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read about half a dozen lines. He then read the following articles of the preliminary treaty. V. Egypt shall be restored to the Sublime Porte, whose dominions and possessions shall be secured in their integrity such as they were before the war. VI. The territories and possessions of his Most Faithful Majesty shall also be maintained in their integrity. France, as far as any treaty can bind her, has concluded a peace with Portugal; but on what terms? She has taken from her Olivenza and the adjoining territory, which Spain had long coveted; and for which nothing more was requisite than to express a wish, in order to obtain it from France. France, at the same time, took for herself a portion of the Brazils, which gave her the command of the river Amazon and the whole of the adjacent coast. Mr. Grenville quoted monsieur de la Condamine, in order to show the advantage which France would derive from the possession of this tract of country, in addition to what she already enjoyed in the proximity of Dutch Guiana. Is this the mode of guarantying the possessions, of securing the integrity of a faithful ally? If integrity and dismemberment be synonymous terms, then, indeed, the assertion may be true. In allusion to the term honourable, which the noble lord has absurdly applied to the peace, every man must feel that no peace was safe that was not honourable, and that no peace was honourable which was not safe; but, unfortunately, this peace was neither safe nor honourable: nor could any peace be honourable, which gave us territories that did not belong to the power by whom

they were given. The conduct of our governinent in the negotiation at Lisle was very different: they did what was wise and proper to attain peace for the good of the country. They selected certain points of importance, which it was necessary, for the preservation of that honour, to insist upon. He was surprised to hear certain expressions which had fallen from the noble lord, relative to the acquisitions we had made by the present peace, which he contrasted with lord Malmesbury's projet, the wisdom of which he extolled. We should have been fully justified in the retention of Ceylon, the Cape, and Cochin, for the more effectual defence of our eastern empire. When we look at the cessions which we have made, we should find the conquests we had retained comparatively trifling. His mind was not at all satisfied with the situation in which the Cape was left by the treaty. We had ceded

a port which might become a great annoyance to our trade. The Cape furnished a military station of vast importance in the event of a sudden war, not preceded by a proclamation. The marquis Cornwallis, in his return from India, had strongly pressed the necessity of retaining Cochin, and the Cape; or if only one of them could be retained, the Cape in preference to Cochin. Though Ceylon was an important settlement, Cochin, on the western side of the peninsula, was one of the strongest military frontiers in India. In the event of a war, a fleet might sail from the Cape and arrive at Cochin before any person in India could know of its arrival, and before any person in England could be apprised of its

sailing.

ng. He might possibly be told, that our merchantmen were advised to avoid the Cape; that the importance of that settlement was not so great as was represented; and that our ships might touch at the Brazils. The settlement which the French had acquired in the Brazils would, in that case, give additional importance to France. The Cape and Cochin were insisted on by lord Malmesbury, at Lisle, as points from which we would not accede; and these were now given up, from that want of vigour, spirit, and prudence which mark our negotiations. An attempt had been made to represent the Levant trade as unimportant to this country. But our manufacturers, he conceived, would tell a far different tale. Was it true that Malta was unimportant;-that fortress which had sustained a blockade of nearly two years? It could not be seriously contended. To rescue Malta and Egypt from France is deemed an object of primary importance; but when it is considered expedient to give them up, their importance suddenly vanishes, and they become trivial and insignificant. No part of the treaty of peace, nor any thing connected with it, excited so much astonishment in his mind, as our treatment of the house of Orange, except the defence of that treatment. Britain was formerly bound by a solemn treaty with that house. He understood some private arrangement was making, between France and Prussia, relative to that subject. But the prince of Orange was not to be thrown as an outcast on the world, by those for whom he had, sacrificed his all. Where would have been the difficulty in introducing an article in

