I am compelled to understand the Executive recommendation, not as merely confined to the raising the men, but to extend to the employment of the men when raised, for offensive purposes against the British possessions in North America. For what other purpose could the Executive recommend the raising of men? Could it be to defend the country from invasion, or to quell insurrection? Certainly not. For no invasion or insurrection is apprehended: if, therefore, the mere raising the force will be a compliance with the Executive recommendation, as the gentleman seems to believe it will, you must then accuse the Executive of wishing to increase their own patronage, by creating a useless and unnecessary army in time of peace, and thereby conjuring down on themselves the united curses of their own friends. The uniform opinion of the Executive, in the legislature, as well as in the cabinet, is a perfect refutation of this idea-yet you must attach this erroneous inconsistency to the Executive, or admit that his recommendation to raise the force was made with the intention of using the force, as soon as raised, in offensive war; and it is with this view alone that we can be justified in voting for the resolutions on your table. Indeed, sir, my opinion was,, and still is, as I expressed it in the committee of the whole house on this subject, to wit: that the better mode of proceeding would be, first to lay an embargo on all the ships and vessels of the United States for a limited time, as a measure of precaution, as well as a necessary preliminary to the commencement of hostilities, and as an exposition of our intentions to this nation as well as to others.

As my remarks in the committee of the whole house have been liable to some misapprehension, I now beg leave to explain them to the house.

When the first five resolutions on your table shall have passed this house, and arrive in England, accompanied with the commentary on them, given by the committee of foreign relations, England cannot misunderstand their meaning. If then England determines to conciliate this country by withdrawing the orders in council, the matter will end very well; but if she determines to permit us to proceed to hostility with her, is it not probable she will strike the first blow by sweeping from the ocean every inch of American canvass? What security have you that England will not adopt such a course? Do you expect she will be deterred from it by the principles of morality, or her ancient usage? Sir, British history will furnish you with cases in point. At the commencement of the war of 1756, long before any declaration of war had taken place between France and England, secret orders were given by the English admiralty, to sweep the ocean of French commerce; which was executed accordingly; and American commerce may share a similar fate.

My apprehensions on this subject are strengthened by a recurrence to the origin of our differences with England. Out of what did they arise? Principally from the great prosperity of American commerce. Before the year 1807, the English traders were met in almost every

port and harbor of the world, by the Americans; and the Americans had the faculty of out-trading the English merchants. This excited the jealousy of the English, to whom it seemed strange, that America commerce and tonnage, unprotected as it was by naval force, should be second only to England, and arriving fast to an equality both in amount and value with them, who were protected by one thousand ships of war. The object of the government of England seems to me, was to give a preference to her own commerce by crippling that of others; and if such were and now are her views, by proceeding as we do, we furnish the fairest opportunity to England to give your commerce a blow that it will not recover in half a century. By restraining your merchants within your ports and harbors, and enabling them to bring home their property from abroad, you would not only increase the means of carrying on the war, but in the mean time preparations would be made for carrying it on with more effect at the outset. It is not to be concealed, that before the commencement of hostilities you must resort to an embargo: no commercial nation can, without the most obvious absurdity, go to war with a naval power without first laying an embargo for three or four months. And when, I ask, will you proceed to lay your embargo? Certainly it ought to be very shortly, if you expect the campaign to open next spring. Such a course would have a happy effect on your recruiting service: no man then could either mistake or mistrust your views; and the best population in your country, perceiving that the nation was about to engage in a war, where laurels might be won, would flock to your standard.

But, sir, as matters now stand, your first five resolutions looking to war, and the sixth resolution calculated only for a state of peace, the yeomanry of the country will recollect the fate of the army of 6000, and will reluctantly engage in your service, lest they too should be employed in an ignoble warfare against the fens of the Mississippi, and the hosts of musquetoes and gallinippers with which they are infested.

This, sir, is my view of the subject: but as we all appear to be travelling to one result, and only differ about the route which would be most advisable, and gentlemen whose superior wisdom, talents, and experience, I am bound to venerate, differ with me as to the mode of proceeding, and have determined not to go with me, I will go with them; at the same time, if any accident should happen, I shall have nothing to answer for----My constituents have no ships.

[Debates to be continued.]

[Documents---Continued from No. 11.]

Mr. Pinkney to Lord Wellesley.

MY LORD, Great Cumberland Place, January 14, 1811. After a lapfe of many months fince I had the honor to receive and convey to my government your lordship's repeated affurances, written as well as verbal, (which you declined, however, to put into an official form)" that it was your intention immediately to recommend the appointment of a minifter plenipotentiary from the king to the United States," the B itifh goverment continues to be reprefented at Washington by a charge d'affaires; and no fteps whatever appear to have been taken to fulfil the expectation which the abovementioned affurances produced and juftified.

In this ftate of things it has become my duty to inform your lordthip, in compliance with my inftructions, that the government of the United States cannot continue to be reprefented here by a minifter plenipotentiary.

As foon, therefore, as the fituation of the king's government will permit, I fhall wish to take my leave, and return to America in the United States frigate Effex, now at Plymouth, having firit named, as I am fpecially authorized to do, a fit perlon to take charge of the American legation in this country.

I have the honor to be, with great refpect and confideration, my lord, your lordship's moft obedient humble fervant, WM. PINKNEY.

