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French had re-established the bridge, and covered it by strong batteries. In consequence of these movements, Lord Wellington raised the siege of Badajoz, hoping, however, still to maintain the blockade, and advanced to Albuhera on the 13th. The enemy, however, had now collected all their troops from the two Castilles, except a small garrison at Madrid, all the remains of Massena's army, and all their force from Andalusia, except what was sufficient for Sebastiani and Victor, to keep up a show of inactive strength in positions where long experience had shown that no vigorous attack would be made upon them. Thus they brought together a greater force than the allies could oppose to them; and though Lord Wellington was not so inferior in numbers as to have felt any fear, or even doubt, concerning the issue of a battle, the relative resources of the allies in men, as those resources were then managed, were not such that they could afford to win a second battle of Albuhera. The blockade therefore was raised, and the allies recrossed the Guadiana, taking up a line within the Portugueze frontier.

Soult expressed his regret that a ge neral action had not been brought on. He magnified the merit of the defence of Badajoz, saying, that it would be cited in military history as one of the most memorable exploits of its kind; and he magnified the importance of the junction of the two armies on the Guadiana, calling it one of the most marked events of the war in Spain. This general had a more than common interest in blazoning forth a success which, though certainly in itself of considerable importance, was by no means such as he represented it. But it covered over his late defeat. "Thus," said he," the signal victory which was gained at Albuhera has been ascertain ed in favour of the imperial army: the main object which I had in view was

then accomplished,-that of making a diversion in favour of Badajoz, and enabling that fortress to prolong its resistance. It is now evident that the battle of Albuhera gained us at least twenty days, during which we were enabled to make arrangements for bringing up new reinforcements, and the ar my of Portugal was able to take part in the operations: thus the second object which I had in view in making my first movement has been also accom plished, and the troops which fought at Albuhera have not ceased a single day to act upon the offensive against the enemy." Beyond all doubt Marshal Soult is one of the ablest generals of his age; his operations at this time were ultimately successful, but his ear nestness to prove that he had gained a victory at Albuhera, only shows how deeply he felt the defeat.

The French government were highly elated with an advantage which came so seasonably after the various disgraces which the French arms had suffered in the peninsula. "The English," said they, "are again to learn, and by a mighty thunderbolt, (the raising of the siege of Badajoz is a presage of it) that they cannot with impunity leave the element of which they have usurp ed the empire." The English, how ever, had long been accustomed to hear of these thunderbolts, and to defy the more tangible weapons of the enemy. Soult said in his official account, "that they appeared to have given up Spain entirely, and to be concentrating them. selves for the defence of Lisbon: they felt their inability to support the con test, and every thing," he added, "in duced him to think that when the ar my of reserve should have arrived upon Almeida, they would feel the impossi bility even of maintaining themselves at Lisbon." This army, he said, had been announced to him. While the enemy threw out these boastful anticipations, Lord Wellington remained

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in his position, watching their move ments, and perfectly certain that they could not long subsist the force which they had brought together. His line extended from Arronches to Jurumenha, the advanced guard being at Campo Mayor: the French were upon the Guadiana from Merida to Badajoz.

Before the allies retreated across the Guadiana, a plan was arranged between General Blake and Lord Wellington, that the former should make a movement into the county of Niebla, distract the enemy's attention by threatening their rear, and take advantage of whatever favourable opportunity this concentration of the French forces might give him. Accordingly the Spaniards set out on the 18th from Jurumenha, and on the 22d reached Mertola, the distance is about 110 miles, but it was a most exhausting march in the midst of summer, through a dry country, for troops nearly half of whom were barefoot, and whose commissariat was in the most deplorable state. The provisions were never sufficient for full rations to be given; it is said that the Spaniards supported fatigue and hunger with their characteristic patience; but men will not continue to undergo such privations without a strong hope that some adequate success will recompense them, and Blake had unhappily acquired the character of being an unfortunate leader.

From Mertola, he embarked his artillery for Ayamonte. The horse swam the Guadiana, the men crost it by a temporary bridge of boats, and after resting two days to refresh the troops, he marched against NieJune 30. bla. Niebla is an old town, which was fallen to such decay, that its population at this time did not exceed an hundred persons; its walls, however, were less dilapidated than its houses, and the French had repaired its castle so as to render

it a post of respectable strength, from whence they domineered over the surrounding country. Blake probably found it stronger than he expected; he attempted an escalade in the night with ladders, which were not only too short, but too few, for the success of the enterprize; consequently the attempt failed, though the garrison did not consist of more than 300 men. He remained three days before the place, which gave the French governor of Seville time to take the field against him, and make some prisoners before his army could reach the mouth of the Guadiana, and re-embark for Cadiz. Great numbers of his men deserted during this ill-conducted expedition. It is certain that Blake possessed considerable talents, but the good which those talents might have produced, when he was called to the regency, was in great measure frustrated by his jealousy of the English. At Albuhera he seemed to have overcome this unworthy feeling, but it returned upon him, and Lord Wellington remarked in his public dispatches, that neither General Castanos nor himself had received any intelligence from him since he began his march from Jurumenha.

This movement, therefore, which might have so considerably annoyed the enemy, and of which such expectations had been raised, that it was at one time reported and believed that Blake had actually entered Seville, ended only in the diminution of the army, and of the general's reputation. Lord Wellington, however, had taken his measures too wisely to suffer any other evil than that of disappointed hope from this failure. He knew that the enemy could not possibly long continue to subsist their forces when thus concentrated, and, as he expected, they broke up from the Guadiana about the middle of July, having fortified the old castles of Medellin and Truxillo to strengthen their hold upon Extrema

dura. Soult returned to Seville, and Marmont, re-crossing the Tagus at Almaraz, went again to his command in the North. Lord Wellington then moved his whole army to the left, and

cantoned them in Lower Beira, where he remained, waiting till time and opportunity should offer for striking a blow.

