Mr. Russell to Mr. Smith, Secretary of State.

Paris, 21st January, 1811. On the 13th instant I received a note dated that day from the duke of Cadore, in answer to the representation which I had made to him on the 12th of this month, relative to the exceptionable powers intended to be exercised by French confuls in the United States, in perfeeling the contemplated trade under licenses.

You will perceive with satisfaction, that not only these powers, but the system itself, under which they were to have been exer: cised, have been abandoned. I have the honor, &c. (Signed)


The duke de Cadore to Mr. Russell.

Paris, 18th January, 1811.
I have read with much attention your note of the 12th January,
relative to the licenses intended to favor the commerce of the A
mericans in France; this system had been conceived before the
revocation of the decrees of Berlin and Milan had been refolved
upon. Now circumstances are changed by the resolution taken
by the United States, to cause their flag and their independence
to be respected, that which has been done before this last epoch,
can no longer serve as a rule under actual circumstances.
Accept the assurances of my high consideration.

CHAMPAGNY, Duke de Cadore.

[ocr errors]

Mr. Russell to the Duke of Bassano.

Paris, 29th April, 1811. Encouraged by the asfurances which your excellency was pleased to give me in the conversation which I had the honor to hold with you yesterday, that the French government was dispos. ed to promote, as far as might be in its power, the success of the miffion of the special minister of the United States to the court of Denmark, I dare persuade myself that your excellency will feel no hesitation in returning such an answer tothe following inquiries as shall place the facts

to which they relate beyond the possibility of doubt or controversy.

ist. Did not the minister of foreign relations, by a despatch dated the 20th of April, 1808, authorize the confuls of France in the United States to deliver certificates of origin to vessels def. tined for neutral or allied ports, and prescribe the formalities re. quired for such certificates ?

2d. Was not the despatch of the duke of Cadore, of the 30th of August laft, the first that was received in the United States, ei. ther by the French minister or consul general there, prohibiting the further delivery by French consuls of certificates of origin, except to veffels destined to French ports?

3d. Was not this last mentioned despatch first received by gen. eral Turreau, on the 13th of November last, and for the first time communicated by him on that day to the French confuls? And were not thefe confuls in the official and authorized practice, until the faid 13th of November, of furnishing certificates of orig. in to American veftels bound to neutral ports, or to ports belonging to the allies of France, and might not some of thefe confuls, by reason of their distance from the place of residence of general Turreau, have lawfully executed and delivered such certificates several days subsequent to that time?

These facts are directly established by the letter of geneal Tur. reau to Mr. Smith, of the 12th of November last, or necessarily inferred from the declaration contained in that letter, and I cannot permit myself to doubt that your excellency will readily repeat them in a form that shall claim the attention of the Danish govern. ment, and induce it to correct any errors which an ignorance or misapprehension of them may have occafioned in its proceedings against American property.

I rely with the more confidence on the frankness of your excellency in according the request now presented to you, as a re. fufal might operate the confiscation of much innocent property, and at the fame time appear to falsify the law ful acts of the consuls and the official declaration of the minister of France in the United States. I beg leave to renew to your excellency the assurance, &c.


Mr. Russell to Mr. Smith. SIR,

Paris, 27th May, 1811.
By the first opportunity which presented itself after the admission
of our veffels on the 4th of May, I communicated this event to
the American charge d'affaires at London, in hopes that it might
be ufeful there. The enclosed is a copy of the note which I ad. .
dressed to him on the occasion.
I am, &c. &c.

Mr. Russell to Mr. J. S. Smith.

Paris, 10th May, 1811.
I had you herewith the copy of a letter to me from his excel.
lency, th e duke of Bassano, dated the 4th inft. * and inclosing a lift
of the A.merican vefsels whose cargoes have been admitted by or-
der of the emperor.

As this rift contains all the American vessels, except one only whose papeyrs were mislaid, which have arrived spontaneously in


* See this cypy in the inclosures of Mr. Russell's letter 15th July, which will be yound in a subsequent part of this correspondence.

the ports of France, since the first of November last, which had not already been admitted ; the measure adopted by this govern. ment may perhaps be considered to be of a general charaéter and a consequence of the actual relations between the two countries, growing out of the rcvocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees, so far as they violated the neutral rights of the United States. I am, fir, with great confideration, &c. (Signed)


[Documents to be continued.]

[Debates in Congress---Continued.

In Senate Dec. 18. MR. G. W. CAMPBELL'S SPEECH In support of the motion to reduce the number of regiments proposed

in the bill to raise an additional military force, and in reply to Mr. Giles.

