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The people of each of eleven States thus ratified the Constitution - eleven of the thirteen members of the then confederation and perpetual Union; and two, Rhode Island and North Carolina, never ratified until after the Constitution and new government under it, went into full operation, during which interval, from March 4, 1789, to May 29, 1790, in the case of Rhode Island; to November 21, 1789, in the case of North Carolina, the Constitution had no force in either of them. But, moreover, in deference to the articles of confederation, the new Constitution, by its seventh article, was not to be established at all, unless nine States ratified. Then, five States could have rejected for all; or according to the census of 1790, five States, with one-seventh of the population of the United States, could have defeated it as to all.

In the presence of these facts, if asked, who formed the Constitution, can there be but one answer? The States; not the State legislatures, or States as Governments, but the people of each State (as a civil body politic), as the delegating authority, contradistinguished from the delegated authority - the people of the State and not its government. This it was, that was to heal the vice of the confederation. The Constitution is adopted by the people of the States. The confederation by the legislatures of the States. Each was adopted by separate State action, and they differ only as to the nature of the State authority from which each proceeds.

But we are now confronted with the famous words of the preamble to the Constitution. Does it not say that "we, the people of the United States" * * * "do ordain and establish this Constitution?" It does, but what do the words mean?

This obstruction is not formidable. Two propositions may be laid down.

1. These words are descriptive of the parties, who do the deed-not of those, who do not.

2. They describe the party to the deed, not a party who shall exist in virtue, or as a result of it.

If, then, these words describe those who ordained the Constitution, we may know their meaning by learning what is the fact.

Did the people of the United States, as one people, one civil body politic, adopt or ordain the Constitution? When? Where? How? So far from it, Congress, the only organ of all the States, had nothing to do with its adoption, and were expressly and purposely shut out from all intervention in it, except as the medium of sending it to the true ordaining authority. To interpret the preamble then as meaning "the one people of the United States," is to interpret it as meaning an historic falsehood, and one which could deceive nobody at the date of its utterance.

On the contrary, we know, and have shown, that the people of the States, as separate and distinct civil bodies politic, did ordain it. The legislatures of the States elected the Convention, which proposed it, not Congress; nor all the States, as one, in any form. The States voted as such in the Federal Convention, as equal States. They signed it in convention by States. They declared it was done by the unanimous consent of States. The people of each State ratified it for itself, alone, bound only by its own act, and binding no other State. It went into operation between eleven States, because eleven only ratified, and did not bind two, who refused to ratify; that is, the United States, as an unity (as it is claimed to have been), embracing thirteen States,

could not, though eleven consented, bind two, who dissented.

If, therefore, the words mean "we, the people of the United States" (that is, the people of each State of those united, acting for itself, and all co-acting to the same ratification), ordained the Constitution, it speaks truth. If otherwise, it speaks falsehood.

It must be admitted, that the words are susceptible of either meaning; but that should be adopted, which is consistent with facts, rather than that, which is contrary to them; and the trouble was, perhaps, in the non-use at that day of the plural form to the word "people." But when we speak of the people of Europe, we surely would not be held to mean, they were one civil body politic.

But a little care in investigation will dispel all doubt.

"We, the people of the United States" "do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." Let us seek the meaning of the terms, "United States," and "United States of America."

The articles of confederation under which the members of the Convention were then living, give their meaning.

"The style of this Confederacy shall be the United States of America." Art. of Confed., § 1. What Confederacy? The articles answer: "The confederation between the States of New Hampshire" (naming all), etc. Then the "United States of America " means "the Confederacy between the States of New Hampshire," eto.

Substitute (algebraically) this meaning in the preamble to the Constitution, and it will read thus:

We, the people of the Confederacy between the States of New Hampshire, etc., do ordain this Constitution for the Confederacy between the States of New Hampshire, etc. We, the people, not the legislatures, of the Confederated States of New Hampshire, etc., known as the United States of America, not as one civil body politic, but as a league, an alliance, a confederation and union between many civil bodies politic.

And this is more obvious from a further fact. The preamble declares, "We, the people of the United States," etc., "in order to form a more perfect union," etc. More perfect than what? Clearly, than the perpetual union now existing. But that was a confederation. The preamble does not say, to change it from a union of States, into a union of men in one civil body politic; but to form a more perfect union or confederation between the United States than now exists, more perfect, in acting immediately on men and not mediately through States, and more perfect, in resting on the will of the people, rather than of the legislature of each State. And this is clearly the meaning of Chase, C. J., in Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 707.

