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THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
N accordance with the fifth article of the protocol,
President McKinley appointed as the five commissioners to represent the United States in the negotiations for peace, William R. Day, chairman; Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray, and Whitelaw Reid. Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Gray were United States Senators and Mr. Reid had recently returned from his post as Minister to France. Mr. Day resigned as Secretary of State and was succeeded by John Hay. John Bassett Moore was appointed secretary and counsel to the American Commissioners. 1
The Peace Commission met in Paris on the ist day of October, 1898. From the beginning the President kept in close touch, by cable, with all the proceedings, was consulted on every point of difference, and gave his answers with invariable firmness and deci
1 The Commissioners for Spain were Don Eugenio Montero Ríos, President of the Senate, chairman; Don Buenaventura Abarzuza, Senator of the Kingdom and ex-minister of the Crown; Don José de Garnica, deputy to the Cortes and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, Envoy Extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at Brussels; and Don Rafael Cerero, General of Division. Don Emilio de Ojeda was appointed secretary.
sion. In his preliminary instructions of September 16 he defined the purpose of the United States in these words: —
"It is my wish that throughout the negotiations entrusted to the Commission the purpose and spirit with which the United States accepted the unwelcome necessity of war should be kept constantly in view. We took up arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity and in the fulfillment of high public and moral obligations. We had no design of aggrandizement and no ambition of conquest. Through the long course of repeated representations which preceded and aimed to avert the struggle, and in the final arbitrament of force, this country was impelled solely by the purpose of relieving grievous wrongs and removing long-existing conditions which disturbed its tranquillity, which shocked the moral sense of mankind, and which could no longer be endured.
“It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war. It should be as scrupulous and magnanimous in the concluding settlement as it was just and humane in its original action. The luster and the moral strength attaching to a cause which can be confidently rested upon the considerate judgment of the world should not under any illusion of the hour be dimmed by ulterior designs which might tempt us into excessive demands or into an adventurous departure on untried paths. It is believed that the true glory and the enduring interests of the country will most surely be served if an unselfish duty conscientiously accepted and a signal triumph honorably achieved shall be crowned by such an example of moderation, restraint, and reason in victory as best comports with the traditions and character of our enlightened Republic. “Our aim in the adjustment
peace should be directed to lasting results and to the achievement of the common good under the demands of civilization, rather than to ambitious designs. The terms of the protocol were framed upon this consideration. The abandonment of the Western Hemisphere by Spain was an imperative necessity. In presenting that requirement, we only fulfilled a duty universally acknowledged. It involves no ungenerous reference to our recent foe, but simply a recognition of the plain teachings of history, to say that it was not compatible with the assurance of permanent peace on and near our own territory that the Spanish flag should remain on this side of the sea. This lesson of events and of reason left no alternative as to Cuba, Porto Rico, and the other islands belonging to Spain in this hemisphere.
“The Philippines stand upon a different basis. It is none the less true, however, that, without any original thought of complete or even partial acquisition, the presence and success of our arms at Manila imposes upon us obligations which we cannot disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human action. Avowing unreservedly the purpose which has animated all our effort, and still solicitous to adhere to it, we cannot be unmindful that, without any desire or design on our part, the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization.
"In view of what has been stated, the United States cannot accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the Island of Luzon. It is desirable, however, that the United States shall acquire the right of entry for vessels and merchandise belonging to citizens of the United States into such ports of the Philippines as are not ceded to the United States, upon terms of equal favor with Spanish ships and merchandise, both in relation to port and customs charges and rates of trade and commerce, together with other rights of protection and trade
FACSIMILE OF PRESIDENT MCKINLEY'S MEMORANDUM OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH ADMIRAL DEWEY REGARDING THE PHILIPPINES
The questions were written in advance and Dewey's replies noted. Following is a transcription :
TALK WITH DEWEY
October 3, 1899.
-- are they capable? No and will not be for many, many years.
The United States must control and supervise giving Filipinos participation as far as capable.
WHAT DOES AGUINALDO REPRESENT in population and sentiment?
He has no more than 40000 followers of all kinds out of 8 or 10 millions
WHAT IS OUR DI'TY?
Keep the islands permanently. Valuable in every way HOW MANY TROOPS NEEDED?
HAVE WE SHIPS ENOUGH?
Ought to send some more. Recommends that Brooklyn go and smaller vessels.
SHOULD WE GIVE UP THE ISLANDS ?
Never - never
THE STORIES OF CHURCH DESECRATION AND INHUMANITY