FROM Ciudad Rodrigo Massena addressed a proclamation to the Portugueze. "Inhabitants of Portugal," he said, "the Emperor of the French has put under my orders an army of 110,000 men, to take possession of this kingdom, and to expel the English, your pretended friends. Against you he has no animosity. On the contrary, it is his highest wish to promote your happiness, and the first step to secure it is to dismiss from the country those locusts who consume your property, blast your harvests, and palsy your efforts. In opposing the emperor, you oppose your true friend; a friend who has it in his power to render you the happiest people in the world. Were it not Were it not for the insidious counsels of England, you might now have enjoyed peace and tranquillity, and have been put in possession of that happiness. You have blindly rejected offers calculated only to promote your benefit, and have accepted proposals which will long be the curse of Portugal. His majesty has commissioned me to conjure you to awake to your true interests; to awake to those prospects which, with your consent, may be quickly realized; to awake so as to distinguish between friends and enemies. The King of England is ac

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tuated by selfish and narrow purposes; the Emperor of the French is governed by the principles of univer sal philanthropy. The English have put arms into your hands, arms which you know not how to use, I will instruct you. They are to be the instruments of annihilation to your foes:Who those foes are I have al ready shown you. Use them as you ought, and they will become your salvation. Use them as you ought not, and they will prove your destruction. Resistance is vain. Can the feeble army of the British general expect to oppose any barrier to the vic torious legions of the emperor? Already a force is collected, sufficient to overwhelm your country. Snatch the moment that mercy and generosity offer. As friends you may respect us, and be respected in return; as foes you must dread us, and in the conflict must be subdued. The choice is your own, either to meet the hor rors of a bloody war, and to see your country desolated, your villages in flames, and your cities plundered, or to accept an honourable and happy peace, which will obtain for ry blessing that by resistance you would resign for ever."

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On the same day that Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered, the enemy's cavalry

appeared on the plains of Almeida. Lord Wellington's head-quarters at this time were at Alverca; his position was a defensive line, about thirty miles in extent, along the frontier mountains of Beira; but as the line formed a segment of a circle, the points were not distant from each other in proportion to its length. The infantry extended from Celorica to Guarda on the one side, and to Fort Conception, one of the outworks of Almeida, on the other. The cavalry were in advance near Fort Conception, and at Sabugal, and on the Coa. The enemy's superiority in cavalry was very great, but the nature of the ground deprived them of the advantage which this must otherwise have given them. They now proceeded to invest Almeida, a fortress which Dumouriez, forgetting Elvas at the time, called the strongest place in Portugal. It is perhaps more important from its situation, but very far inferior to it in strength.

This town was founded by the Moors, and is said to have been one of those which Ferrando the Great won from them when the Cid served under him, in his first wars. When the tide of success was for a while turned by the entrance of the Almoravides into Spain, Talmayda, as it was then called, fell again into the hands of the misbelievers, from whom it was finally conquered, in 1190, by King Sancho I. of Portugal. Payo Guterres, distinguishing himself in the conquest, obtained from it the appellative of O Almeydam, the Almeydan, and transmitted to his descendants the surname of Almeyda, conspicuous in Portugueze and Indian history. King Diniz, the ruins of whose magnificent works are to be

seen in every part of Portugal, rebuilt the city, and is supposed to have removed it from a valley, a little way north of its present site. The castle was built by him, and repaired by King Emanuel. In the later wars between Spain and Portugal, Almeida has always been considered a place of great importance, being the bulwark of the latter country on its most accessible side; but, like other things of more essential consequence to the strength of a kingdom, it had long been neglected. In 1809,* there were not a dozen gun-carriages fit for service, nor any wood in store for the construction of others; the embrasures were falling to decay, and the palisades of the covert-way were mostly broken, or carried away for fire-wood. The works were origi nally ill constructed, and the place had the great disadvantage of being commanded on one side by a hill. Its population in 1747 was 2463; and Almeida is not one of the few places in Portugal which have been progressive since that time.

