The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EUOUP Oxford, 2003/03/13 - 510 ページ The European Union is composed of its fifteen member governments, yet these governments have chosen repeatedly to delegate executive, judicial and legislative powers and substantial discretion to supranational institutions such as the Commission, the Court of Justice, and the European Parliament. In The Engines of European Integration, the first full-length study of delegation in the European Union and international politics, Mark Pollack draws on principal-agent analyses of delegation, agency and agenda setting to analyze and explain the delegation of powers by governmental principals to supranational agents, and the role played by those agents in the process of European integration. In the first part of the book, Pollack analyses the historical and functional patterns of delegation to the Commission, the Court of Justice, and the Parliament, suggesting that delegation to the first two is motivated by a desire to reduce the transaction costs of EU policymaking, as predicted by principal-agent models, while delegation of powers to the Parliament fits poorly with such models, and primarily reflects a concern by member governments to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the Union. The second part of the book focuses on the role of supranational agents in both the liberalization and the re-regulation of the European market, and suggests that the Commission, Court, and Parliament have indeed played a causally important role alongside member governments as "the engines of integration," but that their ability to do so has varied historically and across issue-areas as a function of the discretion delegated to them by the member governments. |
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actors administrative adoption agency agenda agenda-setting powers agreement amendments Amsterdam Treaty analysis argued Article 141 Article 28 Barber Blair House budget budgetary Cassis Chapter co-decision comitology competition Congressional contrast control mechanisms cooperation procedure Council of Ministers Court of Justice credible commitments delegate powers delegation and discretion Directive draft EC law ECJ decisions EEC Treaty effect EU's European Community European Court European integration European Parliament European Union Franchino functions Garrett hypotheses implementing institutions intergovernmental intergovernmental conference interpretation issue areas Journal judicial review limited Maastricht Treaty measures member gov member governments member-state member-state principals ments Merger Control national courts negotiations Nevertheless non-compliance oversight pension political preferences principal-agent procedure provisions qualified majority reform Regulation regulatory role rules Santer Commission Single European Act social specific Stone Sweet Structural Funds studies supranational agents TEC Art tion trade Treaty of Nice Tsebelis unanimous vis-à-vis vote