tude and intentions; they also want us to understand that they wish a few coaling-stations in the Pacific that they think we may give them; they would also like a free hand at Samoa. At the same time I judge from what Hatzfeldt said, as well as from what Lascelles, the British Ambassador in Berlin, told me, that whatever we do or refuse to do, so that our action and our words are pitched in diplomatic tones, not putting any affront on them which they shall be forced to take up, they will not quarrel with us. They cannot afford to force a quarrel upon us. They have to watch Russia and France on one side, and England on the other. They cannot be sure of any substantial help from either of these quarters, while we can easily obtain allies, if we see proper to seek them; which probably we will not.

In fact I am rejoiced to say that you hold the game in your own hands. Your wisdom, prudence, and political sense have steered us safely through all the initial dangers of our position. You can now make war, or make peace, without danger of disturbing the equilibrium of the world. I congratulate you with all my heart on this great and bloodless victory at Santiago. It is your work, and you and your friends have the right to be proud of it. That we have escaped the double peril of disease through

delay and of needless slaughter by assault, is due, as every one sees, to your wisdom and your courage, which saw the truth more clearly than others, and had the nerve to hold the rudder true.

As to the coming parley of peace. I am sure you will keep the golden mean between too much liberality and too much rapacity and will make a peace as glorious as the war has been.

Sep. 9, 1898.

... I consider it not the least weighty of the results of your Administration to have changed the condition of dull hostility between us and England which existed a year ago into a friendship firm enough to bear any test you might choose to put upon it.

Aug. 2, 1898.

We are watching with great interest the progress of your negotiations for peace. If we give up the Philippines it will be a considerable disappointment to our English friends — but of course we can consider nothing but our own interests; and the more I hear about the state of the Tagalog population and their leaders the more I am convinced of the seriousness of the task which would devolve upon us if we made ourselves permanently responsible for them. I have no doubt that Germany has been in

triguing both with Aguinaldo and with Spain. They are most anxious to get a foothold there; but if they do it there will be danger of grave complication with other European powers.

Our position is stronger than ever before, morally and materially. We have never, even at the close of our Civil War, been so strong in Europe as to-day.

JOHN HAY.

The struggle in the Senate over the ratification of the treaty marked one of the most critical periods in the Administration of President McKinley. The sudden acquisition of great possessions in Asiatic territory brought new problems which could not be readily grasped nor their real significance foreseen. Senator Platt, of Connecticut, in supporting the treaty maintained that the United States is a nation and as such is entitled to possess the inherent sovereign power to acquire territory; and that in the right to acquire is found the right to govern territory. Senator Hoar, of Massachusetts, took issue with the Senator from Connecticut on this point and declared the attempt to govern a people without their consent to be abhorrent to the letter and spirit of the Constitution and to the Declaration of Independence. The opposition of Senator Hoar

created a profound impression. He was a lifelong Republican, a supporter and indeed an affectionate friend and admirer of the President, a man actuated by the loftiest patriotism and conscientious devotion to duty, and a Senator of vast personal influence and unquestioned ability. The true solution required a larger knowledge of the actual facts and a greater faith in the future wisdom, righteousness, and skill in government of American administration than a majority of the Senate then possessed. The President had reached his decision, because he knew, better perhaps than any one else in Washington, what were the conditions in the Philippines; what would be the probable result of turning the islands back to Spain, of leaving them to govern themselves, or of creating a divided responsibility; and what could be accomplished for the islands by an Executive determined to give them a government solely in their own interests, with the powerful arm of the United States to guarantee the blessings of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, such as they had never known in their entire history. Such a vision as the President's could not come to a man of less faith in the essential goodness of the American people. It is not remarkable, therefore, that in the brief period of the debate (from January 4 to February 6) the Senate should have hesitated.

The practical consideration which probably influenced the final vote, quite as much as the question of constitutional rights, was aptly presented by the Junior Senator from Massachusetts, Henry Cabot Lodge:

"Take now the other alternative. Suppose we reject the treaty or strike out the clause relating to the Philippines. That will hand the islands back to Spain; and I cannot conceive that any American should be willing to do that. Suppose we reject the treaty; what follows? Let us look at it practically. We continue the state of war and every sensible man in the country, every business interest, desires the reëstablishment of peace in law as well as in fact. At the same time we repudiate the President and his action before the whole world, and the repudiation of the President in such a matter as this is, to my mind, the humiliation of the United States in the eyes of civilized mankind and brands us a people incapable of great affairs or of taking rank where we belong, as one of the greatest of the great worldpowers.

"The President cannot be sent back across the Atlantic in the person of his commissioners, hat in hand, to say to Spain, with bated breath, 'I am here in obedience to the mandate of a minority of one third of the Senate to tell you that we have been too