offered for the detection of those caught violating it, has, during the past few days, been found a very efficient means of checking the disposition manifested on the part of those engaged in interfering with railroad traffic to tamper with railroad property.

The case of State v. Hoskins, which we give in our present issue, settles in a satisfactory manner a question of considerable importance in relation to the collection of the Federal revenue. In the State of North Carolina there have, during two or three years past, been quite a large number of persons engaged in illicit distilling. In order to prevent interference by the revenue officers, prosecutions were instituted in the State courts, under the State laws, for acts done by these officers in the discharge of their duty, and it was claimed that a provision of the United States law of 1866 (U. S. R. S., § 643), authorizing the removal of such prosecutions to the Federal courts, was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of North Carolina sustains the validity of the law in the case mentioned.

The pardon of Frank H. Walworth is the final event in a criminal proceeding which a few years ago occupied a large share of the public attention, and which, from the nature of the act which led to it, and the social standing of the parties involved, entitles it to be classed among the causes celebrè of the present century. The reasons given by the governor for the exercise of executive clemency are very convincing and would seem to be sufficient to answer any objections which may be raised to the course he has taken. The public have never fully understood all the facts of the case, and we think the jury who convicted Walworth did not see them in their true light. But the jury did so far understand them correctly as to decide that the homicide committed by the accused was neither premeditated nor deliberate. It has been established, to the satisfaction of the governor, that the accused, when a mere boy of nine or ten years of age, was afflicted with epilepsy in its worst form, and subject to what are known as blind paroxysms of that disease. The father was guilty of brutal conduct toward the mother, which intensely roused the feelings of the boy, who was devotedly attached to her. The boy sometimes shared in the effects of the hatred shown by his father to his mother, and the governor says that the circumstances of the last visit made by the son to the father, during which the homicide took place, "the morbid mental condition of the prisoner resulting from his malady and his great terror of his father's violence, force me to the conclusion that the murder for which he stands convicted was caused either by the insanity attendant upon one of his epileptic paroxysms," or from a belief that it was necessary to preserve his own life. The

report of the commission appointed to examine into the condition of Walworth was, that his confinement would eventually result in idiocy, and necessitate his detention in the asylum for insane convicts. The governor says: "Reviewing the whole case in the light of the facts brought to my knowledge, outside of as well as in the evidence, I cannot believe it comports with even-handed justice to longer detain a prisoner, feeble of mind and body, about whose mental, moral and even legal responsibility, for the crime of which he stands convicted, there yet remain so very serious doubts."

It is stated by the Law Times that there is shortly to be laid before parliament papers having reference to an indexing the entire statute law of the realm, a statement which, on its face, would not seem to convey an idea that any thing very remarkable was intended, but which, in fact, is meant as an announcement that measures are to

be taken to reduce the statute law to the form of a code. When this is done, and the Law Times thinks it will be well under way during the next session of parliament, we trust that our own legislature will follow the example, and treat our statute law in a like manner.

NOTES OF CASES.

N Calkins v. Chandler, 4 Cent. L. J. 490, recently decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan, the action was upon a contract of this kind. Plaintiffs having a chattel mortgage upon a saw-mill owned by a firm, it was verbally agreed between them and defendant, for whom the firm was engaged in sawing lumber, that in consideration of plaintiffs' extending the time of the payment of the mortgage, "during the next sawing season," the firm should allow the defendant to retain the sum of fifty cents for each thousand feet of lumber to be sawed for him, and that he should pay the said sum to plaintiffs to apply on the mortgage. The principal objections made to the recovery were, that the agreement was void for a want of consideration, there being no promise to extend payment for a definite time, and that it was void under the statute of frauds, being a promise to answer for the debt of another, and not in writing. The court overruled both objections. As to the first objection, the decision is in accordance with numerous cases. See Rolle's Abr. 27, pl. 6, where it is said that forbearance to sue in pursuance of a promise, though no certain time was appointed for forbearance, was a sufficient consideration. Payn v. Wilson, 7 B. & C. 423; Sidwell v. Evans, 1 Penn. St. 383; King v. Upton, 4 Me. 387; Elting v. Vanderlyn, 4 Johns. 237. See, also, Allen v. Pryor, 3 A. K. Marsh, 305; Hakes v. Hotchkiss, 23 Vt. 231. In regard to the second objection, the court say that in many cases as the test

ALTERATIONS OF WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS. WHEN PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE, AND THEIR EFFECT.

AS

(Concluded.)

