the French would command the navigation of the river of Amazons. Louisiana was also to France an acquisition of incalculable value. France will for the future command the navigation of the two greatest rivers in the world, the Mississippi and the Amazons. Great rivers are the vital parts of countries; we might therefore, without hyperbole, be said to have ceded to France a brace of continents. Never was there such a lavish, prodigal, thoughtless spirit of cession! In addition to those foreign objects, the whole continent of Europe is left at the mercy of France. Mr. Windham then expatiated at great length on the claims which would probably be set up by France in consequence of the non-renewal of former treaties; he particularly thought that this omission in the treaty would very much endanger our Indian empire. We might pretty well learn to appreciate the fraudulent views of France by her recent conduct with respect to the island of Elba, which she first stipulated should be surrendered to the king of Etruria, and immediately after took possession of herself. French power pursued us in Asia, in America, and in every part of the world. He considered that the establishment of French power in St. Domingo was more formidable to our West India settlements than even the independence of the blacks in that island, who would have no means of extending their empire further. Mr. Windham then took a general review of the war. He thought the country was never sufficiently apprised of its danger. In his opinion, the real principle of war had been mistaken in pursuing colonial ac

quisitions. He then proceeded to speak of the expeditions of Toulon and Quiberon, of which he highly approved, and of which a right honourable friend of his (Mr. Pitt) had the manliness to claim his share of the responsibility. He

Mr. Pitt spoke to order. thought his right honourable friend out of order, in mentioning the variety of opinions which prevailed on different points in the conduct of the war. He also submitted it to his judgment, whether he was entirely free from those obligations which were in force when they were together the confidential servants of his majesty.

[Mr. Windham was then proceeding to take upon himself the whole responsibility of the Quiberon business, when Mr. Pitt again objected, and considered that he had not a right to speak of opinious delivered in official confidence.]

Mr. Windham, then, at great length, repeated the opinions he had so often delivered on the prin ciples of the war and its proper object. He lamented the triumph of jacobinism, and feared every thing from the restless ambition and perfidy of France, armed as she now was with immense power. The danger he thought was infinitely greater, because the people appeared insensible of it. great naval victories seemed hardly to produce the proper feeling on the minds of our countrymen ; their universal cry was for peace: with such a power as France now is, and as she is possessed of this immense power, he thought it absolutely necessary to take such measures of defence as now are left us against any future attack. He con⚫

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Our

cluded

cluded a very long and eloquent speech with moving an address similar to that moved by lord Grenville in the house of lords.

Lord Folkstone seconded the motion. He said, that the British flag was degraded and disgraced by this treaty as far as any treaty could do it. It was a treaty built on jacobin principles and confirming jacobin power. We had abandoned Portugal to spoliation, and in our treatment of the prince of Orange, we had added insult to injury. He saw nothing left for the country but dishonour, degradation, and ruin.

Lord Hawkesbury then rose. [His lordship's speech was by much the ablest defence of the treaty which was made in either house of parliament] He said he was happy that the whole subject now came before the house at once, and he trusted that he should be able to prove this treaty to be not only expedient, but advantageous and honourable to the country. The circumstances which immediately preceded the negotiation were as follows: Almost as soon as his majesty's present ministers had accepted their situations, the news arrived of our allies the Austrians being defeated in a great battle, which was very soon followed by the treaty of Luneville. The situation of Europe was now materially changed with respect to Great Britain. Instead of being at the head of a great confederacy, a powerful confederacy was formed against her, under the direction of France. Under these circumstances, after sending a fleet to the Baltic, we opened a negotiation with France. We certainly could not then pretend to unsettle that which had been settled at the treaty of Lune

