which he had acquired in a more deliberate manner he never forgets, but can perform them at any time without a moment's preparation; but in regard to the character now mentioned, there was the farther and very singular fact, that though he has repeatedly performed it since that time, he has been obliged each time to prepare it anew, and has never acquired in regard to it that facility which is familiar to him in other instances. When questioned respecting the mental process which he employed the first time he performed this part, he says, that he lost sight entirely of the audience, and seemed to have nothing before him but the pages of the book from which he had learned it; and that if any thing had occurred to interrupt this illusion, he should have stopped instantly.

That degree of attention which is required for the full remembrance of a subject, is to be considered as a voluntary act on the part of the individual; but the actual exercise of it is influenced in a great measure by his previous intellectual habits. Of four individuals, for example, who are giving an account of a journey through the same district, one may describe chiefly its agricultural produce; another, its mineralogical characters; a third, its picturesque beauties; while the fourth may not be able to give an account of any thing except the state of the roads and the facilities for travelling. The same facts or objects must have passed before the senses of all the four; but their remembrance of them depends upon the points to which their attention was directed. Besides the manner here alluded to, in which the attention is influenced by previous habits or pursuits, some persons have an active inquiring state of mind, which keeps the attention fully engaged upon whatever is passing before them; while others give way to a listless, inactive condition, which requires to be strongly excited before the attention is roused to the degree required for remembrance. The former, accordingly, remember a great deal of all that passes before them, either in reading or observation. The latter are apt to say that they are deficient in memory; their deficiency, however, is not in memory, but in attention; and this appears from the fact that they do not forget any thing which deeply engages their feelings, or concerns their interest.

Different objects of attention? Effects of inattention ?

The habit of listless inactivity of mind should be carefully guarded against in the young; and the utmost care should be taken to cultivate the opposite, namely, the habit of directing the mind intensely to whatever comes before it, either in reading or observation. This may be considered as forming the foundation of sound intellectual character.

Next to the effect of attention, is the remarkable influence produced upon memory by ASSOCIATION. This principle holds so important a place in relation to the mental operations, that some philosophers have been disposed to refer to it nearly all the phenomena of mind; but without ascribing to it this universal influence, its effects are certainly very extensive, and the facts connected with it present a subject of peculiar interest.

The principle of association is founded upon a remarkable tendency, by which wo or more facts or conceptions, which have been contemplated together, or in immediate succession, become so connected in the mind that one of them at a future time recalls the others, or introduces a train of thoughts which, without any mental effort, follow each other in the order in which they were originally associated. This is called the association of ideas, and various phenomena of a very interesting kind are connected with it.

But besides this tendency, by which thoughts formerly associated are brought into the mind in a particular order, there is another species of association into which the mind passes spontaneously, by a suggestion from any subject which happens to be present to it. The thought or fact which is thus present suggests another which has some kind of affinity to it; this suggests a third, and so on, to the formation of a train or series which may be continued to a great length. A remarkable circumstance likewise is, that such a train may go on with very little consciousness of, or attention to it; so that the particulars of the series are scarcely remembered, or are traced only by an effort. This singular fact every one must have experienced in that state of mind which is called a revery. It goes on for some time

without effort and with little attention; at length the attention is roused, and directed to a particular thought which is

Caution to the young. Association. Its foundation? Trains of thought. Embracing them ?

in the mind, without the person being at first able to recollect what led him to think of that subject. He then, by a voluntary effort, traces the chain of thoughts backwards, perhaps through a long series, till he arrives at a subject of which he has a distinct remembrance as having given rise to it.