That this is the key to the construction is further evident from many facts in the debates of the Convention. Mad. Pap. 796, etc., 846, 861, 1184, and from others already referred to.

In the first draft of the preamble (Mad. Pap. 735) it read: "We, the people of the States of New Hampshire," etc. (naming all). That form was preserved in the report August 6, 1787 (Mad. Pap. 1226), and was adopted nem. con. August 7, 1787. Mad. Pap. 1243.

The committee to revise the style (Mad. Pap. 1532, 1542-3) of the Constitution, as it had been adopted in detail, reported the preamble in form, as it now stands, September 9, 1787, to which no objection was made.

Now, either the committee on style changed the substantial meaning of the preamble without objection by the Convention; or, as it stands, it must mean what it did when, naming all the States, it was adopted nem. con. Clearly the latter is the truth.

But I may be asked, why the change of form. Several reasons may be assigned.

(a) Rhode Island was named in the first draft as one of the States ordaining the Constitution, but was not present in the Convention, and might, therefore, never become a party. The change is additionally significant evidence that she could only be self-bound.

(b) By article 7 of the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution could operate between any nine States, who ratified it, but in none other. In the first draft, thirteen were named as parties; and yet none could say which of them would ratify, or which would be the nine parties to it. The names should not have been stated until it was known who would ratify.

(c) New States were to be admitted. It would be awkward to name in the body of the paper a part only of those who would be parties to it.

(d) The words "United States" meant the States united in confederation under existing articles. The use of those words would embrace all who would be so united, under the same name under the new Constitution. The words "United States" in the present Constitution were imported without definition from the old articles, where they had the meaning of confederation and perpetual union between the States named. And the article 6th of this Constitution, makes the United States responsible under the Constitution of the United States for all debts and engagements of the United States under the Confederation. It is the same United States though bound by new terms. Federalist, No. 43, shows this.

In confirmation of all this I need only add one passage from the famous opinion of Chief-Justice Marshall in McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 403. He is arguing that the Constitution was the act of the people, and says, "It is true, they assembled in their several States; and where else should they have assembled! No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which separate the States, and of compounding the American people into one common mass. Of consequence, when they act, they act in their States. But the measures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be the measures of the people themselves, or become the measures of the State governments."

Now, what is the Constitution thus ordained?
It is a Federal compact between the States.

This results from the views already presented. For if the people of each State unite upon terms contained in a paper, adopted by all as binding upon them; this is a Federal compact.

States, he held at Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose of revising the articles of confederation, and reporting such alterations and provisions therein as shall, when agreed to," etc., "render the Federal Constitution adequate," etc. 12 Jour. Cong. 13, 14.

In the credentials of the delegates to the Federal Convention you will find the same purpose expressed by every State, to revise the Federal Constitution, to advance the Federal Union, to strengthen the Federal Government.

Note, that the articles of confederation in these recitals are called a Federal Constitution; that the purpose was to revise and amend them, not to change radically the Union; that the Confederation is called a Federal Union-and the purpose was to preserve and perfect that Federal Union, which was a Confederacy, and it was to be ratified, before binding any State, by that State itself.

It will not do, therefore, to say that the Constitution is different from the articles of confederation, because it is called a Constitution. The articles were so called by Congress and all the States, and the Convention only was designed to revise and amend them, not to change radically the character of the relations between the States.

In the letter of the Convention to the States, it appears that the Convention only proposed by a different organization of government to effect the same general purpose. The new government is called a general government, a Federal government; and there is no hint that the confederate nature of the Union had ceased, but only that a change in the functional action of the government was intended.

In the first Congress the Senate addressed President Washington, and he replied, both calling the Union a Confederated Republic."

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Mr. Hamilton, in the 9th number of the Federalist, takes special pains to show that the confederate relation will subsist between the States under the Constitution. He maintains that the Constitution created a Confederate Republic; that the government is a Federal government, and that, despite the inequality of power of the States in the government, and the fact that it operates on individuals immediately and not mediately through States, while the preservation of the separate organisms of the States, though in subordination to the general authority of the Union, is secured; the new Union is "in fact and in theory an association of States, or a Confederacy."

