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tended. I do think, indeed, that those rights which have been so long claimed by Great Britain, should not, under the present circumstances of the world, be renounced. I do not impute to the honourable gentleman, that he would willingly be inclined to sacrifice any of the just rights of this country. No character could be gained by the nation which would not stand up in the defence of her rights, and no cha racter could be gained by the individual who would advise and consent to their sacrifice."

Then Mr Perceval noticed what Sir T. Turton, and Mr Whitbread after him, had said respecting peace. "I will ask the honourable gentleman and the house," said he, " if it would be proper that, situated as we are, any notice should be taken of the expectation of peace in the address? With what propriety could it be stated, that peace, at the present moment, was possible to be obtained? No men would be more ready than ministers, if any opportunity should occur when peace could with safety be made, to avail themselves of that opportunity; but they would deceive the country, were they to hold out to them that any thing like such an opportunity had yet occurred. Sir T. Turton says, and makes it matter of charge, that it has been declared in this house, that no peace can be obtained with the present emperor of France, till he abate in his pretensions. It is but too true, that till such an event no peace is to be obtained. What, says he, and are you then determined to carry on an interminable war? If these professions be adhered to, what can follow but the inevitable ruin of Great Britain? What a prospect!-If it be the real state of the prospect, however, why should that prospect be disguised? The pretensions of the ru ler of France are nothing less than the ruin of this country; and till he abate

VOL. IV. PART I.

from those pretensions, how can peace be obtained? And I ask the honourable gentleman with confidence, whether he sees any thing now in the conduct of that ruler, which indicates that he has abandoned his hostile views, or that can lead us to believe that we may with safety accede to his demands?"

Referring then to the affairs of the north, and the complaint that nothing had been said respecting Sweden,-nothing, he affirmed, could be more natural than that ministers, exercising their discretion upon that subject, should chuse to be silent. "When," said he, "we reflect on what our former connection with Sweden was, and the man ner in which that country was compelled to enter into subserviency to an enemy, it will, I think, be found, that forbearance, with regard to that unfortunate country, is the principle on which we should act, so long as we can act on forbearing principles without danger to ourselves." Lastly, Mr Perceval spoke of Ireland. "I know," said he," that representations have been made, for what purpose they can best tell who make them, that the affairs of the sister kingdom are in the most lamentable condition; my colleagues and myself have been accused this night of treating that important part of the empire with systematic neglect ; of never referring to it, except in language of a degrading, insulting nature. I put it to the candour of the house, if this be a correct statement, or if it can believe that we are such fools and idiots, as to treat such grave discussions with an unworthy contempt, much less with that derision, and even laughter, which has been imputed to us? And when it is averred, that the regent could not safely place confidence in the persons who now conduct the administration, and that those persons neither possess nor merit the confidence of the country, then, indeed, I must venture +

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to ask, where could the regent hope to find men who possess it in a greater degree?"

A few nights afterwards, Feb. 21. Mr Perceval informed the house, he had been preparing the plan of an establishment for the regent's household; which, by the temporary reduction of the chamberlains, might have been supported at the

low rate of 12 or 15,000l. a-year; but that his royal highness had determined not to add to the burthens of the people, by accepting of any addition to his public state. Mr Adam added to this statement, that in case of such circumstances occurring, as might lead to a permanent regency, he conceived the question would then be open anew to the prince's consideration.

CHAP. III.

Army Estimates. General Tarleton's View of the Campaigns in the Peninsula. Flogging. Interchange of Militias. Reappointment of the Duke of York. Ordnance and Navy Estimates. Admiralty Courts. Pay of the Army. Discipline of the Navy.

THE army estimates were three millions for his majesty's land forces, and two millions for the militia of Great Britain and Ireland. "The regular force of the country," Lord Palmerstone said, "amounted to 235,000 men, of whom about 211,000 might be considered fully effecMarch 4. tive; the casualties could not at this time be assumed at less than 22 or 23,000 men ; the probable produce of ordinary recruiting might be stated at 11,000, and 4 or 5000 might be expected from foreign recruiting: no means was so advisable for supplying the deficiency, as that of allowing a certain portion of the militia to volunteer into the line. The militia establishment was 92,000 men, of which the effectives might be considered to be 84,000, and 5 or 6000 were still due by ballot; it might now be reduced to the old establishment, 70,000 for the two islands; and 10,000, therefore, might be allowed to enter the line."

Upon this General Tarleton rose, and entered into a criticism of the whole Spanish war, "not," he said, "arrogating to himself a superior degree of patriotism or of military know ledge, but that he might discharge a conscientious duty to his country." The plan upon which ministers were

acting, he affirmed, would offer up our best soldiers as unnecessary victims, and by wasting our men and our resources, co-operate with the designs of Buonaparte, and open a passage for our mortal enemy: for our means were physically inadequate to the object in view; the plan and system were founded in error, and must inevitably lead to disaster and destruction. The misfortunes of Sir John Moore he ascribed wholly to the nature of the instructions which he was compelled to follow; "he himself," General Tarleton said, "evinced genius, intrepidity, and constancy; his army embarked with a heavy loss and great difficulty, and the French forces have ever since been banished from the northern provinces of Spain." The general expressed himself as if the delivery of those provinces had been the consequence of Sir John Moore's measures, and not the work of the Spaniards themselves, after he had abandoned their defence as hopeless. The later operations in the peninsula he imputed to Lord Wellington, and never perhaps did there exist a stranger specimen of distorted representation, than in the sketch which General Tarleton drew of that commander's campaign, while he protested, at the same time, that what he was saying did not bear with any cri

