eldest son J.) were the receipt by J. of half-a-year's rent in 1804, and the felling of timber by him in 1805. In 1813, the lessor of the plaintiff having demanded the rent, the tenant stated that the relation of landlord and tenant had long ceased between J. and himself, and that he now paid rent to the younger brother: Held, that the above acts of ownership barred the statute of limitations, and that the tenant's disclaimer made a notice to quit unnecessary, and would support a demise laid the month preceding the tenant's refusal.-Doe dem. Grubb v. Grubb, 10 B. & C. 816.

ERROR.

1. The 11 G. 4, and 1 W. 4, c. 70, s. 8, creating a new court of appeal, applies only to cases commenced originally in the court to which the writ of error is directed, not, for instance, to a judgment of the K. B. affirming a judgment of the C. P.-Ricketts v. Lewis, 2 Tyr. 15.

2. The defendant was convicted before the commissioners of oyer and terminer of London of a libel. Upon the return of a writ of error to the K. B. the defendant assigned as errors in fact, in addition to errors in law, the following:-1. That when the jury gave their verdict, only one of the justices named in the commission was in court;—2. That the verdict was not, at the time it was so given, entered of record. The Attorney General answered the assignment by alleging that there was not any error: Held, that the first allegation, being in contradiction to the record, could not be received, and that, it being impossible that a verdict should be recorded at the time it is given, the second was equally groundless. The Court also intimated that in strictness it was not allowable to assign errors both in fact and in law.―The King v. Carlile, 2 B. & Adol. 362.

ESTOPPEL.

1. The father of A. had been let into the possession of the lands in question under a contract of sale made in 1808, but never had the lands conveyed to him. He devised them to A. his son, in 1820, and A. mortgaged them by lease and release to B. The release recited that A. was legally or equitably entitled, and the releasor covenanted that he was lawfully or equitably seised as of fee. In 1824, deeds of conveyance, passing the legal fee, were executed to A. in pursuance of the contract of 1808, and he afterwards mortgaged the lands again to B. by conveying the legal fee: Held, 1. that B. was not estopped by the above-mentioned recital or covenant from setting up the legal estate against B. (2 Sim. & Stu. 519; 1 T. R. 755; 2 B. & A. 242.) 2. That the ordinary words in a release-granted, bargained, sold, released, &c.—do not amount to an estoppel. (Litt. s. 446.) 3. That the case was not within the rule that a mortgagor cannot dispute the title of his mortgagee, as the second mortgagee had no notice, and took a different estate.-Right dem. Jeffreys v. Bucknell, 2 B. & Adol. 278. 2. (Recital of Bond.) Debt on bonds given by a company. The bonds recited that the money was raised for the purposes contemplated in the act of incorporation: Held, that it was not sufficient for the company to plead that the money, as the plaintiff knew, was not raised for those purposes. They must go further, and show fraud.-Hill v. Manchester and Salford Waterworks Company, 2 B. & Adol. 544.

And see JOINT-STOCK COMPANY.

EVIDENCE.

1. (Subscribing Witness.) In an action for a deposit on a purchase, the defendant having produced the agreement: Held that the subscribing witness need not be called.-Bradshaw v. Burnett, 2 M. & M. 143.

2. (Declarations of Wife.) In an action against the husband as administrator of his wife, the declarations of the wife are admissible.—Humphreys v. ·Boyce, 2 M. & M. 140.

3. (Declarations of Indorser). The declarations of an indorser of a bill were held admissible where the plaintiff was merely the agent of such indorser.— Welstead v. Levy, 2 M. & M. 138.

4. (Of Opinion.) A physician who has heard the evidence may be called to give his opinion as to whether the facts and appearances showed symptoms of insanity.-(Rex v. Wright, R. & R. ; C. C. R. 456.)—Rex v. Serle,

2 M. & M. 75.

5. (Of Handwriting). In an action on a bill of exchange with a count for goods sold, the plaintiff, in support of the last count, put in a letter from the defendant, the handwriting of which was disputed: Held, that the jury might judge of its authenticity by comparing it with the signature to the bill which was admitted.-Solita v. Yurrow, 2 M. & M. 133.

6. (Written agreement). It appearing that the defendant held under a written agreement, parol evidence was adjudged not admissible to prove under whom he held. (7 B. & C. 611; 5 Bing. 136.)—Doe v. Harvey, 8 Bing. 239.

