selection of Guam. Remained the Philippines, which caused much discussion in the Cabinet, country and with the Spanish Peace Commissioners, who by the terms of the Protocol, met in Paris those sent from the United States to negotiate a treaty of peace. 1 2 When the letter of the Spanish Minister of State was received [July 26] the President on a hot afternoon took the members of the Cabinet on a lighthouse tender for a trip down the Potomac, when were thoroughly discussed the terms of peace. This resulted later in the submission by Secretary Day of an article which proposed to "relinquish all of the Philippine Islands to Spain except sufficient ground for a naval station." On this proposition the Cabinet was about equally divided. It is easy to see that had the President then decided not to take the Philippines he would have had a powerful backing. During the war he had displayed a shrewd trading instinct thus expressed, "While we are conducting war and until its conclusion we must keep all we get; when the war is over we must keep what we want." Now he did not desire to come to a positive decision, and preferred to leave the matter open for the development of circumstances and until we had more information and especially some enlightening word from Dewey. The President said to Jules Cambon: "The negotiators of the two countries will be the ones to decide what will be the permanent advantages that we shall demand in the archipelago and finally the control, disposition and government of the Philippines. The Madrid government may be assured that up to this time there is nothing determined à priori 1 This is printed by Olcott, ii. 59. 'Ibid., 165. in my mind against Spain; likewise I consider there is nothing decided against the United States." Therefore, Article III in the Protocol, agreed to with Jules Cambon, left the disposition of the Philippines until a formal treaty of peace should be concluded. The Protocol provided for the appointment of five Commissioners to meet in Paris an equal number from Spain. The President named William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William P. Frye, Senator from Maine, Whitelaw Reid, editor and proprietor of the New York Tribune and ex-minister to France, and George Gray, Senator from Delaware, the only Democrat on the Commission. The discussion between the Peace Commissioners and the different despatches of the Americans to Washington make interesting reading, but it is apparent that the decision of the main points rested with the President, who used the communications from the Commissioners as materials on which to base his own judgment. He decided at once that neither the United States nor any government which she might set up in Cuba would assume any portion of the so-called Cuban debt which had been largely incurred in fighting two insurrections. The greatest contention, however, was in regard to the Philippines. These consisted of a number of islands with a combined area of 115,000 square miles, nearly as large as England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales. The largest is Luzon with nearly 41,000 square miles, substantially the size of Ohio. The total population was more than seven and one half millions; the population of Luzon was 1 1 Despatch of Cambon to Spain, Aug. 4, Chadwick, ii. 436. 3,798,507 and that of Manila, the chief city, 219,928.1 "The Philippines were a rich prize for any ambitious power," was Dewey's opinion after his victory.2 3 After the Protocol was signed, the President inclined toward taking the Philippines. Of his five Peace Commissioners, three, Davis, Frye and Reid, were avowed imperialists. In his instruction to the Commission of September 16, he wrote that we must have the island of Luzon and on October 26 he had his Secretary of State, John Hay, telegraph as follows to Commissioner Day: "The information which has come to the President since your departure convinces him that the acceptance of the cession of Luzon alone, leaving the rest of the islands subject to the Spanish rule, or to be the subject of future contention, cannot be justified on political, commercial or humanitarian grounds. The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible and the former must therefore be required. The President reaches this conclusion after most thorough consideration of the whole subject, and is deeply sensible of the grave responsibilities it will impose, believing that this course will entail less trouble than any other, and besides will best subserve the interests of the people involved, for whose welfare we cannot escape responsibility." 1 Life of McKinley, ii. 145; Foreign Relations, 1898, 925. "The entire population, according to the census of 1903, was 7,635,426. Of these 6,987,686 were classed as civilized and 647,740 as wild. The civilized native inhabitants are practically all adherents of the Roman Catholic Church. Of the wild tribes at least two-fifths are Mohammedan Moros. With the exception of the aboriginal Negritos, who are widely dispersed through the mountain regions, all the natives are believed to be Malays." Latané, 79. 2 Autobiography, 251. 3 Foreign Relations, 904. John Hay had become Secretary of State succeeding William R. Day. 'Hay to Day, Foreign Relations, 1898, 935. Between October 10 and 22 McKinley visited the Omaha Trans-Mississippi Exposition; in going thither and returning he made a number of speeches at convenient rail stops.1 Senator Hoar called it "his famous Western journey." Unquestionably Hoar is correct in attributing to McKinley too great a reliance on the sentiment exhibited by the enthusiastic crowds that he addressed, but in truth his deductions from the meetings only confirmed what he had already determined. By direction of the President, General Merritt went from Manila to Paris and gave a full report to the Peace Commission. While he was careful not to express himself positively in response to certain questions, a fair inference from his testimony is that it was desirable to take the whole group.3 The President had before him Dewey's report, from which it may be gathered that the Admiral favored the retention of Luzon alone, but General Greene, who brought to the White House this report, with whom McKinley had a "long talk" and whom he found "thoroughly well informed," approved decidedly our taking all of the Philippines. The President had also 1 For these speeches, see New York Tribune, Oct. 11-23, 1898. 'Autobiography, ii. 311. • Foreign Relations, 1898, 918. "Luzon is in almost all respects the most desirable of these islands and therefore the one to retain."-Dewey, Aug. 29. General Greene said in his Memorandum of August 27 which represented his opinion when he had the "long talk" with McKinley on September 28: "If the United States evacuate these islands, anarchy and civil war will immediately ensue and lead to foreign intervention. The insurgents were furnished arms and the moral support of the Navy prior to our arrival, and we cannot ignore obligations, either to the insurgents or to foreign nations, which our own acts have imposed upon us. The Spanish Government is completely demoralized and Spanish power is dead beyond possibility of resurrection. Spain would be unable to govern these islands if we surrendered them.... On the other hand, the Filipinos cannot govern the before him the opinion of the several members of the Peace Commission before it was necessary to arrive at a final decision. The opinions of the three imperialists, Davis, Frye and Reid, tallied with his own; that of Day was a compromise,' but Senator Gray's opinion deserves consideration. "I cannot agree," he said, "that it is wise to take Philippines in whole or in part. To do so would be to reverse accepted continental policy of country, declared and acted upon throughout our history. Propinquity governs case of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Policy proposed introduces us into European politics and the entangling alliances, against which Washington and all American statesmen have protested. . . . Attacked Manila as part of legitimate war against Spain. If we had captured Cadiz and Carlists had helped us, would not owe duty to stay by them at conclusion of war. On contrary interest and duty would require us to abandon both Manila and Cadiz.. "So much from standpoint of interest. But even conceding all benefits claimed for annexation we thereby abandon the infinitely greater benefit to accrue from acting the part of a great, powerful and Christian nation; we exchange the moral grandeur and strength to be gained by keeping our word to nations of the world and by exhibiting a magnanimity and moderation in hour of victory that becomes the advanced civilization we claim, for doubtful material advantages and shameful stepping down from high moral position boastfully assumed. We country without the support of some strong nation."-Senate docs. 8, no. 62; Treaty of Peace between United States and Spain, 374, 383; Foreign Relations, 1898, 915, 917. 1 Foreign Relations, 1898, 932 et seq. |