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But the Constitution establishes its own character. 1. The preamble declares it to be a Constitution "for the United States of America" (the name of the old Confederation), and the Constitution says it is "done by the States."

But I am not left to this deduction. The convention of five States at Annapolis (already referred to) addressed all the States, and called "for an exertion of the united virtue and wisdom of all the members of the Confederacy," and proposed that the States should hold a convention "to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the Constitution|ing of the Federal government adequate to the exigencies of the Union." Mad. Pap. 702-3. Congress, in response to a letter of instructions by New York to her delegates, recommended "that a convention of delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several

2. It declares it (when ratified by the conventions of nine States) shall be established "between the States so ratifying the same." This is the same form, as in the articles of confederation, which are recited as be"between the States of New Hampshire," etc. Compacts, confederations, bind between the parties to them, and they bind upon each, because made between all the parties.

3. "All debts contracted and engagements entered into before the adoption of this Constitution shall be

as valid against the United States under this Constitution as under the Confederation." C. U. S., art. 6, cl. 1.

They were valid against the United States as a Confederacy. They are valid against the same, though under the Constitution.

In this clause the legal succession of the United States under the Constitution to the United States under the Confederation is established. By the preamble, ordaining a more perfect union than the former one, the political organism of the United States under the two systems, is shown to be the same. And by the reasoning of the 43d number of the Federalist as to the debts and engagements of the United States under the Confederation, the moral obligation of the government under the two systems is clearly maintained. So that the absolute identity of the United States, legally, politically and morally, under the Confederation, and the Constitution cannot be doubted.

4. The Constitution is full of stipulations between the States, which are permanent. All limitations on State power. Art. 1, § 10; the provisions as to faith and credit to each other's records and acts; as to reciprocal privileges of citizenship; as to surrender of persons held to service; as to extradition of criminals; are all stipulations of a compact between the States.

The Constitution is then a Federal compact between States, ordained and established by each of them for itself and in federal union with others.

אן

(To be concluded.)

THE PENGE MURDER CASE.

LONDON, Sept. 27, 1877. one of my letters, in the spring of this year, I had occasion to draw a contrast between the crime of murder in England and America, and I took, as a somewhat exaggerated illustration of the brutal nature of the English murderer, a case which was then new to public attention, but which subsequently became notorious under the name of "The Penge Mystery." Last night the "mystery " dropped out of the case, and, by the verdict of the jury, it will hereafter be known as "The Penge Murder Case."

The trial at the Old Bailey (to which the venue was changed from the Maidstone Assizes) was originally set down for the 7th of August, and the Lord ChiefJustice came to town from holding the Assizes at Croydon, for the purpose of presiding. But the counsel for defendants asked for further time to prepare their case, on the ground that important medical evidence would be at their command later, which could not be had at that time, because of the absence of the witnesses; and the Attorney-General declined to oppose the application for delay; so that the Chief-Justice had no option about granting it. He expressed disappointment at this result, and said, in substance, that he would have ruled otherwise on even a show of opposition from Sir John Holker. It was observed at the time that Chief-Justice Cockburn has a mania for trying celebrated criminal cases, and it looked, indeed, as if he had set his heart on this one, and felt the disappointment keenly.

In the event, Mr. Justice Hawkins "fleshed his maiden sword" on the Penge murderers, - this being his first important case since his appointment last spring. This is the celebrated ex-Queen's counsel, Mr. Henry Hawkins, whose connection with the Tich

borne case earned him a world-wide celebrity. He gave up an extensive and lucrative practice to take his seat on the bench, and, from reading his charge to the jury yesterday, one is constrained to fear that he has not yet been able to sink the advocate in the judge. Certainly his argument against the prisoners was far more effectual than that of the Attorney-General.

Each of the four prisoners was represented by separate counsel, and all were defended with zeal and ability. But, unfortunately for the clients, the only hope of their escape lay in confusing the minds of the jury with conflicting technical evidence, and in impeaching the credibility of the government's principal witness. It was by clearly setting forth his own convictions on every doubtful point, while at the same time commending to the jury their duty to follow their own convictions, that Mr. Hawkins rendered such effectual help to the counsel for the prosecution.