ticism or attack upon his military conduct. "Lord Wellington," he said, "after leaving his sick and wounded at Talavera, and consigning his hospital to the humanity of the French, evaded their power by a rapid retreat; and while part of our allies sustained a heavy loss in crossing the Tagus, he sought security from the enemy, and cantonments for his army, in the unwholesome marshes of Extremadura. Afterwards he posted himself in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo; the enemy, in spite of all the disadvantages of the season and the nature of the country, laid siege to that fortress, and it fell in the presence of the allies, without making a long defence. Almeida also, strong as it was, strengthened as it newly had been, and power fully garrisoned,-fell in eight-andforty hours." The fact of the explosion of the magazine, which rendered it untenable, was, like the heroic behaviour of the Spaniards at Ciudad Rodrigo, not to General Tarleton's purpose, and therefore he passed over both in silence. "Rumours of a conspiracy at Lisbon," he continued, "had then reached this country, and the history of the world afforded a general solution to similar reports under similar circumstances; for all historians have described the effects of invasion and overthrow, and invariably shown, that a people cease to feel confidence when they cannot obtain protection," Next, the Park and Tower guns, and the Gazette, proclaimed the victory of Busaco. "The reports of that repulse of the French which have hitherto reached this country," said General Tarleton, "contain such scanty information, that the whole transaction, as a military transaction, except the repulse, appears enigmatical. The French after this repulse, however, entered Coimbra;" that they had subsequently been dispossessed of it, losing there their sick and wounded, and their hos

pitals, was another fact which it did not enter into the general's plan to notice. Our army fell back to Torres Vedras, and Massena, having faced the allies for about a month, without chusing to make any attempt upon the lines, fell back upon Santarem, where Loison had prepared cantonments for him. The general then appealed to the house, whether any of his observations had been made with too much severity. He proceeded to set forth the extent of the population for which Lord Wellington had to provide, and the means for providing it. For the military, at least 90,000 rations were required every day. Lisbon and the intermediate towns must contain at least 200,000 mouths, nearly destitute of food, and the fugitives perhaps exceeded another hundred thousand. The provisions therefore to be issued daily, without taking into account the marines and seamen ashore or afloat in the Tagus, formed a gross amount of nearly 400,000 rations. The stores at Lisbon could not be abundant. Every article of life between the lines and the capital must long have been exhaust ed; the supplies therefore of the whole population must come from foreign countries, and England must pay for all.

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"What have you achieved," said the general, "or what can you accomplish? From the frontiers of Spain, the allied armies of England and Portugal have fallen back to the neighbourhood of Lisbon, and with the pressure of an expence which will soon prove intole. rable, and to defray which you must make an increase of your tax upon come, you have collected all the distressed inhabitants of Portugal to ask for daily bread at the hands of the British general; whilst our common enemy, pleased with the measures of your insanity, in prosecuting a continental war, is congregating at his leisure a mighty force, and can add to its im

mensity and mightiness in the comparative proportion of ten combatants to one. He is not entangled by suffering inhabitants-by the cries of huma nity or by the importunities of famishing thousands: he is not restricted in his operations by any respect for laws, human or divine: he does not call in vain for reinforcements; nor has he drained to the dregs the military population of Europe. Massena and his master are now bringing to a close the downfall of British resources, and, with fell and malignant joy, are already contemplating a mortal blow against the unprotected vitals of our empire and constitution. If ancient history is worthy of your consideration, look at the fate of Carthage-a commercial against a military nation! If that government had not destined the flower of its army for the invasion of Italy, the overthrow and destruction in Africa might have been retarded, or ultimately averted. But it is in vain to cite instances from history to you, if you are not admonished by your own errors. You ought to have remembered the first ill-planned expedition from Salamanca, committed to Sir John Moore. You ought to have remembered the enterprise directed against Madrid, under the auspices of Lord Wellington. Both these awful lessons are written in the blood of your best soldiers! and yet you intemper ately urge on your course of folly and rashness, and lay open the last disposable army of England to dangers of that extent and alarm, as such a precious stake ought not to be liable to, except upon our own shores, and in defence of British liberty and independence."

When General Tarleton had concluded this curious speech, Lord Castlereagh said," he hoped it would neither be considered to arise from disrespect to his arguments, or acquiessence in his sentiments, if he forbore

to follow him through a field of discussion, too extensive, as well as too important, to be mixed with the detailed considerations of the army, which were then before the house." His lordship then proceeded to offer some suggestions, in that spirit by which every member of a legislative assembly ought to be actuated, but which party feeling has almost banished from a large proportion of the British legislature. He asked, whether, if the allowance of a militia man's wife and family were continued at the public expence, (the counties of course being relieved from the charge) in case of the man transferring his services to the line, it would not operate as the best species of bounty; and he recommended to the attention of ministers the principle which he had introduced in 1809, of protecting the counties, as far as possible, from the heavy inconvenience of a ballot, by making the expence of filling up vacancies, which arose from volunteering to the line, fali upon the public, provided the county succeeded in raising the men within a certain time. "But," he said, "there was one improvement in our military system, which he had always deemed of the highest importance, of which he had never for a moment lost sight, and which he had only been induced, when in administration, to delay pressing upon the consideration of parliament, from the persuasion that its success might have been risked, had it been brought forward entangled with the many other arduous military measures which had in latter years occupied the legislature. The sphere of service of the militia was not co-extensive with the general exigencies of the empire, but still remained broken and localized by those national distinctions, which happily, in other respects, had ceased with the Union. When the militia system was extended to Scotland in 1797, it was not at first

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