as for the common welfare and tranquillity of mankind. He further took occasion to observe, with respect to the conduct of our government, in maintaining, our neutrality, that although there were some matters with which this government was not perfectly satisfied, (and to which, for the same reason, they refrained from giving that opposition they thought they would be justified in doing,) yet from the general tenor of the conduct of our government, they were convinced it was their desire to maintain a full neutrality, which was an additional motive for their present conduct."

It is to be remarked, that on the 8th of January the revocation of the hostile order of the 6th of November took place, and on the next day after an apology for the acknowledged indelicacy of interfering in the internal affairs of a foreign government, Lord Grenville modestly

tion of affairs, Congress took the subject into consideration. Great Britain was, at that time at least, considered as the aggressing nation. The first measure of self-protection proposed, was a restriction of the commerce of Great Britain with the United States: this measure was objected to, as being too strong as a commercial measure, and too weak as a political one. As far, however, as a vote was taken upon it, a majority of the House appeared in favor of that proceeding. On the 6th of November, 1793, an additional order was issued, the purport of which was, to take and bring to legal adjudication all neutral vessels bound to French ports. This additional evidence of hostility gave rise to three other measures; the one was an embargo for a limited time, which was effected; the second was the suspension of commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain; the third, a seques-undertakes to intermeddle with the affairs of tration, or rather the arrestation of debts due to British subjects. The proposition for the arrestation of debts, was moved the 27th of March: the proposition for the suspension of intercourse, 7th of April, 1794. On the 4th of April, 1794, the President laid before the House | a communication from Mr. Pinckney, minister from the United States to Great Britain, containing a conversation between Mr. Pinckney and Lord Grenville, of a very extraordinary nature, which always appeared to me to be the groundwork of the change, which shortly afterwards took place in the conduct of the executive of the United States towards the House of Representatives.

The part of the communication alluded to, is in the following words.-Extract of a letter from Mr. Pinckney to the Secretary of State, dated 9th of January, 1794.

the United States. It has always been matter of surprise to me, that the American minister should have listened to such a communication, and still more surprising, that it should have met with a favorable reception in the United States. But the fact is, that on the 19th of April, 1794, the chief justice was taken from the exercise of his judicial duties, and nominated envoy extraordinary to Great Britain, during the pendency of two of the before-mentioned propositions in the House of Representatives. The House of Representatives proceeded to pass the bill for the suspension of commercial intercourse on the 25th of April, by an uncommonly large majority, and on the 27th of April the bill was negatived by the Senate upon the casting vote of the Vice President. The effect of this vote was a discontinuance of the embargo, and an aban"Lord Grenville answered, that the only donment of all the other measures proposed for reason for renewing them was, lest the present self-protection. In these acts will be seen, the instruction, being a revocation of that of the commencement of what gentlemen call the hos6th of November, might also be deemed to re-tility of departments; but what I shall term voke the articles which were connected with it. His lordship then explained the motives which had induced this government to issue the present instruction. The first, he said, was the sincere desire of administration to maintain the best understanding and harmony with the United States. The second was, what he could not mention to me officially, but what he still thought it right I should be apprised of, that no misconception of their motives might be entertained; that he was aware of the delicacy of speaking to a foreign minister concerning the internal state of his country, neither could he expect an answer from me on the subject; but that their second reason was, by this conduct, to take away every pretext, from evildisposed persons among us, who, according to the intelligence he had received, were endeavor-! ing to irritate our people against Great Britain, as well as to oppose the measures of our own government, and, in short, to reduce us to the present situation of France; a misfortune, which they deprecated, as well for our sakes,

the due exercise of the checks, provided by the
constitution. And if it is to be traced to this
source, the House of Representatives will evi-
dently appear not to be the aggressor. The
House, viewing their measures defeated by
the constitutional check, acquiesced in the de-
cision without a murmur. Now we are told,
if the House should exercise its constitutional
check, a dissolution of the government would
necessarily ensue. This conclusion seems to
me without foundation, and ought not to be
brought into calculation, in estimating the
present question. The treaty itself was con-
cluded on the 28th of October, 1794.
It was
communicated to this House, the 1st of March,
1796, having on the same day been promulgated
by proclamation declaring it to be obligatory.

The treaty originated from an intimation of Lord Grenville, which has always excited my apprehension; it was commenced against the known sense of the House of Representatives, and every step of its progression seems to have been marked with peculiar coercion.