The charge covers nine solid columns of the Times — over 20,000 words. Its delivery was commenced at 11.20 A. M., and completed at 9.40 P. M. It is a masterpiece of clear and connected statement, but the end and inevitable effect of every sentence is to destroy the labors of defendants' counsel; and where law and facts, simply stated, do not suffice, the judge's opinions and inferences are never concealed. In short, it would be impossible to imagine a case wherein the consciences of the jurymen would be so thoroughly relieved of duty by that of the judge.

The result was that in one hour and twenty-five minutes the jury brought in a verdict of "guilty " against all of the four prisoners, although nine men out of ten, skilled or simple, were confident that there would be serious difficulty in reaching a verdict of "murder" at all, and that, if such verdict could be found, it certainly would not include the female pris

oners.

Louis Stanton and his paramour Alice Rhodes, and Patrick Stanton and his wife Elizabeth Rhodes, — brothers and sisters, - received sentence of death. Of their guilt of the crime of murder, willful and deliberate, and with the most cruel and barbarous accessaries that can be imagined, scarcely an intelligent member of this community entertains a particle of moral doubt. But I do not believe that, if the judge's charge had been confined within the limits of a mere statement of the law and summary of evidence, a jury could have been found to convict them.

That the case is not free from perplexity, even now, after it has been decided and sentence passed, you may gather from the following editorial reflections in to-day's Times:

It is impossible to survey the evidence in this cause without reflecting on the peculiarity of our rule of evidence which shuts the mouths of the prisoners at a criminal trial. After the medical evidence, the chief question in the case was the truthfulness or the accuracy of Clara Brown. This question could hardly have remained a matter of doubt if the four prisoners in the dock could have been each submitted to examination. The prisoners and Clara Brown are the only living persons who know what really happened during these previous months, but four of them were absolutely silenced by the forms of our procedure. As it is, the jury have had to grope their way as best they could. They had to balance, on the one hand, the various expedients to which the efforts of the prisoners to conceal the social infamy of their position might give rise, the liability to misconstruction which the malice, or the incapacity, or self-interested alarms of Clara Brown might expose them, aud on the other, the difficulty of accounting for the condition in which Harriet Staunton was found, while in the custody of

those responsible for her proper care, and who had an evident interest in violating that duty so as to destroy her life. To determine the problem when the evil impulse of which the jury seem to have assumed the existence became active so as to amount to the actual guilt of murder was an inquiry of singular difficulty.

EMPLOYMENT OF SERVANT BY JOINT MASTERS.

ENGLISH HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, EXCHEQUER DIVISION, JUNE 1, 1877.

SWAINSON V. NORTHEASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, 37 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 102.

T. was employed as a signalman by the G. Railway Company at a station which abutted upon a station of the N. Railway Company. The business of T. was common to both stations, and was to signal the trains of both companies, and he was called one of the joint-station staff, all of whom were appointed and paid by the G. Company, but the expense of their salaries was borne equally by the two companies. Held, that he was employed as the servant of both companies, and the N. Company was not liable for his death through the negligence of one of its servants.

Mo

[OTION by defendant to enter a verdict. This was an action by the plaintiff, the widow of one Thos. Swainson, who, at the time of his death, was a signalman in the employment of the Great Northern Railway Company, and was brought by her to recover compensation in damages for herself and her children by reason of the death of her said husband through, as she alleged, the negligence of an engine driver in the service and employ of the defendant. The facts were briefly as follows: The Leeds station of the Great Northern Railway Company abutted upon a station of the defendant, the Northeastern Railway Company. The stations were approached by lines of rails, two of which belonged to each of the companies, and the entrances and exits of trains were governed by signals worked by signalmen, whose duty was common to both stations. The deceased was one of these signalmen, and was engaged and paid by the Great Northern Company and wore their uniform; and, though he had not, at the time of his appointment, been made aware that he was a joint servant, yet his duty was to attend to the signaling of the Northeastern trains as well as to that of the Great Northern trains, and he had done so for four years. As between the two companies he was called one of the joint-station staff," all of whom were engaged and paid by the Great Northern Company, but their salaries were treated as a joint charge, and borne equally by the two companies. The deceased, while in the discharge of his duty as one of such signalmen, was negligently knocked down and killed by an engine belonging to the Northeastern Company and driven by one of its engine drivers.