the preliminary treaty, similar to one which was prepared at the negotiation at Lisle, which stipulated for the restoration of the whole property of the house of Orange, or the full value of it in money? There could be no objection to this; but we wanted the spirit, the vigour, or courage to support an ally, who had been so unfortunate as to be an enemy to France! Though he did not think the peace of 1783 was either glorious or honourable; yet he would recommend it to the gentlemen to read the preliminaries to that treaty, and compare them with the present. Let the cessions made then be compared with the cessions made now; and, though he thought the former a bad peace, which presented nothing but defeat and humiliation, yet would the latter be found infinitely worse in itself, and unfortunately more dangerous in its consequences. The present peace was not honourable, in respect of our allies; nor was it necessary to be made. Mr. Addington had indignantly disclaimed the plea of necessity. Although a difference of opinion existed as to the terms of the peace, no one would contend that we were reduced to the necessity of making a peace, dishonourable to our allies or unsafe to ourselves. He contrasted the terms of the peace of Utrecht, and of the peace of 1763, with those of the present peace; showed the vast increase of power which France had acquired now, and the consequent increase of danger to ourselves. The noble lord had contended, that our danger did not accrue from the existence of republican principles in France, but from the extent of her power; that, in this respect, things had changed.

Admitting

Admitting such to be the case, could any man view the present power of France, and consequently our present danger, without shuddering? In the event of a war, notwithstanding our stipulations, all the ports and fortresses in the Mediterranean would be seized by France, and shut against us. She will monopolize its commerce in time of peace, its power in time of war. Acting upon such a principle of negotiation, or rather of sacrifice, and let the definitive treaty be completed, and he would desire to know whether it would not place us in a state of war with France in twelve months? Could peace be good if its duration were so short? It would reduce us to the necessity of dismantling our navy, and disbanding our army and our volunteers; it had deprived us of all the military points and stations; and, notwithstanding all our exertions of economy, what would be our state, if France, in the course of twelve months, should take us unprepared, and direct her whole power against us? He called upon the house seriously to reflect on our situation; and to ask themselves what state we should be placed in if France should so declare war against us? Did they not believe that such a war must shake our country to the very center? Feeling, as he did, that the peace was neither honourable to our allies, nor safe to ourselves, he should give his decided negative to the motion.

which had taken place in the pubiie mind, both in Ireland and in France.

Lord Temple highly disapproved of the concessions which ministers had made, as dangerous to the safety, and degrading to the honour of England. He had seen with regret, that a party of degenerated Englishmen were to be found, mean enough to draw the coach of gen. Lauriston through the streets of London, with cries of " Long live Bonaparté." This was an afflicting prospect, and augured no good to the country: but this was in some degree encouraged by the conduct of ministers; for he understood that general Lauriston was accompanied from France by a person who had been twice sent out of the country under the alien act; that on his ar rival the proper officer recognizing him, refused him permission to land, till general Lauriston declared that in that case he would return with the preliminaries; and this man he understood was in the coach with general Lauriston when he was drawn in triumph through the streets of London, and that ministers had not the spirit to take notice of the circumstance. If that was a true statement of the fact, it was rather an unhappy omen of what this country had to expect from a connexion with France, under its present ministers. He opposed ministers from no factious motive, but because he sincerely thought them unworthy of the confidence of the public. He was aware that his obLord Castlereagh supported the jections would not be supported by peace, and thought it bid as fair to those who were in the constant habe lasting as any which had ever bit of opposing the conduct of adpreceded it. This peace, at least, ministration, but he did not wish would try France, and he thought for the support of any man who it but fair to give her a trial. He could declare his pleasure at the relied much on the great change peace, "because it was glorious to

the

the enemy." Such a sentiment he thought by no means becoming a patriot or an Englishman, and any peace founded on it must be hollow and suspicious.

Mr. Pitt said, that he had upon this occasion the misfortune to differ from some of those with whom he had been long united in the ties of private friendship and political opinion. He should begin by observing, that whatever variety of sentiments once existed, as to what governments we ought to treat with, whatever objects it might have once been thought most advisable to pursue in the course of the war, for some time past all have agreed that the question of peace and war was DOW a mere question of terms. After the continental alliance had been dissolved, nothing remained for us but to procure just and honourable conditions of peace for ourselves and the few allies which had not deserted us. When it became merely a question of terms, he was much more anxious as to the tone and character of the peace, than about any particular object which should come into dispute. Although he conceived it the duty of every minister to obtain the best possible terms for the state to which he belonged, yet as long as the peace was honourable, he should prefer accepting terms, even short of what he thought the country entitled to, to risking the result of the negotiation by too obstinate an adherence to any particular point: although certainly every thing had not been obtained by the preliminaries, yet it did not appear to him that the difference between those terins and what the country had a right to, was to be compared with the evils which might have resulted from being too

