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Spain is bound by secular ties that can be forgotten by no nation either of the old or of the new world.

To end calamities already so great, and to avert evils still greater, our countries might mutually endeavor to find upon which conditions the present struggle could be terminated otherwise than by force of arms.

Spain believes this understanding possible and hopes that this view is also harbored by the Government of the United States. All true friends of both nations share, no doubt, the same hope.

Spain wishes to show again that in this war, as well as in the one she carried on against the Cuban insurgents, she had but one object- the vindication of her prestige, her honor, her name. During the war of insurrection it was her desire to spare the great island from the dangers of premature independence. In the present war she has been actuated by sentiments inspired rather by ties of blood than by her interests, and by the right belonging to her as mother country.

Spain is prepared to spare Cuba from the continuation of the horrors of war if the United States are on their part likewise disposed.

The President of the United States and the American people may now learn from this message the true thought, desire, and intention of the Spanish nation.

And so do we wish to learn from the President of the United States upon which basis might be established a political status in Cuba, and might be terminated a strife which would continue without reason should both Governments agree upon the means of pacifying the island.

In the name of the Government of Her Majesty the Queen Regent I have the honor to address this message to Your Excellency with the expression of my highest consideration.

DUC D'ALMODOVAR DEL RIO,
Ministre d'État.

On a hot afternoon immediately following the receipt of this communication, the President invited the members of the Cabinet to accompany him on a trip down the Potomac in a lighthouse tender, the ostensible purpose of which was to escape the heat. The letter was then read and a discussion ensued, lasting several days, which proved to be the longest in which the McKinley Cabinet ever engaged. On the following day the draft of a protocol, prepared in the State Department, was submitted by Mr. Day. It differed from the one finally agreed upon in proposing to relinquish all of the Philippine Islands to Spain, except sufficient ground for a naval station. Upon this question the Cabinet

was about equally divided. All of the arguments with which the country subsequently became familiar were brought forth in favor of abandoning the islands and restoring them to Spain. On the other hand, it was argued that it was impossible to decide definitely at that time whether it would be advantageous or desirable either to surrender the islands or to retain them or some of them; that more information was needed; that the report of Admiral Dewey and his advice should be obtained before final action was taken. The latter was the view which finally prevailed.

At first the President felt a natural revulsion against the acquisition of a vast unknown territory thousands of miles away. He did not want the islands, but, once in our possession, he felt that the people would never be satisfied if they were given back to Spain. Perhaps this feeling was best expressed in the words of a certain distinguished senator, himself an anti-expansionist, who declared that he would "as soon turn a redeemed soul over to the devil as give the Philippines back to Spain." Secretary Wilson was strong for evangelizing the islands and favored keeping the whole group. "Yes," said the President, in his humorous way, "you Scotch favor keeping everything—including the Sabbath."

Secretary Bliss saw great commercial opportunities and he also favored taking the entire group, as did Attorney-General Griggs. Secretaries Gage, Long, and Day stood out for a naval base only, though Mr. Gage later changed his mind. In summing up the varying views the President, remarking that some were in favor of retaining the whole Archipelago, while others wanted Luzon, jokingly added, "but Judge Day only wants a hitching-post." His own decision was to keep all the islands, at least temporarily, and await developments. "Mr. President," said the Secretary of State, after the meeting adjourned, "you didn't put my motion for a naval base." "No, judge," was the answer, with a twinkle of the eye, "I was afraid it would be carried!"

A few extracts from the diary of Mr. Cortelyou will serve to throw further light upon the way in which the character of the reply to the Spanish Duke - so momentous in the history of the United States was finally determined:

"Friday, July 29, 1898. The session [of the Cabinet] was a protracted one, discussion of the important question of peace proposals by the Spanish Government occupying the entire time.

"Several drafts were made of different portions of the proposed reply to the communication of the

Duke of Almodovar. The Cabinet appears to be nearly if not quite unanimous on the main points which will form the basis of this Government's response. Naturally the disposition to be made of the Philippines consumed most time and elicited the greatest amount of discussion.

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"A little after one o'clock Attorney-General Griggs, with a copy of the first rough draft of the reply, prepared under the President's direction by the Secretary of State and his assistants, paired to the President's large office with Assistant Secretary Cortelyou and dictated to him the three main points to be insisted upon by the Government of the United States as essential terms and conditions precedent to an agreement leading to peace. The Attorney-General prepared these points-or it would be more accurate to say that he selected these points from the manuscripts which he held in his hand, prepared as heretofore indicated by the Department of State; the Attorney-General's dictation being merely to present them in proper form and with legal accuracy."

"Saturday, July 30, 1898. The Cabinet met at 10.30 o'clock this morning, to resume the consideration of this Government's reply to the Spanish note. All the members of the Cabinet were present. The

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