When a British minister undertakes to de- 'contains abridgments of the national rights, but clare, that the motive for the revocation of a changes the municipal regulations of the United hostile order was, to take away every pretext States: and how have these things been effectfrom evil-disposed persons among us, who, ac-ed?-By the substitution of a foreign power in cording to the intelligence he had received, the place of the House of Representatives. If were endeavoring to irritate our own people the treaty-making power be thus extensive, against Great Britain, as well as to oppose the and if it be so absolutely obligatory, as to demeasures of our own government, &c., and to prive the House of Representatives of the right assign the same reason for refraining from giv- of judging as to the expediency of making the ing that opposition to some exceptionable meas-provisions for its complete effectuation, of what ures of our government, which he otherwise use is the House of Representatives as a distinct might have done; and when the United States branch of the government? Will it not be a so far listen to this language, as immediately mere formal, and not an efficient branch of the to enter into negotiation upon the subject, my government? An entire new system of jurisapprehensions of British interference, of British prudence may thus be introduced by treaty, influence, are strongly excited, particularly and become obligatory upon the House of Repwhen the British minister seems to make a resentatives obligatory upon the nation. common cause between the two governments against what he is pleased to call evil-disposed persons. I will here incidentally remark, that as far as these "evil-disposed persons" have produced the revocation of the hostile order of November, and a relaxation of British hostility in other respects, they are certainly entitled to applause from the United States, whatever epithets may have been bestowed upon them by a British minister.

The contents of the treaty have very much confirmed my original apprehensions. Gentlemen have often said, show us the danger of British interference, of British influence. To my mind, the treaty itself contains the evidence. The treaty itself corresponds with what I consider as the object of the British minister in giving the invitation to it. I find it in the following particular instances.

Whenever the question, which necessarily results from the unlimited scope given to the treaty-making power, shall be presented to the people of the United States, to wit:-Shall the House of Representatives become a formal, or remain an efficient, branch of the government; they will pause, before they will decide upon its annihilation. Their love of liberty, their love of their own interests, will check, for a moment, personal affections, or antipathies: party sensations, state jealousies will be disarmed, and the people will be found right in their decision.

Even in the midst of the clamor of war and disunion, which has been momentarily excited for a particular object, the people cannot be led to such fatal extremities, as the doctrine contended for would necessarily produce. Much less will this be the case after they shall have been relieved from these causeless apprehensions.

Before the treaty, the right of laying a special as well as a general embargo existed in the If, therefore, the House should exercise a United States: the right of laying a special constitutional right of judging of the propriety embargo upon British vessels is surrendered. of the object of expenditure, and a refusal Before the treaty, the right of sequestration ex- should be the result of their judgment, I do not isted, and the exercise of it was proposed. This believe that it will produce that fatal hostility right, so far as it respects Great Britain, is for- of departments which would eventuate in a total ever surrendered. Before the treaty, the right dissolution of the government; but will be an of discriminating against British goods, in favor exercise of one of the salutary checks, provided of those of other nations, existed, and the exer- in the constitution, which, in my opinion, concise of it was proposed. This right is surrender-stitute its merit, and not its reproach. ed. Before the treaty, the right of suspending commercial intercourse with Great Britain existed, and was proposed to be exercised; the exercise of that right is stipulated against for a limited time, &c. All these are restrictions of the exercise of the rights of national sovereign-be the least ground for the clamor, which has ty, and seem to me complete evidence of British interference.

These circumstances furnish two reflections. The one is, that the British cabinet deem the measures proposed, to be more efficacious, than they have generally been represented to be in the United States; and hence, the extreme caution to stipulate against the future exercise of them. The other is, that party sensations must have had great influence upon the extraordinary envoy of the United States, to induce his consent to these great abridgments of the rights of national sovereignty. The treaty not only

I shall now proceed to consider, whether a war with Great Britain will be the probable consequence of a refusal to make the necessary provision for carrying the British treaty into effect. To my mind, there does not appear to

been excited from this suggestion. I believe that Great Britain will make war upon the United States whenever she deems it her interest to do so: and that the treaty would impose no restraint upon her, if she thought her interest would justify the conduct. I also believe, that if there should be no treaty with Great Britain, she would not go to war with the United States, unless her interest should dictate the measure. In short, I believe, that Great Britain, like all other nations, will make her interest the criterion of her conduct in every question of peace or war.

