ftamps, it would produce nothing at all, but would encreafe the confufions of the country, if any attempts were made to disturb the transactions which were carried on without stamps. That accordingly he never had proposed any tax on America; he found them already taxed, when he unfortunately (as he ftill must fay, whatever ufe has been, or might be made of the word) came into administration. That his principle of policy was to have had as little difcuffion on thefe fubjects as poffible, but to keep the affairs of America out of Parliament; that accordingly, as he had not laid, fo did he not think it advisable for him to repeal the tea-tax, nor did he ever think of any particular means for enforcing it.

That the act enabling the Eaft-India company to fend teas to America on their own account, and with the draw-back of the whole duty here, was a regulation which he thought it not poffible the Americans could complain of, fince it was a relief inftead of an oppreffion; but that the ill-affected there, and perfons concerned in a contraband trade, endeavoured to represent it as a monoply; that fome hand-bills that were fcattered about at Bofton, even fuppofed that he had taken off the American three-pence per pound duty, and that even on that fuppofition, the difaffected excited the people to a tumult, upon a principle totally diftinct from all idea of taxation. This, therefore, as he never had meant taxation as his object in the laft tea-act, so neither did he in his conciliatory propofition; but in the latter, confidered it only as a means of union and good agreement between the two countries; that, therefore, in what he was going to propofe he was uniform and confiftent.

One of the bills he propofed to move for was, to quiet America upon the subject of taxation, and to remove all fears, real or pretended, of Parliament's ever attempting to tax them again, and to take away all exercise of the right itfelf in future, fo far as regarded revenue. That as to the other particulars in controverfy, he obferved that the Americans had defired a repeal of all the acts paffed fince 1763; that this could not, however, be fuppofed to mean any more than thofe acts which had in fome way or other preffed on them; for that fome which had paffed in 1769 were beneficial, and fuch as they themselves muft confider in that light, being the granting of bounties and premiums, or the relaxation of former ftatutes that had been grievous to them. That as to the late acts, fuch as the Maffachusetts charter, the

fishery,

fifhery, and the prohibitory bills, as they were the effect of the quarrel, they should ceafe; and that as to complaints of matters of a various nature, authority should be given to settle them to the fatisfaction of America.

That all these matters, confifting of a great variety, would be better left to the difcuffion of commiffioners, than to be established here by act of Parliament, or by explicit powers given for each specific purpofe; for that the Americans in the negotiation would confider every conceffion made actually here, to be a part of the basis of the treaty, and therefore never to be receded from, and would accumulate new demands upon that; therefore, as every thing of that kind might be variously modified by agreement, he was for leaving the whole to commiffioners.

That the commiffioners formerly appointed had very large powers, fo indeed he understood thofe powers; but that as others feemed to confider them as more limited than in reality they were, he should take care now to be very explicit, and that he would give them full powers to treat, difcufs, and conclude upon every point whatever. That as fome difficul ties had arifen about the powers given to the commiffioners, of treating with the Congrefs by name, he would now remove that difficulty, by empowering and enabling the commiffioners to treat with the Congrefs as if it were a legal body, and would fo far give it authenticity, as to fuppofe its acts and conceffions would bind all America. That they should have powers to treat with any of the provincial affemblies upon their prefent conftitution, and with any individuals in their prefent civil capacities or military commands; with General Washington, or any other officer. That they should have a power, whenever they thought requifite, to order a fufpenfion of arms. That they fhould have a power to fufpend the operation of all laws. That they should have a power of granting all forts of pardons, immunities, and rewards. That they fhould have a power of restoring all the colonies, or any of them, to the form of its antient conftitution, as it flood before the troubles; any of thofe where the King nominated the governors, council, judges, and other magiftrates, to nominate fuch at their difcretion, till the King's further pleafure be known.

That as the powers of the former commiffioners had been objected to, fo the Congrefs had raised a difficulty, on pre tence of the non-admiffion of their title to be independent

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ftates. As the Americans' might claim their independence on the outset, he would not infift on their renouncing it till the treaty fhould receive its final ratification by the King and Parliament of Great Britain.

