not of light. The eye cannot say to the ear, I have no need of thee; nor the ear to the eye, I have no need of thee; neither can the hand say this to the foot, nor the foot to the hand. We are all members one of another, and each a member in particular. There are many sides to truth. So there are many ways of viewing all questions which offer themselves to our at tention. If all other things be related, and mutually dependent one upon another, so with the different faculties of which we have treated, genius, talent, tact, and their relations. We hope we have made ourselves understood in what we have written with regard to them. We have come to the end of the space we had intended to occupy, but do not feel that we have begun to exhaust our subject.

It is a subject which not only cannot be exhausted, but which cannot be exhibited, certainly not illustrated, but by those who are themselves its embodied exponents and examples. We take leave, therefore, of our queen and of her attendants. She has stood forth before us the impersonation of all grand and glorious, of all graceful and beautiful things. As she passed by, we could but bow and worship and adore; we could but veil our faces and look towards the holy place into which she has entered. If we have caught a single ray of her inspiration, if we have felt the touch of her mantle as she swept in majesty along, if we have been lifted up by her pres

when he advises writers to choose their subjects carefully-such subjects as they feel themselves best competent to treat-adding, that when they have duly studied them, neither eloquence nor conspicuous order will fail them:

Sumite materiam vestris qui scribitis, æquam

Viribus; et versate diu, quid ferre recusent
Quid valent. humeri: cui lecta potenter erit res

Nec facundia deseret hunc, nec lucidus ordo."—De Arte Poetica, v. 38-41. Of the writers in our own language who have used the words genius and talent almost indiscriminately, but always making genius the highest order of talent, suffice it to mention Burke, Addison, Swift, Akenside, Hume, and Goldsmith. When the majority of these give any very different sense to genius than is meant by a high order of talent, they make the former word synonymous with taste, or the natural disposition or characteristics, good or bad, of the mind. Thus it is what we generally mean by genius, in the most exalted sense of the term, that Akenside means by taste, in the following passage:

What, then, is taste, but those internal powers
Active and strong, and feelingly alive

To each fine impulse? A discerning sense

Of decent and sublime, with quick disgust

From things deformed, or disarranged, or gross,

In species. This nor genius, nor stores of gold.

Nor purple state, nor culture can bestno,

But God alone, when first his active hand

Imprints the secret bias of the soul."-Pleasures of the Imagination.

As an example of the other sense in which the term genius is used, we transcribe two or three lines from the prologue to Beaumont and Fletcher's "Maid's Tragedy."

Of all our elder plays,

This and Philaster have the loudest fame:

Great are their faults, and glorious is their flame.

In both our English genius is express'd:

Lofty and bold, but negligently dress'd."

ence to the desire of being the humblest of her servitors, we are content; we have not lived in vain. And her handmaidens, too, if we have been enabled to linger even for a time with those who daily wait upon her and who thus enter into her spirit and are blessed by her presence, we are grateful and thankful. Genius, talent, tact !-whichever, in the providence of God, we may exhibit and illustrate, may we prove faithful and give Him the glory due his name. Be our talent ten or five, be it one; whatever it be, may it be exercised and not be buried in a napkin and laid away when the Lord of conscience shall call. Then, faithful ourselves, we shall receive the plaudits of "Well done!" and that shall be our great reward.

ART. IV.-1. Observations on Modern Systems of Fortification, &c. By General Sir HOWARD DOUGLAS, Bart. 1859.

2. Système de Défense de l'Angleterre. Par A. BRIALMONT, Capitaine de l'Etat Major. Paris. 1860.

3. Du Projet de fortifier Paris; ou Examen d'un Système Général de Défense, &c. Paris. 1840.

4. Etudes sur les Fortifications de Paris, considérés politiquement et Militairement. Par M. ARAGO, Député des Pyrenées Orientales. Paris. 1843.

5. Niles' Register, vols. 20 and 22, Reports on Our National Defences.

Six months ago we endeavored to show, that if only as a precautionary measure, we should lose no time in strengthening our national defences.* Our remarks on the subject were then brief, because we thought that no elaborate arguments were necessary to prove what the experience of the world had already established. In all ages fortifications have had an important influence on the issue of wars; not unfrequently they have decided the destinies of nations. Nor can any change in the art of war justify their being neglected. That the strongest forts can be battered down now much more easily than they could have been twenty or even five years ago, only shows that they now require to be built still stronger. At first sight this may seem a contradiction; but in proportion as destructive missiles are increased the power of resisting them is also increased. Sometimes there may be exceptions to this rule, but they cannot last. When a new instrument of destruction is invented,

*N. Q. R., No. viii.

it may do much damage before it can be successfully resisted; but in time, if not immediately, it suggests a means of resist ance itself. This is sufficiently illustrated by the iron-plated gun-boats. Only a few brief years have passed since it was thought that no ship, let it be built as it might, could resist rifled cannon; nay, the opinion was very generally entertained that they were irresistible on land as well as on sea; to fortresses as well as to fleets. But now their heaviest shot scarcely makes a dent in the vessels which it was thought they could have annihilated at once; and it needs no argument to prove that what can be resisted on sea can be resisted on land. Only a certain amount of iron can be borne by a ship; in proportion as the amount is large it retards her movements, compels her to keep near the shore, or sinks her altogether; whereas any amount required may be used on land fortifications. This cannot be denied; it shows, then, that whatever has been alleged to the contrary, fortifications have lost none of their relative utility. In other words, if they are properly constructed that is, constructed with a view to the new force to be brought to bear against them-they are as useful and important now as they were in the times of Julius Cæsar, Hannibal, and Alexander.

