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CHA P. XII.

Debate on the Definitive Treaty in the House of Lords.-Speeches of Lord Grenville, Duke of Norfolk, Lords Pelham, Mulgrave, Auckland, Caernarvon, Westmoreland, Ellenborough, Darnley, Rosslyn, Duke of Richmond, Lord Eldon (Chancellor), Camden, Hobart, Spencer.-Lord Grenville's Address lost. — Address moved in the Commons same Day by Mr. Windham.-Speeches of Lords Folkstone, Hawkesbury, Mr. T. Grenville, Dundas-(Adjournment of a Day-Debate resumed)-Sir William Young, Lord Castlereagh, Lord Temple, General Maitland, Dr. Lawrence, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Sheridan---- Division---- Mr. Windham's Address negatived.

THE

HE important and long expected debate on the definitive treaty took place, on the 13th of May, in both houses. In the house of lords, after some previous observations by lord Stanhope, who moved that strangers should withdraw, (while he endeavoured to impress upon his noble audience, the dangers that might in future arise from the French nation having taken under their patronage the American, Fulton, the inventor of the batteau plongeur, or diving boat *.)

Lord Grenville rose, in order to make a motion respecting the treaty which was now for the consideration of the house. He and his noble friends had already frequently advanced arguments against the treaty, while those whose duty it was to defend it had remained silent. It had been his opinion that repeated opportunities should have been taken for discussing the treaty, before its merits were to have been

decided on. His majesty's ministers, however, thought otherwise,and had hitherto remained silent. It might be asked, what was the use of discussion now? Was it wished to overturn the treaty which had been concluded? He should be sorry to bring forward any motion if he could not answer those questions. Whatever disadvantages might result from this unfortunate treaty, yet it had been made by that power, to whom the constitution had given the right of making treaties which should bind the country; it had been ratified by his majesty; the great seal of the kingdom had been put to it; and it would be adding dishonour to our disasters if we should now recede from it, or not carry it into full effect. The faith of the country must at all events be preserved. The first proposition he should make to the house was, to declare to his majesty their opinion, that the public faith was pledged to the observance of the

* Vide" Useful Projects."

peace;

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peace; that it was an obligation on the country to preserve it inviolable. After such a declaration, what objection could there remain to a discussion? Why should he not be allowed to urge the house to set a mark on those impolitic and weak ministers who had negotiated such a treaty, and whose counsels had concluded it? It was not his wish to disturb the treaty now it was made, but only to lay before the house the dangerous tendency of its provisions, that future ministers might be warned against advising a measure so disadvantageous to the country. He wished also to point out the dangers which this treaty brought upon the country, in order that we might adopt a true courage, by preparing to meet them. He therefore intended now to propose, that an address should be laid before his majesty, expressive of the determination of that house to preserve inviolate the treaty, and then to represent to his majesty the state of the country, the dangers which threatened it, and the means of avoiding them; for this purpose, he must advert to the arguments which had been used against the preliminary treaties, and the events which had taken place since. He had already stated to the house his objections to the preliminaries; but if the definitive treaty had been conformable to the preliminaries and the relative situation of France and Spain, and the rest of Europe had remained the same, he should not now have proposed any new measure; but he now found that the terms of the definitive treaty were infinitely more prejudicial than those of the preliminaries. It had been already stated, that in all negotiations for peace, the basis

was either the status quo ante bellum, or the state before the war ; or else the uti possidetis, or the condition of the country after the war. Instead of our negotiators proceeding distinctly on either of those grounds, they had applied them both in the manner the most prejudicial that was possible to this country: they had applied the first principle to England, who was to give up all she had taken during the war to France; and they applied the last principle to France, by allowing her to remain in possession of all she had since acquired. The arrangement which was to have been desired was, that we should have diminished the power of France on the continent, in proportion to the sacrifices we made with respect to the colonies we had ceded. Ministers, however, appeared to have made no attempt at weakening the power of France on the continent; but by the concessions they had made, had given France the power of weakening us in our colonial possessions. The great lord Chatham had adopted a different principle, when he said, that every preliminary treaty should be as definitive as possible. In the interval between the preliminaries and the definitive treaty, we had allowed a naval armistice, during which the French government, in spite of our entreaties and our threats, sent to the West Indies a considerable armament, which obliged us also to send a much greater force there than ever we had done during the war. The first, fruits of the peace were, that we were under the necessity of keeping up a fleet of thirty-five sail of the line in the West Indies. Whether the expedition to St. Domingo was likely to be ultimately advanta