MR. CAMPBELL (of Tennessee) rose, and in substance made the following observations. He said, he would submit to the Senate some of the reasons which would govern bis vote on this question : and then he would notice such of the remarks made by the honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Giles) as appeared to him to relate to the grounds on which he acted. It would seem, said Mr. C. from what has passed on this subject, that little or no difference of opinion exists, especiall among gentlemen on the republican side, with regard to the objects to be effected by the troops proposed to be raised. All appear to admit the time has arrived, in which you ought to, and must act; the crisis requires it; the nation imperiously demands it; and nothing but a speedy and honorable accommodation of existing difa ferences, securing your rights or open war, in which you may a. venge your wrongs, will meet public expectation. To produce one' or other of these results, and be fully prepared for either alternative, was his object; and he would vote for such a force as appeared to him best calculated for that purpose. If all are serious, said Mr. C. as I trust they are, in the professions made on this subject, the only difference of opinion appears to be in regard to the number and kind of troops necessary to effect the objects in view. Qur decision on this point must be governed by the information we possess. The amount, as well as the description, of forces to be raised, ought, in a degree, to be proportioned to and regulated by the impression intended to be made on your expected eremy, and the probable force to be resisted or subdued. The purpose for which these troops are raised, and the immediate use to be made of them, appear now to be made no secret. The honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Giles) told you this force of 25,000 troops, proposed to be raised by this bill, ought to be considered the army of the north, and are intended to

[ocr errors]

take and occupy Canada, &c. If it be intended, said Mr. C. to occupy this country, of which at present there appears no ground to doubt, it ought to be done with the least possible delay, and in a time much shorter than would be required to raise so large a regular force. This number, with the present establishment of 10,000 men, make an aggregate amount of 35,000. Of these you have in service little more than 5000 of course, near 30,000 are yet to be enlisted. To raise and discipline this number, or the half of it, would consume more time than ought to elapse before you act, if you are determined to act with effect.

The motion is to strike out the word “ten,” the number of regiments of infantry, for the purpose of inserting “six.” This would make the number of troops to be raised by this bill, somewhat less than 17,000 men, and increase the whole regular force to nearly 27,000 men. Mr. C. said, from the best view which he had been able to take of the subject, upon the information we now possess,this force, aided by a proper proportion of volunteers, would be fully competent to effect any object the government can have in view; to resist and subdue any force ; and to occupy, if necessary, any territory in your neighborbood. On any sudden emergency, the number of volunteers or militia actually employed, might and perhaps generally ought to be equal, and on many occasions much exceed, that of the regular troops, as they could be organized and marched to the scene of action in much shorter time than would be consumed in raising regular troops ; would consist of better materials, and could be more relied upon to make a first impression than newly enlisted troops, without the advantages of discipline. They would also, when the service was completed, lay down the military character, return to their homes and again amalgamate with their fellow citizens, without a murmur. Hence the expense would be inconsiderable, the time of service being probably short. It is, therefore, fair to calculate, if your regular force amouuts to 27,000 men,' that you ought to, and will have in actual service, and of course in pay, 40,000 men. And will it be contended, that this force is not sufficient to accomplish all the purposes which the most sanguine have in view ?

But it seems volunteers are not now to be relied on. You must depend entirely on regular troops-on a standing army. This doctrine is of modern date among republicans, and may, if it should gain currency, sap the vital principles of your government. The language of the President on this subject, in his message, breathes a very different spirit. He recommends, “that adequate provision be made, for filling the ranks and prolonging the enlistments of the regular troops : for an auxiliary force to be engaged for a more limited term ; for the acceptance of volunteer corps, whose patriotic ardor may court a participation in urgent services; for detachments, as they may be wanted, of other portions of the militia,” &c. Here, we perceive, he considers the new force recommended to be raised as only auxiliary to the present regerlar force. Hence it would seem fair to conclude,he did not mean the number of the former should exceed that of the latter. But he seems to place considerable confidence in “volunteer corps," on the ground that their “ patriotic ardor may court a participation in urgent services”—those yery kind of services for which the force is now to be provided. He did, therefore, contemplate that such volunteers should constitute an efficient part of the force to be employed in effecting the more important objects now in view ; and that the militia also should be engaged, and contribute their share in supporting any. contest that might ensue. But it seems, your volunteers and militia are considered totally incompetent to perform any important military services; from them you are required to withdraw your confidence and place it in regular troops only, of whom you must raise an army sufficiently large to effect all your purposes. Let this doctrine be once established, and the people may tremble for their liberties when it is too late—when their chains are rivetted upon them by the machinery of military power. But the attem

But the attempt to raise so large a regular force at this moment, would retard, instead of accelerating the completion of the objects intended ; for it will be found impracticable to enlist and organize such force in time to act before the proper season is gone, before the ice breaks up in the spring. You might indeed collect that portion which consists of officers; but you could not fill up the common ranks. If 10 or 15,000 effectives could be brought into service in time, it would equal his most sanguine expectations. You would therefore have, it is believed, a force equally efficient, if the proposed amendment prevailed, as if the bill passed in its present shape; while your expenditures would be thereby greatly diminished, and no obstacle whatever presented to the most decisive and vigorous course of proceeding. : If immediate operations be intended, as he trusted they were, they must be principally carried on, in the first instance, by volunteers, who could and ought to be embodied and prepared to act on the shortest notice. For this purpose, authorize the Executive immediately to officer, organize for a limited time, and put into motion, such number of volunteers, who may render their services, as shall be deemed competent to the occasion ; bring to the scene of action as many of your present regular troops as may be spared from other services and can with the least delay be concentrated : and let these, united with your volunteers, and such of the new troops as can be raised in time, make the first impression ; scize and occupy the country contemplated, and maintain the contest until the additional regular force about to be raised can be organized and brought into actual service. These may then support and in due time relieve your volunteers_hold the advantages you may have gained-repel any force that may be brought to oppose them--and extend, if required, your acquisitions--while, in the mean time, sufficient corps of the militia may be called into service and employed within the limits of the Union, with such of the regular troops as may be retained for the purpose, to protect your

« 前へ次へ »