Woolmer, aged 19, and Miss Eve, perished in the flames.-Notwithstanding the most strenuous exertions of the populace, and the soldiers from the garrison, by six o'clock the houses of Mrs Smith, Mrs Peck, druggist, and Mr Hill, shoemaker, adjoining, were totally destroyed; and those of Mr Rood, plasterer, and Mr Nash, hair-dresser, were so greatly damaged that they must be rebuilt.

WHITSTABLE. -A smack belonging to Queensborough, bound to Faversham, laden with king's stores, was driven on shore on the Pollard, on the 14th inst. The crew and passengers consisted of four men and one woman, the captain's wife. The captain, his wife, and a boy got into the boat, and put off for the shore. The boat had not proceeded many yards from the vessel when it stove, and the captain with much difficulty regained the vessel; but his wife and boy perished. He remained on board the vessel with the rest of the crew till morning. The vessel being nearly dry, they left her and walked ashore, with the exception of the owner, who died of extreme cold. The distress of the captain may be more easily conceived than described. He had only been married a week, and was bringing his wife to Faversham, to introduce her to her friends. The bodies of the woman and boy have been since picked up.

20th. The court-martial assembled at Chelsea, for the purpose of trying Lieut. Gen. Whitelocke, on various charges preferred against him for his conduct during the attack of Buenos Ayres by the British troops, concluded its proceedings on the 16th. The trial lasted thirty-two days, and, after a diligent investigation of the evidence adduced in sup

port of the charges, the court adjudged Lieut. Gen. Whitelocke totally unworthy to serve his majesty in any military capacity whatever. The following is the substance of the charges, and a short outline of the evidence by which they were supported:

1. Having, contrary to the tenor of instructions, in the summons to Buenos Ayres, required, that the civil officers and magistrates should be prisoners of war, which, it is averred, is contrary to all customs of war, and had a decided effect in inflaming the civil population to resistance.

2. Exposing the army, in marching against Buenos Ayres, to a destructive discharge of musquetry from the town, without furnishing that army with any means of defence or attack.

3. Not being present personally on the advance against Buenos Ayres; also, not keeping open a communication between the main body of the troops and the detachment under General Craufurd, which compelled that officer to surrender.

4. Surrendering the fortress of Monte Video without necessity, which was capable of making an effectual resistance against any force which could be brought against it.

General Gower was the first witness called on the part of the prosecution, who stated, That the hostility of the people against the British was implacable, and, as far as his observation went, he did not believe there was one man in Spanish America attached to the British cause. If the whole army had been collected, and the attack made on Buenos Ayres on the 2d, the witness was of opinion that the place would have been carried. The witness had formed a plan for the attack on Buenos Ayres, the basis of which was very similar

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to that of General Whitelocke. There appeared to be a general confidence among the officers that the plan would succeed. There were no general orders given with respect to a point of retreat in case the attack failed. Being asked if there was much probability of success in re-attacking Buenos Ayres, he observed, That there were but two means."I did not think either would succeed. The one by assault had been tried with only partial success; the second by bombardment, even were the means in our power to the fullest extent, would, in my opinion, produce very little effect upon a town of so immense a size as Buenos Ayres, the buildings of which were effectually incombustible. That there was but one British twenty-four pounder landed, and that a large proportion of the captured guns were spiked, or unfit for service. Of the few that were fit, the number of any considerable calibre was very small; that, having seen the trifling effect produced by twenty-four pounders on the houses of Monte Video, I was convinced that guns of a lighter calibre would produce little or none against houses constructed of similar materials, and nearly in a similar manner to those at Monte Video. I moreover stated it as my opinion, from the rough estimate I had been able to form of the loss, that the number of troops remaining, even were the Spanish general disposed to give up Buenos Ayres without a further struggle, were by no means adequate, or nearly so, to controul such a mass of armed inhabitants, and to hold such points as were absolutely necessary for the support of the British army. Soon after this Lieutenant General Whitelocke informed me that he had sent to General Liniers

to say, that he would order me inte the town to communicate with him on the subject of his letter. I attended Lieutenant General Whitelocke some time afterwards to receive his orders, and he gave me a variety of verbal ones relative to the points which I was to discuss with General Liniers. I requested a detailed written order on the subject, but he would not give it to me. I believe that it was about three o'clock when I went with a flag of truce into the town."