S to deeds-The English authorities have laid down the rule, that the writing in a deed must be completed before the same is delivered, what is added afterward being of no avail; Sheph. Touch. 541; and this is true even if it be made by the consent of all. 2 Roll. Abr. 29, a. Lord Mansfield, however, in the case of Terira v. Evans, 1 Ans. 228, held that blanks, in a bond under seal, could be filled up after execution by parol authority. This decision was questioned by many, and was finally overruled, on the ground, that to allow a deed to be filled up by an agent appointed by parol, and then delivered in the absence of the principal as a deed, would be a violation of the principle, that an attorney, to execute and deliver to another a deed, must himself be appointed by deed. 6 M. & W. 215.

If, however, a deed be materially altered by consent after its final execution, and the grantor assents that the grantee shall retain it in its altered state as an instrument of title, this assent amounts to a delivery, or a redelivery. 5 Bing. 368. Alterations, by consent, are valid. First, when the other party to the deed is not affected. 4 B. & Ald. 672. Secondly, where the other party is benefited. 2 Lev. 30; 1 Vent. 180. Thirdly, where something cannot be ascertained. 4 B. & Ad.

The New York courts have adopted the doctrine of Texira v. Evans. A deed, if altered by consent, takes effect from the time of alteration as a re-execution. 18 Johns. 499. This consent may be given before execution, and may be proved orally. 8 Cow. 118. Among the cases where such alterations were made by parol may be mentioned: Appeal bonds, 6 Cow. 59; powers of attorney, 22 Wend. 348; and custom-house bonds, id. 366. The express parol authority, direction, and consent of the grantor, or obligor, is necessary to fill up blanks in sealed instruments. 24 N. Y. 330. But no parol authority can be given to sign and seal. 1 Wend. 481.

The stamp

As to notes In England it has always been held that notes may be altered by consent. The indorsement of a blank note is said to be a letter of credit for any indefinite sum. Dougl. 516. acts have made it necessary to add a new stamp wherever an alteration is made after execution, unless it was to correct a mistake, 8 Esp. 346; or render the instrument what it was originally intended to have been. Id.

The New York courts hold that notes in blank give a general authority to an unlimited extent, 2 Sandf., chap. 77; and such blanks may be filled up

with a sum exceeding that fixed by the acceptor, the maker or acceptor being estopped from setting up that fact. 21 N. Y. 531.

The conclusions to be drawn from the cases are; that the filling up of blanks in negotiable instruments is valid; and that the same is true of deeds where the grantor assents and ratifies the agent's act; or where the latter has a power under seal. At this point the English and New York authorities differ; the latter contend that the former are incorrect in holding that an instrument, executed by one in the absence of the principal by parol authority, and without a power under seal, is no deed; that the English courts make no distinction between the original execution of a deed and the filling up of some blanks which are merely necessary to its completion, and that an authority to fill up a deed cannot be regarded as an authority to execute it. 24 N. Y. 330.

(B.) Alterations by strangers may now be considered:

First. Without consent.

The act of a stranger, without the participation of the parties interested, is a mere spoliation, or mutilation of the instrument, not changing its legal operation so long as the original writing remains legible; and if it be a deed, any trace remains of the seal. Greenleaf's Evid., § 568. This is the general rule.

(a.) When presumed to have been made.

It is unnecessary to consider this at length. It will be sufficient to remark that the presumptions are similar to those arising by the act of parties without consent.

(b.) Their effect:

As to deeds — At one time, in England, an alteration by a stranger, if material, was held fatal to an instrument, even if the original words could be restored. 11 Rep. 27. The rule was afterward relaxed, such an alteration being treated as accidental. 6 East, 369. The old doctrine was subsequently

reaffirmed as to all cases where the altered deed was the foundation of a right; but the instrument was allowed to be offered in evidence as the proof of some title or interest. 11 M. & W. 778.

In New York, the doctrine of Pigot's case was questioned in Jackson v. Malin, 10 Johns. 297, and finally departed from in 6 Cow. 746. It was there held that no alteration by a stranger under a mistake could avoid the instrument, nor in any case where the original words could be ascertained. 2 Barb. Ch. 129.

These are referred to for the purpose of carrying out the classification. The rules of law applicable to alterations of parties by consent govern here.

The substance of the cases is, that in England the alterations of a stranger without consent do not affect an instrument except where it is the foundation of a right, as it may be given in proof of title. In New York such an alteration is looked upon as a mere spoliation, in the absence of fraud, which will, in some cases, compel the parties to resort to secondary evidence. It may be remarked that the doctrine of Pigot's case was severely criticised, and strongly condemned by Judge Story, as repugnant to justice and common sense. 2 Mason, 478.

