the belligerent refuses to neutrals the liberty of carrying on, during the war, those parts of the enemy's trade, from which they are excluded in time of peace, and which has usually been applied to the coasting and colonial trade of France. One of the articles of the armed neutrality in 1780, claimed the right of carrying on unmolested these branches of French commerce, although prohibited in time of peace: this unjust pretension, aimed at our naval dominion, was renewed by the hostile convention of 1800, nearly in the following words: "That neutral ships may navigate freely from post to post, and upon the coasts of the belligerent powers." The present convention adopts very nearly the same terms; by it, "neutral ships are permitted to navigate freely to the ports and upon the coasts of the belligerent powers:' and in the next section of this article, it is added, that "the effects embarked on board neutral ships shall be free, with the exception of contraband of war, and of enemy's property." By the first of these clauses the hostile claim of the northern league is completely recognized, as far as relates to the coasting trade; by the latter it as clearly concedes to the neutral powers the right in time of war to carry on the whole colonial trade of France, under the pretence of its being their acquired property. Thus have we surrendered for ever, with out reserve or compensation, the whole of this long admitted claim, its principle, and its practice. We have given by it to our enemy, in any future contest, all the resources of commerce; and we have deprived the valour and energy of our navy, of the just reward which it

now derives from its most valuable captures!

On the second of the general principles of the convention, that' which is opposed to the absurd and unjust pretension, viz. that "free ships make free goods,” there is in this treaty a proper recognition of the long established public law of Europe on that head.

The third, which applies to "contraband of war," lays down a principle the most fatal that could possibly be devised to our future maritime dominion; by it" all ambiguity or misunderstanding as to what ought to be considered as "contraband of war," is declared. Nor is this declaration the concession of any special privilege to the contracting parties, but the recognition of a preexistent right, which as such cannot be refused to any other independent state. In the enumeration of such articles, cannons and firelocks, helmets and swords, saddles and bridles, are carefully set down, with others of a nature appropriate to a war by land; but iron and timber, pitch and tar, masts, hemp, sail-cloth and cordage, are by it not only declared not to be contraband, but not even to be naval stores! So that so soon as our present commercial treaty shall have expired with America, we must, in our renewal of it, abide by that rule of public law, which we have ourselves proclaimed: in similar circumstances shall we find ousrselves situated with Holland, with Spain, with Portugal, with Prussia, in short with every maritime power of Europe not a party to this convention.

Blockaded ports is the next subject which this treaty embraces: on this head we shall not go into the exami

nation of what is the precise nature of a blockade by sea, always an intricate and difficult subject; but there is ground sufficient to call in question the justice and policy of the whole stipulation on this head. From the words of the article, the blockade is understood to last so jong only, as that there shall be evident danger of entering, and to be raised as often as that danger ceases, even for the shortest interval. In this light, declaration of blockade, or of its having ceased, heretofore the assurance required of the existence of such a measure, is abrogated; there must, under this new code, be the actual presence at all times, and at all seasons, of the blockading squadron to constitute a blockade, contrary to the very nature of naval operations, which necessarily depend on the variations of the weather, and which must occasionally compel absence from the port, frequently to such a distance as that no evident danger can exist in entering it. Nor can any neutral ship bereafter be detained, bound to such port, if met with at a distance from it, because by this regulation it is made impossible that the officer of the belligerent can know that the blockade does at that moment subsist, and because the fact of its existence can alone justify the detention.

The "right of search," the last material principle of the convention, and which might, had the code of naval law, which Great Britain has hitherto asserted on this point, been steadily maintained, have cured in its operation many of the gross and dangerous deficiencies we have already pointed out in the preceding articles. But unfortunately in this instance, as in the others, we have

to record the magnanimous concessions which we have made, pot only of our own rights, but the rights of all Europe, in the moment of triumph and of victory; not as a peace-offering to a powerful and grasping enemy, but to a prince, our ally, whose moderation and friendship to us were equally conspicuous; and who could not possibly gain to his own dominions, at least in the present posture of affairs, any commercial or maritime advantages from the sacrifices we have made, proportioned to their extent and consequence. The right of visiting ships under neutral convoy is indeed, by the words of this article, established; but we have so limited and circumscribed it in the operation, as to render it completely invalid and nugatory. As the law will now stand the suspicion must precede the inquiry, and no detention can take place unless the officer be already in possession of evident facts, establishing the violation of neutrality. How this mode of visiting and detaining neutral ships can be reduced to practice, with any sort of advantage to Great Britain, it is difficult to point out. If the papers of the ship detained be regular (and it would be strange indeed if they were not), the ship itself is not to be visited; but if some valid motive of suspicion should exist," then the officer may make further search. Unless indeed it be understood that the framer of this article on our part wished to sanction, under the ambiguity of phrase, the power of eluding the whole object of the stipulation, what valid object of suspicion can arise in the mind of an officer, respecting a ship whose name he never heard before, whose

crew

crew and cargo he has never seen, nor is permitted to see, unless the papers are bunglingly fabricated? What judge can he be, or what conjecture can he make, at that distance, of what concealed articles the ship may carry? Can he in such a situation acquire the details which the information of some or all of the crew might furnish him; or can he, from the papers, decide whether the ship be victualled and stored as they indicate?