If this opinion be well formed, the proba- | 13th, the rebellion of La Vendee commenced; bility of war may be tested by this question. on the 18th, Dumourier was defeated; on the Is it the interest of Great Britain to make war 20th, he abandoned his army; on the 3d of upon the United States in the relative situation April, his army retreated into France; on the of the two countries? Great Britain is now 4th, Dumourier himself was outlawed; on the engaged in a war in which the government 13th, France made a declaration against all inhazards every thing. She is at this moment terference with foreign governments; on the engaged in an important enterprise against the 22d of April, the President issued the proclaFrench West Indies. She is under the neces- mation of neutrality; on the 3d of May, the sity of resorting to the United States for sundry | rebellion of Corsica commenced; 29th, the resupplies for facilitating the enterprise. The bellion of the department of Loire; 30th, the United States are the best commercial customer rebellion of the city of Lyons; June 2d, thirtyshe has in the world. Under these circum- two deputies of the convention, generally called stances, what would be her inducement for the Brissotines, were arrested. About the same war? What would be her inducements to avoid time, a rebellion commenced in the departments it? These questions furnish their own answers. of Bouches du Rhone, Calvados and Eure; The argument of war is an argument of de- June the 8th, the first order by Great Britain pendence. It is also an argument which will for seizure of neutral vessels bound to France, last for ever. If the fear of war is now to in- with provisions, was issued. It is here to be fluence our conduct against our judgments, remarked, that the impartial state of neutrality will not the same argument apply with double proclaimed by the President of the United force two years after the expiration of the States, on the 22d of the preceding April, was present war, to induce a continuance of the probably known to the British cabinet; but, treaty upon its present injurious conditions? whilst flushed with these successes in her crusade against liberty, the neutrality of the United States could not protect them from the

As the argument of war is the chief instrument by which the treaty is pressed upon the people of the United States, I beg the indulg-invasion of their neutral rights. On the 10th ence of the committee in taking a retrospective view of this subject, and in examining it with some minuteness. Whatever may have been my opinion at the time of receiving the information of the hostile order of the 6th of November, I am now of opinion, that at that time, Great Britain did meditate war against the United States, although I believe there is no danger of it at present.

I believe, too, that the neutrality proclaimed by the United States does not, in the smallest degree, influence the conduct or disposition of Great Britain towards the United States in regard to war or peace, but that the true explanation of her disposition will be found in the course of events in Europe. On the 1st of February, 1793, France declared war against the King of England, and the stadtholder of Holland, and on the 7th of the same month against Spain. France was then at war with the Emperor of Germany, and the King of Prussia, &c. A combination of most of the despots of Europe had previously been formed, (it is generally believed on the 21st July, 1791, at Pilnitz,) for the purpose of crushing the revolutionary spirit which had appeared in France. The accession of Great Britain, Spain, Holland, Portugal and some of the Italian States to the combination already formed, made it the most formidable which has ever appeared in the history of modern times. The most desperate and bloody war of course ensued, and immediately succeeded the declaration of war against Great Britain; a series of successes took place, which threatened the absolute subjugation of France.

On the 1st of March, the French sustained a considerable loss by the surprise of the vanguard of their army, on the river Roer; on the

of July, Conde surrendered to the Combined Armies; on the 27th, Mayence, &c.; on the 28th, Valenciennes; at the end of July, the Spaniards were in possession of Bellegrade, Collioure, St. Elme, &c., and of the whole department of the eastern Pyrenees, and part of the lower Pyrenees. The Prussians and Austrians were possessed of the lines of Weisemburg, Fort Vauban, &c., and had blockaded Landau. The Piedmontese and Hanoverians had made successful inroads into other parts of France; the royalists of La Vendee were in possession of four departments.

The royalists of the fourth were in possession of Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon, and the departments of Vaucluse and Rhone. On the 28th of August, all Frenchmen were put in requisition; on the 28th, Toulon surrendered to Lord Hood, by the royalists; on the 9th of September, the Duke of York was defeated; on the 11th, Lyons was subdued; on the 30th of October, the Brissotines were executed. This was nearly the state of the war upon the European continent, at the time of issuing the hostile order of the 6th of November. In this chronological statement of facts, may be found the hostile disposition of Great Britain, widened by that order against the United States. France, convulsed with intestine divisions, which extended to the very heart of the convention, laboring under the most formidable external pressure, was supposed to be an easy prey to this terrible combination of despots: the combination having in view, as I believe, the total destruction of liberty. Great Britain, possessed of the most triumphant and formidable fleet, and guiding almost implicitly the movements of this great combination, already anticipated the destruction of liberty in France, and began to

turn her attention towards the same object in the United States. Hence, the order of the 6th of November; hence, the truce between Portugal and Algiers; hence, the talk between Lord Dorchester and the Indians. These were all acts of hostility, and evidently produced by the state of things before described. But what events followed these acts of hostility?

The

at this moment, than at any time previously,
during the whole period of the war.
nation is desirous of peace, and distressed for
provisions. The combination which indulged
her presumptuous hopes, crumbled into dust.

