of the testimony, in the instance assigned by him, makes it different from all others. I answer, that admitting it does, still he stands charged with a contradiction of his own principles, which, how he can get clear of, I see not. His general opinion, as is evident from his own words just quoted, is, that human testimony, in no instance, can prove a miracle ; how, therefore, can this position be maintained, and it be granted, at the same time, as he does grant, that such a testimony as he describes will give credibility to the miracle of the eight days' darkness? In the one place he rejects human testimony absolutely, and without any restrictions, when reporting a miracle; and, in the other place, he gives us leave, provided human testimony have certain qualifications mentioned by him, tɔ admit it, however miraculous the fact attested may be.

But I see no reason why a local violation of the course of nature; a darkness, for instance, of eight days in one country only, if attested by those who lived near the place where it happened, and confirmed by the tradition of those who had opportunities of knowing the fact, should not be looked upon as equally credible with the universal darkness instanced by our author. The possibility of a local miracle cannot, surely, be denied by the person who admits the possibility of so strange a miracle as one extending over the whole earth. Now, if a local miracle be possible, nothing more can be requisite to establish its credibility, but that we have all the evidence for it that the nature of the fact can admit of; and as it was not universal, universal testimony must not be expected. For the nature of the proof from testimony is the same, whether we have five

hundred or five millions of witnesses.

If the less

number have equal opportunities of knowing what they attest, and be equally credible in other respects with the greater number, we have equal reason for admitting the testimony of both.

You see, sir, that the greatest champion against miracles does himself admit, that human testimony may prove a miracle of as extraordinary a kind too as we can suppose ever to happen.

But, upon a closer attention, I begin to think I have injured him, by supposing that he could ever deny that miracles, in general, can be made credible by testimony; for, it seems, his opinion is, that only such miracles cannot be made credible by testimony, as are urged to be the foundation of a new system of religion; and he desires us to understand him with this limitation 9. Not to misrepresent him, therefore, this limitation shall be allowed him. But, at the same time, I would ask him this plain question, if this be allowed him, will it not involve him in a labyrinth of contradictions? For it matters not, whether a miracle be wrought in support of a religion or no; our author's boasted argument strikes at all miracles; and, according to his principles, all miracles must be rejected, because all miracles are events contrary to firm and unalterable experience. Before, therefore, he had admitted that human testimony may give credibility to such miracles as are not ascribed to a new system of religion, he should have taken care to have weighed the obvious consequences of his own arguments, which expressly forbid him to believe any miracles at all. But, not to carry this charge of inconsistency any farther, we

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have here a clear view of the principles of this gentleman. He will believe any thing when religion is out of the question, let it be ever so strange; but whenever religion is concerned, he is so scrupulous, that he will admit nothing. He grants that the most extraordinary prodigies may be proved by testimony, provided nobody can assign any end or purpose they could be designed to answer; but whenever miracles are appealed to as the foundation of a new system of religion, that is, whenever a wise and important end can be served by them, then he would have us believe that we have been imposed upon, and that no such miracles were really performed. How wild and inconsistent this way of talking (for I cannot call it reasoning) is, I appeal even to yourself; which, while it absolutely refuses credibility to the miracles of the Christian scriptures, allows us to believe such miracles and prodigies as are to be met with in Livy or Dion Cassius.

But what is the reason assigned for the incredibility of miracles, when they are made the foundation of a new religion? Because, says our author, " men, "in all ages, have been so much imposed on by ridi"culous stories of that kind, that this very circum"stance would be a full proof of a cheat, and sufficient, with all men of sense, not only to make “them reject the fact, but even reject it without "farther examination"."

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Are we then brought back, after all the efforts of metaphysical scepticism, to this weak and childish argument, that, because some men have been knaves and fools, therefore all must be such? That because some men's testimony in relating miracles has been Page 200.

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false, no testimony whatever for a miraculous fact ought ever to be taken? To infer from the world's having been sometimes imposed upon by false miracles, that no miracles have ever been true, is as absurd as if one should deny that there is any real virtue among men, because there is much hypocrisy; or as if he should refuse to take any coin, because it sometimes has been counterfeited. Counterfeit coin supposes that there is such a thing in the world as good money, and nobody would pretend, outwardly, to be virtuous, unless some were really so. In the same manner, the false miracles, about which so much work is made, suppose the existence of real ones; and the cheats that have been imposed upon the world, far from furnishing us with reasons to reject all miracles in general, are, on the contrary, a strong proof that some, of which they are imitations, have been genuine. By what criterion we can distinguish the true from the false is indeed a most important inquiry, and will be the subject of the following sheets.

I shall not prosecute my examination of this author's boasted argument against miracles any farther, both because it has been fully and effectually answered by others, and because what I have just thrown out must satisfy you that events contrary to firm and constant experience may become credible by human testimony, especially as you have his word for it; and he was the first, I know of, who ever denied it, giving us his reason for doing so. In this, acting

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By Dr. Rutherforth in a sermon; by an anonymous author of Remarks on an Essay concerning Miracles; supposed to be bishop Ellis; but more at large by the Rev. Mr. Adams, of Shrewsbury, and by Dr. Campbell, of Aberdeen.

the part of a fair adversary, and at the same time, in my opinion, giving the severest blow to the enemies of the gospel miracles that they ever received; because he has shewn that he could not (and if he could not, I am sure no other person can) establish the incredibility of miracles, but by calling in question the first principles of human knowledge: but by introducing the most extravagant scepticism that ever made its appearance under the venerable name of philosophy. I shall only add, that an author who espouses such opinions can never be a dangerous enemy to religion. His arguments having novelty may please for a while; but so opposite are they to every one's settled notions, that their influence cannot be lasting. Sorry I am to say, that the author of the Philosophical Essays seems to have a right to this character, a character which must sink the value of his writings, in spite of the most eminent abilities.

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Though I have sufficiently exposed the weakness of Mr. Hume's sceptical subtleties, the advocates of infidelity, in general, not having adopted them, it is incumbent on me to take notice of a more popular objection, to which they usually have recourse. is this, that man has a light within, which answers, to the full, all the purposes of religion, and that a due attention to his rational faculties will, without the assistance of supernatural instruction, enable him to know and to act in conformity to the Divine will, as the means of securing the favour of Heaven, and the happiness of a future life.

We may pronounce this to be an assertion equally presumptuous and unfounded; for, however instructed man might be, as originally created, it could not