tageous

geous or disadvantageous to France, ministers should not have permitted it to sail till the preliminary articles had been converted into a definitive treaty, nor should it have been allowed to sail until the first consul had renounced that important cession which had been made to him in Italy (the presidency of the Cisalpine republic). As to the pacific disposition of the French government, he could see nothing of it, they evidently evinced a design to exclude the commerce of this country from the continent of Europe. As to the fate of the prince of Orange, and the situation of Portugal, those subjects were indeed mentioned with some regret, but the indemnity which was mentioned in the treaty for the prince of Orange was a sort of an indemnity which France might give or withhold as she pleased. As to the island of Malta, nothing could be more absurd than the placing it under the guarantee of six powers, who could not be expected to be brought to agree on any one point respecting the island. The treaty professed to restore it to the order of Malta: this was still more absurd; for how could it be said that such an order was in existence, when almost all the funds necessary for the support of it had been confiscated? The expenses of the order of Malta (principally in fortifications and garrisons), on an average of the last ten years, was 130,000 annually. Their revenues from the island of Malta were only 34,000l. in the whole, and only 8000/. came into the coffers of the knights. Of those revenues which supported the order, France has, at the time of the suppression of the French langue, confiscated 58,000l. annually. Spain has confiscated

27,000l. per annum. The property of the order also in Piedmont and Lombardy had been confiscated, so that of their former income of 130,000l. only 20,000l. was now left, which was evidently insufficient to keep up the fortifications, or prepare for the defence of the island. The order of Malta was therefore extinct as a power, and must necessarily come under the influence and into the pay of France. The grand master would be elected by their nomination, and the whole order would be subordinate to them. In the West India islands, the proprietors of property in the settlements ceded to England were to have the right of removing themselves and their properties at their pleasure; but in the colonies ceded by us to France, the proprietors were to be absolutely subject to the regulations of the French government. With respect to our claims for the maintenance of French prisoners, a most audacious imposition had been practised against us: we had been obliged to make allowance for Russian prisoners, who had been armed, clothed, and destined, by a positive stipulation, to act against

us.

By the non-renewal of treaties the situation of this country was rendered much worse than it had been. By the non-renewal of the treaty of Utrecht, France might now acquire exclusive commercial privileges in Spanish South America. By the non-renewal of the treaty of 1783, France might exclude us from the gum trade on the coast of Africa. If the definitive treaty had been perfectly agreeable to the preliminaries which parliament had approved of, he should admit that the house was bound to sanction it. Since the preliminarics, however,

France,

France, by taking possession of Italy, had given ground for the renewal of war. His lordship then proceeded to compare a picture of the situation of the country before the negotiation, when we were masters of the West Indies, and derived great resources from thence, with the state in which the definitive treaty has left it. We had now left France all her preponderating strength upon the continent, and confirmed her in the possession of Italy. We had also given her very important settlements in India, without stipulating that they should not be fortified. Our right of sovereignty in India was not recognized, and the Cape of Good Hope was ceded. He considered the Cape of Good Hope as an object of the first importance to our Indian empire, both from the facilities it afforded to sending over troops, and as a station which, in the hands of our enemies, would greatly annoy our Indian trade, and make it necessary for us to send strong convoys with our homeward and outward bound fleets. By ceding the Cape to Holland, we had in fact ceded it to France. In the West Indies we had ceded Martinique and Tobago, and had facilitated the means of their recovering St. Domingo. In the Mediterranean too, where our naval superiority was most important, we had dispossessed ourselves of Malta, Minorca, and even the island of Elba, which France wanted, merely to exclude us from the port of Leghorn. We were now excluded from all the ports of Italy, and yet it must be recollected that it was from the accommodation which lord Nelson received in the ports of the king of Naples, that he was enabled to proceed to achieve the