There is no maxim relative to the art of war more readily assented to by military men, than that every frontier town, of over twenty thousand inhabitants, should be fortified. Scarcely any deny, that let the size or population of an important frontier city be what it may, it ought to be fortified that is, if it be a city the occupation of which would have a considerable influence on the war, either in rendering the enemy independent of his base of operations by affording him subsistence for a long period, or by enabling him to command important routes. Nor is it a mere maxim; it is a fact tested by experience, and acted upon by the nations most distinguished as well for their superior knowledge of the art of war, as for their general enlightenment. We need only mention France, Prussia and Austria as examples. All who have travelled remember the formidable fortifications of Cologne, Coblentz, Antwerp, &c.; and not one of these cities was fortified until it was evident that, much expense as the project would involve, it would prove, in the long run, the cheapest investment that could be made-an investment in which five or six million dollars might save a hundred millions, or perhaps the very existence of the nation.

But it is not alone frontier cities which, in the opinion of the greatest captains of the age, ought to be fortified, when of such a character as to render their capture and occupation of

great value to the enemy. Napoleon had long contemplated fortifying Paris, though so far from the interior; and Wellington often advised the British government to fortify London. Perhaps the majority of military men would not deem it necessary to fortify either city; of London, in particular, this may be said; for there is a great difference between the two cities, as to the danger to which they would be subject in time of war. Leaving the insular position of England out of the question, which, by itself, affords a powerful barrier, it would be much more difficult for a hostile army to march on the capital of England than on that of France, assuming the defenders of both to be as nearly equal in numbers and discipline as they would be in bravery and patriotism. This Napoleon understood very well, and he did not hesitate to admit it. Whereas Wellington admitted, on the other hand, to the British government, that the arguments in favor of fortifying both cities acquired ten-fold force as applied to the French capital.

Accordingly, Paris is fortified in the strongest manner; and London yet remains unfortified. And what is the effect of this disparity? Do the Londoners feel as safe when there is a prospect of war as the Parisians? or does the British government feel as much at ease in regard to its capital as the French government? The excitement which pervaded all England, less than two years since, affords all who remember it a sufficient answer to these questions. The probability of an invasion, and the consequences that might result from it, were freely discussed by the press of every grade, from the Daily journal to the Quarterly; and no defensive measures were more strongly urged than the immediate building of fortifications, especially for the protection of London. Nor was the govern ment less convinced than the press of the importance of fortifying the British capital. The only question was, Did the necessity of any measures of defence yet exist, as appear ances seemed to show? While this point was being discussed with no slight anxiety, the Emperor assured England directly and indirectly that there was no intention on his part to commit any hostile act against England. But this had little effect; the general opinion was, that he merely wished to lull the country into a false sense of security. The preparations for defence were continued on an extensive scale, nor did they cease for a day, until a large reduction in the French army satisfied the most timorous that, after all. England was not to be invaded by the French, at least for the present. Several plans of fortifications, some of which were acted upon to a greater or less extent, were then suspended, but not abandoned.

Before we speak of what the principal governments of Europe have done in this way in recent years, we will make a few observations on fortifications in general, avoiding technicalities as much as possible. Holding that nothing is superfluous that serves to shed light on a subject, which, however important in itself, is but little understood by the generality of readers, we will take the liberty of giving a passing glance at those defensive operations of the past, which, although sufficiently famous, are but little remembered even by those who hold the commissions of field officers. We need not, however, inquire whether the Egyptians or the Phoenicians were the builders of the first fortifications; or whether a German savant is not right in undertaking to prove that the tower of Babel was intended rather to guard against the future depredations of war, than against a future deluge. It is pretty safe to conclude, in passing, that men had not long been divided into separate communities, however small, before they began to build fortifications.

We can only judge of the strength of ancient fortifications by the resistance which they are said to have offered. Taking this as a criterion, we should regard those of Azoth as the strongest of all antiquity, since they are recorded to have held out twenty-nine years; nearly three times as long as those of Troy, and nearly ten times as long as those of Carthage. True, those which yielded soonest may have been the strongest after all; and most probably they were. But even the case of Carthage shows the value of fortifications: since by their means, the doomed city was enabled to bid defiance to the whole power of the Roman Empire for more than three years; and even then, it was lost only by treachery. Other memorable sieges are those of Alesia and Marseilles, by Julius Cæsar, and that of Jerusalem, by Vespasian and Titus. We refer to the former especially, because the best generals of modern times have admitted that they took valuable hints from Julius Cæsar, whose own description of the two sieges, in the seventh book of his Commentaries, will ever be read with interest.

Even the Jews, weak as they had become a mere handful -might have held out seven years more against the disciplined legions of Rome, had they not quarrelled amongst themselves.. Every means had been exhausted which was at the command of the Roman generals to reduce the works, but all in vain; for Herod had brought all the skill and science of the age to bear on the latter. This is, indeed, sufficiently proved by the results, without any reference to what the historians say on the subject. The Jews saw their holy city taken in the end,