That the commiffioners fhould be inftructed to negotiate for fome reasonable and moderate contribution towards the common defence of the empire when re-united; but to take away all pretence for not terminating this unhappy difference, the contribution was not to be infifted on as a fine qua non of the treaty; but that if the Americans fhould refuse fo reasonable and equitable a propofition, they were not to complain, if hereafter they were not to look for fupport from that part of the empire to whofe expence they had refufed to contribute. That it might be asked, if his fentiments had always been fuch with regard to taxation and peace, and why he had not made this propofition at a more early period? To this he answered, his opinion had ever been, that the moment of victory was the proper time for offering terins of conceffion. That the Houfe might remember, that at the beginning of the feffion he had declared, that fuch were his fentiments; he at that time thought that the victories obtained by Sir William Howe had been more decifive, and that he knew nothing of General Burgoyne's misfortune. That when the news of that misfortune had arrived, and that the victories obtained by Sir William Howe could not be fo improved, as to hinder General Washington from appearing with fome fuperiority in the field, and that the King's troops were obliged to retire, and fortify themfelves in winter quarters, the first thing that occurred to him, as the nation was ftill ftrong and vigorous, that they could raise a number of men, and that the refources were far from exhausted, that their strength fhould be exerted to repair the loffes, and to pursue the war with vigour to a happy termination: but when he reflected upon the uncertainty of events, which had hitherto fo much difappointed his expectation, and that in cafe of the utmoft fuccefs, the terms which he now proposed must be substantially the fame as he fhould propofe in the height of victory, he faw no reafon to prevent the protracting the war, the effufion of blood, and the immoderate expence, he would offer the fame propofitions now.

That he was convinced that they would confiderably aid the operations of war, as they would themselves be aided by the force in America, which was ftill very great; that in

cafe

39 cafe nothing farther could be done by force, at any rate they would be offered with more grace than hereafter.

That the events of war in America had turned out very differently from his expectation; that great force had been procured to be sent into America, but to little purpose hitherto.

That he muft confefs himself extremely difappointed in his expectations of the effect of our military force. He did not mean at that time to condemn, or even to call into question, the conduct of any of our commanders, but he had been difappointed. That Sir William Howe had not only been in the late actions, and in the whole courfe of the campaign, in goodness of troops, and in all manner of fupplies, but in numbers too, much fuperior to the American army which opposed him in the field. That General Burgoyne, who was at length overpowered by numbers, had been in numbers, until the affair at Bennington, near twice as ftrong as the army under General Gates. That all these things had happened in a manner very contrary to his expectation.

That, for his part, he never had made a promife which he did not perform, or receive an information which he did not communicate. That he only kept back the names of those who had given him information, and which it would be unfaithful and inhumane to divulge; that he promised a great army should be sent out, and a great army had been sent out; there were 60,000 men and upwards; that he had promised a great fleet should be employed, and a great fleet had been employed, and is now employed; that they fhould be provided with every kind of fupply, and that they had been fo moft amply and liberally, and might be fo for years to come; that if the Houfe was deceived, they had deceived themselves.

On the whole, his conceffions were from reafon and propriety, not from neceffity; that we were in a condition to carry on the war much longer. We might raife many more men, and had many more men ready to fend, for the navy was never in greater ftrength, the revenue very little funk, and that he could raise the fupplies for the current year, as a little time would fhew; that he fubmitted the whole, with. regard to the propriety of his paft and prefent conduct, to the judgment of the Houfe.

Mr. Fox rofe next. He faid, that he could not refuse his affent to the propofitions made by Lord North; that he was very glad to find that they were, in the main, fo ample and

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fatisfactory, and that he believed they would be fupported by all those with whom he had the honour to act. That they did not materially differ from thofe which had been made by a friend of his [Mr. Burke] about three years ago; that the very fame arguments which had been ufed by the minority, and very nearly in the fame words, were used by the noble Lord upon this occafion. He was glad to find, that he had wholly relinquifhed the right of taxation, as this was a fundamental; he was glad, alfo, that he had declared his intention of giving the commiffioners power to reftore the charter of Maffachufett's-Bay; for, giving the fatisfaction which he [Lord North] propofed, it would be neceffary for Parliament to give the fame fecurity, with regard to charters, which it had given with regard to taxation; that the Americans were full as jealous of the rights of their affemblies, as of taxation; and their chief objection to the latter was its tendency to affect the former.

He wished that this conceffion had been made more early, and upon principles more respectful to Parliament. To tell them, that if they were deceived, they had deceived themfelves, was neither kind nor civil to an affembly, which, for fo many years, had relied upon him with fuch unreserved confidence; that all public bodies, like the House of Commons, muft give a large confidence to perfons in office; and their only method of preventing the abufe of that confidence was to punish those who had mifinformed them concerning the true ftate of their affairs, or conducted them with negligence, ignorance, or incapacity; that Lord North's arguments upon this fubject might be all collected into one point, his excufes all reduced into one apology, his total ignorance.

He hoped, and was difappointed; he expected a great deal, and found little to answer his expectations. He thought America would have fubmitted to his laws, and they refifted them. He thought they would have fubmitted to his armies, and they were beaten by inferior numbers. He made conciliatory propofitions, and he thought they would fucceed, but they were rejected. He appointed commiffioners to make peace, and he thought they had powers, but he found they could not make peace, and nobody believed that they had any powers. That he had faid many fuch things as he had thought fit in his conciliatory propofition; he thought it a proper method of quieting the Americans upon the affair of taxation. If any perfon fhould give himself the trouble of reading that propofition, he would find not one word of it

cor