peremptory in our demands. He
thought the principle and the terms
of the treaty had been well described
by his noble friend (lord Hawkes-
bury). Our grand object was to
add fresh security to our maritime
strength and commercial greatness.
We did not seek to retain any of
our conquests which we did not
materially want, and which were
unconnected with our ancient pos-
sessions. In the East and West
Indies we had got every thing that
we could reasonably demand; and
if we consented to give up our con-
quests in the Mediterranean, what-
ever glory we had acquired in mak-
ing these conquests, it must be con-
fessed, that the Mediterranean and
Levant were of much less importance
to British commerce than the East
and West Indies. Although certain
ports in that quarter might be use-
ful in a future continental war, yet
when we were selecting which of
our conquests we should retain,
we should certainly prefer those
which are
constant and permanent sources of
our prosperity. As to Minorca,
during the four last wars it had re-
gularly shifted hands. In peace it
was of no importance, and in war
the power which was strongest at
sea always took it. He was sorry
we could not retain Malta; but if
we were obliged to give it up, he
did not know in what hands it could
better be placed than those men-
tioned in the treaty. Turning to
the East Indies, he felt regret at the
cession of the Cape of Good Hope,
which he had been always accus-
tomed to estimate more highly than
his noble friend, but still he consi-
dered it as much less important than
Ceylon, which was to us the most
valuable colonial possession on the

connected with the

globe,

:

globe, as giving to our Indian empire a security which it had not enjoyed from its first establishment. As to the arrangement proposed by lord Malmesbury about Cochin, he did not feel himself at liberty to state how far lord Malmesbury had been permitted by his instructions to recede from the projet presented at Lisle but it was evident that Cochin was not now of the importance it possessed while Tippoo Saib was master of the surrounding districts. It was like Berwick-uponTweed, which, while the Scotch were a separate people, was of great importance as a fortified frontier town; but after the whole island was happily united, what was the political importance of Berwickupon-Tweed? While Tippoo existed, the supplies he might have received from the port of Cochin, in the hands of France, was a most important consideration, but at present, even Negapatam was of more consequence than Cochin. Mr. Pitt also expatiated at great length on the importance of Trinidad; he said, that with the terms of peace, as they regard ourselves, he was completely satisfied. They were also satisfactory with respect to our allies for the Porte we had done every thing we were bound to do, and a great deal more. The recognition of the republic of the Seven Islands was of the utmost importance, as the very existence of the Turkish empire was in danger, if they should be left in the hands of France. For Naples we had done every thing which could have been done, even if the treaty had still existed with that power. As to Sardinia, it was evident, that unless we had the power to dissolve the Cisalpine and Ligurian republics, and undo all

3

that the war in Italy had done, we never could restore the king of Sar dinia to his former situation. With respect to Portugal, we had not only exhibited the most punctilious good faith, but the most dignified liberality. France would have insisted on far more considerable cessions, had it not been for our interposition. As to our guaranty of the constitution of Holland in 1787, could it be forgotten what exertions we had made to support it? As to a mere pecu niary indemnity to the stadtholder, which was all that was asked at Lisle, it was an object of too trifling importance to endanger the success of a negotiation about. Many gentlemen seemed to think, that we had ceded possessions which were important to our security; he, on the contrary, thought that what we had ceded was not unimportant to our commerce or finance, but had nothing to do with our security : the retaining them would not have maintained the integrity of Portugal, Naples, or Sardinia, nor would have deprived the French of any of that immense line of coast which causes our dismay. A little more commerce, a little more finance, after a continuation of the war for some years longer, would be a bad bargain: unless it was possible to raise up a new confederacy more unanimous and better cemented than the former ones, war might not only be an idle waste of treasure, but might leave the relative situation of the country worse than it is at present. France had not insisted on the uti possidetis with the nations she conquered on the continent, much less had we a right to insist upon that basis with her. It would be strange indeed if we should expect that the gigantic

power

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