In order to this, and in pursuance of the plan that I have laid down, let us now take into consideration such of the wonderful works said to have been performed amongst pagans and papists, as could not possibly be brought about by the operation of any natural cause; and, I flatter myself, that the evidence produced in their support will appear to be so very defective and insufficient, as justly to warrant our rejecting them as idle tales that never happened, and the inventions of bold and interested deceivers.

u

I have already observed, when I treated of the evidence requisite to give credibility to miracles, that the testimony supporting them must be free from every suspicion of fraud and imposture. And the reason is this. The history of miracles (to make use of the words of an author " whose authority you will think of some weight) is of a kind totally different from that of common events: the one to be suspected always of course, without the strongest evidence to confirm it; the other to be admitted of course, without as strong reason to suspect it. So that, wherever the evidence urged for miracles leaves grounds for a suspicion of fraud and imposition, the very suspicion furnishes sufficient reasons for disbelieving them. And what I shall offer, under this head, will make it evident that those miracles which the protestant Christian thinks himself at liberty to reject, have always been so insufficiently attested as to leave full scope for fraud and imposition.

That I may proceed with the greater perspicuity, I shall here lay down a few general rules, by which we may try those pretended miracles, one and all, wherever they occur, and which may set forth the u Middleton's Free Inquiry, p. 217.

grounds on which we suspect them to be false. It would be an endless and an unnecessary task to enumerate all the manifold miracles reported amongst pagans and amongst papists, and to examine them one by one critically, in order to disprove them. I shall only, by way of illustration of my rules, select a few memorable ones, by which may be formed a judgment of the rest.

Now, I think it will be impossible for you to assign any particular instance of a pagan or popish miracle which does not labour under one or other of the following defects, which we think warrant our disbelieving them.

First, we suspect miracles to be false, when the accounts of them are not published to the world till long after the time when they are said to have been performed.

Secondly, we suspect them to be false, when the accounts are not published in the place where it is pretended they were performed, but are propagated only at a great distance from the supposed scene of action.

Thirdly, supposing the accounts to have the two foregoing qualifications, we still may suspect them to be false, if in the time when, and at the place where they took their rise, the circumstances were such that they might be suffered to pass without examination. For if the circumstances under which miracles were appealed to, be such as that we can give a probable account of their passing current without examination, we shall be warranted to conclude, that this really was the case.

Now in illustrating the last and the most important rule laid down, it immediately occurs to us that

miracles may be supposed to have been admitted without examination: first, if they coincided with the favourite opinions and superstitious prejudices of those to whom they were reported, and who, on that account, might be eager to receive them without evidence; secondly, if they were set on foot, or at least were encouraged and supported by those who alone had the power of detecting the fraud, and who could prevent any examination which might tend to undeceive the world.

And when we come to try by this test any particular miracle of paganism or popery, which can be traced up to contemporary witnesses, and was published on the spot, it will be instantly observed that it labours under one or other, or both of the above mentioned defects. We shall ever find the people refusing any examination of the miracle, through a blind credulity and eagerness of belief, or the promoters of it, armed with power, rendering an examination impracticable.

But what occasion, you may say, can there be for my troubling myself to point out to you the reasons why those miracles ought to be rejected as false, of the truth of which you never professed yourself to be a believer? I answer, that though you have not professed a belief of them, you and your friends have represented them as bearing equally strong marks of genuineness with the miracles of the gospel; with this professed view, to have both of them thought spurious. It became necessary, therefore, in order to extricate ourselves out of this labyrinth, in which you would involve us, to point out such defects in the evidence of the miracles set up in opposition to those of the gospel, as warrant our disbelieving

them. When I have examined, then, the most memorable accounts of those spurious miracles, according to the rules above mentioned, I shall proceed to prove that the objections which destroy their credibility, cannot, with any justice, be urged against the evidence of the miracles of the gospel.

The first rule laid down was, that we may justly suspect those miracles to be false, the accounts of which are not published to the world till long after the time when they are said to have been performed.

In order to give credibility to any distant fact, it is expected either that uninterrupted tradition should have preserved and handed down the memory of it; or, at least, if the tradition has been interrupted, that it should be mentioned in contemporary records. And if common matters of fact, which cannot be traced up to the age they pretend to, are not to be admitted as credible, this certainly holds much stronger with regard to miracles. Now, upon examination, it will be found that the accounts which we have of many of the boasted wonders of paganism and popery are of this kind, that is, cannot be traced up to the age they pretend to, but were published to the world, when length of time had, by removing the means of examination, rendered a detection of their falsehood impossible.

And, first of all, under this head may be ranged the account of the miracles of Apollonius of Tyana, published to the world in his Life, written by Philostratus.

It is certain that Philostratus did not write till above an hundred years after the death of his hero. What evidence, therefore, have we that the facts attributed to this wonder-worker by his historian were

ever heard of before he wrote? That the Life of Apollonius had been already written by Mæragenes is, indeed, certain *. But so far is this from proving that the miracles ascribed to him by Philostratus had been, before this, taken notice of by Mæragenes, that the direct contrary may be inferred from this, that Philostratus, instead of making use of such materials as were already in the hands of the public ›, acquaints us that he composed his work, partly from common report, and partly from an account of Apollonius, delivered to him by the empress Julia, the wife of Severus, said, indeed, on the authority of the unknown person who gave it to the empress, to have been written by one Damis, a companion of Apollonius, but never heard of in the world, till it furnished materials to Philostratus 2.

Is it possible, therefore, to give credit to any * Origen. contra Celsum, lib. vi. c. 41. p. 662.

y The reason why Philostratus did not make use of Mæragenes, who had written Apollonius's Life before he did, may be guessed at from what Origen tells us that Apollonius, according to the account given of him by Mæragenes, was looked upon as a magician and a juggler. Αλῶναι ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν ̓Απολλωνίῳ μαγείας οὐκ ἀγεννεῖς τινας φιλοσόφους, ὡς πρὸς γόητα αὐτὸν εἰσελθόντας. Origen loc. cit. The authority, therefore, of Mæragenes could not be appealed to by Philostratus, without defeating the intention of his book. The former seems to have represented Apollonius, as he really was, a person who could, by his superior art and dexterity, perform surprising feats and legerdemain tricks which the superstition and ignorance of the times gave him encouragement to attribute to magic. A magician being, in those ages, looked upon (as appears from many places of Origen's book just quoted) to be one who, by the use of certain incantations, and charms, and forms of barbarous words, or by the celebration of certain odd rites, could force superior beings or dæmons to assist him.