At the trial before Quain, J., and a jury, at the sittings for Middlesex, in June, 1870, the counsel for the defendants, at the conclusion of the case and the evidence, contended that there was no evidence to go to the jury of liability on the part of the defendant; that if there was any negligence in the driver of the Northeastern Railway engine, such driver and the deceased man were engaged in a common employment; " that the deceased was employed by the Northeastern Railway Company, and that at all events his duties were to attend to the Northeastern trains and signals, and that the risk that resulted in his death was one of the risks incidental to his employment, and one of the consequences of the duty which he had undertaken.

The learned judge ruled against the defendant with respect to the "common employment," and the deceased having undertaken the risk of the Northeastern traffic as well as that of the Great Northern Railway, and a verdict was found and entered for the plaintiff for £600, which was apportioned between the widow and her children as follows: £200 to the widow and £100 to each of the children. Leave was at the same time reserved to the defendant to move to enter the verdict for itself on the above grounds, the court to have power to draw inferences of fact. The circumstances and facts of the case as they appeared in evidence at the trial are fully and sufficiently stated in the judgment of the court.

Crompton and Grainger (with whom was C. Russell, Q. C.), for defendant for the motion.

Waddy, Q. C., Willis, Q. C., and Wilberforce, for plaintiff, contra.

POLLOCK, B. This action was brought by the plaintiff, who was the widow of Thomas Swainson,'a signalman, in the employment of the defendants company, and was brought by her against the defendants to recover damages from them for the death of her husband, who was killed by the negligence of an engine driver in their service. The trial took place before my late brother Quain, at the Middlesex Trinity Sittings, in 1877, when the following facts were proved: Adjoining Wellington street, Leeds, are two railway stations the one belonging to the Great Northern Railway Company and the other to the Northeastern Railway Company. These stations abut upon each other, and are approached from the south by lines of rails, two of which belong to each of these companies, the entrance and exit for these stations being governed by signals and points, which are worked by signalmen, whose duty is common to both stations. The deceased man, Swainson, was one of these signalmen, and he had acted for four years in the same position. He was engaged and paid by the Great Northern Railway Company, and wore their uniform, and was not made aware at the time of his appointment that he was a joint servant; but, in fact, his duty was to attend to the Northeastern trains as well as to the Great Northern trains as to points and signals, whenever any engines or trucks had to be transferred from the rails of one company to those of the other. As between the two companies, Swainson, the deceased, was one of what was called the "joint-station staff," all of whom were engaged and paid by the Great Northern Railway Company. The cost of their salaries was treated as a joint charge, and was borne equally by the two companies, and when the deceased received his wages at the end of each week he signed a pay sheet, which was headed, "Great Northern Railway, Traffic Department, Pay Bill, Joint-Station Staff." On the 7th May, 1875, Swainson, in the discharge of his duty, was standing on the six-foot space between the Great Northern and the Northeastern departure lines. A Northeastern engine came toward the station on the Great Northern arrival rails with some Great Northern coal trucks, and Swainson signaled to the driver to go on to the Northeastern departure line. The driver obeyed and went on to that line until he passed some points, when he reversed his engine and backed out again, having a van before the engine which obscured his view of the line. Swainson was then looking in the other direction, watching a train which was coming from the south, and,