(Signed)

Mr. Pinkney to Lord Wellesley.

MY LORD, Great Cumberland Place, January 15, 1811. I have the honor to inform you that it has been reprefented to me, that two American veffels (the fchooner Polly and the fchooner Mary) laden with cod fish, and bound from Marblehead to Bordeaux, in France, have, fince the 1ft inftant, been captured and brought into Plymouth as a prize, for an imputed breach of the orders in council.

It is my duty to demand the restoration of the fe veffels and their cargoes to the American owners, together with compenfation for their unjuft detention, and liberty to refume the voyages which that detention has interrupted.

I have the honor to be, &c.
(Signed)

WM. PINKNEY.

Extract of a letter from Mr. Pinkney, to the Secretary of State of the United States.

LONDON, February 12, 1811. "I received a few hours fince, a letter from Lord Wellfley (of which a copy is enclosed) in anfwer to mine of the 14th ultimo, refpecting the British orders in council and blockades."

1

Lord Wellesley to Mr. Pinkney.

SIR FOREIGN OFFICE, February 11, 1811. The letter which I had the honor to receive from you, under date the 14th of January, 1811, has been fubmitted to his royal highnefs the prince regent.

In communicating to you the orders which I have received from his royal highness on the fubject of your letter, I am commanded to abftain from any courfe of argument, and from any expreffions, which (however juftified by the general tenor of your obfervations) might tend to interrupt the good understanding, which it is the with of his royal highnefs, on the behalf of his ma jefly, to maintain with the government of the United States.

No statement contained in your letter appears to affect the general principles, which I had the honor to communicate to you in my letter of the 29th of December, 1810.

Great Britain has always infifted upon her right of felf-defence against the fyftem of commercial warfare pursued by France, and the Britilh orders of council were founded upon a juft principle of retaliation against the French decrees. The incidental operation of the orders of council upon the commerce of the United States, (although deeply to be lamented) must be ascribed exclufively to the violence and injuftice of the enemy, which compelled this country to refort to adequate means of defence. It cannot now be amitted that the foundation of the original queftion fhould be changed, and that the .nafure of retaliation adopted against France fhould now be relinquifhed, at the defire of the United States, without any reference to the actual conduct of the enemy. The intention has been repeatedly declared of repealing the orders of council, whenever France fhall actually have revoked the decree of Berlin and Milan, and fhall have reftored the trade of neutral nations to the condition in which it ftood previously to the promulgation of thofe decrees. Even admitting that France has fufpended the operation of those decrees, or has repealed them, with reference to the United States, it is evident that fhe has not relinquithed the conditions exprefsly declared in the letter of the French minifter, under date of Aug. 5, 1810. France, therefore, requires that G. Britain fhall not only repeal the orders of council, but renounce thofe principles of blockade which are alledged in the fame letter to be new; an allegation which must be understood to refer to the introductory part of the Berlin decree. If Great Britain fhall not fubmit to the fe terms, it is plainly intimated in the fame letter that France requires America to enforce them.

To thefe conditions, his royal highnefs, on behalf of his ma. jefty, cannot accede. No principles of blockade have been promulgated or acted upon by Great Britain previously to the Berlin decree, which are not strictly conformable to the rights of civilized war, and to the approved ufages and law of nations. The blockades established by the orders of council reft on feparate grounds, and are justified by the principles of neceffary retaliation in which they originated.

The conditions exacted by France, would require Great Brit ain to furrender to the enemy the most important maritime rights and interefts of the united kingdoms.

I am commanded to inform you that his royal highnefs cannot confent to blend the queftion which has arifen upon the orders of council, with any difcuffion of the general principles of blockade.

This declaration does not preclude any amicable difcuffion upon the fubject of any particular blockade, of which the circumftances may appear to the government of the United States to be exceptionable, or to require explanation.

I have the honor to be, &c. &c.

Mr. Pinkney to Lord Wellesley.

MY LORD, London, February 13, 1811 I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 11th inftant, and will tranfmit a copy of it to my government. I can have no inducement to trouble your lordship any farther upon the subject to which it relates: 1 have the honor to be, &c. &c.

WM. PINKNEY.

Lord Wellesley to Mr. Pinkney.

The marquis Wellesley has the honor to inform Mr Pinkney, that his royal highness, the prince regent, will receive the foreign minifters at his levee at Carlton houfe, on Tuesday next, the 19th inftant, at two o'clock.

Foreign Office, February 12, 1811.

Mr. Pinkney to Lord Wellesley.

MY LORD, Great Cumberland Place, February 13, 1811. Referring to my letter of the 14th of laft month, I beg to be informed by your lordship, at what time his royal highness the prince regent will do me the honor to give me audience of leave. I have the honor to be, &c.

Sir,

(Signed)

WM. PINKNEY.

Mr. Pinkney to Mr. Smith.

London, Febr. 16, 1811. I received at a very late hour last night two notes (bearing date "February 15, 1811") of which copies, marked No. 1, and No. 2, are inclosed.

Taken together (as of course they muft be) they announce the oppointment of Mr. Fofter as envoy extraordinary and minifter plenipotentiary to the United States, and fet forth the reasons why an appointment has been fo long delayed.

You will preceive, in the fecond and third paragraphs of the un