« 前へ次へ »
victorious, and that you have yielded us too much, and that I am very sorry that I took the Philippines from you.' I do not think that any American President would do that, or that any American would wish him to.
The President had a narrow escape from the predicament described by Senator Lodge. The treaty was ratified by only one vote in excess of the required two-thirds. It received 57 votes against 27. One Senator, who did not wish to oppose the sentiment in his State if he could help it, but who nevertheless wished the treaty to be rejected, withheld his vote until after the roll-call. He then voted for it, but if there had been one more opposing vote he would have cast his vote to defeat it. The
personal interposition of Mr. Bryan, who preferred any treaty to a resumption of the war, influenced enough members of his party to secure its acceptance. The treaty was signed by the President on the roth of February and by the Queen of Spain on the 17th of March. It was proclaimed on the 11th of April, 1899, just one year from the date of the famous message of intervention.
Senator Hoar, in his “Autobiography,” gives a glimpse of President McKinley during this trying period:
"When I saw President McKinley early in December, 1898, he was, I suppose, committed to the policy to which he adhered. He greeted me with the delightful and affectionate cordiality which I always found in him. He took me by the hand, and said: ‘How are you feeling this winter, Mr. Senator?' I was determined there should be no misunderstanding. I replied at once: 'Pretty pugnacious, I confess, Mr. President.' The tears came into his eyes, and he said, grasping my hand again: 'I shall always love you, whatever you do.'
"I found we differed widely on this great subject. I denounced with all the vigor of which I was capable the treaty, and the conduct of the war in the Philippine Islands, in the Senate, on the platform, in many public letters, and in articles in magazines and newspapers. But President McKinley never abated one jot of his cordiality toward me. I did not, of course, undertake to press upon him my advice in matters affecting the Philippine Islands, about which we differed so much. But he continued to seek it, and to take it in all other matters as constantly as ever before."
THE MAKING OF THE PHILIPPINES
THEN the Administration of President Mc
Kinley began, the colonial possessions of Spain in both the Atlantic and the Pacific were in revolt. The troubles of the native population of Cuba had aroused the American people to a high degree of excitement, but those of the Filipinos were not even a subject of common knowledge. The former were within a hundred miles of our own shores, while the latter were halfway round the world. Yet the appeal to human sympathy was the same in both cases. Both had suffered from centuries of misrule, official rapacity and corruption, broken promises, cruelty and oppression. The troubles in the Philippines remained unnoticed because it was no part of the duty of the United States to regulate the colonial policy of Spain, except in so far as it clashed with our own interests. Intervention in Cuban affairs was a deliberate act on the part of the United States, occasioned by the fact that peace in a neighboring island, so necessary to our own tranquillity, could be obtained by no other means. Intervention in the Philippines was the result of a
well-considered strategical move which the war made necessary, but which otherwise was wholly unintentional. A striking proof of this fact is shown in the following correspondence between Mr. Rounseville Wildman, Consul of the United States at Hongkong, and the Department of State:
Mr. Wildman to Mr. Day
HONGKONG, November 3, 1897. SIR:
Since my arrival in Hongkong I have been called upon several times by Mr. F. Agoncilla, foreign agent and high commissioner, etc., of the new republic of the Philippines.
Mr. Agoncilla holds a commission, signed by the president, members of cabinet, and general in chief of the republic of the Philippines, empowering him absolutely with power to conclude treaties with foreign governments.
Mr. Agoncilla offers on behalf of his government alliance offensive and defensive with the United States when the United States declares war on Spain, which, in Mr. Agoncilla's judgment, will be very soon. In the meantime he wishes the United States to send to some port in the Philippines 20,000 stand of arms and 200,000 rounds of ammunition for the use of his government, to be paid for on the
recognition of his government by the United States. He pledges as security two provinces and the customhouse at Manila.
He is not particular about the price — is willing the United States should make 25 per cent or 30 per cent profit.
He is a very earnest and attentive diplomat and a great admirer of the United States.
On his last visit he surprised me with the information that he had written his government that he had hopes of inducing the United States to supply the much-needed guns, etc.
In case Señor Agoncilla's dispatch should fall into the hands of an unfriendly power and find its way into the newspapers, I have thought it wise to apprise the State Department of the nature of the high commissioner's proposals.
Señor Agoncilla informs me by late mail that he will proceed at once to Washington to conclude the proposed treaty, if I advise.
I shall not advise said step until so instructed by the State Department. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, ROUNSEVILLE WILDMAN,