Prussia is at peace with France, and almost at war with Great Britain. Spain is at peace with France, and hardly at peace with Great Britain. Holland is at peace and in alliance with France, and at war with Great Britain. Austria herself is almost exhausted, and desirous of peace; and the continuation of French exertions and successes has excited the admiration and astonishment of the world. Are these the circumstances which would justify apprehensions of war from Great Britain? And are the United States to tremble at the sound of war from a nation thus circumstanced? I trust not. And for what cause is this war to be produced? Because the House of Representatives may deem it inexpedient to become the instrument of giving efficacy to a bad bargain.

I verily believe, that the alarm of war is not serious. I verily believe it is resorted to as an artificial instrument to effect a favorite object. For my part, I believe the hazard so small, as not to constitute an item in estimating the present question.

in the West Indies, than some gentlemen seem to admit; and I believe also, that she views the United States more formidable as an enemy. I infer these opinions from the avidity with which this treaty seems to have been received in that country, and particularly from an expression in the speech of the king at the late

A complete reverse of fortune immediately succeeded. The Duke of York had been already defeated. On the 17th of December, Toulon was retaken by the French; on the 22d, the Austrian fortified camp near Werth, was attacked and carried; on the 24th and 25th, the army under the command of the Duke of Brunswick was defeated at Kellsburg, and the Austrian army at Geisberg; on the 26th, the lines of Weisemburg were forced, and the Austrian army defeated. On the 8th of January, the hostile order for seizing neutral vessels was revoked, and on the 9th, Lord Grenville informed the American minister that the revocation of the order was to take away all pretext from evil disposed persons amongst us, for indulging their resentment against Great Britain. But, however strongly this motive may have operated on the British cabinet, it certainly was very strongly enforced by the state of things upon the European continent, which was not only changed, but completely reversed between I believe that Great Britain considers the the 6th of November, 1793, and the 8th of United States as a more important commercial January, 1794. It is remarkable, that notwith-connexion, particularly as it respects her views standing the several changes in the conduct of Great Britain towards the United States, they have been uniform in their impartial neutrality towards Great Britain; of course, the uniform disposition of the United States towards Great Britain could not have produced the fluctuating disposition of Great Britain towards the United States. Great Britain, in all probability, sup-meeting of parliament. Two reflections were posed, that, in the intoxication of the combined powers, from their early successes, her influence might unite them in a war against the United States, and perhaps, in the height of her presumption, she might even have indulged the impious hope of regaining her dominion over them: but this sudden reverse of fortune checked her ambitious enterprise. Probably anticipating a speedy dissolution of the combination, and having abandoned all prospects of engaging them in her iniquitous project, and being unwilling to add a new and formidable enemy to the one she already had encountered, and even fearing the effects of her previous hostilities, a sudden revolution is produced in her conduct towards the United States: it is then she is desirous of taking away all pretext from "evil disposed persons," to indulge their resentment against her: it is then the order of revocation is seen. If, then, Great Britain was unwilling to encounter a new enemy, in her then situation, will any change of circumstances justify, at this time, the supposition of a change of disposition in Great Britain, respecting war with the United States? I believe not. Peace seems to be more important to Great Britain

strongly impressed upon my mind from that speech. The one, that the treaty is deemed a very advantageous one to Great Britain, the other, that Great Britain has no appetite for war against the United States, in her present situation.

Hence, I cannot believe that there is the least possible foundation for the suggestion of the fatal hostility of departments of government, or of war with Great Britain, as amongst the consequences resulting from a refusal to make the necessary provisions for giving efficacy to the treaty.

As the present treaty is incomplete, and as further negotiations are stipulated in the treaty itself, and in the event of a decision either way, are expected; I think the most important consequences of the vote will be these. If the House should refuse to make the provisions for carrying the treaty into effect, the new negotiations will commence without the concessions contained in the present treaty. If the provisions are made, the further negotiations will proceed under the weight of the concessions already made, and very little melioration of the present conditions can be expected, as the

| the treaty to be a bad one. I believe it contains the completest evidence of British interference in our internal affairs, and has laid the foundation for the further extension of British influence. It has restricted the exercise of some of the important rights of national sovereignty. It has voluntarily hazarded the neutrality of the United States in the present European war, and destroyed all pretensions to its character of impartiality. It has not afforded protection to our neutral rights, which is amongst its great objects; and, in the adjustment of the differences resulting from the inexecution of the treaty of peace, it is unequal and unjust. All these important circumstances considered, and when it is also considered, that the British persevere in impressing our seamen and seizing our vessels in violation of the clearest rights of neutral nations, even since the signing of the treaty, I cannot consent to be the instrument of giving it efficacy. I believe that it is one of those extraordinary cases which justify strong and extraordinary re

Upon the whole, I conscientiously believesistance.

SPEECH ON THE JUDICIARY.