ville, and assented to by the whole Germanic empire. The treaty which had been made secured the integrity of the British empire, obtained better conditions for our allies than could have been expected when the negotiation began, and confirmed the acquisition of two of the most important possessions in the East and West Indies. Such a treaty he could not conceive any thing less than honourable. The first class of objections which he shou'd consider were those that went against the conclusion of a definitive treaty, on account of the events which took place on the continent after the signing of the preliminaries. He must confess he regretted much a great many of those events, not entirely on account of their intrinsic importance, but much more so by reason of the dispositions they indicated in the French governant; but he could not at the same time think that they would tity our breaking off the negotiation altogether. He could by no means agree with the opinion of some gentlemen, that whenever any continental power became involved with France, it was our business, without considering how the question affected our external or internal interests, immediately to embark in a war about it. If it was not expedient for us to continue the war for Holland and the Netherlands, much less so was it to continue it for Italy. Besides, the first intimation which his majesty received of the new constitution of Italy, was followed by accounts of the congratulations of the court of Berlin, and the acquiescence of Austria and Russia. As to the cession of Louisiana by Spain to France, this was certainly an event of importance, but that very colony had

been

been before ceded by France to Spain in a private convention, which took place between the signing of the preliminaries and definitive treaty of 1763. As to the value of Louisiana, it must also be recollected, that formerly, when it was in the possession of France, they made nothing of it, although, at the same time, they made their West India islands highly valuable. As to the American states being brought into danger by this event, he thought much too highly of their power and resources, and that if they were jealous of the neighbourhood of the French, they would be the more inclined to the cause of this country, As to the faults of omission which were alleged against the present treaty, the principal stress appeared to be laid on the non-renewal of treaties, and yet it appeared that the events of the war had so completely unhinged the foundations of all former treaties, that it would be alment impossible, if they were renewed, to bring them at all to bear on the present political situation of Europe Had we sanctioned the treaty of Luneville, for example, we should then have made ourselves parties to the dismemberment of the Germanic empire. At present, we have, at least, the satisfaction of saying, that if we have not been able to recover for Europe her rights, at least we have been no parties to her wrongs. As to commercial treaties, they involve so mahy subjects, so many points of discussion, that they necessarily take a great deal of time to settle. The prohibition of our manufactures could not be carried on to the same extent in peace as in war; and if it came only to a war of duties between Great Britain and France, the exclusion

of French wines and brandy would be a heavier loss to them, than the exclusion of our manufactures would be to us. He did not conceive that · our rights in India, or at Honduras, were in the least affected by the nonrenewal of certain articles in former treaties. But there was no point which appeared more completely to be mistaken than that which respected our flag. The fact was, that this country had for centuries claimed a sovereignty of the seas, and from this sovereignty, that other nations should lower their flags to us. No express sipulation had ever been introduced in our treaties with France and Spain to this purpose, and yet the right had been always acknowledged. The reason that the express stipulation was only with Holland, was, because there had once been a war between this country and Holland upon that very point, and therefore the right had been at the peace, and by subsequent treaties, expressly recognized with respect to Holland, and if this had not now been again. mentioned, it was because, with Holland, as well as other countries, we chose to stand upon our ancient and long exercised right. We had ceded nothing in this respect. The next general head of objections was the variations between this definitive treaty and the preliminaries. As to the allowances made to France on account of Russian prisoners, it was by no means unreasonable: it was in fact a new principle introduced by us at the treaty of 1703, that each state should maintain its subjects when prisoners in the enemy's country. France had never acted on this principle with Austria, or any power, when it would have evidently been her interest to have done so: and therefore, when she consented

consented to adopt this principle with respect to us (although the balance of prisoners was much against her), it was by no means unreasonable for us to expect to be allowed to set off against our demand the expenses of the Russian prisoners, who were taken by them when in our pay. The balance still remained considerably in our favour. The next point was the situation of Portugal. On this subject he must state, that this government had done every thing in its power respecting Portugal. If it had divided its army between Portugal and Egypt, they would probably have failed in both places. They had been, however, extremely anxious for the security of Portugal, and had recommended in the most pressing manner to the Portugueze government to change their general in chief, who was an old man, incapable from years of the active exertions that a campaign would require. Had this been done, we should have given Por tugal every assistance in our power. The government of Portugal, however, refused, and after that country was invaded and conquered, we paid a subsidy of 300,000%. to enable them to make better terms for themselves, and now at the definitive treaty we had got better terms for Portugal than she was able to procure for herself; and some of her foreign possessions, which she had ceded, were still to remain in her possession. As to the question of Malta, it would be recollected that it was our original intention, in taking possession of Malta, to restore it to the order. Afterwards we had thought of placing it under the protection of Russia; but the strange and ill judged politics of that court prevented this. Afterwards the politics of

