serious impression. It appeared to him at the time a very extraordinary measure, and the most impolitic and dangerous that could have been proposed; and he would venture to assert, you might in vain search for its likeness in the annals of nations-it was in fact putting it in the power of one belligerent to declare war for you, or determine when you should declare it against the other; and at the same time, enabling the other, who would know, if she did not accede to the terms proposed, war would be the consequence, to take advantage of the situation in which you would place yourself, and, in case she determined not to revoke her edicts, make the first attack upon you, when you would first learn such her determination, from the mouths of her cannon, by the seizure of your ships, and the bombardment of your towns. It would also be holding out a threat to the belligerents, which would be more likely to enlist their pride on the side of persevering in their measures, than to induce them to change them— · And this is the very wise and important measure said to be intended as a substitute for the embargo! "To maintain the honor and promote the interest of the nation; and the rejecting of which occasioned the British government to disavow the arrangement made with Mr. Erskine!" Mr. C. said, he could hardly persuade himself the honorable gentleman was serious in this statement. It was the first time he had ever heard any importance attached to that measure. It was in itself too crude, and inconsistent with national policy, to claim or receive public notice at home or abroad; its existence was probably never known in Great Britain, and its rejection could certainly have had no agency in the disavowal of the arrangement with Mr. Erskine. The premature repeal of the embargo, combined with the great events then unfolding themselves in Europe, no doubt produced the disavowal of that arrangement.

Among the many extraordinary materials pressed into this discussion, was a paragraph from a newspaper published in Quebec, read by the gentleman, it is presumed as part of his speech. This was not a comment on the president's message, (as it was stated by the gentleman to be) but a petty effort, of the most stupid kind, to censure, by anticipation, what the writer supposed the message, which he had not seen, would contain. Mr. C. said, he would not deign to remark on the contents of that production, nor sully the discussions of the senate, by again bringing before them matter, in his opinion so indecorous, as well as frivolous and irrelevant. ticed it only to express his surprise, that the honorable member, contrary, as he believed, to his usual practice, should so far descend from the respect due himself and the national legislature, as to introduce on this floor a scurrilous paragraph from a petty newspaper, published in a neighboring dependent colony of a foreign power, the object of which was to reflect on the proceedings, though not then known, of his own government.

The honorable gentleman has told you, that in 1776, when your population was but about two millions, you had more than 46,000

regular troops in service; and now, when your population is more than three-fold, and your pecuniary resources greatly increased, it is proposed to raise 35,000 only, and yet an alarm is made about supporting them, &c.-and he asks, "if we are at the maximum of our capacity? and whether an occasion does not exist to call out a force as great as our capacity would enable us?" &c.-Mr. C. said, according to the information he had obtained on the subject, the 46,000 men in service in 1776, were not all regular troops, but including all descriptions of troops then employed under public authority. He could not, however, perceive how the number employed in 1776 should regulate the number now to be raised. The object then was, to shake off the shackles of slavery that enchained the people of this country, and were about being rivetted on them with additional severity. It was a great effort to resist the oppression of a powerful nation, having at the time, and claiming the right to hold, the actual government of the country; and possessing a disposable force, which it was known she intended to employ for the subjugation of the people of this country, much greater than their population or means could be supposed equal to resist. The question, then, with the American people, was not what force would be necessary to bring into service, but what force the exertion of their utmost energies could oppose to their powerful enemy. Such is not the question at this time; no one denies the ability of the nation to bring into actual service, and also provide for their support, if the Occasion required it, not only 35,000, but 100,000 men. Seven millions of people, with the pecuniary resources of this country, properly managed, could not be really oppressed by the employment and support of 100,000 men for such term as it is reasonable to suppose the war would continue. But the question now ought to be, what number of troops, and of what description, is requisite to accomplish, in due time, and with sufficient certainty, the objects you have in view, and would at the same time occasion the least public inconvenience, and produce the least pecuniary pressure on the people. To determine this correctly, you must regulate the number and description of troops you call into service, by the amount and kind of force to be resisted or subdued, and not by the capacity of the nation. There is no ground to believe, from the gentleman's own statement, the force to be opposed is so great as to require the utmost exertions of the nation. We have not, therefore, said Mr. C. come to the maximum of our capacity, nor does an occasion exist that requires a force to be raised as great as our capacity would enable us. It would be the worst policy we could pursue, and prove most injurious to the nation, to call into actual service, at the commencement of a war, a force so greatly beyond what the occasion demanded, and thereby waste your strength and exhaust your resources before the crisis arrived that might require the exertion of all your energies.