7. (Of contents of a deed.) The plaintiff's counsel was held entitled to ask a witness the description and contents of a deed without calling for it, though the defendant's counsel offered to produce it, and also to have a letter, said to be a demand of the deed, read, though the defendant offered to admit the demand.-(1 M. & M. 273.)—Whitehead v. Scott, 2 M. & M. 2. 8. A witness having proved that one of the defendants had informed him of their being partners (the point in dispute): Held, that a statement of the fact made by the witness when neither of the defendants was present, might be proved by him, on the ground that it might otherwise be objected that what was said was confined to the witness, and that the plaintiff could not have acted on it.-Shott v. Streatfield, 2 M. & M. 8.

9. (To impeach character.) Evidence is not admissible to impeach the credit of a witness by proving that he made a declaration, of which he says he has no recollection, but does not expressly deny it.-Pain v. Beeston, 2 M. & M. 20,

10. (Letter-book.) A letter-book, containing a copy of a letter written by the plaintiff's agent, was left to be inspected at the office of the plaintiff's solicitor, to save the expense of procuring the original. It was there inspected on the behalf of one H., who had filed a bill in equity against the present plaintiff on another policy on the same ship in respect of which the present action was brought. On that occasion a copy was taken, which it was proposed to read in the present action: Held, that it was admissible

without putting in the plaintiff's answer to H.'s bill in equity, in which answer the letter was referred to.-Long v. Champion, 2 B. & Adol. 284. 11. (Steward's book.) A book taken from among the muniments of the manor was offered in evidence. It contained entries of all fines whether paid or not, and it was proved that at the end of every year the steward made up a second book, in which he entered the fines he had received: Held, inadmissible to show what fines were payable. (4 T. R. 514.)—Dean of Ely v. Caldecott, 5 M. & P. 272.

And see BILL OF LADING.

EXECUTION.

The statute, 1 Wm. 4, c. 7, s. 2, applies only where the judge, on the facts appearing at the trial, thinks that execution should issue immediately. Affidavits are not admissible.-Gervas v. Barschley, 2 M. & M. 150. EXECUTOR.

(De son tort.) An executor de son tort may, after action brought by a simple contract creditor, pay a creditor of higher degree, as a bond creditor, and plead the payment in bar. It seems doubtful whether he might pay a debt of equal degree without suit. (5 Rep. 51.)-Oxenham v. Clapp, 2 B. & Adol. 309.

And see ADMINISTRATOR.

FACTOR.

1. A wharfinger, who was also a flour-factor, sold some flour sent to his wharf with directions to keep it till further orders: Held, that he was not an agent within 6 Geo. 4, c. 94, s. 4, so as to make the sale valid.-Monk v. Whittenbury, 2 M. & M. 81.

2. A party receiving India warrants, &c. from a factor in pledge, will be held to have notice of their not being the factor's property, if the circumstances be such as would lead a reasonable man to that conclusion, (6 Géo. 4, c. 94, s. 2.)-Evans v. Trueman, 2 M. & M. 10.

GAME.

1. (Demand of certificate.) The demand of a certificate within 52 G. 3, c. 93, need not be made on the land, but must be made so immediately after the party has left it as to form one transaction. The party making the demand need not show his own certificate, but the party refusing is liable if the other party is really entitled to make the demand.—Scarth v. Gardener, 5 C. & P.38.

2. A bludgeon or stick may be an offensive weapon within 9 G. 4, c. 69, s. 9, but it is a question for the jury whether the party accused took it out with the intention of using it as such.-Rex v. Palmer, 2 M. & M. 70. GUARANTEE.

1. The defendant guaranteed the payment of any porter the plaintiffs might send to A. B. until notice to the contrary. According to the invoices, the course of the business was to give six months credit, or cash 24 discount; the plaintiffs gave A. B. eleven months credit, i. e. by allowing nine months to elapse and then taking a note at two. Held, that the guarantee was thereby discharged.

A question was raised as to the liability of the defendant for the casks,

but the declaration was not drawn so as to include the demand. It was argued by Mr. Serjeant Taddy, that " one who guarantees the expense of liquors necessarily guarantees the vessels in which they are contained, as an inseparable accessary; just as one who contracts to admit another to the opera, contracts by implication to admit with him the clothes he wears on his back.”—Combe v. Woolf, 8 Bing. 156.

HAWKER.

A hawker's license does not privilege the bearer to trade in corporate towns where the charter limits the right.-Simpson v. Moss, 2 B. & Adol. 543. HIGHWAY.