It is impossible distinctly to trace the principles which lead to the particular chain of thoughts which arise in a case of this kind. It is probably much influenced by the previous intellectual habits of the individual; and perhaps in many instances is guided by associations previously formed. There are also among the facts or thoughts themselves certain principles of analogy, by which one suggests another without that kind of connection which is established by previous proximity. These have usually been called principles of association, or, according to the phraseology of Dr. Brown, principles of simple suggestion. They have been generally referred to four heads, namely, resemblance, contiguity in time and place, cause and effect, and contrast: and others have reduced them to three, considering contiguity and cause and effect as referable to the same head. On these principles, then, one thought may suggest another which has some relation to it, either in the way of resemblance, contiguity, cause, effect, or contrast. But still the question recurs, What gives rise to the occurrence of one of these relations in preference to the others? This may depend, in some instances, on previous habits of thought and peculiarities of mental temperament; and in other cases associations may be more apt to occur, according as some analogous association may have been more recently formed, more lively, or more frequently repeated. When the common topic of the weather, for example, is introduced in conversation, or presented to the mind, the agriculturist will naturally refer to its influence on vegetation; the physician to its effect on the health of the community; the man of pleasure may think only of its reference to the sports of the field; the philosopher may endea vor to seek for its cause in some preceding atmospheric phenomena; and another person of certain habits of ob

Explanation? Principles of association? Form used by Dr. Brown? Classifica. tion 7 Effects of habit? Illustration ?

servation may compare or contrast it with the weather of the same period in a preceding year. Thus, in five individuals, the same topic may give rise to five trains of thought, perfectly distinct from each other, yet each depending upon a very natural and obvious principle of suggestion. In other instances it is impossible to trace the cause which leads the mind off into peculiar and unusual associations. The following example from Hobbes has been frequently referred to:- "In a company in which the conversation turned on the civil war, what could be conceived more impertinent than for a person to ask abruptly what was the value of a Roman denarius? On a little reflection, however, I was easily able to trace the train of thought which suggested the question; for the original subject of discourse naturally introduced the history of the king, and of the treachery of those who surrendered his person to his enemies; this again introduced the treachery of Judas Iscariot, and the sum of money which he received for his reward. And all this train of ideas passed through the mind of the speaker in a twinkling in consequence of the velocity of thought." Mr. Stewart adds, in relation to this anecdote, "It is by no means improbable, that if the speaker had been interrogated about the connection of ideas which led him aside from the original topic of discourse, he would have found himself, at first, at a loss for an answer."

In the mental process now referred to it is evident that the term suggestion is much more correct than association, which has often been applied to it. For in the cases which belong to this class, the facts or thoughts suggest each other, not according to any connection or association which the mind had previously formed between them, but according to some mental impression or emotion, which by a law of our constitution proves a principle of analogy or suggestion. We readily perceive how this takes place in regard to circumstances which are allied to each other by resemblance, contiguity, cause, or effect; and the sugges tion of contrast must also occur to every one as by no means unnatural. Thus, the sight of a remarkably fat man may recall to us the thought of another man we had

Hobbes' example? Mr. Stewart's remark? Terms. Which preferable?

lately seen, who was equally remarkable for his leanness; the playfulness and mirth of childhood may suggest the cares and anxieties of after life; and an instance of conduct which we greatly disapprove may lead us to recollecs how very differently another individual conducted himse in similar circumstances.

In a practical view, the subject of association leads us chiefly to a consideration of the manner in which facts are so associated in the mind as to be recalled by means of the connection; in other words, the influence of association upon memory. In this view, associations are distinctly referable to three classes:

I. Natural or philosophical association.
II. Local or incidental association.

III. Arbitrary or fictitious association.

A variety of mental phenomena of the most interesting kind will be found connected with the subjects referred to under these classes. The principle on which they all depend is simply the circumstance of two or more facts, thoughts, or events being contemplated together by the mind, though many of them may have no relation to each other except this conjunction. The strength of the association is generally in proportion to the intensity of the mental emotion; and is likewise in a great measure regulated by the length of time, or the number of times, in which the facts have been contemplated in this connection. Astonishing examples may be often met with of facts or occurrences which have long ceased to be objects of simple memory, being brought up in this manner by association, though they had not passed through the mind for a very long time.

I. NATURAL OR PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION takes place when a fact or statement on which the attention is fixed, is by a mental process associated with some fact previously known to which it has a relation, or with some subject which it is calculated to illustrate. The fact so acquired is thus, to use a figurative expression, put by in its proper

Why? Association, how classified? Foundation of all. The strength of it depends on what? Philosophical association.