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It would seem, said Mr. C. as if gentlemen conceived they evinc

ed their patriotism by the number of regular troops for which they voted-nothing could, however, be more fallacious, nor would the public be deceived by such a delusion. It was as easy to vote for 100,000 men as for 10,000; but the people must at last furnish both the soldiers and the means to support them-and the nation will be able to determine by the conduct and votes of gentlemen, on the ulterior measures that may come before you, whether the advocates for so large a regular force as that contained in the bill, or those who support the present motion, being disposed to provide such forces and of such descriptions only as in their opinion, as well as that of the government, would be sufficient to meet the present emergency, and could be most usefully employed, are most in earnest on this subject, and will ultimately prove mcst firm and decided in supporting the rights and honor of their country.

Among the strange doctrines lately advanced, one is introduced on this occasion by the hon. gentleman, that will not a little surprise the people of America, and that is, that the accumulation of public debt is of no great importance to the nation. The gentleman asked if any one felt any benefit from the payment of fifty millions of the public debt? And observed, to use his own words, "the increase of the public debt is no great bug-bear." The advantages arising from extinguishing the public debt, said Mr. C. cannot well be mistaken, and must be felt by every member of society capable of feeling the pressure of public taxes. By the extinguishment of 50 millions of your public debt, which has been effected by the operations of your treasury department, the nation is relieved from the payment of at least three millions of interest annually, a sum more than the proceeds of all the internal taxes, the repeal of which has been so much regretted by the hon. gentleman. Your finances are therefore rendered as productive by the extinction of that amount of debt, without those internal taxes, as they would be with them, had such debt continued unpaid; and this sum of three millions annually, remains now at the disposal of the government, may be applied to the support of the war, in case of such event, and will therefore certainly diminish, by that amount, the revenue to be raised annually from the people-would they not therefore be sensible of this, and consider it a benefit? But it seems the increase of the public debt is not matter of much importance to the nation! Are the people to be told, that to augment the public debt, which they and their successors are solemnly pledged to reimburse, which is an incumbrance to its full extent on their estates and possessions of every kind, is in itself of so little consequence as not to be considered of much importance to the nation? Upon the same principle the gentleman might say, that to impose new taxes on the people, to increase their burdens from time to time until they groaned under the pressure, would not be matter of such importance to the nation. Is the old maxim formerly ascribed to the opposition "that a public debt is a public blessing" and once so much and so justly reprobated, now again brought forward,

and supported by professed republicans? This has always been con sidered the rankest doctrine of high toned leaders in Federal times, and cannot fail to awaken the public mind to investigate the views of those who advocate it.

House of Representatives, January 17.

DEBATE ON THE NÁVY BILL. The bill concerning the Naval Establishment being under consideration, in committee of the whole, and the question being to fill the blank for repairing the Frigates, &c.