2. Immaterial alterations:

Alterations are said to be immaterial where neither the rights nor interests, duties nor obligations are affected or changed.

(A.) By parties.

First. Without consent.

As a general proposition, if the alteration consists of words which the law would imply, even though it be without authority, it will not affect the operation of the instrument. Greenleaf's Evid., § 567.

(a.) When presumed to have been made:

The English and New York authorities agree that such alterations may be presumed to have been made before execution. 5 E. L. & E. 349; 1 Wend. 628. Though some of the New York cases hold that there is no presumption but the whole matter should be left to the jury. 2 E. D. Smith, 1. This rule is applicable to both deeds and notes.

(b.) Their effect:

As to deeds-In England any alteration, even though it were immaterial, avoided the instrument. Sheph. Touch. 689. This doctrine has been exploded by a recent case, and held not to be law. 3 Q. B. 573. It was there said that no authority could be cited or found where the doctrine has been acted upon and an instrument held void by an immaterial alteration. See, also, 11 M. & W. 465; 17 C. B. 179.

In New York, an immaterial alteration by a party will avoid the instrument as to him, 8 Cow. 71; unless the law would supply the words; and then the assent of the party is presumed, 13 Wend. 387; or the alterations do not affect the legal construction and effect of the instrument. 15 Johns. 273. As to notes-The English decisions are to the effect that an alteration to avoid a note must be material.

If the alteration only expresses the effect of the note as it originally stood, it does not affect the validity of the instrument. See 3 Q. B. 173, where the rule in Pigot's case is dissented from.

In New York an immaterial alteration in negotiable paper is not fatal. Such would be: the addition of a name to a several promissory note, 29 N.

The substance of the cases cited in regard to immaterial alterations is, that in England according to the recent decisions, the immaterial alteration of a party, with or without consent, will not avoid the note or deed; whereas, in New York, such an alteration if made by a party will avoid it as to him. (B.) By strangers:

It may be stated, as a general proposition, that immaterial alterations by, or without the consent of the parties, by a stranger, do not vitiate the deed or note. 11 Coke, 277; 1 Wend. 625.

II. NON-APPARENT ALTERATIONS.

In some cases a distinction has been taken between those alterations which appear on the face of an instrument and those which are extrinsic, as to the burden of proof. It has been held, that where an instrument carries with it no appearance of alteration, the defendant who, in his pleading, alleges a fatal alteration, must show it to have been such. 1 How. (U. S.) 104. When the instrument is shown to have been altered, the rules of law applicable to apparent alterations apply.

III. The foregoing statement of the subject is imperfect; but it must not be forgotten that a perplexing question of law has been treated in a necessarily brief manner.

It has been shown how, in some respects, the English and New York decisions differ. This chiefly arises from the different conditions of the people in the two countries as regards the transfer of property. In England all deeds are drawn by a skilled body of men known as conveyancers; while in America necessity frequently compels parties to make conveyances without legal assistance. The result is that erasures and interlineations occur. If the rule in Pigot's case were applied, it is clear that titles would be disturbed to an incalculable degree.

This difference of opinion is only confined to a few rules of law, as the legal principles that guide both courts are derived from the same source. Thus, it is evident that the genius of the common law can accommodate itself, not only to the superior refinements of older, but to the varied necessities of younger communities. FRANCIS J. SULLIVAN. SAN FRANCISCO, 1877.

LEGAL NOTES FROM ABROAD.

LONDON, July 19, 1877.

Sir James Stephens' recent work on criminal law seems likely to bear fruit-at least, that may fairly be credited with having given an impetus to the discussion of the subject which has resulted, it is said, in determining the government to undertake the task of reformation. According to the report which reaches me, the Lord Chancellor will submit a bill to Parliament next year for the codification of the criminal law. It will not be easy to exaggerate the importance, from a judicial point of view, of this measure, which, I am told, is in actual course of preparation.

Apropos of the codification, the following “definition" from the Darlington Improvement Act (1872) is the result of the combined efforts of a parliamentary committee, parliamentary counsel, and parliamentary agent. "The term 'new building' means any building pulled or burned down to or within ten feet from the surface of the adjoining ground." The following amendment was proposed in Parliament on the 22d of May, 1865, by an eminent Queen's counsel: Dogs trespassing on inclosed land. Every dog found trespassing on inclosed land unaccompanied by the registered owner of such dog, or other person, who shall, on being asked, give his true name and address, may be then or there destroyed by such occupier or by his order."