CHAP. XI.

Expedition from Cadiz under General Lapena. Battle of Barrosa. Variance between the Spanish and British Generals, and consequent Failure of the Expedition. Death of the Duke de Alburquerque.

ALBUHERA was not the only field up on which brave blood was sacrificed in unprofitable though glorious atchievements. When Soult marched against Badajoz, hoping to co-operate with Massena in the conquest of Portugal, he made such large drafts from the army before Cadiz, for the purpose of encreasing his own, that it was thought possible, by a well-concerted attack, to raise the blockade. The plan was, that an expedition should sail from Cadiz, and force a landing between Cape Trafalgar and Cape de Plata, or at Tarifa, or at Algeciras. The Spanish forces at St Roques were then to join, and a combined attack to be made upon the rear of the enemy's line; while, in the mean time, an attempt should be made from the Isle of Leon to open a communication with them. D. Manuel de Lapena was appointed to the command. He had commanded the wreck of the Central Army during the latter part of its memorable retreat, under circumstances in which no military skill could be displayed, but in which his patriotism and moderation had been fully proved. Lieutenant-General Graham, who commanded the British troops at Cadiz, consented to act under him. This officer was now in his sixty-first year. The former part of his life he had past in all the enjoyments of domestic comfort, amusing himself with rural sports,

with improving his estates, and with literature: after eighteen years of happiness his wife died on the way to the south of France, and Mr Graham, seeking for relief in change of place and in active occupations, joined Lord Hood as a volunteer when Toulon was taken possession of in 1793. Here he distinguished himself greatly by his exertions and intrepidity, and on his return to England obtained permission to raise a regiment, but not without great difficulty and express discourage

ment from the commander-in-chief. He was at Mantua with Wurmser in 1796, and escaped captivity by cutting his way through the besiegers in a night sortie; and he bore a distinguished part at Malta when Sir Alexander Ball, under circumstances the most painful, and with means the most inadequate, by his wisdom and perseverance recovered that island from the enemy. Nevertheless the time of life at which he had entered the army, and the manner, operated as a bar to his promotion; and he would probably never have risen in rank if General Moore had not experienced great assistance from him in his retreat, and at the battle of Coruna, and sent home so strong a recommendation that it could not be neglected.

The expedition, though upon no very extensive scale, was yet a great exertion for a government so poor in

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means as the regency, so feeble, and with all its branches so miserably disorganized. The bustle in the roads was visible from the enemy's lines, as well as from the city; in Cadiz the highest hopes were excited, and Marshal Victor felt no little degree of alarm. He thought, and with good reason, that when Soult had so considerably weakened the blockading force, he should at least have placed Sebastiani's army at his disposal, in case of need: this had not been done, and Marshal Victor, seeing the naval preparations, sent to Sebastiani, entreating him to manœuvre so as to alarm the allies upon their landing, and to endanger them; but his entreaties were of no effect, and Victor afterwards complain. ed in his public dispatches, that this corps, though numerous, in good condition, and at leisure (for it was not seriously employed) had not given the least assistance to him.

During the latter days of January and great part of the following month, heavy rains delayed the expedition, and rendered all the roads impracticable by which the allies could have approached the enemy. On the 20th of February, the troops were all embarked, waiting a favourable opportunity to proceed into the Straits: General Graham had about 4000 men, British and Portugueze, the Spaniards were 7000. The British got to sea the next day, and not being able to effect a landing near Cape Trafalgar, nor at Tarifa, disembarked at Algeciras, from whence they marched to Tarifa. The roads between the two towns were impassable forcarriages, and therefore the artillery, provisions, and stores, were conveyed in boats, by the indefatigable exertions of the seamen, against every disadvantage of wind and weather. The Spanish transports were thrice driven back, but reached Tarifa on the evening of the 27th, and the next day they began their march to the Puerto de Fa

cinas, a pass in that chain of mountains which, bounding the plain of Gibraltar on the west, runs to the sea from the Sierras of Ronda. To this point the road had been practicable for carriages, some days labour having been thus em ployed: From thence it descends to those spacious plains which extend from the skirts of the chain to Medina Sidonia, Chiclana, and the river Santi Petris the roads below were in a dreadful state, the country being marshy, intersected with a labyrinth of streams: one of which, the Barbate, which receives the waters of the Lake of Janda, is a considerable river. At Veger, which is about half way between Tarifa and the Isle of Leon, the French had three companies of infantry and 180 horse. They had also a small fort with two pieces of cannon at Casas Viejas, on the road to Medina. These points it was hoped to surprise, and the troops therefore encamped on the side of the mountain, taking every precaution to conceal their movements from the enemy.

Lapena, when the troops commen. ced their march, addressed a proclamation to them, which at once disclosed the extent of his object, and the confidence with which he expected to realize it.

"Soldiers of the fourth army," said he, "the moment for which you have a whole year been longing is at length arrived: A second time Andalusia is about to owe to you her li berty, and the laurels of Mengibar and Baylen will revive upon your brows. You have to combat in sight of the whole nation assembled in its cortes; the government will see your deeds; the inhabitants of Cadiz, who have made so many sacrifices for you, will be eye-witnesses of your heroism; they will lift up their voices in blessings and in acclamations of praise, which you will hear amid the roar of musketry and cannon. Let us go then to con quer: my cares are directed to this end; implicit obedience, firmness, and

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