Russia changed, and the present emperor refused Malta. He could have wished that the king of Naples had been something of a more powerful protector, but he saw no reason to doubt his fidelity. When gentlemen expatiated on the great acquisitions which France had made this war, they never spoke of her losses, nor of what we had acquired. They dwelt on Louisiana, but did not mention Mysore or India. They did not either compare the relative situation of the West India colonies of the two countries. The English colonies, flourishing, improved, and increased by the addition of Trinidad, while St. Domingo, the principal French colony, was in a most precarious state. They did not compare the navy and commerce of the two countries; the French navy had been in the war reduced more than a half, and their commerce absolutely destroyed. He could not pretend to say this peace, or any other which could be made in the present times, was secure, but he could not see that any additional security would be gained by a continuance of war. France, besides, now appeared to be returning to her old maxims of religion and politics. A renewal of the war appeared only likely to plunge her back into the revolutionary system, which would afford less security.

The resources and the spirit of the country should be spared as much as possible: they had in some sort been worn out by the long duration of the war, and required to be cherished by peace, After having endeavoured to prove the interests and honour of the British empire had been preserved, its allies not neglected, and no degrading or dishonourable article introduced in the treaty, his lordship concluded

concluded by moving an address to his majesty, the substance of which was to assure his majesty, that "the house were fully sensible that his majesty had wisely consulted the interests of his people in forming a definitive treaty on the basis of the preliminaries; that they relied on his majesty's known disposition to adhere with the most scrupulous fidelity to his engagements, but that they entertained a perfect confidence that he would be always prepared to defend, against every encroachment, the great sources of the wealth, commerce, and naval power of the empire; and that they were firmly persuaded his majesty's faithful subjects would be always ready to support the honour of his crown, and the rights, laws, and liberties of their country, with the same spirit they had manifested during the war, which was now happily brought to a conclusion.

Mr. Wellesley Pole seconded the motion.

Mr. T. Grenville opposed the motion and the definitive treaty in a very long and able speech. He examined the treaty in its several parts, and urged his objections nearly on the same grounds which his noble relative (lord Grenville) had taken in the house of lords.

Mr. Dundas complained of many misrepresentations which had been made of what had fallen from him with respect to India. As to the inconsistency which he was charged with for changing his mind respecting the importance of the convention of 1787, from the time he consented to the negotiation at Lisle to the present, he should answer, that the circumstances of the case had entirely and most notoriously changed, and that we had

now an undisputed sovereignty in India. He must confess, however, that it was with the utmost regret he had heard of the cession of the Cape of Good Hope. He always thought that this was a post of the utmost importance to this country. He thought so in theory before we had it, and he was the more convinced of it, from the use which was made of it after it had been in our possession. He looked upon it as a most excellent dept both commercial and military. In a word, he considered it the great bulwark of India. With regard to Malta too, he considered it an island of the greatest importance, one of the finest ports in the world. It was not merely for commercial purposes that he should wish to see the British flag flying at Malta: it was also to give assurance to all the surrounding nations, of the protection of the British arms in case they should be attacked. And when to these considerations he added the desire of the Maltese themselves, that they should be under the British government, the surrender of this island gave him the deepest concern. Notwithstanding that he stated those points in the treaty of which he disapproved, yet he could by no means adopt the address of his right honourable friend (Mr. Windham), which appeared to be pointed against the peace itself: the adoption of such an address, he conceived, would be mischievous. He concluded by declaring he should vote for the amendment proposed by the noble secretary.

On the motion of general Gascoyne, it was resolved, on account of the lateness of the hour, and the magnitude of the question, to adjourn the debate till the next day.

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