Thus have we entered minutely into the component parts of this celebrated convention. To the whole of the treaty it must be objected, that whatever might be the circumstances which induced us to conclude it in the present manner and form, with one or more powers of Europe, we should have guarded, by the most explicit declarations, against the possibility of our special engagements being converted into general rules, applicable to all other countries: and this for the obvious reason, that we were now limiting our ancient rights by express stipulations. The reverse of this policy has, however, been unfortunately pursued. We have by the words of the treaty declared, that the stipulations to which we have now acceded "shall be regarded as permanent, and shall

serve as a constant rule to the contracting powers, in matters of commerce and navigation."

Nor should it be forgotten that this treaty, in the modern spirit of innovation, has unsettled the basis of the public law of Europe, venerable for its antiquity, respectable for its equity, and above all valuable for the stability of its principles.

This was the first great measure of Mr. Addington's administration which could fairly be said to come before the public.

The preliminaries of the peace with France were, in their own nature, too loose and undefined, to serve as data by which the political wisdom of him and his colleagues were to be determined on by the public. The convention with Russia stood in a very different predicament. It was the mature and perfected result of many months negotiation: for the reasons we have already given, a minute consideration of its merits and defects was hardly given to it in any quarter; all its demerits were overlooked or were swallowed up in the vortex of delight and rapture at the ter mination of the war; and the "convention" and the "preliminaries" went hand in hand in the triumphant progress of Mr. Addington's administration.

CHAP

business of moment oc

N° curred in either house of

parliament worth detailing for the remainder of the year 1801, if we except the conversation which arose in consequence of a motion made by sir W. Pulteney, on the subject of the East India trade, and some observations of the right honourable Mr. Grenville on the sailing of the Brest fleet for St. Domingo.

Sir W. Pulteney had, some time previously to his motion, given notice of it, and had repeatedly deferred it on the ground that he understood that the parties were disposed to settle the matter in dispute without the interference of parliament. On the 25th of November, however, finding that there was little prospect of an amicable adjustment on the subject of the free trade between those whose concern it immediately was, he was determined to bring it at length before the house of commons.

Sir W. Pulteney prefaced his motion, relative to the trade between this country and the East Indies, with entering into a com

prehensive historical retrospect of the original rise and establishment of the East India company. The cause of that institution, he said, was twofold. In the first place, it was the object of government to get an ample loan, in compensation for the exclusive monopoly granted to the company. Secondly, that exclusive charter was granted for this reason, because the trade with India, from the great distance of the latter country, could not possibly be carried on by individuals, but required a confederated capital. In the reign of queen Anne, a larger sum of money was raised by the erection of another company. These two companies were afterwards united and consolidated into one, under the title of the United Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies. At the time the encroachment of foreign companies constituted the principal object of the jealousy of the British traders, the speculation went on prosperously, and was eminently lucrative. But when they departed from their simple character of merchants, and

acquired

acquired territorial possessions, they became subject to considerable losses. So great was the falling off, that the rupee, which was worth upwards of 2s. did not fetch more than 1s. 3d. Things continuing in this adverse train, a bill was, in 1782, brought into parliament, the effect of which went to take the trade out of the company's hands altogether. It is true that this bill did not eventually pass, being thrown out in the lords, after it had gone through the commons, and been read twice in the upper house. But though the bill was lost, the necessity of some system of regulation was universally felt and acknowledged. Under this impression, parliament applied to a milder mode of correction, by the establishment of the board of control. In this state the business continued till the year 1793, when the question of the renewal of the company's charter came on. Particular attention was, on this occasion, devoted to the consideration of the free trade, and many clauses were introduced into the bill relating to that subject. On this point he could not refrain from observing, that all the different governors who had been appointed to the command in the East Indies had, without a single exception, given their opinions in favour of the principle of granting greater facilities to the free trade, which they considered as essential to the very primary interests of the company. The directors of the company, on the contrary, had always set their faces against the proposition, notwithstanding the declared sentiments of their officers, refusing to facilitate the free trade, exeept in such a way as rendered it 4

impossible for the English trader te enter into a fair competition with foreigners. Acting on the same principle which all his predecessors in the government of India had avowed, lord Wellesley, in the year 1798, granted a greater latitude of permission to the free trade. The directors of the company, however, though they had not been able to substantiate any proof of disadvantage which had accrued from the system, wrote against it very forcibly to lord Wellesley; in consequence of which, his lordship, in 1799, was more tenacious of granting facilities to the free trade. In the following year, 1800, lord Wellesley found himself, however, under the necessity of again resorting to his former principle, which produced strong remonstrances against the measure, on the part of the directors, who persisted in their system of hampering the native trader, to the emolument of foreign speculators. On these grounds, he felt it his duty to bring the business fully and directly before parliament. The house would have the goodness to recollect, that the trade to India was divided into two branches-the trade to China; and that to India, as it was called: the latter embracing Bengal, Calcutta, and the rest of the settlements., The joint produce of these two branches amounted, in the year 1800, to 7,000,000l. sterling: of these, 4,000,000l. sterling were reexported. The proportion of the free trade was nearly 3,500,000l. sterling. The trade carried on by foreigners amounted to considerably more than 1,500,000l. sterling. To what extent the trade might be carried and improved, it was impossible to say. In the single ar

ticle