General Craufurd, after stating that he attacked and defeated a division of the enemy the evening before the attack was made upon Buenos Ayres, and, that when he was preparing to follow up his advantage, he received an order to fall back to the Coral; mentioned, that he considered it as desirable to follow the enemy into the town, that he requested permission to do so; "I felt convinced," said General Craufurd, "That if the main division under General Whitelocke had been as near as I thought it might have been, we certainly should have taken the town with ease. I had very strong doubts whether we might not have taken it with General Gower's corps. In answer to the message I had so sent by Captain Squires, I received a second and peremptory order to fall back to the Coral; the general stating at the same time, that our wounded (which did not exceed six officers and thirty men) might be cut off by the straggling parties of the enemy which had been hovering about us. Just at the time I began to retire, I discovered that General Lumley's brigade had arrived immediately on my right."

General Craufurd then proceeded

to state, that very little anxiety was shewn to prepare provisions for the troops, of which negligence the general adduced various instances, particularly, that there were no camp kettles, these necessary articles being left behind, so that the men had no means of cooking their victuals after they received them.

Sir Samuel Achmuty was then examined, whose evidence tended to confirm the statement of General Craufurd, respecting the little care taken to supply the troops with necessaries. Sir Samuel also detailed very minutely, the obstacles which impeded the march of the armyexposed to the most unfavourable weather, and terrified besides, by the difficulties of transporting artillery over a swampy country. was of opinion, that the force, if it had been differently conducted, conducted, would have accomplished the reduction of the place.

He

Sir Samuel Achmuty then gave an account of his operations in the streets of Buenos Ayres, from which it appeared, that the men were exposed to the most destructive fire of grape and musketry, from two guns planted in their front, and from the Plaza del Toros, where 1000 men were stationed. They were also attacked on the rear, and at length took shelter from the fire of the enemy, in a deep water course, which run through the street.

Captain Fraser, Colonel Mahon, Lieut.-Col. Torrens, Bradford, Davie, and Nugent, spoke strongly respecting the difficulties of the country, and the little exertion made by General Whitelocke to overcome them. They also mentioned, that the town was never reconnoitered, nor no place of retreat fixed upon in case the attack failed.

In support of the third charge, Major-General Gower deposed, that, until the morning of the 6th, General Whitelocke did not attempt to open a communication with the different corps of his army: at that period he was of opinion the enemy could not have made any serious impression on the army. The witness also stated, that, in consequence of having objected, on several occasions, to General Whitelocke's arrangements, he angrily replied, that he wished to throw cold water on every thing he did, and that he would supersede him in his

command on the staff.

Sir Samuel Achmuty, after a minute detail of the operations of the corps under his command, stated, that, during all this time, he was ignorant of the station or intentions of the commander in chief; at length he was informed, that the general in chief and General Gower were on the same ground they originally occupied; that the general was ignorant of the situation of any of the columns, and had sent him to procure what information he could. He then, after acquainting the general with the operations of the day, requested him to send him a reinforcement, and to make the post he occupied his head quarters; that he received a reinforcement of sixteen artillerymen, and was directed to defend his post, and assured that General Whitelocke would communicate with him next morning. The next morning a letter was received from General Liniers, containing an offer of allowing the troops to evacuate Buenos Ayres and South America in six months. By noon, General Whitelocke and General Gower came to the Plaza Del Toros, and, on being asked whether the terms ought to be accepted, Sir Samuel Achmuty gave his opinion that