The same causes which rendered it impossible for Lord Wellington to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, made it necessary for him to leave Almeida to its own means of defence; the works had been repaired, the garrison was strong, and Brigadier Cox, an English officer in the Portugueze service, was appointed to the command. With the example of Ciudad Rodrigo before it, there was no reason to doubt that Almeida would make a vigorous resistance, and probably hold out so long as materially to derange the plans of the enemy. Massena, having detached General Reg. July 21. nier to take possession of Penamacor and Monsanto, proceed

ed to invest this place. Fort Conception was abandoned and blown up at their approach. General Craufurd, however, continued to occupy a position near Almeida with 3200 British, and 1100 Portugueze troops, eight squadrons, of cavalry included. The chain of his cavalry outposts formed a semicircle in front of the town, their right flank resting on the Coa, near As Naves, about three miles above this fortress, and their left, in like manner, resting upon the same river, about three miles below it, near Cinco Villas. The centre was covered by a small stream, and on the right and centre, where it was expected that the enemy would advance, the cavalry posts were supported by piquets of infantry.

Had Almeida been built in a modern age, it would have been placed behind the Coa, not in front of it. In the days of King Diniz, it was of no importance on which side the river ran; but General Craufurd seems to have committed an error in taking a position which had the river in its rear. There was but one road by which the artillery and cavalry could retreat, that leading from Almeida to the bridge, which is about a mile west of the town. The nature of the ground made it difficult for the enemy to approach this road on the left of the allies, and on the south the infantry were placed to cover it, having their right flank resting on the Coa above the bridge, their front covered by a deep rocky ravine, and their left in some enclosures near a windmill, on the plain, about 800 yards south of the town. Upon this windmill the governor intended to mount a gun, and the gun was lying in it, but not as yet mounted, and consequently useless; another dismounted gun was lying near the mill. These guns of

course could be of no use in the action which ensued, but they figured in Marshal Massena's account of it.

On the morning of July 24th, the centre of the British line of piquets was attacked; they were supported by the 14th light dragoons and two guns, but were withdrawn when a considerable column of the enemy appeared with artillery, and began to form on the other side of the rivulet. The force which Marshal Ney, who directed the movements this day, brought into the field, consisted, according to the account of Massena himself, of 20,000 foot, and between 3 and 4000 horse. Fifteen squadrons of cavalry crossed the rivulet as soon as the piquets retired, and formed with artillery in front, and about 7000 infantry on their right; other troops meantime were advancing upon the right of the British position, the side on which they might best expect to cut off the retreat of the allies to the bridge. General Craufurd now perceived that it was impossible for him to prevent the investment of Almeida, and that he was on the wrong side of the Coa. The artillery and cavalry were therefore ordered to retreat along the only road which was practicable for them; the infantry from the left to move off in echelon; the right it was necessary to hold till the last, to prevent the enemy from approaching the bridge by a road coming from Junca, which runs in the bottom of the valley by the river side.

On the left, the men had to retreat through thick vineyards, intersected with deep trenches, and with walls six or seven feet high: they could not take advantage of this ground, for the enemy were in such force, that there was imminent danger of being overpowered, and cut off before they could reach the bridge. One of these walls

General Craufurd had considered as a complete defence against cavalry; it enclosed a vineyard, in which some companies had been stationed, but there had been a heavy rain during the whole of the preceding night, and the troops had pulled down this wall in many places to make use of the stones to form a shelter; through these openings the enemy's horse entered, and here they made most of the prisoners who were taken in the action. To retire in order over such ground was impossible, but the retreat was made with characteristic coolness. On the other side the bridge, the ground was equally unfavourable for re-forming; the 43d and part of the 95th regiments were ordered to form in front of the bridge, and defend it as long as they could, while the rest of the troops should pass over and take a new position. They obeyed these orders so literally, that they defended it all day; three times the enemy attempted to force the passage, and each time they were al ways desperately repulsed at the point of the bayonet; at length, when night closed, every thing had passed over, and the enemy had ceased to assail them, these brave men retreated from the post which they had maintained so nobly, and where so many of their comrades had fallen: the heaviest loss fell upon these gallant regiments. Our total loss, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, amounted to 330.