MR. CHEVES, (the Chairman of the Navy Committee) moved to fill the blank in the firft fection of the bill with "four hundred and eighty thousand dollars," and faid he believed it to be his duty at this time to difclose to the committee of the whole the views and motives of the felect committee, in reporting the bill. Mr. C. faid, I confider this fubject as one of the most im. portant that can be brought before this Houfe; as a great queftion, involving to a confiderable extent the fate of a fpecies of national defence the molt effential and neceffary to the interefts of this country. I know, faid Mr. C. how many and how ftrong are the prejudices, how numerous and how deeply laid are the errors which I have to encounter in the difcuffion of this queftion; errors and prejudices the more formidable as they come recom. mended by the virtues and thielded by the eftimable motives of thofe who indulge them. I have been told, faid Mr. C. that this fubject is unpopular, and it has been not indiftinctly hinted that thole who become the zealous advocates of the bill will not advance by their exertions the perfonal eftimation in which they may be held by their political affociates. I will not, faid Mr. C. do my political friends the injuftice to believe that thefe exertions will diminish their confidence; but, could I think otherwife, I hope I fhall never be diverted from a faithful difcharge of my duty by confiderations of this kind. I with to lead no man, and I am determined to be blindly led by no man. In acting with a party, I do fo because I adopt their leading principles and politics as the best, and because I believe, from the nature of free govern. ment, it is necessary so to act to give efficiency to the exertions of any individual: but I do not feel myself, therefore, bound to renounce my deliberate opinions on all the great interefts of the nation, or to take no independent part in the exertions of the party to which I belong. I sincerely believe, faid Mr. C. that if this infant naval establishment be either abandoned or put down, the party who now form the majority in this House, and in the country, may run great risque of becoming the minority not only within thefe walls, but in the nation.

This queftion, faid Mr. C. muft be difcuffed on this occafion, on new principles. Hitherto, in politics, as in fcience and morals, there have been certain fixed principles, which, to attempt to prove, would be confidered as trifling with the bearer; and cer

tainly among thofe the propriety and neceffity of protecting commerce, in a commercial country, would have been ranked. But we have heard it faid, and it has almoft become popular and fathjonable to fay on this floor, that the nation ought not to go to war for the protection of commerce; and, by ftronger reafon, that it ought not to establish a navy, which, it is fuppofd, is fitted only for that object; that nothing should provoke us to this act of national refiftance but the actual invafion of our foil. When fuch principles have been avowed, the friends of the bill before you cannot deem it unneceffary-the opponents of it cannot confider it as improperly obtrufive to discufs the queftion, whether the commerce of this country is entitled to protection? I afk the patient attention of the committee, faid Mr. C. to fuch arguments as fhall grow out of the subject, which I will endeavor to lay before them with as much precifion and clearness as I am able. I fhall not hesitate to occupy their time by a tuil de velopement of them as the importance of the qui ftion demands, and will justify it while the errors and prejudices that encumber and embarrafs the fubje&t render it neceflary.

Is commerce, then, in this country, entitled to protection?, The object of all government is protection-the ftrong under it are more effectually protected by the combination of their ftrength with the power of weaker interefis-even to the ftrong this protection is neceflary; but it is more the object of the weak, and to them is more neceffary. How obvious, then, is the violation of the object of all government, if the weaker interefts are denied protection because it may require fome facrifices from the ftrong? Yet this violation is really, though not oftenfibly afferted to be juftifiable by thofe who fay we fhall not exert the national energies in the form of war for the protection of commerce. Agriculture, they fay, is the great intereft of the country; and as war will require of it great facrifices, therefore the protection of commerce ought to be abandoned. And is it, then, true, that the greatest interest which enjoys the protection of government and exacts of the weaker the facrifices neceffary for this end, fhall in turn fuffer nothing in defence of thofe interefts with which it is affociated? No, that is too monstrous a principle to be afferted. But gentlemen fay, it is not incumbent on a government to defend the fmallest intereft which claims its prote&ion by the greatest facrifices of which it is capable-the fufferings of war and its calamitous and ruinous conf quences. This protection of commerce will coft more, they fay, than the object is worth, and therefore ought not to be granted. The fe pofitions I deny, faid Mr. C.; and although I admit that the fmallest interests of fociety are not to be defended by the greateft exertion, by war, becaule partial interefts muft yield to the great and general interefts of fociety; yet every other intereft is not to yield to the greatest intereft. When the intereft in queftion becomes a general one, and affumes the character of one of the great interests of the