(Where parish liable to repair.) The commissioners for the inclosure of

Enfield Chase ordered roads to be repaired by the parish. The parish, though not bound by the order, repaired the roads for more than twenty years: Held, that if they acted under a mistaken notion of liability, they were not bound to continue such repairs. (6 T. R. 20; 4 B. & A. 447; 1 B. & Adol. 32.)—Rex v. Inhabitants of Edmonton, 2 M. & M. 24. HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. A joint and several promissory note was given to a married woman, as administratrix, by her husband and two other persons. The consideration was money lent to him by her: Held, that after his death she might sue the other parties to the note at any time within six years from the death of her husband, and recover interest from the date of the note. (1 B. & A. 218.)-Richards v. Richards, 2 B. & Adol. 447.

2. (Separate maintenance.) Adultery on the part of the wife, subsequently to separation, is no defence to an action on a deed whereby the husband covenants to make her a separate allowance. (2 B. & C. 547.)

3. The declaration alleged that by a deed purporting to be made, &c. it was witnessed, &c.: Held sufficient, after plea. Baynon v. Batley, 8 Bing. 256.

And see ADMINISTRATOR.

INDICTMENT.

(Joinder of counts.) Counts for robbery and for assault with intent to rob having been joined in the same indictment, the judge (Park J.) compelled the prosecutor to make his election. (Galloway's case, R. & M. C. C. R. 234.)-Rex v. Gingle, 2 M. & M. 71.

INCLOSURE ACT.

Commissioners were empowered generally to allot the lands to be inclosed in such shares as they should judge to be a just compensation to persons entitled, and also to allot lands in the parish of K. in lieu of or in exchange for any other lands, tenements, &c. in K. provided that all such exchanges should be ascertained, specified, and declared in their award, and made with the consent of the owner of the lands, &c. so exchanged. The commissioners allotted two several allotments to A. "in lieu of and as a compensation for copyhold open field lands, rights of sheep-walk and common, and an old inclosure given up by A. to be allotted by the said

commissioners in exchange:" Held, that these allotments were invalid, on the ground that the award did not show what was done with the old incloand that the commissioners had no power to give A. an allotment in lieu of it.-Wingfield v. Tharp, 10 B. & C. 785.

sure,

INSOLVENT.

1. A party who has given in his schedule on oath, under the Insolvent Act, cannot afterwards maintain an action for a debt not mentioned in it. A doubt was raised whether copies of the proceedings in the Insolvent Court are admissible in evidence under 7 G. 4, c. 57, s. 76, except for the insolvent and the creditors.-Nicholls v. Downs, 2 M. & M. 13.

2. The assignee of an insolvent cannot maintain an action in which he had declared before the assignment.-Lawrence v. Miller, 2 M. & M. 97. 3. (Where indictable for perjury.) An insolvent is not indictable for perjury for omissions in his schedule under 7 G. 4, c. 57, s. 71, being merely punishable under the 70th section.-Rex v. Mudie, 2 M. & M. 128.

4. An application to bring up an insolvent under the compulsory clause in the Lords' Act, (32 G. 2, c. 28,) made on the 7th day of term, was refused as too late.-Acraman v. Harrison, 8 Bing. 154.

INSURANCE.

1. The announcement in the foreign lists, filed at Lloyd's, of a ship having sailed from a foreign port, does not dispense with the assured's disclosing a letter from the captain announcing the probable time of departure. (1 B. & A. 672.)-Elton v. Larkins, 8 Bing. 198.

2. (Total loss.) A ship being wrecked, was sold by the owner, but was afterwards got off and repaired by the purchaser: Held, that if the sale was apparently at the time the best thing that could be done for all parties, the 'owner was entitled to recover as for a total loss.

3. The fact of a ship being unfit to proceed with the cargo originally contracted for, will not alone justify an abandonment.—Doyle v. Dallas, 2 M. & M. 48.

4. (Partial loss.) The vessel having been damaged in her outward voyage could not take in the cargo prepared for her, but earned full freight by conveying other goods: Held, that there could be no partial loss under the circumstances. (4 B. & C. 102.)—Brocklebank v. Sugrue, 2 M. & M. 102. 5. (Pilot.) The vessel arrived off Sierra Leone about three in the afternoon; the captain hoisted signals for a pilot, and none having come off by ten, he attempted to enter the harbour without one, and the vessel was lost:" Held that the captain being a person of competent skill, the underwriters were liable for the loss sustained; such an exercise of discretion comes within the principle applied to other losses incurred by the error of the master or captain. (2 B. & A. 73; 5 B. & A. 171.)—Phillips v. Headlam, 2 B. & Adol. 380.

JOINT STOCK COMPANY.

By the act incorporating a public company it was provided that no calls should be made but at the distance of two calendar months at the least