Massena's official statement of this action was a masterpiece of impudent falsehood. He asserted that General Craufurd's force consisted of 2000 horse and 8000 foot, and that they were all posted under the guns of the fortress; that they gave way before the French, our cavalry not daring to meet them with the sabre, and the infantry pursued at a running step;

that we lost 60 officers, of whom 24 were buried in the field of battle; 400 killed, 700 wounded, 400 prisoners, one stand of colours, and two pieces of cannon, while the loss of the conquerors did not amount to 300. He took no colours, and the two pieces of cannon were the dismounted guns at the windmill. In a subsequent dispatch, Massena assured the war minister that all his troops were burning with impatience to teach the English army what they had already taught Craufurd's division. Our own gazette had already shown the veracity of this boaster's account, but this new insult called forth a counterstatement from General Craufurd, from which this detail has chiefly been drawn, and to the truth of which the whole British army are witnesses. Certain it is, that General Craufurd ought not to have exposed himself to such an action; but never did men behave more gallantly than all who were engaged that day, British and Portugueze alike. They effected their retreat under the most disadvantageous circumstances, without losing a gun, a trophy, or a single article of field equipment, and they inflicted upon the enemy a loss, which, by his own account, was nearly equal to what we know to have been the sum of ours, and which in reality doubled its amount.

Massena affirmed likewise, that one of our couriers had been taken with all his dispatches, which represented that the English had never been engaged in so brisk an affair; that they were in full route; and that it was im possible to form an idea of their de plorable condition. Of the condition of that army, and the full route to which he had driven them, it was not long before Massena obtained some correct personal knowledge; but it is probable that some desponding letters

may have fallen into his hands, and as the manner of General Moore's retreat had been marked with no public disapprobation in England, it is likely also that he expected to drive the Brítish army before him full speed to Lisbon. Letters had been written from that army to Porto, in which the writers had delivered it as their opinion that our forces must inevitably retreat, Massena having such an immense superiority, that Portugal could not possibly be defended against him. These letters excited such alarm among the British merchants in that city, that the vice-consul applied to our admiral at Lisbon, requesting he would take into consideration the necessity of having a sufficient force off the Douro to protect the British subjects, who, on account of the imminent danger, might be compelled to embark without the least delay. They were in the utmost consternation, he said. Admiral Berkeley thought it proper to send this requisition to Lord Wellington, who in consequence issued general orders upon the subject. "He would not make any inquiry," he said, "to ascertain the authors of these letters, which had excited so much fear and consternation in a place where it was most to be wished that none should exist. He had frequently lamented the ignorance displayed in let ters from the army, and the indiscretion with which those letters were published. It was impossible that many officers could possess a sufficient knowledge of facts to be able to form a correct opinion of the probable events of the campaign, yet when their erroneous opinions were published, they could not but produce mischievous effects. He requested, therefore, that the officers, on account of their own reputation, would refrain from giving opinions upon mat

ters, with regard to which they could not possibly possess the necessary knowledge for giving it with correctness; and if they communicated to their correspondents facts relating to the position of the army, its strength, the formation of its magazines, preparations for cutting down or blowing up bridges, &c., they would at least tell their correspondents not to publish these letters in newspapers, unless it was certain that the publication could not prove injurious to the army and to the public service."

There was good cause for this reproof. The effect of such aguish predictions in Portugal, could only be to make the Portugueze believe we should forsake them, and thus dispose them for submission to the enemy; while, in England, they assisted the party of the despondents, whose journalists, Scotch and English, were labouring to strike their country with a dead palsy. "We had been lulled," they said, "into the most dangerous confidence. Massena was only waiting for the advance of his flanks, that he might, with his whole combined army, either force our handful of men to a battle, or surround them: all that could be expected was, that the survivors might be enabled to retire to their ships with eclat." By the next dispatches it appeared, that it was more easy for a journalist to imagine such a manœuvre, than for Massena to execute it; but this had no other effect than to make them change the note of alarm. "if Massena did not destroy Lord Wellington's army by fighting, it could only be because he meant to destroy it by not fighting; for Massena was the most consummate captain of all Buonaparte's generals. And did ministers anticipate with complacency the continuance of our army in Portugal through the win