scattered about. At Chardeh, our next halting-place, a communication from Colonel Tanner, Commanding at Kelat-i-Ghilzai, was brought to me by a Native messenger; it was dated the 12th August, and informed me that Kandahar was closely invested, but that the garrison had supplies for two months and forage for fifteen days. On the 21st we arrived at a point thirty miles from Kelat-i-Ghilzai, whence we opened heliograph communication with that place, and were told of an unsuccessful sortie made from Kandahar five days before, in which General Brooke and eight other British officers had been killed. On the 23rd Kelat-i-Ghilzai was reached. The garrison* had been well taken care of by Colonel Tanner, and a large quantity of food for man and beast had been collected; but I thought it unadvisable at present to continue to hold the place, and have to keep open communication between it and Kandahar, and as I could see no compensating advantage in doing so, I determined to withdraw the troops and take them along with me. * The garrison consisted of 2 guns of C/2, Royal Artillery, 145 rifles of the 66th Foot, 100 of the 3rd Sind Horse, and the 2nd Baluch Regiment, 639 strong. Now Lieutenant-General Sir Oriel Tanner, K.C.B. Colonel Tanner's report satisfied me there was no immediate danger to be apprehended at Kandahar, so I decided to halt for one day; both men and animals greatly needed rest after a continuous march of 225 miles. I had endeavoured to keep the Government of India informed of my progress by a message from Ghazni, and one from Oba Karez on the 18th August, but neither reached its destination. I now despatched a message which was more successful, and was delivered at Simla on the 30th August. It was as follows: The force under my command arrived here this morning. The authorities at Kandahar having stated on the 17th instant that they have abundant supplies and can make forage last until 1st September, I halt to-morrow to rest troops, and more especially the transport animals and camp-followers. The force left Ghazni on the 16th, and has marched 136 miles during the last eight days; the troops are in good health and spirits. From this I purpose moving by regular stages, so that the men may arrive fresh at Kandahar. I hope to be in heliographic communication with Kandahar from Robat, distant twenty miles, on the 29th. If General Phayre reaches Takht-i-Pul, I should also hope to communicate with him and arrange a combined movement on Kandahar. I am taking the Kelat-i-Ghilzai garrison with me, making the Fort over to Mahomed Sadik Khan, a Toki Chief, who had charge of the place when we arrived in 1879; the present Governor, Sirdar Sherindil Khan, refuses to remain. We have met with no opposition during the march, and have been able to make satisfactory arrangements for supplies, especially forage, which at this season is plentiful. The Cavalry horses and Artillery mules are in excellent order; our casualties to date are, one soldier 72nd Highlanders, one sepoy 23rd Pioneers, one 2nd Sikhs, two sepoys 3rd Sikhs dead, one sepoy 4th Gurkhas, two sepoys 24th Punjab Native Infantry, one Duffadar 3rd Punjab Cavalry missing, six camp-followers dead, five missing. The missing men have, I fear, been murdered. telegraphed from Ghazni on the 15th, and from Oba Karez on the 18th August.' I 1880] FOOD REQUIRED DAILY FOR THE FORCE 353 I wrote also to Major-General Phayre, telling him of the date on which I expected to reach Kandahar, and that if I heard of his being anywhere near I would arrange my movements to suit his, in order that the two forces might make a combined attack on Ayub Khan's position. As I was afraid the supplies at Kandahar would be insufficient for the additional troops about to be collected there, I sent General Phayre a memorandum* of the amount of food required daily by my force, and begged him to get pushed up from the rear such articles as were more particularly wanted. I pointed out that we were badly * Estimate of daily requirements for the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force and the Kelat-i-Ghilzai garrison: Transport—yabus 1,592, mules and ponies 5,926, camels 400, donkeys 400. |