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glorious victory of Aboukir. Every object of importance obtained by the valour of our navy had been ceded to France; and ministers at the same time disclaimed the plea of necessity for peace, which could alone have justified such enormous sacrifices. They, on the contrary, talked highly of the resources of the country to continue the contest. The advantages of the peace must be greater than the disadvantages of the war, or otherwise it must be evident that the peace was a bad one. What those advantages were he should now consider. First, it was said that peace would increase our commerce : on the contrary, he thought it would rather tend to diminish our commerce, by letting in the other maritime states, and France, in particular, to share it with us. Upon the question of economy he must observe, that in order to husband our revenue, it was necessary to be able to protect it, and with this view government would still be obliged to keep up a large naval and military establishment. If any security had been obtained against the renewal of war, he should rejoice at it, for we must renew it at a great disadvantage. If we recovered in three campaigns what we had given up by the treaty, he should consider it a glorious war. In this state of the country, he deemed it necessary to carry an address to the throne, containing a resolution to follow every practicable economy, that would still leave the country in a state of defence sufficient to repel any future danger. His lordship then recapitulated his arguments, and expressed a desire of introducing in the address a hope, that no time would be lost in settling, by amicable adjustment,

those

those points which had not been arranged by the definitive treaty. He therefore concluded one of the most luminous and masterly and convincing orations ever delivered in a public assembly, by moving an address which conveyed that principle, which at the same time that it acknowledged that the national faith was pledged to the observance of the treaty, humbly 'pointed out the great danger this country was exposed to, in consequence of the sacrifices she had made, without any adequate compensation on the part of France, and finally praying him to settle, by amicable arrangement, those points which the definitive treaty had left unsettled.

The duke of Norfolk opposed the address moved by lord Grenville, and disapproved of the tendency of the noble lord's arguments. He was thankful to those who restored to the country the blessings of peace, which he thought was in a great degree to be attributed to the removal of his majesty's late ministers from his councils. He hoped that the war would never again be renewed upon trifling points of controversy.

He therefore moved as an amendment, that all the words in the address after " humbly advise" should be left out.

Lord Pelham expressed some surprise at the nature of lord Grenville's motion, for which he was not prepared. He considered that the noble lord had by no means confined himself to what he thought was the true question, namely, how far the definitive treaty agreed with the preliminaries, but rather appeared to express an aversion to any treaty of peace under the circumstances of the VOL. XLIV.

country, and to consider the present as only a nominal peace.

Lord Grenville,denied that he had uttered an expression which could justify the construction the noble lord had put upon his speech.

Lord Pelham proceeded, and contended, that when the noble lord talked of the commercial disadvan tages which peace would bring, it was arguing against the peace. One principle which pervaded the noble Ford's speech he must entirely deny, namely, that what we ceded to other powers was, in fact, ceded to France. His lordship then ar◄ gued at considerable length on the manner in which we had ceded Malta and the Cape, and could by no means allow that those places had been ceded to France. After a general defence of the treaty, he concluded by moving, that all the words in the address moved by lord Grenville, after " May it please your majesty," should be left out. As this amendment went further than that of the noble duke, he hoped his grace would withdraw his amendment.

Lord Mulgrave expressed his intention to support the motion of the noble lord who spoke last. With respect to Malta, he considered it in no danger of falling into the hands of the French, while the pcople of the island were, as it is known they are, much better affected to the English, and heartily tired of French fraternity. Although he allowed that the assumption of the presidency of the Cisalpine government by the first consul of France was an event of great importance, which had happened since the preliminaries, yet he did not think it sufficiently so to risk the breaking of the treaty altogether, and renew

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