At Bow street, on the 12th July, Nathaniel Druscovitch, William Palmer and John Micklejohn, wellknown officers of the Detective Police of Scotlandyard, and Mr. E. Froggatt, solicitor, were placed at the bar before Sir James Ingham, charged by warrant with having conspired to defeat the ends of justice in the recent trial of five prisoners for defrauding the Comtesse de Goncourt of upward of £10,000. Mr. Poland, instructed by Mr. Pollard, of the Treasury, said it was his painful duty to charge the four defendants with an offense which might be shortly stated as one of conspiring to divert the due course of justice, and also with being accessories after the fact to certain felonies committed by Henry Benson, William Kerr, Charles Bale and Frederick Kerr. Toward the end of September, 1876, frauds of a most ingenious kind were practiced upon Madame de Goncourt, a French lady, by means of forged indorsements and drafts, and during the investigation of the case the solicitor for the prosecutrix had reason to suspect that some in authority at Scotland yard had been interfering with the course of justice. The prisoners were tried in April last and sentenced to various terms of penal servitude, and from what transpired the Home Secretary, Mr. Cross, was determined that the imputation made against the police officers should be fully investigated. For obvious reasons these inquiries were conducted in secrecy, the result being at last stated in the information laid before Sir James Ingham, and upon which he had been asked to grant warrants for the apprehension of the four persons at the bar. This serious course would not have been taken by the chief magistrate if the facts disclosed did not appear to justify it, but Mr. Poland did not propose at the present stage to go into the circumstances of the case, all of which would be fully opened at the next examination, and letters, telegrams, and other documents produced in confirmation of the charge. The prisoner Micklejohn, in addition to his office as inspector of the detective department of Scotland yard, held the appointment

of superintendent of police on the Midland Railway Company. Druscovitch and Palmer were also chief inspectors of the same department at Scotland yard; and Mr. Froggatt, a solicitor of the High Court, was charged with being in league with the other defeudants in these transactions. Mr. Poland was afraid a charge of attempting to defeat the ends of justice would be fully made out against the defendants. Mr. Froggatt was held in the sum of £500, but the magistrate declined to entertain the application for bail in behalf of the other prisoners. One of the defendants - Palmer - unavailingly appealed to Mr. Poland to interpose in his case, as he had been over 30 years in the police, and as by absconding, which he did not dream of doing, he would forfeit a pension of £160 per annum.

In many respects this case bids fair to be a remarkable one, and I will, probably, have occasion to notice it again. The three accused detectives are the most prominent and widely-known officers of the force. Hardly an important case requiring tact and discretion, and entire trustworthiness, has come to Scotland yard for years, which has not passed through the hands of one or more of them. Their reputations, in fact, are almost world-wide. In extradition cases especially, I know that Micklejohn and Druscovitch were always conspicuous. Judge, then, how this community or that portion of it which has had occasion to require or to take note of the services of these men-must have been startled to hear the grave accusations preferred against them by the government itself!

But what I particularly desire to direct attention to at this time, is the manner in which the Home Office received the insinuations of the unofficial persons who found reason to believe that some one in authority at Scotland yard had been interfering with the course of justice. Mr. Cross, the Home Secretary, we are told, was determined that the imputation made against the police officers should be fully investigated." Moreover, the "inquiries were conducted in secret "-not even the accused officers were allowed to find out what was going on-and the result was that "letters, telegrams and other documents" were secured "in confirmation of the charge;" the Treasury was asked to prosecute the officers; warrants were obtained, and the accused were arrested at their several posts of duty - victims of misplaced confidence in a treacherous system of administration for which they were wholly unprepared. Such are the inferences to be drawn from the published accounts. But I hear, from a good source, that when the Home Secretary placed the matter in the hands of the law officers, such extreme care was considered necessary in pursuing the investigations that even the confidential clerks in the offices of the solicitor and attorney-general were not permitted to know what was going on. Communications from Mr. Poland, or from Chief Williamson of Scotland yard, on the subject, were brought to Sir Hardinge Gifford in a sealed dispatch-box, and telegrams to his address were delivered to no one but himself.

How strange all this would sound in-well, New York, say! And what an absurd and discreditable way it was for a government to go to work to disgrace its own employees. How much more natural and proper it would have been for the Police Commis-I beg pardon! I mean the Home Secretary - to have "denounced" the solicitor who made the orginal “in