failing to observe the engine and van coming out, he was struck by the step of the van, knocked down and killed. Evidence was given on the part of the plaintiffs that the engine driver had not turned on his whistle when he backed out, and also that it was unsafe to back out with the van before the engine. At the close of the case my learned brother Quain left two questions to the jury-first, was there negligence on the part of the driver of the defendants' engine? and, secondly, was there contributory negligence on the part of the deceased man Swainson? The jury answered the first of these questions in the affirmative and the second in the negative, and a verdict was accordingly entered for the plaintiffs for £600, with leave to the defendants to move to enter it for themselves on the ground that the driver of the engine and Swainson, the deceased, were engaged in a common employment, and that the risk which resulted in Swainson's death was incidental to the employment, the contingencies of which he had undertaken. We see no ground for disturbing this verdict as being against the weight of evidence upon either question. The counsel for the defendants raised, however, the further point, namely, that the driver of the engine and Swainson, the deceased, were engaged in a common employment, and that the risk which resulted in Swainson's death was incidental to that employment, the consequences of which he had undertaken. The learned judge ruled against the defendants upon this point, but reserved leave to move the court, having power to draw inferences of fact. The case was fully and ably argued before us, and upon the facts and findings of the jury it is clear that an action would well lie against the driver of the engine, by whose negligent act the death of Swainson was occasioned. Whether the relation of Swainson to the defendants was such that this action can be maintained against them is a question the solution of which is more difficult, and requires a careful consideration both of the facts proved, and of the law properly applicable to them. It will be well, in the first place, to see what is the principle affecting this case which can be gathered from authority. Up to a certain point this is clear, that wherever the person injured, and he by whose negligent act the injury is occasioned, are engaged in a common employment in the service of the same master, no action will lie against the master, if he be innocent of any personal negligence. The negligence of a fellow-servant is taken to be one of the risks which a servant, as between himself and his master, undertakes when he enters into the service. This is thoroughly established by the cases of Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. & W.; 17 L. J. (N. S.) 42, Ex.; Hutchinson v. The York, Newcastle and Berwick Railway Company, 5 Ex. 343; 19 L. J. 296, Ex., and other cases. In Wiggett v. Fox, 11 Ex. 832; 25 L. J. 185, Ex., the rule was held to apply where Wiggett, the person injured, was the servant of Moss, a piece-worker, or subcontractor, and he by whose negligence the injury was occasioned was in the immediate employ of the defendants; but in that case it is to be observed that, although Wiggett was engaged by the piece-worker, it was a part of the arrangement between the latter and the defendant that the workmen should be paid their weekly wages by the defendant, so that, as was said by Martin, B., in the course of the argument, Moss was not a sub-contractor in the sense that an action would lie against him by a stranger. In Wilson v. Merry, in the House of Lords, 19 L. T. Rep. (N. S.)

30; L. R., 1 Scotch App. 326, it was held that the master was protected, although the fellow-servant, whose negligence caused the injury, was a manager. So in Morgan v. The Vale of Neath Railway Company, 18 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 564; 5 B. & S. 570 and 736; L. R., 1 Q. B. 149; and Lovell v. Howell, 34 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 183; 45 L. J. 387, C. P.; L. R., 1 C. P. D. 161, where the work in which the two servants were engaged was wholly dissimilar. In all these cases there was not only a common employment, that is, an employment with a common object, but also common service — that is, service under one master. Dicta are no doubt, however, to be found in some of the cases, which tend to suggest that the principle ought to be applied to cases in which the element of common service may be wanting. There is great difficulty in so holding, because, when it is said that the servant undertakes the risk of the negligent acts of his fellow-servant, the question arises, "Undertakes to whom?" and the proposition must, we think, be limited by confining the undertaking to the master of the servant, who is supposed to give it. It cannot, we think, reasonably be extended to strangers, or those who, though having some interest in a joint operation, are not in some sort the masters of the person injured. It is not, however, necessary in the view which we take of this case to pursue this further. Before dismissing the

cases, however, it is right to notice two, namely: Voss V. The Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, 2 H. & N. 728; 27 L. J. 249, Ex., and Warburton v. The Great Western Railway Company, 15 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 361; 36 L. J. 9, Ex.; L. R., 2 Ex. 30, which were cited by Mr. Waddy in favor of the plaintiffs as governing the present case. In the former of these cases a man named Voss, a blacksmith, in the employment of the East Lancashire Railway Company, was working at one of their engines, which was on their siding at the Liverpool Station, when an engine belonging to the defendants, and driven by one of their drivers, pushed some wagons into the siding, and so Voss was killed. The station where the deceased man was working at the time of the accident was in the joint occupation of the defendants and the East Lancashire Company; but the deceased was the servant of the latter company, and not of the defendants, and upon this ground the court held the defendants were liable. In Warburton v. The Great Western Railway Company, ubi sup., the facts as stated in the judgment of the court were as follows: The plaintiff was a servant in the employ of the London and Northwestern Railway Company, and was at work in the Victoria Station at Manchester, when an engine driver in the employ of the defendants, the Great Western Railway Company, having entered the station, shunted a train belonging to the defendants from one part of the station to another, and in so doing was guilty of the negligence complained of. The station was the property of the London and Northwestern Railway Company, and was used in common by the plaintiff's employers and the defendants, and other companies. By an arrangement between these companies the defendants' engine driver ought to have awaited a signal from an officer of the London and Northwestern Railway Company before he shunted the train into the siding; but without doing so, and without any signal at all, he shunted the train, and negligently caused the injury in question to the plaintiff. Upon these facts the court say, "We are of opinion that inasmuch as the injury sustained by the plaintiff was occasioned

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